FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1940

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The Editors.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE: PLAN OR PATCHWORK?

By Lindsay Rogers

PAUL REYNAUD published a little book in 1937 called *Le Problème Militaire Français*. Two years before, France had decided to extend military service from one to two years. Was that a sound method of building the army? Was that real preparedness? M. Reynaud answered "no," it was "only patchwork." He said that to let Germany have the advantage in respect of the "modern instruments" for destruction would permit the ancient threat weighing on France to grow in terrible proportions. "On the contrary, if we know how to play the new card which the evolution of warfare offers us, we will find again all our advantages, for it is above all in the realm of quality that it is within our power to seize the advantage since the superiority of numbers is, alas, denied us."

Generals, ministers and parliamentarians did not heed Reynaud's words. A few months before, the government had demanded credits of nineteen and a half billion francs for defense preparations. That figure was arrived at by totaling the requisitions of the three defense ministries. In Washington, recent figures seem to have been arrived at by totaling the requests of two services — the army and navy — for themselves, and for a third service, the air force, which they share and in which they compete with each other. France, Reynaud declared, made no attempt "to determine whether, given the actual means of our state of defense, the perils which the country ran, and existing or probable alliances, it were better [for each billion francs] to construct a cruiser or five hundred planes or a thousand tanks. Doubtless the ideal thing would be to have the strongest army, the strongest air force, the strongest navy; but is this possible? If it is not possible, we must choose, that is to say, decide."

France had no machinery for such decisions. Neither has the United States. To be sure, France had a "trinity of national defense" — the three ministers heading the three services of the army, the navy and the air force, each assisted by his chief of staff and meeting periodically in a *Comité Permanent* (of which Marshal Pétain was a "permanent member") under the presidency of the Minister of War, who also had the title of Minister of National Defense. The United States has no such "trinity." It has a "duality" — the Joint Board. But this body includes only the highest army and navy officers, and no one save them — neither the President, nor the Secretaries, nor Congress — can have more than incomplete and haphazard information about the matters on which they agree, on those about which they continue to be deadlocked, and on those they may have completely overlooked.

The French "trinity" was unable to decide the military policy of France, for each minister had faith in his own branch of the service and fought for its interests. Hence contradictory responsibilities confronted each other and were not reconciled. Reynaud proposed a Ministry of National Defense assisted by a staff — an "*espèce de* 'brain trust'" — small in numbers, composed in principle of officers drawn from the *Centre des Hautes-Études de la Défense Nationale* — an organization for which there is no American counterpart. As they exercised their functions, these officers would forget their former allegiances and think only of defense. Underneath the Ministry there would be Secretaries for the three services and an Undersecretary for procurement for all three. The French Government did not adopt this suggestion. Its method was the one which in the last war was described as *le système D* — "*débrouille toi*" — "muddle through." Unhappily in this sort of war such a system was synonymous with catastrophe.

Does not Reynaud's analysis have a direct and immediate bearing on the problem which now confronts the United States? He asked whether, given "existing or probable alliances," France had the weapons that she should have. But his country and Great Britain went ahead and made promises to Poland without having military power to fulfill them. What is it that the United States now proposes to defend and where and how do we propose to do it? France had her Maginot Line, but did the *Comité Permanent* ever consider the necessity of extending it to the Channel, or consider how — as an alternative — France was to be made less deficient in the air? At the time of Munich, Great Britain and

France frankly admitted their unpreparedness. But why was that unpreparedness relatively so little less a year later? Enough money had been appropriated to begin to redress the balance. Did the operations on the Continent show that the British and French had thought out plans for their conduct — just where, for example, they would resist an attack through Belgium? Hasty and even impromptu planning must have contributed to make the Norwegian expedition the egregious failure that it turned out to be. Most important of all was the fact that Great Britain long neglected the cardinal principle of all warfare: that military operations require a secure base. At the time of Munich, anti-aircraft defence was so scant as to be almost ludicrous, and the preparations during the following year were laggard. One reason had been a struggle between the Exchequer and the local authorities, brilliantly conducted on both sides, over who should pay for what. During the first months of the war, Allied purchasing in the United States — particularly of planes — failed to disclose any conviction that deficiencies in the air must be met as fully and as swiftly as possible and at almost any cost. After the Norway débâcle and the change of government in England there was a change of attitude; but until then the record was not heartening.

Before the war of 1914–1918, Jules Cambon, France's Ambassador in Berlin, could and did say, when Germany seemed to be riding high: "*J'attends la gaffe allemande.*" But in this war the Germans do not seem to have made many blunders. They had thought out what they wanted to do and had endeavored to produce the means for doing it. The military machine was mighty. But in addition they were aided by the fact that the governments of their enemies had been victims of what M. Reynaud called the "illusion" that the political authorities could leave it "to the military authority itself to reform itself." Thus they were guilty of crimes which Reynaud listed as *l'hésitation, la timidité, la mollesse* — hesitation, timidity, softness. "In this matter," Reynaud declared — and in recent weeks he must ofttimes have recalled the passage — "history shows us that crimes by abstention are the greatest crimes against a country even if they escape, though wrongfully, dramatic catastrophes in the law courts." Ironically, it is not these crimes which the Riom court is investigating.

If there have been "crimes of abstention" in Germany, they have failed to prevent an almost unbroken series of military successes and were so few as to revise Hans Delbrück's definition of

strategy as "making *one* less error than your opponents." "According to plan" was a phrase sickeningly familiar in the war communiqués of 1914–1918. Newspaper readers knew that in most cases it concealed tactical failures. Only successes would be reported in definite terms of the capture of territory or of prisoners. But since September 1939, "according to plan" has been a not inaccurate description of the way in which Germany's strategy has proceeded and in which total warfare has been conducted. No secret weapon has been brought forth suddenly from the military arsenal for use with catastrophic effects. On the contrary, Germany's most effective weapon has not been secret; yet the enemy did not use it. Germany has simply made certain that sufficient thought preceded the determination of policy and the selection of means for implementing it; that political statecraft and military strategy were harmonious parts of the same effort; that there was coördination of the military machine, and that it had backing from the industrial machine.

Of course, this was far easier in Germany than it would be in a non-totalitarian state. In February 1938, Hitler decreed: "Henceforth I shall take personal and direct command of the armed forces." How far he has actually directed them is not clear, but the High Command has certainly not been independent, and the sweep of events seems to demonstrate that Hitler has got along better with his Command than did, for example, Lincoln with McClellan or Jefferson Davis with his generals.

Two days before the war began, Hitler set up a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. Its head was Field Marshal Göring, whose associates were the Führer's deputy and party representative, Herr Rudolf Hess; the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick; the Minister of Economics, Dr. Funk; the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers; and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Keitel. This organization could instantly settle any dispute between the political and military authorities. It could issue any decrees that it wanted to, coöpt members for sub-committees and appoint and control regional defense commissars. Four months later this body was reorganized and in effect Marshal Göring took over the direction of the war economy with a council of the same character but recruited on a broader basis. The council did not have to improvise because, for six years, Germany's be-all and end-all had been the organization of every military, industrial and moral resource for

the waging of total war. Arbitrary power was subject to few restraints. Laws, constitutions, bills of rights, conscience, decency could not stand in the way of carrying out orders. Bismarck once declared that any fool could rule by martial law; but arbitrary power alone cannot run a complicated mechanism which combines military effort and economic organization, to say nothing of diplomacy and propaganda. Totalitarian warfare, to be successful, requires the transfer of sufficient authority to a body so constituted that it can command the knowledge necessary for it to make intelligent use of its authority. That is possible in a democratic state without excessive sacrifice of democratic values. Indeed, if it is not done, those values may be lost as in France, or threatened as in Great Britain. And when it is done, two important principles must be adhered to.

In the first place, the military hierarchy cannot be permitted to reform itself. "One of the most sure principles" of the art of statecraft, wrote Walter Bagehot, "is that success depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds — of minds which attend to the means and of minds which attend to the ends." Germany acted on that principle. The military hierarchy was not allowed to reform itself. On the contrary, it was broken and reshaped. I do not refer to the purges of generals that Herr Hitler has had and which may have been due to dislike of individuals or to a desire to insure absolute loyalty to himself. Much more important has been the fact that the three military branches — army, navy and air — have been coördinated. *L'amour propre* and particularism were not permitted. The chieftains have not been men whose selection was chiefly influenced by seniority and who reached key posts only when they were close to retirement. For men of ability, promotion has been rapid; and for men whose capacities were found wanting, cashiering has been instantaneous — all this before the war actually began.

But there is, I think, a second clue, the symbol of which is Berghof, the Führer's mountain fastness, to which he so frequently retires. He may be abnormal mentally, he may consult astrologers, he may not himself be the principal directing genius of the German war machine. He may, in 1938, as an official statement declared, have made ninety-seven speeches and had 8,922 telephone conversations, but he and his immediate associates do reserve time which is not interrupted by routine duties. At Berghof, Hitler does not play the country squire; neither there

nor in Berlin has he any burdensome ceremonial duties; and he does not have to run for reëlection. "Too busy to think" is a phrase that does not seem to be in the Berghof vocabulary. When that phrase has to be used, the fact that the busy men are of extraordinary ability is not a sufficient offset. When the description is not apt, lesser minds going at a problem from different angles, pooling experience and ideas, raising questions, asking for facts, demanding of the experts their appreciations of actual and probable situations, can ofttimes do a better job than can an overwhelmed genius. M. Reynaud wanted a thought organization in the French War Office, but he did not have it.

Save in the totalitarian states, civilian ministers have on the whole been extremely reluctant to order, to check, or even to question the services.

Twenty years ago, Lord d'Abernon, then British Ambassador to Germany, remarked that in the country to which he was accredited there was "exaggerated deference to professional opinion," and he contrasted Germany with Great Britain and the United States which heard all the arguments and then made a selection of policies rather than having the "best" handed to them by experts. The heads of totalitarian states, as I have suggested, show "exaggerated deference" to none; but in the democracies, legislatures and executives acquiesce rather easily in the professional opinion of soldiers and sailors, and neglect to question and to prod. Of course, proper deference should be paid any professional opinion that is competent, but the amazing thing is that the professional opinion of soldiers and sailors is considered far more sacrosanct than are the opinions of other professions. For the fact is that, as Churchill said of the generals and admirals in the last war, outside of technical matters they "were helpless and misleading arbiters in problems in whose solution the aid of the statesman, the financier, the manufacturer, the inventor, the psychologist, was equally required."

That this truth is so frequently ignored seems the more remarkable when one reflects on the nature of the profession of arms. In his "History of Civilization," Buckle noted that "in a backward state of society, men of distinguished talents crowd to the army and are proud to enroll themselves in its ranks," but that "as society advances, new sources of activity are opened and new professions arise which, being essentially mental, offer to genius opportunities for success more rapid than any formerly

known." In England, seventy years ago, the opportunities of the new professions were great. To quote Buckle, "if a father has a son whose faculties are remarkable, he brings him up in one of the lay professions where intellect when accompanied by industry is sure to be rewarded. If, however, the inferiority of the boy is obvious, a suitable remedy is at hand: he is made either a soldier or a clergyman; he is sent into the army or hidden in the church."

Let it be said at once that, as applied to the American Army, Buckle's observation is a caricature, and that our officers are, on the whole, able and devoted men, some of whom have deliberately chosen to serve their country instead of seeking great distinction and wealth in other professions. At the moment, moreover, there seems to be agreement that we are fortunate in our high command. On the other hand, it should be remembered that recruitment for the profession of arms is on the basis of excellence tempered by geographical distribution and political nomination. " . . . our whole Army," wrote General MacArthur in his last report as Chief of Staff, "has been developed spiritually in the image of West Point" whose graduates are nurtured in the teachings "of discipline, courage and loyalty — the cardinal virtues of the soldier." These are certainly virtues — perhaps cardinal ones — but no one has ever maintained that instruction at the service academies sought to cultivate flair, judgment, inventiveness, flexibility of mind, receptiveness to new ideas, and rejection of worn-out ideas.

The profession, moreover, is one which discourages juniors from questioning superiors, and which makes rank synonymous with omniscience. "No one," as Harold Laski has said, "can effectively argue with another man on his knees; and the soldier and sailor in high command have become so accustomed to the unquestioning acceptance of their views that they too seldom are accessible to that criticism which makes them state, and defend from attack, the groundwork of their basic assumptions." What other profession separates promotion from ability, makes it depend on seniority, confines high preferment to those who are ceasing to be middle-aged and then permits it to be determined by older comrades in arms? This is tolerated because, save in time of war, soldiering is a sheltered, non-competitive profession. In time of peace, the soldier's life is make-believe: the study of tactics of previous wars, the preparation of plans for new eventualities, manœuvres and war games. But there is no way of find-

ing out whether the plans are any good until they are actually tried against an enemy. Ability is not put to any decisive test as it continually is in the case of the doctor whose patients die or the lawyer whose clients lose. What I have said about the army applies to the navy, save that it, even in time of peace, is not a sheltered occupation. There is competition — with the elements. And, in the case of air forces, unhappily, training demands a heavy toll of human life.

Surely these considerations suggest that, technical matters apart, the deference paid to service opinion should not be exaggerated. Military history teems with illustrations of the beneficial substitution of civilian judgment for the judgment of the services. The story of the tanks is a tragic one of military indifference, even hostility, to the possibilities of a new weapon. The British command in France, ignoring ministerial advice, used the tank in such a way that its effectiveness was greatly lessened. In mid-1915, Lord Kitchener initialled a memorandum which asked two machine guns per battalion: "if possible run to four per battalion and above four may be counted as a luxury." Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions, took Kitchener's maximum of four and gave this order: "Square it, multiply that result by two; and when you are in sight of that, double it again for good luck." By November 1915, five months after Kitchener's memorandum, the War Office had quadrupled his maximum, and before the end of the war the average was about the one anticipated by Lloyd George. Convoys for merchant ships were forced upon the Admiralty by the British War Cabinet against firm and prolonged objections from Admiral Jellicoe. The Cabinet's view, it should be noted, was backed by Admiral Sims, who in turn was supported by the Navy Department and the White House. Until Munich, the British War Office had only allotted one quarter of one percent of its total appropriations for anti-aircraft defense. "The custom of the services," it has been said, "differs from the domestic family in that the latest born is commonly the first to suffer." Old, well-intrenched branches can look after themselves. Before 1938, our War Department was spending more on horses, mules, harness and wagons than on tanks, arms and armed vehicles.

But it should not be thought that the only lesson of the past is the need for more civilian coöperation with or even direction of the services. Despite agitation in Parliament and in the press, the British Cabinet was laggard in planning its defense preparations.

There was great delay in setting up a Ministry of Supply, and when it was finally created its powers were inadequate. Anti-aircraft defense was for long left to the Home Office and was not put under a separate organization. The stimulation of agriculture and the storage of food supplies were tackled late and then, for some time, tentatively. British experience before the war demonstrated that the much-vaunted administrative class of the British Civil Service was not brilliantly adapted to meet the new tasks imposed upon it. When a man has spent the formative years of his life caring as much for routine as for results, and, in an endeavor to keep costs down, has habituated himself to say "no," it is too much to expect that, save in exceptional cases, he will undergo a metamorphosis and, in meeting emergencies, will be imaginative, courageous and even rash. Lloyd George realized this in the last war when he staffed the key posts of his Ministry of Munitions from outside the Civil Service, and it was an amazingly efficient organization that he created.

When this war came, Mr. Chamberlain created a War Cabinet, but it differed fundamentally from the War Cabinet that Lloyd George set up in December 1916. It was on strict party lines and was nearly twice as large. With the exception of the Prime Minister, it had only one member who was entirely free of departmental duties. It was heavily weighted with Mr. Chamberlain's cronies — Sir John Simon, Sir Kingsley Wood, Sir Samuel Hoare — all Ministers who were worn out through devotion to routine. In Lloyd George's Cabinet of five, there was only one man — Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer — who had departmental duties, and he was rather a sentinel outside the Cabinet to keep matters from getting to it than a full member of the directorate. The others, Lord Milner, Lord Curzon, Arthur Henderson and General Smuts, were not mere deserving party hacks.

From December 1916 on, that War Cabinet planned the conduct of the war. It met daily, sometimes twice a day. It had direct access to chiefs of staff and to departmental experts. It had a highly efficient secretariat. It divided labor and set up innumerable sub-committees under the chairmanships of the individual members. There was criticism that it ignored the fact that policy cannot be completely separated from departmental detail and that it imposed great burdens on the time of officials who had to dance attendance until they could get their innings. But the War Cabinet was an organization which attempted to put

thought before action, and after it was set up the British effort was much more smoothly directed and the term "too late" was rarely used. A British War Cabinet is not an article for export, but the principles which underlay its creation and functioning are principles which must be accepted and then adapted by any government which seeks to avoid failure.

What is the situation in which we in this country find ourselves? Our problem is more difficult than was the comparable problem in Great Britain and in France. Their parliaments were willing to give *pleins pouvoirs* to the executive. Hence, for any errors which were committed, the executives bore sole responsibility. Our Congress is not willing to write a blank check in respect to grants of power, and I do not think that we should blame Congress. It encounters vagueness in high places. It knows that in June its adjournment was proposed and that now there is much work for it to do. But Congressional delays or even refusals will not be decisive. The President of the United States has emergency powers already granted that give him, as Commander in Chief, sufficient freedom of action — to make or mar his reputation and perhaps save or sacrifice his country. If we go the way of France, no one will be able to blame it on Congress. It has been generous, almost profligate, in granting money and, within the limitations it has imposed, there is ample opportunity for the spenders to be intelligent. Likewise there can be no legislative barrier to their unintelligence.

In France and particularly in Great Britain, parliaments exercised a beneficent influence on executive policy and stimulated executive action through questioning ministers, expressing fears and alarms, and demanding an accounting. That kind of rôle is impossible for the American Congress. Nor can it impose on the executive any solution of the planning problem. When the executive becomes aware of the necessity for coöperation and anxious to effect it, he will take the necessary steps himself, for his powers are ample. If Congress tried to impose a solution on an executive unaware of its necessity, any organization suggested would be viewed with suspicion, even hostility, and would not work.

Blueprints of desirable changes could easily be drawn up, but what blueprint would be best? A separate department of National Defense is probably ruled out because both services would be so hostile to it. Even if it were desirable, a separate Air Department would take so long to shake down that the advisability of con-

stituting it at the present juncture would seem doubtful. Certainly, however, there should be some civilian participation in the Joint Board so that there could be a mixture of the non-special and special minds. Certainly also, on the procurement and industrial mobilization side the National Defense Advisory Commission cannot be left advisory. But most important of all is the necessity of setting up some kind of body — perhaps interdepartmental, perhaps supradepartmental — in which routine will not be allowed to postpone thinking about policy, charting its outlines, and planning its execution — a body, in short, which will confine itself to intellectual effort.

"It is one business," wrote Sir Henry Taylor many years ago, "to do what must be done and another to devise what ought to be done. It is the spirit of the British Government as hitherto existing to transact only the former business; and the reform which it requires is to enlarge that spirit so as to include the latter." Where in Washington is any machinery for devising what ought to be done? President Roosevelt undoubtedly wishes to go down in history as a great President. He may — and with some justification — think of himself as did William Pitt, the Elder, who said to George II, "I know that I can save this country and that no one else can." If he feels this way, he should ponder a remark by Mandell Creighton in his "Life of Cardinal Wolsey." Creighton said that "all men are to be judged by what they do and the way in which they do it;" but he added that in the case of great statesmen there is a third consideration which challenges our judgment — "what they choose to do." That third consideration is nowadays much more important than it was in Wolsey's or even in Creighton's time. Given the tremendous problems which now confront statesmen — the totalitarian nature of defense preparations, the importance of time, the difficulty of retrieving errors, the catastrophic effects of not being able to say "according to plan," there is a fourth consideration: the selection of machinery and procedures by a statesman so that he makes it certain that thought will precede decisions, that his choosing what to do will be intelligent and not too late.

There is a French proverb which says that a man can accomplish miracles if he will only share the credit with others. The proverb does not say what is equally true — that a man who thus accomplishes miracles seems a miracle man because those with whom he shares the credit are no more than his instruments.

HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY

Some Economic and Strategic Considerations

By Alvin H. Hansen

FOR a century or more any thought which this country has felt like giving to Latin America as a whole has been cast in a rather stereotyped mold. A considerable degree of homogeneity was assumed. It did not, in fact, exist. Diversities in economic and social conditions and in political and cultural ideologies divided the individual countries from each other and from the United States. But they were concealed under a superficial mantle of the republican form of government common to all, and remained largely unnoticed. And not merely was it always repeated that the New World, with the exception of Canada, was united in its abhorrence for the rule of monarchs. It was stressed that the principle of non-intervention by Europe, proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine, was generally accepted.

This is not to say that underneath the ideological and political conception of solidarity there did not lie a substratum of economic reality. The Monroe Doctrine was born and nurtured in the economic conditions peculiar to the nineteenth century. We may remind ourselves that the century between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War was uniquely favorable to the growth and survival of independent sovereign states in the New World no less than in the Old. The far-flung geographical distribution of the British Empire fixed British policy in terms of freedom of trade and freedom of the seas — a policy necessary for the growth and development of England as the heart and center of modern industrialism. This was also the international basis for the growth and vigor of the ideas inherent in the Monroe Doctrine.

We must also remind ourselves that the nineteenth century, which enjoyed a seemingly boundless expansion into the frontier areas of the New World, fostered the growth of economic liberalism. By this we mean a scheme of economic coördination based not upon central planning, state interventionism or industrial control of economic life, but rather upon the loose coördination and coöperation of individual and atomistic units, each guided and directed through the functioning of the price system. The price system, to be sure, could function only on the basis of cer-

tain political institutional arrangements, including private property, private contract and freedom of private enterprise. Under the functioning of such a system, trade was not subordinated to political and military ends. Economics dominated the state — not the other way round. So long as the coördination of economic activity was effected through the impersonal direction of a free price system, no antagonism developed between economic internationalism and political nationalism. Under the price system the existence of numerous national states had relatively little economic significance. The price system transcended political boundaries and made the world essentially international from the economic standpoint.

Thus the system of independent sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere, as conceived in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, fitted admirably into the framework of economic liberalism supported by the British policing of the seas which was the political basis of nineteenth-century economic internationalism. But the growth of protectionism, imperial preferential systems, economic blocs, and, finally, totalitarian states holding sway over entire continents, has spelled the doom of small nations. The latter are being drawn inevitably within the orbits of the great giants through the interplay of the forces of political penetration, trade relationships and military strategy.

The Monroe Doctrine was grounded in the institutions of free trade, freedom of the seas, economic liberalism and the political independence of nation-states. But, under the changed world conditions, if it is to have any meaning in terms of freedom from European intervention, it must be conceived not in terms of nineteenth-century political and economic liberalism, but in terms of a compact solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The perfection of relations inside this hemisphere with a view to maintaining the interests of each and all *vis-à-vis* Europe — this is the way the Monroe Doctrine must be made over if it is to retain vitality. Once this fact is firmly grasped, we begin to see what difficult problems face us in our relations with Latin America.

The countries of the Western Hemisphere are not homogeneous with respect to race, culture or political ideologies. Nor does Latin America conform to the cultural model of the United States. From the beginning it has found its inspiration in the intellectual life of the great European capitals — at first Madrid and Paris, more latterly Rome and Berlin. This is increasingly true today.

It must be admitted that the basic concepts of the now ascendant Fascist or corporative European states are congenial to many Latin Americans. Political democracy has run a turbulent course in Latin American history. Nineteenth-century democratic institutions, fathered by the American and French Revolutions, were never genuinely suited to the social and economic position of the masses in Latin America. With few exceptions they have not succeeded in establishing stable governments on the democratic model. Mutuality of interests between this country and the Latin American countries is consequently difficult to establish on an ideological and political basis.

Nor are the states of this hemisphere complementary in an economic sense. Under the economic liberalism of the last century, this lack of racial and ideological homogeneity and economic complementarity had no serious consequences, indeed it was scarcely noticed. But today, when new conditions call for solidarity and collective action, the differences become important.

Theoretically we can conceive of the Western Hemisphere achieving solidarity by one of two methods: (a) the operation of a ruthless imperialism which brings all the nations of the two continents under the military subjugation of the United States; and (b) voluntary collective action by the nations concerned.

The political and economic implications of the first of these alternatives are not worth exploring for the simple reason, if no other, that it clearly seems contrary to the spirit and psychology of the people of the United States. They do not dream of attempting any program of military subjugation and ruthless imperialistic domination in this hemisphere. There remains, therefore, only the second and more civilized alternative.

Obviously the first thing to consider is whether or not it would be to the interest of these countries to collaborate in the formation of a hemisphere bloc. Here we see at once that the situation of the different countries is by no means uniform. It is not enough to study the trade relations of the United States with the Western Hemisphere as a whole. That sort of study reveals the growing importance of this area in the trade of the United States. Thus, if we compare the prewar years of 1911–1915 with the year 1937, we discover that the total average trade (imports and exports) of the United States with the countries of the Western Hemisphere has increased from $1,242 million to $2,271 million. In comparison, our total trade with Europe declined slightly from

$2,315 million in the prewar period to $2,203 million in 1937, just below the hemisphere total. Moreover, we find that while the exports of our leading agricultural commodities — cotton, meat products, wheat and tobacco — fell from $1,576 million in 1921–25 to $611 million in 1937, our exports of machinery, iron and steel products, automobiles and petroleum increased from $1,069 million in the early twenties to $1,502 million in 1937. With respect to leading finished manufactures, including machinery, iron and steel products, and automobiles, the Western Hemisphere took 44 percent in 1937, while Europe took only 28 percent. These general data tend to support the thesis that the trend is increasingly favorable to a close economic collaboration of the Western Hemisphere countries. But that conclusion would be superficial. The facts cited cover up other uncomfortable facts which become apparent when we examine the trade relations of the individual countries with the United States.

The problem becomes more manageable if we classify the Latin American countries into three groups, arranged according to the proportion of total imports coming into each from the United States in 1937. The picture is substantially the same for any other recent year. The following table makes such a classification, and also gives the proportion of the total exports sent by the countries in question to the United States:

Countries	*Percentage of total imports coming from the United States, 1937*	*Percentage of total exports shipped to the United States, 1937*
AREA A		
Cuba	69	81
Mexico	62	56
Honduras	58	89
Nicaragua	54	55
Venezuela	53	14
Dominican Republic	52	35
Panama	52	90
Haiti	51	28
Colombia	48	64
Guatemala	45	64
Costa Rica	43	45
El Salvador	40	61
AREA B		
Ecuador	40	33
Peru	35	22
Bolivia	28	7

AREA C		
Chile	29	22
Brazil	23	36
Argentina	16	13
Uruguay	14	14
Paraguay	8	8

The foregoing table discloses the fallacy of generalizations about our trade relations with Latin America as a whole. However, with respect to each of the three groups certain generalizations are possible. Group A, it will be noted, is composed of the countries geographically nearest to the United States. It includes all of Central America and the two northernmost countries of South America. Group C, on the other hand, includes all of the countries farthest from the United States. Group B is in an intermediate position.

The trade of the Group A countries is highly integrated with the trade of the United States. Imports from us range from 40 to 69 percent, while exports to us, with one exception, range from 28 to 90 percent. The single exception is Venezuela, whose leading export, petroleum, goes to the Dutch West Indies and is largely reëxported to Europe. At the other extreme, the trade of the Group C countries is preponderantly with Europe; it is comparatively small with the United States. Thus in the case of Argentina, only about 15 percent of both her export and import trade is with us. And despite the large American market for Brazilian coffee, we take only one-third of Brazil's total exports and supply less than one-fourth of her imports.

The reason the United States has such a different importance in the trade of the Group A countries in comparison with those in Group C lies, of course, in the character of the export products of the two areas. Generally speaking (Chile aside, for her case is somewhat special), the great export surpluses of the Group C countries are agricultural. Except for Brazilian coffee, most of these compete directly with the export surpluses of the United States. They include, among others, corn, wheat, cotton and meat products. The United States, with its excess of agricultural production, obviously cannot absorb these great surpluses.

On the other hand, the export commodities of the countries in Groups A and B are not, in the main, competitive with the American economy. The leading exports of these countries are sugar, bananas, vegetable fibers, coffee, cacao, and mineral products in-

cluding manganese, tin, copper, lead, zinc, silver, gold and petroleum. Either these products are complementary to our economy or they offer no such serious competitive menace as do the great agricultural surpluses of the Group C area.

We may conclude on the basis of this classification that an economic bloc consisting of the United States and the countries in areas A and B would have a solid foundation in the economic self-interest of all the countries involved. If it should be deemed desirable to include this entire area within a single customs union, no serious economic problems would arise. Moreover, such a bloc would be composed of countries contiguous to one another.

Now it is just this area which is vitally important for the United States from the standpoint of military strategy. We are told on competent military authority that the protection of this country against foreign aggression does not require that we develop military bases beyond a line extending roughly from the bulge of Brazil westward to the Pacific. Indeed, for the protection of the continental United States and the Canal Zone, bases considerably north of Natal (up to say 1500 miles from the Canal) would be adequate. A base on the hump of Brazil would go somewhat beyond the strictly primary or inner zone of defense, but would be important for carrying out a flexible defense program designed to meet various contingencies. It will be noted that the most productive and populous parts of Brazil are located south of the line indicated. It should also be noted that topographically the boundary of this area forms a natural barrier which would greatly facilitate its defense against outside aggression. We may conclude, then, that the area which is complementary to the United States from the economic standpoint is, in its geographic position, exactly the area which of necessity must be included in any defense program which pretends to be at all adequate.

Canada, it will be noted, is left aside in this survey. There are grave obstacles in the way of any effort to integrate the Canadian economy and ours. The huge wheat surplus of Western Canada alone offers a seemingly insoluble problem. Our politically important agricultural West would be vastly irritated by attempts to control its wheat production in harmony with Canada's.

But from the defense angle the Canadian problem ought not to be too difficult. Even though an economic union of Canada and the United States is probably not feasible under existing conditions, military collaboration for defense purposes is already a fact

in the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense. In general, the conflict of economic interests between the two countries is more than offset by the community of political and cultural ideologies, and we may hope that closer economic relations can gradually be attained through a progressive broadening of the Canadian-American trade agreement.

It is the Group C countries which present the most difficult problem. For them the populous industrial nations of Western Europe constitute a natural market. The industry of Europe is too large to be supplied from her own raw material resources. Her urban population is too large to be fed by her own agriculture. Such an area must be a powerful magnet for relatively undeveloped countries which produce a surplus of primary products. Germany in particular constitutes such a magnet. She needs the agricultural products of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil; they need her industrial products. It is for just this reason that expansionistic nations like Germany, Italy and Japan favor the continued and rapid growth of their populations. For overpopulation (from the point of view of food and raw materials) furnishes them both with the justification for political expansion and with a magnetic power over countries rich in primary products.

In such a contest the United States cannot play a strong rôle. We have a surplus both of foodstuffs and industrial products. We are eager to export but reluctant to import. During the last twenty-five years we have had a net export surplus of goods and services totaling $25,000,000,000, for which no adequate *quid pro quo* has ever been received (or should one say accepted) in return. We lack relatively few raw materials; and even with respect to most of these we can supply our needs from synthetic production (as in the case of rubber) or else can find substitutes (as in the case of tin, except for a relatively small and irreducible minimum). The trouble with the United States is that it underutilizes its own productive resources, both agricultural and industrial. Its problem is one of internal expansion.

The export surplus of the whole Western Hemisphere — that is to say, the annual products which, judging by statistics of its recent capacity to consume, cannot be absorbed at home — totals roughly two billion dollars. Of this sum nearly half is produced in the Latin American countries; about 300 millions in Canada; and about 750 millions in the United States. In essence the economic problem facing the Western Hemisphere arises from

the fact that it has heretofore been integrated in a world economy in which Western Europe has drawn upon the New World for food and raw materials, and that this situation is now undergoing drastic change.

Under postwar conditions the Western Hemisphere will probably have to move much farther in the direction of a closed economy than has previously been the case. This will be especially true if Germany dominates Europe completely. A German-dominated Europe is likely to develop along American mass-production lines and create precisely the great industries in which America has held the lead — automobiles, electrical equipment, agricultural and industrial machinery, etc. Just as our agricultural exports dropped sharply in the last two decades under the influence of increasing self-sufficiency in Europe, so in the next decade we may see a sharp drop in the leading industrial exports to Europe, once it is unified and mass production begins on a large scale. Moreover, an economically unified Europe would include most of Africa and the Near East. This would give it the possibility of attaining a high degree of agricultural self-sufficiency.

If the Western Hemisphere is to move in the direction of a closed economy, a redirection of production will obviously become necessary. The transition period will be painful. But it can be made very much shorter and very much less painful if the Western Hemisphere — especially the United States — undertakes a vigorous program of economic expansion. A large part of the farm population could be drawn into urban industry. Moreover, the consumption of food and raw materials could be considerably increased. This in turn would be reflected in imports from Latin America and from Canada, thereby facilitating the transition in those countries also. Finally, Canadian and Latin American purchases of industrial products from this country, replacing products hitherto drawn from Europe, would facilitate the industrial expansion of the United States.

The Western Hemisphere contains within itself all the essential materials men need for enjoying a higher standard of living than any so far attained. The overwhelmingly important need is to secure the full and efficient application of labor power to these resources. A greater industrialization of the Latin American countries is a necessary part of the program. This could be greatly facilitated by the export of capital from the United States, and with it the export of heavy industry products.

If the British Empire should dissolve as a result of the war, the position of the Latin American countries *vis-à-vis* Europe might be greatly weakened. This would be particularly true of the countries of the C Group. With Scandinavia, Holland, the Balkans and much of Africa under permanent German and Italian domination, the German Government would be in a position to drive a hard bargain with South America. Nor would the establishment of a Western Hemisphere trading corporation to canalize trade with Germany help matters much. If Germany found herself confronted with such a monopolistic set-up she could be expected to develop her own sources of supply elsewhere. Whatever tempting trade terms Germany offers Latin America will be made in large part for political reasons.

So far as we are concerned, we can find all the natural resources we need without turning to the nations of the C Area; and, as already noted, their inclusion in the same bloc as ourselves is not essential from the standpoint of national defense. This is not to imply that the United States ought to assume an attitude of indifference toward the C Group countries. We should coöperate with them in facilitating their internal development and in easing the difficulties they will encounter during the transition period. We should expand our imports from those countries whenever possible. A large increase could be defended on economic grounds. For example, it is not good policy to subsidize the production of flaxseed, sugar and copper in the United States when they can be imported far more economically from Latin American countries. Nor is it good policy to prevent the importation of low-priced and nutritious canned meats from the Argentine, thereby depriving our low-income groups of a reasonably adequate meat diet. Imports of this sort compete only indirectly and only in relatively small degree with any important branch of American agriculture. In addition, we might give the Latin American countries a share in some of the purchases which we now make in other parts of the world. Our imports from Latin America of certain commodities such as coffee, sugar, cacao, fruits and nuts, copra, hides and skins, wool, canned beef, fibers, cabinet woods, nitrate, manganese, tin, copper, lead, zinc, chromite, could all be increased in varying degree. Tourist expenditures in Latin America can also be expected to grow, especially if aided by an efficient campaign of travel promotion. Dollar balances enabling Latin Americans to buy our exports could in some measure be made available through

direct investment of private capital and loans by our government agencies such as the Export-Import Bank.

Meanwhile, every effort should be made to facilitate a closer cultural understanding by the interchange of students, by the development of radio communication, and by other means. A feeling of Hemisphere Solidarity can be grounded only in the conscious self-interest of all the countries concerned. It is not enough to work out a program by which in some manner and measure the United States will take care of surplus Latin American commodities. The Latin American countries would hardly feel that this offered a secure basis for thoroughgoing coöperation; our Western agricultural bloc might at any time force the abandonment of the policy, by bringing pressure on the Administration which had adopted the scheme. The most important single economic policy by which the United States can further the real and lasting solidarity of the Western Hemisphere is by releasing the magnetic power of a dynamic internal expansion in our own home market.

But when all is said and done we are compelled to face the uncomfortable fact that it is difficult both to plan and practice a system of solidarity which embraces the whole of the Western Hemisphere. Within the next few months we may witness serious internal upheavals in some of those Latin American countries which are least drawn to us by direct economic interest and which for various reasons are most susceptible to Nazi propaganda. The State Department rightly insists on the inclusion of all of Latin America in its program for collective action. We could and should pursue no other policy. But in the event that a program involving all the American republics does not succeed, we should remember that our southern neighbors can be considered in different categories, and that when one so considers them one finds significant things to report both on the economic and the military score. We approve the coöperative effort now being made to help and defend all of Latin America. But we should also keep in the back of our minds the solid fact that the area which constitutes our best and indeed essential line of defense is also precisely the area which has the sort of economic ties with us which signify that self-interest coincides with other less tangible reasons in dictating coöperation and solidarity.

THE FUTURE OF THE WHITE MAN IN THE FAR EAST

By Pearl S. Buck

WHENEVER the future of the white man in the Orient comes to be discussed it inevitably means one question. Will the power and prestige of the white man in the Far East be what it has been in the past? It is acknowledged that for the moment these are at a low ebb. But can they rise again in the future to anything like their past glory?

I never hear that phrase, the power and the prestige of the white man in the Far East, without being reminded of a certain incident in my Chinese childhood which more nearly wrecked our peaceful missionary household than all the riots and revolutions of China put together. There came to our compound gate one winter's day a unique person. He was an American salesman. Any white man was strange at our gate, but a salesman we had never seen. My father admitted him at once because what he sold, it seemed, was Bibles, though anything more coals to Newcastle than Bibles to our house cannot be imagined. My father in the goodness of his heart never inquired how the man came to be selling Bibles, and the salesman himself never told us, so none of us ever knew. He was simply there, very dirty and hungry and with no baggage except some shopworn Bibles and a small cardboard suitcase that after several weeks of his steadfastly remaining a hungry guest in the house apparently provided him with no change of garments. The weeks grew into months and he stayed on, and my mother reached the point of mutiny. He had a change of clothes now, but they were my father's. When he finally left us, and it was entirely due to my redoubtable mother that he did so at all, he went out clothed in my father's second-best suit, with other garments of my father's in my father's suitcase, all his Bibles sold to my father, and his purse full of my father's meager funds. Only under these terms had he consented to move on.

My mother remarked after the gate had been bolted by the servants, "Thank God we still have the house and the furniture." Whereupon my father, in one of his few moments of self-doubt, said in an uncertain voice, "Maybe I should never have let him come into the house to sell me anything."

That Bible salesman represents in a simple way the white man

who walked into the Far East to trade, who stayed to take all he could get — and long beyond his welcome. There is about as much chance that he will be welcome again on the old terms as there was for that salesman to get back into my father's house.

I must therefore preface anything I have to write on the subject of the white man in the Far East by saying first that he ought never to have had that power and prestige, held and secured by force as it was. Power and prestige are not absolute good in themselves, and whether they are or not depends entirely on how they are secured and how they are wielded. In the Far East they were secured for the white man in ways of which he ought to be ashamed enough so that he would not want them back at the price of seizing them again upon the same terms. If he is to have them again, they must — and this for his own sake, too — be built upon new foundations.

But no one knows better than the white man that his power and prestige in the Far East are gone and that his future there cannot be like his past. And if the Chinese and the Japanese are agreed upon nothing else they are upon one thing — that the white man's future in the Orient shall and must be different from his past. The Japanese are now making life in their country so difficult for the white man that he can scarcely live there at all. And when I have listened to Chinese talking together seriously of the future after the war, I have been impressed that it includes no place for the white man except upon strictly Chinese terms.

How has this come about? The white man's present plight in the Far East is entirely of his own making and his future there depends upon his present elsewhere. War of his own making is ruining him in the Far East as well as in Europe. Until the First World War, the Oriental looked upon the white man as invincibly his superior. Science was the white man's magic of which the Oriental understood nothing; indeed, he considered himself well-nigh incapable of understanding it. That First World War enlightened the Oriental in many ways. He saw white men destroying each other. This horrified him, but it encouraged him too. He ceased to consider the white man a superman, and he took hope for himself. White men were not, as he had supposed, solidly against the darker races. They were also against each other. In their division might be the yellow man's salvation. His unwilling admiration of the white man's abilities fell even lower, never to rise, when he saw the savage behavior of white men toward each

other. Every Oriental understands cruelty to an inferior or to one deemed an inferior. But when during the last war the Oriental beheld, with his own eyes and upon Chinese territory, the cruelty of Englishmen directed against Germans — against missionaries and merchants, men and women and children, sick and well alike, when he saw them driven from their homes and possessions, herded into cattle-ships and sent to the tropics to manage as best they could, he saw something new to him, and if he lost an illusion he also took heart for himself. For when the white man attacked the white man in the Orient, it was the end of an era.

The history of the white man in the Far East is too well known to need close repetition. It began when the great nations of Europe — Portugal, Spain, England and France — established regular trade with the Orient. The United States was the last but not the least vigorous in this competition. The need to control that trade was what drove England to the Opium Wars. These wars set in motion the waves which swept in the period of conquest, and upon these waves France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, England, Russia and the United States rode high. They rode so high indeed that their greed nearly divided China into colonies. Only mutual rapacity and the Open Door Policy, which the skill of England and the prudence of the United States introduced at the eleventh hour, kept China at least physically whole, though actually divided into spheres of influence.

Had the Western World not fallen into war, China might still have been lost. But the World War saved her. When the strength of the white man was turned against himself, the Far East was given a breathing space. China used it to observe and to prepare herself for a new revolution based upon a revolt against the white man; Japan used it to begin solidifying her dreams of Pan Asia into reality. This she did by stepping into China and demanding control of what had belonged to the Germans. The white man, in the haste and exigency of the war, acceded to Japan, mistakenly thinking of her as an ally and that it would be easier to regain these possessions from Japan's temporary control than if they were returned to China, to whom they really belonged. This was the white man's first serious mistake in the Far East. Certainly it was the beginning of the long chain of events which have led to his weakened position there today. Had England, as the strongest white Power in China, taken the German colonies after the Germans had been expelled, or better still, had she returned them

at once to China, they would not have given Japan her first real foothold upon the Chinese mainland.

Japan worked hard upon her plans during those years of the World War and in the years after it while the West was struggling to recover. Only an immediate and determined union of white men could then have restored even a measure of their power and prestige in the Far East. But such a union was physically and spiritually impossible, for peace after war brings no unity anywhere. Division between enemies is driven irrevocably deeper and the quarrel about peace terms alienates allies. Years are needed to heal the cleavages of war.

But if the victor nations could have taken a unified stand toward the Far East, they might have restored at least part of their former power. The Oriental understands human nature well enough to realize that bystanders must deal respectfully with victors, as China and Japan had already signified by their polite alliance with the Allies. But peace divided the victors. France, England and the United States drew away from each other, and, with the short-sighted arrogance, or the indifference, of the white man which may one day be fatal to him, they still failed to consider the problems of the Far East as of primary importance to them.

The period of the white man's conquest over the Far East ended, therefore, with the World War. From then until now the story has been one of his steadily declining power and lessening prestige. And England has led the procession down hill. For, though England emerged as the chief victor in the war, the Oriental knew that everywhere the white man was greatly weakened. He knew that even England could not afford, for a time at least, the energy necessary to enforce prestige. When English businessmen came back to China with all the old arrogance, the Oriental knew they were no longer backed by English armies. The English Government was tired and preoccupied with crises of its own. To the Oriental it therefore appeared unnecessary to bear further insults from the individual Englishman. These insults seemed slight but they were important.

Thus English merchants, seeking to restore English trade with China, took no more trouble than they ever had to be courteous to Chinese merchants. Long Chinese feasts, even of welcome and congratulation upon military victory, bored the average Englishman, who seldom learns to speak Chinese or even to like Chinese

food. The Germans came back, too. But because they knew that there was no force back of them, they took great pains to learn Chinese manners and to be delighted with Chinese food; they had plenty of time to linger and to talk and to make themselves agreeable to Chinese merchants; their wives made calls on the Chinese merchant's wives, to the horror of Englishwomen; and thus were laid sound foundations for the future. China does not at all hate Germany. If Germany makes Fascism safe for the world, there is a Chinese Fascist party which, if the time becomes ripe, may be headed by a dictator with a very notable name. Chinese Fascism will not be German Fascism. Even the Christian God has undergone change at the hands of Chinese believers. But Fascism will scarcely be democracy, even in China. And Japan already is casting off the cloak of a democracy which she never liked anyway and which she wore only because everybody else was wearing it. Japan has always been Fascist in her soul.

No, the Oriental knew the white man's true situation when the World War ended, and how much and how little he was capable of doing for himself. He gambled, mainly on English weakness, and he won. The fact that England suddenly began to use diplomacy instead of gunboats in the Far East only hastened her downward progress. For the Oriental believes that the time to use diplomacy is when one is strong. The voice may be soft when the sword is drawn and in the hand. But when the sword is broken there must not be diplomacy but a loud voice and threatening eyebrows. That England used a soft voice after the World War meant to the Oriental simply that the Allies were exhausted and could never have won the war if the United States had not helped them.

The Americans, on the other hand, lost much of their own prestige for quite other reasons. The United States had never had any power in the Far East based on important possessions in China. But they had prestige based, for one reason or another, upon China's belief in America's sympathy and friendship. The Chinese, in a manner almost touching, believed in that friendship, and in China friendship carries with it the inviolate obligation of material aid if it is wanted. Thus if a man even admires a possession in his friend's house, friendship compels that what he admires be given him as a gift. How much more, then, when a man is in trouble, must his friend give him aid! When Japan began her encroachments, therefore, many Chinese really believed that the United States would do something about it. I remember very well

how difficult it was to be an American in China when Japan was taking Manchuria. A dozen times a day one heard the confident belief expressed: "The United States will not allow this. The Americans will surely come to help us." And how hard it was to say: "I fear they will not;" how impossible to explain reasonably why not! But when it became apparent to the Chinese themselves that China must stand alone in the world, she quietly and gently lowered the Stars and Stripes to half-mast, and the United States took a place only a little better than that of England.

Japan, of course, observed this with pleasure. During the years since the World War she had had her own experiences which hardened her definitely against the West. But in her case it was the United States and not England who represented the objectionable white man. The League of Nations had for a brief moment held the possibility of coöperation between East and West, and Japan gave consideration to the benefits which such coöperation with the white man might give her. She began to doubt these benefits when in 1920 the League was set back by the refusal of the United States to be a part of it. But the liberals were in control in Japan then, and they were able to keep their hold, even to the point of agreeing in 1922 to the limitation of Japan's navy. The downfall of the liberals came in 1924, when laws were passed in the United States discriminating against the Japanese. In effect the Japanese liberals then gave up. What was the use, they felt, of maintaining the struggle for liberalism in Japan when the United States committed herself so definitely to an opposite course? Though most Americans were too ignorant to know it, the United States hastened the day of Fascism in the world by putting despair into the hearts of the only Japanese who might have kept their country from lining up with the Axis. Japan turned from the white man back to the Pan Asian dream.

She might have hastened, if not fulfilled, that dream had she been able to conciliate China at this moment in the white man's downward progression. There was definitely an hour, even after the taking of Manchuria, when China, in panic at finding herself alone in the modern world, would have come to terms with Japan, even at the cost of Manchuria. But Japan had absorbed the spirit as well as the tactics of Germany. She was imbued with militarism both by nature and by her modern education, and she preferred the speed and ease of conquest to the more civilized means of arbitration and compromise. Moreover, her enemies in the Far East

were miraculously clearing themselves away. If a Second World War should begin, and it took no prophet to pronounce it probable, then half of her battle was won. She gambled upon such a war, and as time has shown, she has won. For even if the United States does not actually enter the present European war, it is already engaged in it psychologically and materially. Moreover, its interest in the Orient, never intelligently awake to the importance of what takes place there, is always overshadowed by its own immediate problems and those of Europe.

The present moment, therefore, sees the white man's prestige in the Far East at its lowest ebb in modern times, and power follows the trend of prestige. Both are at a point that would once have been inconceivable to the white man. But the strangest of all things in this strange present is the speed with which the inconceivable happens. How short a time ago the International Concession in Shanghai felt itself as impregnable as the Rock of Gibraltar because the English were that rock! Now it is a handful of foreigners left without defense. That is not to say that they are defenseless. Englishmen at least have a way of defending themselves somehow. But if they do so now in the Far East it is as individuals, and they are no longer England, as once every Englishman was England, wherever he was. I will not say that the Oriental is confident that England's power is gone. He has too often seen individual Englishmen come through trouble. Put it rather thus, that China is not counting on any help whatever from England against Japan and for the moment is prepared for English capitulation to Japan on all but the most important points, and perhaps even on those. Japan is simply working fast, with her weather eye not on England but on Germany. For the situation between Germany and Japan is not at all smooth. Germany is the big dog, Japan the little impatient one — and the big dog has the bones. Germany is not allowing bones to be divided yet, particularly the prize ones of Indo-China and the Dutch Indies. They are valuable for bargaining, if for nothing else.

Thus the cause for the downfall of the white man's power and prestige in the Far East has been war and only war. Had he been able to keep his own peace in the West, he might by now have been lord of the East as well. Consider what a strong peace among white men would have meant on the eastern side of the world. China, if her partition had gone on, would have been the white man's prize. Even if he had allowed her to keep her sovereignty,

trade would have been enough to strengthen the West in the East, and Japan would have been permanently confined to her islands, for she would never have dared arm herself to rebel against an unweakened West. The world would have belonged to the white man.

As it is, it may be that he has given it to the yellow man. Certainly the white man is no longer its master. He is still destroying himself by his own wars, and the Far East waits to see whether he will stop short of complete destruction. It may be that sooner than we think white men will be compelled to unite against a common enemy and that enemy will be a united Far East. This prophecy might be made with some confidence if Japan had not alienated China. As it is, the future is ambiguous, and the Far East waits.

But if the future is ambiguous from the point of view of the Oriental, it is not so ambiguous for the white man. Whether England or Germany wins in the present struggle for supremacy in the West, the white man's place in the Far East, in the old sense, is lost. The white man's prestige in the Far East was always underwritten by force, the force he possessed in his armies and navies with modern weapons, armies and navies which the Far East did not have. But by the time the white man is free to think about the Far East again, there will be vast modern armies there, Chinese as well as Japanese, and a primary condition in the relationship of East and West will have changed.

The nature of white power and prestige will have changed, too. In the past it was expressed in such terms as extraterritoriality, concessions of land, control over customs, railway construction, investment in industries, the right to station soldiers and vessels of war at various places along the coast and in inland waters — all rights which should never be given away by one country to another. These rights have for the most part been restored to the Far East — taken back, as a matter of fact, because of the crisis between white men themselves — and it is very doubtful if they will ever become the property of white men again. The Far East has learned something.

If England survives, the problems of her survival will be so enormous that she cannot at once undertake to recover her position, especially in China. If England does not survive, it remains to be seen what a victorious Germany will do with the Far East. Even if Germany should be the victor in Europe, we may doubt whether she could take a strong hand in the Far East, not only

because she would be exhausted, not only because her problems in Europe and with Russia will be many and severe, but also because it will take her some time to discover what she could do in the new Far East that would be to her greatest advantage. Even though she may have the prestige of the victor, actually she will probably have to use the methods of the diplomat rather than those of the conqueror. It is doubtful whether she can allow Japan a free hand. It can scarcely be to Germany's interest to allow a nation so like herself as Japan — a nation organized upon strictly Fascist and military forms and principles, and whose ambitions are Germany's — to come into territory and resources far superior to her own. The Soviets wait too, and it may be that Germany will need to play them against Japan, and she may even need to maintain the fiction that France and the Dutch Empire are independent. Meantime, Japan goes as far as she can.

As for China, she is now in a mood of impartiality, or simply of fatalism. The English can do nothing but damage themselves in Chinese eyes by their present diplomatic concessions, either to China or Japan. To the Chinese this is the behavior of a man in desperate straits, and even so, despicable. For when the Chinese is desperate, he becomes unyielding. He reasons that if all is lost, why yield further? Only if England ceases to seem to yield in the Far East will her prestige there take an upward turn.

And yet the issues are still not as clear as they would have been if Japan had not been so foolish and so shortsighted as to attack China. Japan has never understood the temper of the Chinese people. When she saw the white man departing, she thought a quick blow would bring China into her control. But there is no such thing as a quick blow against anything so huge as China. Progressive blows over her surface only infuriate her and strengthen her resistance, as time has shown. If for the past generation China and Japan could have been allies instead of enemies, the white man might by now have entirely disappeared from the Far East. With this Second World War entangling all white men, China and Japan together could simply have taken over the Far East, with or without Russia's permission. It would have been logical for Indo-China and the East Indies, and even the Philippines, to have joined together in a great Pan Asia. And that would have been the end of the white man in the Orient.

But militarism has again lost the day — or saved it, depending upon which side of the world one's feet stand upon. This time it

has lost it for the Far East and perhaps therefore to some extent saved it for the white man. For China is not in a mood, nor will she be in a mood for a long time, to join with Japan in anything. Japan's stupid cruelties have filled the Chinese with rage, and anyone who knows a Chinese knows that if his belly is full of rage he will do nothing until he has emptied himself of it. He believes that rage unrelieved by retaliation is poison in the system, and Japan has put a mighty dose of rage into his capacious belly.

So, unwittingly, Japan has in her turn helped the white man. If the white man could be clever and if he really wants a place in the Far East of tomorrow, he would offer himself as China's ally now that she stands alone and has given up hope of help. He could be Androcles and China his lion. Japan is still no more than a thorn in that great paw, but it is a painful and festering thorn and it may be that the lion will become helpless. It may be, too, that if China really becomes subjugated and Japan too great with power, the white man will succumb in his time. There are dreams being spun that reach beyond Pan Asia.

But Androcles was a brave man, of course, and he took some risk when he pulled the thorn out of a lion's paw, and the white man has not shown any particular bravery about lions, or indeed shown that he cares anything about lions. I am only saying that if there were an Androcles among the nations, now would be his chance of getting a lion as his grateful and faithful friend who might one day in turn save him. But England is at present in the position, not of Androcles, but of a wounded lion. France is no more, Italy has never been wise in the Far East, and the United States has no Far Eastern imagination. That leaves Germany and Russia.

It is not difficult to prophesy that the Germans will be the next white men in the Orient unless they are badly defeated in Europe. Germany has been laying her foundations well in the Far East ever since the last war. Today she is Japan's friend and not China's enemy. What she must now decide is whether it would not pay her better to reverse this relationship, and be China's friend without being Japan's enemy. If she is wise she will choose to exploit the enormous resources of China and limit the power of Japan. The Japanese might have made this difficult had they won a clean, quick victory over China. But victory lags. The war is well into its fourth year, with China unyielding and in her complete rage imperturbable even to the point of cheerfulness. What

to do next is Japan's problem, for she is not quite succeeding anywhere.

What part Russia has to play depends on how *white* Russia is, a point which has never yet been settled. That Russians are white men has always been debatable even on their own admission. And yet, now that they are linked to Germany, it would be awkward for them to move toward territory which Germany might wish to guard for reasons of her own. Since Russia is inevitably the enemy of Japan, she might well applaud Hitler's befriending China and even hasten to compete by offering friendliness of her own. Perhaps Russia might discover that she is white after all, and that the Russians and Germans together should be the new white men in the Far East. A new history would then have to be written about the power and the prestige of the white man there.

But China has never forgotten one thing about Germany: that after the Boxer Rebellion the German troops sent to avenge the death of a few Germans behaved with a brutality the Chinese themselves had never imagined. The Chinese expected the lowest of behavior from soldiers, for their tradition had been that soldiers were the lowest of men. But the German soldiers had orders from their Emperor to be brutal so that the Chinese would never forget what the Germans were like, and it was this command which the Chinese have never forgotten. They were horrified to see that the spirit of brutality was imbedded in the highest places. It may be, therefore, that if Germany now approaches China, speaking of help and friendship, China will suck her own paw, preferring an enemy she knows and is used to rather than a friend so new and powerful. Or she may turn to Russia, and then Russia and Germany will cease to be friends. What the new white man in the Far East will then do may depend on how Germany feels she must confront this new situation. She might feel obliged to force her friendship on China. Japan might then decide to help Germany against Russia; or she might even lay aside her dreams of Pan Asia and help China.

But of course England may survive. Many are betting on her, though something more is wrong with her than a thorn in the paw. Still, she too is a lion. But if she survives she will have to begin anew in the Far East. The old power and the old prestige are gone and the Far East will have no more of it. Whether a victorious England succeeds or not in creating a new place for the white man depends on how much white men have learned in

these recent years. Men usually learn a great deal by escaping death. Sometimes an actual conversion takes place. But it is hard to think of an Englishman really converted. He is more likely to be the tough old sinner who mumbles the Lord's Prayer when badly scared, but as soon as he feels better declares that he knew all along that he was not going to die.

If he goes back to the Far East, too proud and unregenerate, he will find doors slamming in his face and his feet wet because he is standing in the ocean outside without an inch of dry land to call his own. For China and Japan will remember how he looked when it seemed he might die, and they will not be afraid of him any more. Besides, they will have had a good deal of practice in war themselves by that time. In short, it will pay the English to be soundly converted before they go East again. Thus converted, England might be very good friends, with China at least, and do a brisk trade — for they are, after all, both lions.

As for the white man from the United States, he has lost no power in the Far East for he never had any in any real sense; and as for his prestige, that depends upon the extent to which he can revive his traditions of friendship for China. The new tradition, however, must have fairly solid material foundations. The most solid would be for the United States to give China enough aid to stop Japan's aggression. But the Americans say they are a neutral people, and besides they are going to be busy for a long time getting ready to defend themselves against Europe. Their shadow upon the future of the Far East lies very light and indistinct, and will continue to do so as long as they do not make it a reality.

The whole future of the white man in the Far East is confused and no glass can show it otherwise than darkly. And the darkest of all is that possibility envisaged by Nazi leaders of an Asia united against Europe. It is the old familiar nightmare of the Yellow Peril; but it may be used again as an excuse for a new conquest of the Far East by the white man. If it is, the Yellow Peril will be a peril indeed, especially if Russia decides not to be white. Then war, now destroying mankind separately in the West and the East, will complete that destruction in a last gigantic struggle of East against West.

Where is the voice left in the world today to speak for the simple and practical wisdom of peace and good will among men?

THE NEW AMERICAN ARMY

By Hanson W. Baldwin

LAST summer the United States abandoned a military policy that had always been the warp and woof of our national life and embarked on an unprecedented program of modernization and expansion — a program that will profoundly affect the country's social order. The impetus behind this sudden change was the threat of world-wide revolution implicit in Hitler's victories in Europe. The German conquests, achieved by the unstinted use of smashing power and by novel tactics, left behind them in America a trail of riddled ideas and obsolete organizations. The one great issue, therefore, upon which all Americans became emphatically united after the fateful tenth of May was defense. There remain differences as to methods and means, but there is fundamental unanimity for the proposition that our fighting services require drastic modernization and expansion.

The navy, long recognized as an "M-Day" (Mobilization Day) service ready for instant action, had been modernized and strengthened by the various expansion programs undertaken since President Roosevelt assumed office in March 1933. Our "first line of defense" was therefore far better prepared for an emergency than was the army, and far better equipped to absorb readily and efficiently the billions of dollars that were to be appropriated for it and to translate those billions into fighting strength.

This is not to say that the army had made no progress whatsoever since 1933, for it, too, had undergone a certain amount of expansion, as the following tables show:

Strength of the Army

	1934 Fiscal Year (ending June 30, 1934)	*1940 Fiscal Year* (ending June 30, 1940)
Regulars	136,975	242,914 [a]
National Guard	189,000	243,000
Reserve officers	87,000	125,000
Enlisted reserve	none	28,000

Equipment of the Army

Planes	1,497	2,800
Tanks	none [b]	464
Semi-automatic rifles	none	38,000

[a] Officers and men

[b] Except obsolete Renaults and other World War models

But in no sense had the army's expansion been equal to the navy's, and only a handful of Regulars were called, by courtesy, "M-Day" units. Indeed, the army's war plans had always been based upon the assumption, perhaps no longer tenable after the German victories in Europe, that it would have ample time (as it did in 1917–1918) to prepare, train and equip itself *after war had started*. In other words, the nation depended for its second line of defense on the small professional Regular Army.

This military policy stemmed from our beginnings and was predicated upon the geographical fact of our isolation behind two ocean ramparts. Having no land frontiers on powerful states, we felt no need for conscription in time of peace. Indeed, the mass armies that conscription implied were looked upon as something alien to the American way of life. Conscription was, of course, envisaged in the War Department's plans for raising an army in case the United States should again become involved in a great war. But as late as the end of last May, even after the German break-through at Sedan, it formed no part of the General Staff's plans for expanding the army to meet the threat of a possible German victory. According to these plans, first priority was given to the expansion, modernization, reëquipment and reorganization of our small professional force in order to provide nine "streamlined" infantry divisions at peace strength, an army air force of about 11,000 planes, and augmented garrisons for our coastal and overseas possessions. Second in priority was the reëquipment, reorganization and intensified training of the National Guard. But the speed of the German victories aroused public apprehension to such a high pitch, and the movement for conscription started by the Military Training Camps Association gained such momentum, that the army was persuaded, not very unwillingly (except for Secretary of War Woodring, who subsequently resigned) to alter its plans and key its expansion program to a new military policy in which the citizen soldier would become virtually a professional, with the Regular Army merely providing the cadres for the mass army of conscripts.

This fundamental change in policy is, of course, only one of the many measures which the Administration is taking, or has advocated, in order to transform the United States Army from a second line of defense into a possible first line, and to make our land forces in actual fact ready for action on "M-Day" — not one month, six months or a year later.

All these measures are predicated upon the possibility, that a victorious Germany — in possession of all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe and in coalition with, let us say, Japan and Italy, and perhaps even Russia — might, after seizing the British fleet, launch an attack upon the United States, which by then would be definitely outmatched upon the seas. The projected mass army is regarded as insurance against this possibility. It is also looked upon as a force for protecting *one* of our coasts until the navy, some six to eight years hence, is able to guard *both* coasts through the completion of the "two-ocean" fleet now authorized.

Such are the assumptions and such is the policy evolved by the army to meet them. There seems little doubt that the bulk of public opinion believes the threat from Europe to be real, though it is far from unanimous as to precisely what we should do in order to meet that threat. One minority thinks the danger has been exaggerated; another fears that the mass army concept may give us the shadow of strength without the substance.

THE COST

Shortly after the war reached a crisis in May, President Roosevelt requested additional funds for defense. This request was followed by two others; and at the time of writing Congress has approved the principal appropriations that have been asked for, and is considering and even initiating others. However, a summary of the budget for the 1941 fiscal year presented to Congress by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau on August 5 showed that out of the $14,702,000,000 requested of this session of Congress for national defense, $6,809,000,000 (in appropriations made or pending, or in contract authorizations approved or pending) were earmarked for the army.

Not all of this, of course, was to be spent during the fiscal year 1941; some of it would carry over into 1942 or even 1943. On the other hand, this figure does not by any means represent the total cost of our modernized and expanded army. It does not include any funds for maintenance of the National Guard on active service during 1941 and subsequent fiscal years; it does not include any funds for putting conscription into effect or for training conscripts; nor does it provide either for maintaining our huge force after it has been brought up to its contemplated strength or for routine replacements of equipment. Training the Guard and the conscripts will add about $2,000,000,000 to this

year's costs. As for the annual upkeep costs of our future army, no precise estimate can be made since the form of that army is still uncertain; but those costs cannot possibly be much less than $3,000,000,000 or $4,000,000,000 annually.

According to Mr. Morgenthau, $2,320,000,000 of the army's $6,809,000,000 had actually been appropriated by August 5; in addition, contract authorizations of $577,000,000 had been approved. The rest — an important remainder, because it included the moneys intended to provide most of the land and air equipment for our mass army — was still in the legislative hoppers at the time; but the bulk of it was approved in the early part of September.

MAN POWER

The army's man power plans are, at the time of writing, based upon the peacetime conscription law, passed by Congress in September, requiring the registration of all men between 21 and 35. The eventual numerical goal must depend largely upon the complexion of the international situation. In late August 1940, the Regular Army's strength was about 285,000 men and 14,000 Regular officers. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for a Regular Army of 375,000 enlisted men and a Regular officer personnel of about 16,719, plus 9,000 Reserve officers called up for extended active duty. During this last summer, peacetime (and even some wartime) recruiting records were broken time and again as the army enlisted 22,000 men in June and 31,500 in July. It was hoped that the goal of 375,000 would be reached by January 1, 1941, or sooner, by voluntary enlistments alone. But General Marshall, Chief of Staff, explained to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that this was not fast enough, and that he did not believe voluntary recruiting would provide more than 375,000 men.

The National Guard's actual strength is now about 233,000 enlisted men and 15,000 officers, as against an authorized strength of 255,850 officers and men. Under the National Guard Mobilization Act the President has ordered the entire Guard to begin a year's active duty commencing in September 1940; but the terms of this legislation permit married officers under the rank of captain and married enlisted men to resign, while men indispensable to a war industry are to be discharged. This provision, plus losses due to physical or other disabilities, will probably reduce the strength of the Guard to less than 220,000.

This means that the total trained army man power of the nation in August 1940 was about 534,000. The War Department proposes, with the passage of the conscription bill, to increase as rapidly as possible the number of men actually under training to about 1,400,000, probably by the spring of 1941. Eventually this total may be considerably increased; General Marshall has testified that in his opinion at least 2,000,000 — more probably 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 — men would be required for Hemisphere Defense. With 16,500,000 men available between the draft ages of 21 and 35, there is no doubt that conscription can secure the necessary increments. Allowances must be made, however, for men suffering from physical or character disabilities (from 40 to 60 percent of those volunteering for the Army were rejected during the summer for these reasons) and for the exemption of those indispensable to industry or with dependents. Nevertheless, it is clear that if the United States should choose to broaden the base of conscription to include all men between the ages of 18 and 65, its man power resources would become almost limitless. The army's original plan provided for calling up conscripts as follows: 75,000 men on October 15, 1940; 115,000 on November 5; 112,000 on December 15; 98,000 late in December; 400,000 on April 1, 1941; 600,000 on October 1, 1941; and 400,000 men each April 1 and October 1 thereafter until the expiration of the conscription legislation in 1945. This schedule was delayed by the failure of Congress to approve the conscription bill promptly, and the first trainees will not start service until after mid-November. Since each man is to receive one year's training, a total of 3,400,000 would be trained in the next five years, in addition to the volunteer personnel of the Regular Army and the National Guard.

To direct this vast force and to provide additional officers for the Regular Army and National Guard, it is proposed to call from 40,000 to 60,000 Reserve officers to active duty in increments. By April 1, 1945, therefore, the new army of the United States will consist of the following components: Regular Army — 375,000 men, 16,719 officers; National Guard — 240,850 men, 15,000 officers; Trained Reserve — 3,400,000 men, 40,000 to 60,000 officers. In addition there will be various other increments of strength, such as Home Guard units now being formed in many states to replace the National Guard when the latter is ordered to active duty, the remainder of the Reserve officers (many of whom will have to be eliminated because of physical or professional un-

fitness), R.O.T.C. students, and certain other reservoirs of semi-trained man power.

ORGANIZATION

The organization of this vast force has not yet been completely defined, but the skeleton framework has already been set up, and is now being filled out with new units in process of rapid formation.

A year ago the organization of the Regular Army was based on three divisions which in reality were little more than cadres. By the end of May 1940 the army's strength had grown to five well-equipped, peace-strength infantry divisions. During the summer it has been further expanded to include nine infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two armored divisions. When the National Guard is called into service, the minimum initial goal is to be a "powerful, mobile army" consisting of nine army corps, each composed of two National Guard "square" divisions (four infantry regiments per division) with a war strength of about 18,300 men, and one Regular Army "triangular" division (three infantry regiments) with a war strength of about 14,000 men. These twenty-seven infantry divisions would be supported by the necessary corps, army and G.H.Q. units, including field artillery, two horsed cavalry divisions and four armored or mechanized divisions. The total strength of this force, as now envisaged, would be 850,000 men, and it would constitute the mobile field army of the United States.

It is estimated that an additional 150,000 men would be required to maintain and operate the army's planes, which, it is hoped, will reach a total of around 26,500 (about 8,000 or 9,000 of them combat planes in operating squadrons) by May or July 1942. Another 100,000 men — which seems a minimum number — will be required for overseas garrisons in the Philippine and Hawaiian islands, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, plus perhaps additional thousands if and when the United States establishes garrisons to protect the naval and air bases recently acquired, or which may in the future be acquired, on British, French, Dutch or Latin American territory. For coastal and anti-aircraft defenses in the United States the army wants a minimum of 50,000 men. Under present plans this number is being augmented by the formation of special anti-aircraft and home defense units for the protection of specific localities. These

will operate in conjunction with, and under the orders of, the country's first Air Defense Command, formed last February with headquarters at Mitchel Field, Long Island. The War Department also estimates that still another 150,000 to 200,000 men will be required for administrative overhead, the initial training of recruits, the service of supply, medical care, etc.

These figures, it must be emphasized, are the minimum, initial goal; General Marshall has testified that the eventual goal is the formation of forty-five infantry divisions and ten armored divisions, which means upwards of 2,000,000 men. The tactical organization of the army is still in flux, among other things because of a rapid changing of ideas inspired by Germany's victories in Europe. Much emphasis is being placed on aviation and mechanized forces, though the army still believes that the infantry is the queen of battle.

To secure greater mobility and flexibility, the Regular Army abandoned the two-brigade, four-infantry-regiment, "square" division a year ago and reorganized its infantry components on the basis of the more streamlined, three-regiment, "triangular" division, smaller in size than the square division but faster moving. The final organizational tables of this new division are, at the time of writing, about to be issued, but numerous changes dictated by the lessons of field experience are already being made: the weakness in anti-tank strength is being remedied and the number of anti-tank ("A.T.") guns assigned to each division is to be at least doubled (it will still be only half of the German divisional "A.T." strength); each division will be given a mechanized unit of armored scout cars and motorcycles for reconnaissance; and the divisional artillery is to be reorganized on a novel basis, with the new 105 mm. howitzer as the primary weapon of divisional artillery strength and the famous 75 mm. gun probably relegated to anti-tank purposes.

Last summer the nucleus of the nation's first armored corps was formed, with headquarters at Fort Benning, Georgia. The cadres of this corps consisted of the infantry's tanks and the cavalry's Seventh Mechanized Brigade, comprising between them some 400 to 500 tanks, most of them light — weighing about ten tons. This in reality is a tank corps. It is responsible for the maintenance, development and operations of tanks, separated from the infantry and the cavalry; and it has been put under one head — the Armored Field Force Commander,

who is Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee — and has a representative on the General Staff in the War Department. This corps is at present experimental, being frankly patterned on the German *Panzer* division (which some of our officers anticipated — on paper — as early as 1930). It will almost certainly be duplicated when men and equipment are available. When it is, the army will have four armored, or tank, divisions, as compared to the single brigade, or less than half a division, available a year ago. Each division will eventually have a war strength of some 8,000 to 9,000 men; each will comprise a division headquarters troop, a signal troop, a squadron (thirteen planes) of observation aviation, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank brigade, a mechanized field artillery regiment plus a field artillery battalion, a motorized infantry regiment, with attached ordnance, quartermaster and other troops. There will be 272 light tanks, 110 medium tanks, and 201 armored scout cars in each division, supported by twenty-four 75 mm. howitzers, twelve 105 mm. guns and eight 75 mm. guns. The German *Panzer* division has somewhat more tanks in its organic structure than ours (about 425 to our 382), but our ratio of light to medium tanks is only about 2½ to 1, as compared to the German 4 to 1. In addition to these tank or armored divisions, a G. H. Q. tank force — for the present a responsibility of the Armored Field Force Commander — will be formed when equipment is available. This will be composed of heavy tanks, probably for use as break-through weapons to accompany the infantry.

Several of the new streamlined, or triangular, divisions are to train and equip themselves to act, if necessary, as specialized units. One division, the Fourth, is to be completely motorized and may work with the armored divisions. (Contrary to common belief, the normal triangular division, instead of being completely motorized is only partially so and can move its men and equipment about 100 miles a day only by "shuttling.") Another, probably the Ninth, is to be specially trained and equipped for landing operations. Several cavalry regiments are being reorganized to form corps reconnaissance regiments. Half of each of these regiments will operate armored scout cars; the rest, though horse-mounted, will transport their horses over long distances in vans. Thus these regiments will be prepared for both road and cross-country reconnaissance, and will have considerable strategic mobility. Unfortunately, however, this mobility will be limited

by the great weight of the loaded horse vans — fifteen tons, a weight greater than many bridges can support.

Still another organizational development is the Air Defense Command, under Brigadier General James E. Chaney. General Chaney, with the aid of American Legion posts and many civilian observation stations, is building up an aircraft warning system, which by means of a commercial telephone hook-up will be able to flash to a central headquarters warnings of enemy bombing raids. These observation stations will be supplemented by the new specially-built ray detectors, which pick up planes sometimes more than 100 miles away. The central headquarters of the First Air Defense Command, embracing all the northeastern states as far south as the Virginia Capes and as far west as Duluth, may be shifted from Mitchel Field to Westover Field, Massachusetts, when the latter is finished. This headquarters will be responsible for organizing aircraft warning services, for collating the reports as they are received, and for coördinating the defense operations of pursuit planes, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, etc.

Such are the organizational plans for the Regular Army, and it is into these plans that the National Guard and the conscripted men must fit. The Guard itself is already in process of reorganization; many excess cavalry and infantry "outfits" are being transformed into field artillery, anti-aircraft or coast artillery regiments, or into mechanized reconnaissance troops. However, the basic tactical organization of the Guard's eighteen infantry divisions, consisting of two brigades and four regiments each, is not expected to be altered immediately, at least under present plans. Two of the larger Guard divisions will operate with one of the Regular Army's triangular divisions to form a corps. Each corps will thus have the advantage of an extremely mobile, hard-hitting, small division plus the staying power of two slower-moving but larger and stronger divisions.

Finally, the organization of the War Department itself is being altered to distribute the increased work load more equably. For instance, the nucleus of a General Headquarters to assist the Chief of Staff of the Army, has been formed at Washington, with Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair as chief of staff to General Marshall. This move may presage the complete alteration of our structure of high command. Although, according to official releases, the new G.H.Q. has been set up to supervise training

activities, some observers see in it an attempt to combine the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander of the Field Armies. Other changes, intended to relieve and distribute the load of the General Staff include the appointment of new assistants and of an additional Deputy Chief of Staff.

EQUIPMENT

When the present program started in May 1940, the army actually had surplus stocks of certain types of equipment, such as rifles, machine guns, and some types of field artillery — most of them left over from World War days but on the whole quite serviceable. At that time the War Department was working on a program to complete the equipment of the Regular Army and National Guard with "critical" (*i.e.*, not commercially manufactured) items of modern arms; and considerable equipment had already been delivered. The status of this program — as of May 1, 1940, prior to the tremendous expansion undertaken as a result of the German victories — is shown in the following table:

	On hand, May 1 1940	*Planned on completion of program, July 1, 1941*
Anti-aircraft		
3 inch guns, mobile	448	500
90 mm. guns, mobile	None	317
Directors	168	273
Height finders	142	276
Sound locators	194	801
37 mm. guns, anti-aircraft, mobile	15	1,423
.50 caliber machine guns, AA, mobile	1,014	1,362
Small Arms		
Semi-automatic rifles, M-1, Garand	38,000	240,559
37 mm. anti-tank guns	228	1,388
60 mm. mortars	3	3,756
81 mm. mortars	183	853
.50 caliber machine guns (pack)	83	962
Rifles, Springfield	895,000	895,000
Rifles, Enfield	2,450,000	2,450,000
Machine guns, cal .30 and .50	75,000	75,000
Field Artillery		
75 mm. guns	3,000 (approx.)	3,000*
75 mm. howitzers (field and pack)	60	319
105 mm. howitzers	14	120

*Only 141 were completely modernized; 459 were in the process of modernization; a total of 1,439 were planned.

155 mm. howitzers	1,000	1,055 [b]
155 mm. guns	4	96
8-inch howitzers	None	48

[b] Of these howitzers 407 have been modernized and 324 others were in process of modernization. A total of 984 modernized howitzers was planned.

Ammunition

Bombs, 500 pound	11,928	34,924
Bombs, 1,000 pound	4,336	14,511
Cal .30 armor-piercing (rounds)	17,268,000	73,920,000
Cal .50 ball	25,220,000	53,117,000
37 mm. tank and anti-tank	75,000	1,205,000
37 mm. anti-aircraft	46,000	2,624,000
81 mm. mortar	43,000	373,000
75 mm. howitzer, H. E.	142,000	382,500
155 mm. howitzer, H. E.	925,000	1,131,000
8-inch howitzer, H. E.	None	29,000

Armored Vehicles

Tanks (light and medium)	464 [c]	1,300
Scout cars	485	1,346

[c] About eighteen were medium tanks, of a model now considered obsolescent; only ten light tanks were of the latest model.

Tractors and Special Ordnance Vehicles

Tractors, light	93	120
Tractors, medium	261	550
Tractors, heavy	65	777
Trucks, small-arms repair	79	146
Trucks, instrument repair	None	53

Engineer Equipment

Pontoon bridges, 10 ton	1	32
Pontoon equipages, 23-ton	1	8
Water-purification units	4	45
Searchlights, 60-inch mobile	285	1,028

Chemical Warfare

Gas masks	407,696	1,297,000

Aviation

Planes, all types	2,800	11,000

The above table does not, of course, include all the numerous items — uniforms, tents, shoes, automatic pistols, canteens, etc. — which any army needs, nor do the items listed as "on hand" represent the complete matériel strength of our army. It had, for instance, thousands of Colt .45's, thousands of blankets, thou-

sands of motor vehicles of all types. The table does, however, give a fair idea of the strength and weaknesses in the army's equipment situation. Its strength lies in the great quantity of basic weapons left over from World War stocks, such as Springfield and Enfield rifles, machine guns and 75 mm. field guns. Indeed, so considerable was the quantity of these items on hand that hundreds of thousands of Enfields, thousands of machine guns and hundreds of 75's have been sold to Britain since these statistics were first made public, thus reducing our superfluous stocks considerably. Ammunition and powder has also been made available to Britain, it is understood, but here we had less to spare; indeed, as of last spring, it is believed that we had on hand only enough ammunition for one big battle comparable to that of the Meuse-Argonne. Other weaknesses, as the table shows, were in modern arms, particularly in many items like tanks and anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the production of which had been largely limited to government arsenals.

The quantities listed as "planned" had not in all instances been appropriated or contracted for, although considerable sums had been voted and many contracts signed before the May crisis. But this program looked only towards the provision of "critical" items of equipment for the then existing units of the Regular Army and National Guard — that is, for some 500,000 men.

Since last May, however, this equipment program has been stepped up drastically. As it now stands its initial objectives are: (1) to procure complete equipment for a force of about 1,300,000 men; (2) to procure stocks for service use or for a war reserve of "critical" items (such as tanks and guns) for another 700,000 to 800,000 men; (3) and to create and develop manufacturing facilities adequate to maintain and supply in combat an army of at least 2,000,000 men. This means that the items listed as "planned" must in most cases be doubled, tripled or even quadrupled in numbers. Under the new program, for instance, the Army Air Corps will acquire 15,000 more planes, in addition to the 11,000 listed, giving it a final total of more than 26,000.

Exact figures as to the new goals at which the army is now aiming have never been made public; we know, however, that it has hoped to acquire complete equipment for 1,300,000 men, plus the "critical" items for another 800,000 between October 1941 and July 1942. The plane procurement program is pitched to

the same tempo. The following table gives tentative estimates for some of the new totals as now planned:

90 mm. anti-aircraft guns	1,343
tanks, all types	3,600 to 6,000
planes	25,000 to 26,500
37 mm. anti-tank guns	4,300
105 mm. howitzers	2,919
155 mm. guns	393
8 inch howitzers	73

Interpreted in terms of the needs of soldiers in the field, all this means that the National Guard is now probably no more than 50 percent equipped with modern arms, and that six Regular Army divisions are perhaps 75 to 90 percent equipped. During the August 1940 manœuvres the First Regular Army Division was, for instance, shown to be short six of its quota of eighteen 81 mm. mortars allowed by the tables of organization, 75 of its 81 60 mm. mortars, 54 of its 108 .30 caliber light machine guns, 429 automatic pistols (a temporary and easily remedied shortage), 53 semi-automatic rifles out of a quota of 3,198, 21 out of 133 motorcycles, five out of twelve light tractors, 29 out of 223 ¾-ton cargo trailers, two out of two 250-gallon water tanks, three out of 192 command trucks, and 89 out of more than 500 cargo trucks. All other items of equipment were complete. The Twenty-sixth National Guard Division from New England, for instance, had none of the new 60 or 81 mm. mortars, none of the new 37 mm. anti-tank guns (and hence no effective anti-tank gun except its 75 mm. field artillery pieces) and only about half of its complement of motor vehicles. One regiment out of four was equipped with semi-automatic rifles.

The most serious shortages at present, in the order of necessity and combat efficiency, are planes, ammunition and fuses, tanks, anti-tank guns, mortars, anti-aircraft equipment, optical and signal equipment, and new field artillery. Complicating the problem is the fact that the army has been experimenting with many new types of weapons and equipment during the past few years. Experimentation is still going on with many of these types such as the shoulder anti-tank rifle. No satisfactory standard aircraft cannon has been finally adopted. For much of the new equipment not even the specifications and designs have as yet been completed. The equipment on hand is probably adequate for training 1,000,000 men, but it is not adequate for combat.

The army has estimated that approximately 139 new manufacturing plants, or major additions to existing plants, would be required as reserve production capacity to keep an army of 2,000,000 men fully supplied during a major war effort. Seventy-six plants for the production of ordnance equipment will be needed, thirty-three for aircraft, twenty-eight for chemical warfare, two for quartermaster items. Such statistics may come as a shock to Americans who have become accustomed to thinking of the United States as the world's greatest industrial nation; but most of these new plants are needed to manufacture equipment that is not made in peacetime except in government arsenals — which, even when expanded, cannot turn out more than about 10 percent of the required volume.

The following table shows the numbers, types and estimated costs of these plants:

Ordnance Plants

No.	*Purpose*	*Total cost*
4	Smokeless powder	$188,000,000
4	TNT	42,000,000
2	Tetryl	6,000,000
2	Picric acid and explosive D	8,000,000
2	Cotton purification	6,000,000
2	Ammonium nitrate	18,000,000
1	Ammonia	15,000,000
18	Shell and bomb loading:	
	75 millimeter }	108,000,000
	155 millimeter }	
5	Bag loading	26,000,000
2	Fuse loading	10,000,000
2	Small arms ammunition	7,000,000
6	Machine gun and airplane cannon:	
	37 mm }	36,000,000
	.50 caliber }	
	.30 caliber }	
1	Shell machining:	
	75 millimeter }	8,500,000
	155 millimeter }	
2	Armor plate	8,000,000
4	Ammunition metal components	12,000,000
3	Proving grounds	28,000,000
6	Additions to existing manufacturing depots	19,000,000
10	Additions to existing ordnance depots	12,500,000
	Total Ordnance Department	$558,000,000

Chemical Warfare Service

1	Addition to existing arsenal	$ 4,000,000
1	New arsenal	26,500,000
26	Commercial plants	9,000,000
	Total Chemical Warfare Service	$ 39,500,000

Quartermaster Corps

2	Expansion of existing manufacturing depots	$ 5,500,000

Air Corps

(on basis of 50,000 military planes a year)

30	Airframe plants	$300,000,000
3	Engine plants	60,000,000
	Total Air Corps	$360,000,000
	Grand total	$963,000,000

Some $525,000,000 had been (or was being, at the time of writing) appropriated to finance the construction of these plants; additional funds may be needed later. Some of the plants — notably powder factories (to be managed and operated by du Pont, Hercules, Atlas), aircraft cannon plants (General Motors, Chrysler), tank plants (Chrysler) and aircraft engine plants (Wright, Pratt and Whitney, Packard, Ford) — have already been or are about to be started; but it will be ten to eighteen months before they are producing in quantity. The exact status of all these plants is uncertain. Some of them may be owned outright by the Government but operated by private industry, and may revert to the Government after the emergency has passed. Others will be built by private industry with the assistance of government loans, which will be paid for out of industry's earnings; title to plants in this latter category will apparently go to private industry when the government loans have been repaid. In a few instances no government funds for plant expansion may be required, private capital being adequate.

BASES

The expansion of home and overseas cantonments, forts, barracks and bases must not only accompany but precede the additions to man power and equipment. Cantonments in this country are now grossly inadequate to house an army of the size contemplated, and work has only now been started to enlarge

them. It seems clear that thousands of our Guardsmen, Regulars and trainees will have to live, at least for awhile, in tent cities, perhaps even in the midst of winter. Cantonment construction is already a potential bottleneck.

The condition of our coast defense installations, particularly in the Northeast, though improved by a continuing program started some years ago, is not yet satisfactory since the locations of most of our harbor defenses are well known and few, if any, of the guns are concealed by effective camouflage or protected from air attack. The bases of the Army Air Corps, in this country and overseas, are undergoing rapid expansion. The one at Westover Field in Massachusetts, soon scheduled for completion, is of most immediate importance. In general the construction of new fields and the enlargement of old ones is progressing rapidly and satisfactorily.

In Hawaii, our Pacific Gibraltar, the garrison is handicapped by old equipment. However, its position is being improved by the construction, on the island of Oahu, of the army's first underground hangar and by the establishment of small outlying fields and gasoline depots on other islands of the Hawaiian group. In Puerto Rico, air and coastal fortifications are being installed. In the Panama Canal Zone, a very considerable strengthening of the garrison has been effected, though there is still a shortage of modern equipment. The air forces in both Puerto Rico and Panama are not yet adequate. Alaska, on the flank of the Great Circle routes across the Pacific, has perhaps the greatest construction and expansion program of all. The army's garrison there, only 300 until a short time ago, is now 1,400 and may eventually number from 6,000 to 10,000. Two air bases are being rushed to completion ahead of schedule. The principal one, costing $13,000,000 and covering 50,000 acres, is at Anchorage, where a pursuit squadron (28 planes), a bombing squadron (from six to thirteen planes) and a base squadron will be stationed, together with anti-aircraft troops, field artillery and infantry. The other field will be at Fairbanks, only 130 miles below the Arctic Circle, where the Army Air Corps will have its first service experience with sub-zero flying conditions.

TRAINING

As we must expect in the midst of an expansion program, the state of training of the forces now under arms leaves much to be

desired. The manœuvres of the four field armies during August 1940 showed quite conclusively that the National Guard units, though their operations were better than in the manœuvres of 1939, need at least twelve months intensive training before they can be called combat troops.

The Regular Army, after its manœuvres in the Sabine River area last May, had five well-trained and, on the whole, well-equipped divisions. But so many of the trained men of these divisions have now been transferred to form cadres for new units that there is not a single Regular Army "outfit" in the country whose ranks are not composed of anywhere from 20 to 50 percent of recruits. Reserve officers with five to nine months active duty experience are commanding batteries and companies; the seasoned strength of the Regulars has been so diffused with raw men that practically every Regular unit would require from three to six months training before it could be considered ready for modern war. And it must be remembered that every one of the Regular units was so far below war strength (in most cases they were even below peace strength) that at the moment of writing the expansion program of the army — insofar as man power is concerned — has scarcely started. The diffusion process may therefore have to continue.

The principal faults due to lack of training, as exhibited by the August manœuvres, were (1) the tendency of troops to operate as if air power played no part in the scheme of war, (2) the predisposition of commanders to plod along at the same tactical tempo of the First World War, (3) the neglect of concealment and surprise, and (4) defective communications and bad handling of motorized units, with consequent delays and road jams which might have had fatal results if the mimic wars had been real.

The training program has not yet been defined in clear detail by the War Department. Apparently, however, it contemplates "feeding" conscripts and volunteers into Guard and Regular units more or less impartially until they are brought up to war strength, after which additional units of trainees may be formed. Guard units will for the time being receive training at camps in their home states or in the South; later, a number of them may be concentrated in one area for manœuvres. A large part of the first few months must obviously be devoted to basic and primary training in the school of the recruit and the school of the soldier. This will be true both of Regulars and Guardsmen. Later, the officers,

particularly in the Guard, will require training in staff work and the coördinated handling of larger units.

BOTTLENECKS AND OBSTACLES

The army's tentative timetable has already been dislocated by delays; more are sure to arise in the future. Plans for man power have been modified by Congress' debate on conscription. It is now certain that the first conscripts cannot be inducted into service, as was originally planned, by October 15, 1940; nor will the entire Guard, it seems, be in the field before the end of the year. Procurement plans have been delayed by a variety of causes. Congress approved the nearly $4,000,000,000 needed to cover the cost of 15,000 planes and the bulk of the other necessary equipment only in September. Nevertheless, this legislative delay has not materially interfered with the procurement schedule, since considerable portions of the funds appropriated a few months earlier had not yet been tied up in contracts.

The greatest and most serious bottleneck is in plane procurement, and even the considerable efforts of William S. Knudsen and other members of the National Defense Advisory Commission have not been adequate. By August 9, about two months after Congress had appropriated some $400,000,000 for 4,081 planes (part of the final total of 26,500 to be acquired), only thirty-three had been contracted for, according to Secretary of War Stimson. This situation was considerably relieved later in the month when further plane contracts were let, but in early September it was still not satisfactory. Plane manufacturers attributed this in part to the discriminatory provision of the Vinson Bill limiting plane and ship builders to an eight percent profit while failing to limit that of other munitions manufacturers. Another cause for protracted negotiation was the dispute as to how capital investments for plant additions should be amortized. Happily, however, these disagreements were on the way to a satisfactory adjustment by the end of summer. Multiplicity of types, hand-tailored planes with too many "gadgets," and delays attributable to design and construction difficulties also conspired to keep the country's production rate low: by July about 750 military planes were being built a month, but only some 300 of them were delivered to the United States Army and Navy — and nearly all of these were training planes. Priority was being given to the delivery of planes for Great Britain.

Still another bottleneck arose from the fact that designs and specifications for certain types of indispensable weapons and equipment were not ready — the army, in fact, had not in some cases made up its mind what it wanted. And finally, other delays were caused by such simple, but industrially important, matters as specifications that called for long and laborious handwork when machine work would have done just as well. Moreover, industry is occasionally being hampered and confused by dissimilar specifications: for instance, the army and navy may require different materials or different-sized bolt holes in making engines of the same horsepower and performance.

Mr. Knudsen made it plain early in August that the new program could not be finished on time, that we could not produce total equipment for 2,000,000 men until the middle of 1944. The tanks, he said, would be "slow in coming," and the 105 mm. howitzer, which is to be the basic field artillery piece of our new army, is also behind. Other dilatory items, though Mr. Knudsen did not say so, are aircraft cannon, optical and fire control instruments, and a variety of smaller things. Also lagging is the production of the new semi-automatic rifle, now being turned out at the rate of 400 or 500 a day. This rate, though behind schedule, is not, however, a cause for much worry, since we have hundreds of thousands of excellent Springfield rifles, which are equal or superior as a combat arm to any used abroad.

CONCLUSION

This revolutionary transformation of the American Army from a small professional body of volunteers, bolstered by the citizen soldiers of the Guard, into a mass conscript army must naturally encounter obstacles and delays. Not the least of these is the doubt felt, even by some of our best military thinkers, as to the necessity or the wisdom of building a huge mass army. They ask, with some reason, where are the battlefields across which such an army can be deployed, and they express their regrets that we seem to be too slavishly following tactical lessons taught in a European war, lessons which may not be valid when applied to the peculiar geographical conditions of the Western Hemisphere. Most of those who hold these views, though they favor conscription, see no need for land forces exceeding a total of 600,000 to 850,000 men. Others regret the imposition of conscription in peacetime, but are aware that, regardless of its merits as a means for raising

man power, it is a diplomatic weapon which impresses the totalitarian Powers more strongly than any exchange of notes. Still others, among them former Secretary Woodring, hold that the volunteer system has not yet received a fair test.

But perhaps the most valid argument against conscription is that it may produce the shadow of strength without the substance. Great mass armies did not make France strong. Mass can be an element of weakness if it does not have the mobility, flexibility and strength inherent in good training, sound tactics, reliable equipment and a high morale. Certainly, mass plus strength cannot be produced quickly; and it is already obvious that for the next eighteen months or more we shall not have an army so much as an aggregation of half-trained units — both in the air and on the ground. Conscription may, if properly handled, contribute materially to a long-range expansion program; but it cannot assist, in fact it will actually hinder, any short-range program for strengthening our land forces. Too large a mobilization of our man power would dangerously defer the realization of our maximum strength; we might well defeat our own ends and dissipate our strength by mobilizing 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 men. We must, therefore, preserve a fine balance in building our new army; we must remember the old principle of the economy of force and we must attempt to plan — not force unlimited, force for the sake of force — but force nicely calculated to achieve the ends desired, whatever they may be. To this extent we have failed thus far, for we have not prefaced our actions with a reasoned, coördinated plan; we have no final objective, except to strengthen everything as much as possible. To remedy this shortcoming a planning body for national defense is badly needed in Washington.

And there are other needs. We should determine priorities and put first things first. Since an attack upon this hemisphere can come only through the air or over the seas, fighting ships and fighting planes are obviously of first importance. The bottleneck that blocks the acquisition of planes quickly must be broken, if necessary by stern measures. Already many people are asking why should manufacturers squabble about profits when the citizen-conscript may have to sacrifice not only wages and time but perhaps life itself?

To control this hemisphere we must have properly implemented bases located at strategic places. We already have ample bases under construction in the continental United States and

our overseas possessions. Recent or impending agreements with Canada, Britain and Latin American states permitting us to lease or utilize some of their territory for bases will, when those bases are ready, enormously strengthen our strategic position in the Atlantic, the Caribbean and around the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. Garrisons will, of course, be needed to man them and to operate and maintain the ships and planes that will use them; furthermore, a highly trained, thoroughly equipped, mobile force should be ready for instant dispatch to any threatened point in the hemisphere. The army's plans in this respect seem more than adequate, except that our existing strength has been too much diffused, and thus weakened, by the expansion program. At least two of our Regular Army divisions should be put in full readiness as quickly as possible, and no further diffusion of their strength permitted.

In the field of procurement we can resolve present difficulties only by understanding that we cannot eat our cake and have it too, that we *must* upset the normal life of the country if we are going to prepare it to wage modern war. We shall have to reconcile ourselves to the enactment of all sorts of new laws, some of them containing a real sting.

Finally, what is needed most of all is an army command with vision, backed by a united people. Today we have neither one nor the other. There are many men in the army with vision; but only a few of them occupy the places of power. The differing concepts of military policy outlined above — which in essence can be stated as a conflict of mass versus mobility, of speed versus security — find their reflections in the tactical sphere. Many of our present tactics stem from an age that is gone; the dead hand of tradition still lies heavily upon our military thought processes. We must renovate our thinking, for our final citadel is the citadel of the mind. It must be broad and spacious and strong, receptive of new ideas. And we must find common ground for a common patriotism — a patriotism born of a determination to safeguard the vital interests of this nation and its way of life, which once lost can never be regained.

THE DOWNFALL OF FRANCE

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

ON May 10 Hitler sent his troops into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. He chose the moment well. For although there had been repeated alarms of just such a German invasion, the British and French Governments were neither of them in a condition to react to the actual event instantly and in unison. In both countries there was a cabinet crisis.

On April 9 Hitler had occupied Denmark and invaded Norway. In the month that had intervened since then the German invaders had not secured complete success. The British expeditionary force hung on in Narvik. But the larger bodies of British troops landed at several points on the Norwegian coast, and the French and Polish troops that had accompanied or followed them, had been forced to retire. The British people, press and Parliament were busy on May 7, 8 and 9 debating the responsibilities for what seemed more and more clearly to have been a great Allied failure. So intense was the domestic political dispute that on May 10, despite the dangers of the military situation created overnight by Germany's invasion of the Low Countries, Neville Chamberlain felt obliged to resign as Prime Minister and the King asked Winston Churchill to form a new Government.

In France there also was a cabinet crisis over Norway, though it had not come openly to a head. Premier Paul Reynaud had become worried by the conduct of French operations there, and had decided that General Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, ought to be replaced. This added new intensity to M. Reynaud's long-standing feud with M. Daladier, for General Gamelin was Daladier's man. The row had come to such a pitch by May 9 that when M. Reynaud brought the matter up in a Cabinet meeting that afternoon M. Daladier threatened to resign if General Gamelin were replaced; and M. Reynaud was ready to resign if General Gamelin were not replaced. After their sharp discussion, the Cabinet members separated for the night feeling that there would have to be a show-down and probably a new Cabinet the next morning.

But before the new morning dawned Hitler had struck. The French Cabinet closed ranks temporarily, for obviously there

could not be a change in the High Command in the very moment of attack. But General Gamelin can hardly have felt sure that morning whether or not he was to remain Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps, even, the uncertainty of his position was one of the factors which impelled him to make rather rash decisions about how many troops should be sent into Belgium and Holland, and about how far they should be ordered to try to go. That is speculation. But the fact of bickering and discussion in the French Cabinet over the efficiency of the French High Command at the very moment when the campaign opened in the Low Countries is not in doubt. And this French Cabinet crisis joined with the Cabinet crisis in England to provide the Germans, not with the opportunity for a tactical surprise, for that was hardly conceivable, but with an opportunity to act when the men in charge of the destinies of both the Allied Powers were preoccupied with personal and political quarrels.

In the following pages I have attempted to piece together a running account of the "thirty days' war" which followed the German attack on the Low Countries on May 10, as well as of the chief political events which occurred during that time and in the ensuing period of the French collapse. The main related events in other countries, including the United States, are also indicated. Gaps remain both in the military and the political story. We still lack accurate information about the strength and disposition of the Allied troops on May 9 and about many of their movements, especially in the very first days. There are several important uncertainties about the behavior of various French political leaders, especially from the date of the arrival of the French Government at Tours on June 10, down to M. Reynaud's overthrow on the evening of June 16 and the decision of the new Pétain Government to make an armistice on terms which the British Government insisted were incompatible with the Anglo-French agreement of March 28.

Some of the details given here may have to be modified in the light of subsequent disclosures. The account does not pretend to be more than an advance catalogue of some of the materials which historians — if there are to be historians — will later on examine and reëxamine. I simply attempt to record the main matters that we now know or think we know; to put them into order; and to emphasize those points which seem to have been decisive. My story is based partly on the newspaper accounts of

American correspondents,[1] partly on my own conversations and observations during the short time that I was in France just before the fall of Paris, and partly on information supplied from various private sources. I think that a number of bits of information, some of them of considerable interest, have not heretofore appeared in print.

1. The Invasion of the Low Countries

MAY 10

Suddenly, without warning or ultimatum, the armed forces of Germany attack the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Shortly before dawn Nazi planes bomb the principal Dutch and Belgian aerodromes, and Nazi parachutists make surprise landings at strategic points. Aerodromes through France are also seriously damaged and many French planes are destroyed on the ground. Soon after the commencement of the air raids, German troops cross the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers.

Government communiqués issued later in the day in Berlin, The Hague and Brussels put the start of hostilities at slightly different hours. The resulting confusion is due in part to the difference between Western and Central European time, and to the special Amsterdam time observed in Holland. It seems that the attacks actually begin in force at about 4:30 A.M. Western European time (5:30 A.M. in Berlin; 4:50 in The Hague). By sunrise the Nazi bombers have wrought great and widespread destruction and German troops are pouring across the frontiers into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg from the Moselle to the sea.

The Netherland Government orders its army to resist and appeals for help to London and Paris. Some time after the start of actual hostilities, the German Minister at The Hague delivers an ultimatum. Announcing that "an immense German force has been put into action," he explains that resistance would be "senseless." He claims that his Government possesses "undeniable proofs of an immediately imminent invasion by France and Britain" of the Low Countries, and that the Dutch and Belgian Governments had foreknowledge of the preparations. If the Netherlands decides not to resist, Germany will guarantee its European and overseas possessions. Foreign Minister van Kleffens rejects these allegations and demands; and he states that because of the attack the Netherlands now finds itself at war with the Reich. Queen

[1] I am much indebted to Mr. Charles F. Johnson for assistance in the compilation of the newspaper material, and to Mr. Melville J. Ruggles for help in checking it. The printed sources which have been particularly useful are the "Bulletin of International News," published in London by the Royal Institute of International Affairs; the *New York Times;* the *New York Herald Tribune;* the *Chicago Daily News;* the *Times* of London; and the *Temps* of Paris.

Wilhelmina later issues a proclamation emphasizing that her Government has followed a course of "strict neutrality during all these months," and making "a flaming protest against this unprecedented violation of good faith and violation of all that is decent between cultured States."

Meanwhile, the Belgian Cabinet has been in emergency session since 1 A.M., after receiving news of heavy German troop movements at 9:30 the previous evening. King Leopold takes command of the forces in the field. General mobilization is ordered. Great Britain and France are requested to implement their guarantees. Early in the morning, but after Brussels, Antwerp, and other cities have already been bombed and when severe fighting is already in progress, the German Ambassador to Belgium calls on Foreign Minister Spaak. M. Spaak informs him that Germany once again has committed an unwarranted act of aggression against Belgium, and that Belgium will resist with all her strength.

At 7 A.M. Dr. Goebbels broadcasts to the German people. As in the case of the invasion of Norway, the German explanation is that an attack had to be made in order to forestall an attack which was being planned by the Allies. He cites the anti-German attitude of the Belgian and Dutch press, as also the extensive military preparations of the Belgian and Dutch Governments. At 8:25 A.M. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop issues a memorandum to the German and foreign press along similar lines. Leaving for the Western Front, Chancellor Hitler issues a proclamation to his troops stating that the hour has come for the great battle which "will decide the destiny of the German people for the next thousand years."

Some hours after the first German air attacks, Allied troops cross into Flanders and Luxembourg. (In the evening, Premier Paul Reynaud of France in a short radio address announces that the Allied troops began moving between 7 and 8 A.M.) Later information will indicate, however, that although German attacks have long been predicted, they nevertheless profit at the outset from eleventh-hour indecision on the part of the Allied High Command as to where they are to be met. There also proves to be some delay in starting French operations in certain critical regions. This is especially the case where the French Ninth Army, occupying the right of the line of French defenses along the Franco-Belgian frontier, fails promptly to take up and consolidate the advance defensive positions assigned to it on the Belgian Meuse.

General Gamelin, Allied Commander-in-Chief, in an Order of the Day says: "The attack that we had foreseen since October was launched this morning. Germany is engaged in a fight with us to the death. The order of the day for France and all her Allies are the words: Courage, energy, confidence." Officials at the French War Ministry mention Lyon, Nancy, Calais, Laon, Lille, Colmar, Luxeuil, Béthune, Abbe-

ville and Lens among the places bombed. Forty-four enemy planes are brought down on French territory. French plane losses are not mentioned. The German attacking force is put by the Ministry at 29 divisions.

Meanwhile, the Dutch are falling back to the line of the Maas (Meuse) River and the upper Ijssel, where they prepare to offer stubborn resistance, blowing up bridges and opening the dikes which are part of the Netherland defense system. But already in the first hours — minutes, almost — the Germans have gained important strategical advantages. So quick is their advance that the Dutch fail to blow up certain vital bridges on the Maas, notably at Maastricht in the "peninsula" of Dutch territory reaching down between Germany and Belgium towards Liège. The Belgians are thereby put at a serious disadvantage, since Maastricht commands the eastern end of the Albert Canal. But the Belgian defenses are being penetrated further south also. The town of Malmédy, southeast of Liège, is taken and passed; and German troops appear on the Meuse north of Liège. *Before the morning is over the Germans have already effected crossings of the Meuse near Maastricht and of the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Hasselt.* According to the Belgian version, the officer charged with blowing up two vital bridges near Maastricht is killed by a bomb at the moment he is preparing to fulfill this duty. (This is announced by the Belgian Premier, M. Pierlot, over the radio on May 12. His statement, however, does not admit that these developments occurred until May 11.) Also of great importance is the fact that one of the Liège forts, said to be Eben Emael, is (according to tomorrow's German communiqué) "put out of action." Luxembourg is entirely defenseless and during the day is completely overrun. The Grand Duchess Charlotte and her family flee to France.

An attempt is made to adjust internal French political differences by giving Louis Marin and Jean Ybarnégaray, rightist Deputies, places in the Cabinet as Ministers of State. The personal conflict between Premier Reynaud and Defense Minister Daladier, which has been a matter of comment in Paris for some time, is also smoothed over temporarily. In recent days it had been particularly acute, due to M. Reynaud's desire to replace M. Daladier's man, General Gamelin, as Commander-in-Chief. The dispute is resolved for the moment in M. Daladier's favor, because the start of actual hostilities on a large scale makes a sudden change in the High Command difficult if not impossible.

In London, meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Halifax has received both the Belgian Ambassador and the Dutch Minister before 6:30 A.M. They inform him that their countries have been invaded and are resisting, and transmit appeals for Allied assistance. The British War Cabinet meets at 8 A.M., and again at 11:30. At the latter meeting the service chiefs report that arrangements to assist the two invaded countries are,


ENGLAND
NORTH SEA
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
FRANCE
ENGLISH CHANNEL
Bristol Channel
Channel Is
Strait of Dover
Isle of Wight
Worcester
Northampton
Cambridge
Milford
Swansea
Cardiff
Severn
Oxford
Bristol
Harwich
Thames
Tilbury
Reading
LONDON
Margate
Dover
Amsterdam
THE HAGUE
Utrecht
Rotterdam
Arnhem
Münster
Flushing
Ostend
Bruges
Ghent
Antwerp
Albert Canal
Meuse
Rhine
Essen
Duisburg
Düsseldorf
Cologne
Exeter
Weymouth
Southampton
Brighton
Plymouth
Portsmouth
Falmouth
Calais
Boulogne
Dunkerque
Lys
Scheldt
BRUSSELS
Malines
Louvain
Tongres
Maastricht
Aix-la-Chapelle
Béthune
Lille
Tournai
Liége
Valenciennes
Arras
Sambre
Namur
Malmedy
Coblenz
Wiesbaden
Mainz
Abbeville
Cambrai
Maubeuge
Dinant
le Cateau
Somme
Oise
Péronne
Givet
Cherbourg
Dieppe
Amiens
St Quentin
La Capelle
Mézières
Sedan
Trier
Havre
Forges-les-Eaux
Compiègne
Laon
Montmédy
LUXEMBOURG
Rouen
Beauvais
Aisne
Retuel
Longwy
Thionville
Saarbrücken
Caen
Creil
Soissons
Reims
Louviers
Seine
Gisors
Senlis
Epernay
Verdun
Meuse
Metz
Evreux
Meaux
Marne
Château-Thierry
Châlons-sur-Marne
St Mihiel
Brest
St Malo
Dreux
Versailles
PARIS
Vitry-le-François
Nancy
Sarrebourg
Strasbourg
Chartres
Lunéville
Rennes
Troyes
Chaumont
Colmar
Lorient
Le Mans
Orléans
Langres
Luxeuil
Mulhouse
Freiburg
Vesoul
Belfort
Basel
St Nazaire
Angers
Briare
Loire
Nantes
Saumur
Tours
Dijon
Besançon
Scale of miles
50
100
BERNE
SW.

in the words of the *Times* diplomatic correspondent, "in train." At noon the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, and the Colonial Minister, Mr. Welter, arrive in England by air and are received at the Foreign Office in the afternoon. Later the full Cabinet meets. *Shortly before 6 P.M., Prime Minister Chamberlain has an audience with the King and tenders his resignation. Five minutes after he leaves, the King receives Winston Churchill and asks him to form a Cabinet to include the Opposition.* Mr. Chamberlain broadcasts at 9 P.M. explaining the reasons for his resignation.

News of the German invasion is flashed to the Netherland East Indies, where the Dutch authorities seize 19 German ships and intern their crews, as also all Germans of military age.

In Washington, President Roosevelt promptly instructs Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to "freeze" all moneys and credits of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Later in the day, addressing the Pan-American Scientific Congress, the President declares that the American people "are shocked and angered by the tragic news" from the three invaded countries. He adds that it would be a "mistaken idea" to believe that geography makes the Americas safe from aggression.

MAY 11

In Belgium, the Germans have consolidated their capture of Eben Emael, key fort in the Liège defenses, strengthening their control of the junction of the Meuse River and the Albert Canal. The German communiqué announcing the final surrender of the fort this afternoon says "a new type of weapon" was used by the attackers. This seems to refer to parachutists who allegedly descended into the fort and dynamited some of the gun turrets. (Premier Reynaud's speech on May 21, *q.v.*, will confirm the use of parachutists at Eben Emael.) Tanks are pouring into the Belgian defense lines over the Maastricht bridges. Long lines of refugees are streaming westward out of the battle zone. In southern Belgium, German armored and motorized columns are making rapid progress through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes in the direction of Montmédy and Sedan, meeting with unexpectedly slight Belgian resistance. The Belgian troops in their flight here and elsewhere in southern Belgium fail to dynamite roads and bridges according to plan. German wheeled transport is thus able to use these roads for the immense movement of men and supplies required for the advance into France during the next fortnight.

In the Netherlands, the German troops have crossed the Ijssel River, where the Dutch had created advance fortifications and where their army had taken a strong stand. Amsterdam and Rotterdam are bombed repeatedly and many fires set. Later estimates will put at 40,000 the

number of casualties in Rotterdam alone during the period of resistance. Since the start of hostilities several thousand parachutists have landed in the Netherlands. They are reinforced by resident fifth columnists; by a considerable number of "air infantry," transported by plane and landed at the captured air fields; and by several groups of soldiers brought down the Rhine in "Trojan barges," in the same fashion that German soldiers had been sent to Norway in preparation for the attack on that country. An attempt to seize The Hague by these methods fails. Another, directed at the Waalhaven airport in the suburbs of Rotterdam and the vital north-south bridges in the Moerdijk region, succeeds in maintaining its lodgement. There is little effective defense by Dutch air forces. British combat planes are active in Holland; British bombers attack German troop concentrations in the Rhineland and the Krupp arms works at Essen.

Winston Churchill names a cabinet of national unity. Anthony Eden becomes Secretary for War; Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary for Air; and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty. An inner "War Cabinet" of five is composed of Mr. Churchill himself as Prime Minister and Defense Minister; Clement R. Attlee, Lord Privy Seal, and Arthur Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio, representing Labor; Viscount Halifax, who remains as Foreign Secretary; and Neville Chamberlain, who becomes Lord President of the Council.

London announces that, in agreement with the Netherland Government, British and French forces have landed at Curaçao and Aruba, two Dutch possessions off the coast of Venezuela, to prevent possible sabotage of the oil refineries by German residents. In Washington the State Department intimates that it does not look upon this as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.

President Roosevelt extends the American neutrality legislation to cover Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In reply to an appeal from King Leopold for at least moral support, the President cables him that "the cruel invasion by force of arms of the independent nations of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg has shocked and angered the people of the United States and, I feel sure, their neighbors in the Western Hemisphere." He expresses the hope that the "policies which seek to dominate peaceful and independent peoples through force and military aggression may be arrested, and that the Government and people of Belgium may preserve their integrity and their freedom."

MAY 12

The Germans occupy the northernmost Dutch provinces of Groningen and Friesland, where there were only light defending forces, and reach Harlingen, near the entrance to the Zuider Zee. The Dutch High Command admits that further south the enemy have crossed the Maas

and Ijssel Rivers "at various points." An important bridge across the Ijssel east of Arnhem was not blown up in time — "another example," the London *Times* correspondent fears, "of treachery." By this route German columns have reached the Grebbe "water line" between Amersfoort and the Rhine. The Nazi attack on the Netherland "home front" is being augmented. Additional parachute troops and air infantry land. More important are the activities of resident fifth columnists. These have sabotaged the water defenses at many points. They also put out of commission Amsterdam's water supply, its gas and electricity plants, and its air-raid siren system. Desperate fighting with the parachutists and fifth columnists is still going on in the streets of Rotterdam. The Dutch have not succeeded in recapturing the Rotterdam airport.

In eastern Belgium, a German communiqué at last reveals formally that the Albert Canal has been forced between Hasselt and Maastricht. The Liège forts other than Eben Emael still hold out. Premier Pierlot in the course of a radio address says that their slopes are covered with German corpses. The advance of the Germans near Hasselt brings them within 50 miles of Brussels. Motorcycle units are probably even closer.

Even more important than the German progress south of the Albert Canal is the German operation which has been unfolding in the Ardennes and which now suddenly results in the rupture of the French front on the Meuse. The German communiqués continue to provide very little information about it. *We shall learn subsequently that today the Germans succeed in effecting two crossings of the Meuse, one at Sedan, a French town with three bridges, the other lower down the river in the region of Dinant.* This part of the front had been entrusted to the French Ninth Army under General Corap (said afterwards to be largely composed of reserve divisions not in good training and with poor morale). The failure of the Ninth Army to prevent the German crossing (not yet disclosed in any communiqué) opens the way for what in the next few days will prove a decisive strategic operation of the German High Command. While the main body of Allied mechanized forces is engaged back of Liège, the French Ninth Army will be broken here on the Meuse.

Not much is revealed about the British and French advance into northern and eastern Belgium. But though details are withheld, the London *Times* correspondent who is with the advancing British troops says they are "already in the heart of the country" and "going forward on oiled wheels." In French military circles it is claimed that so far only advance guards, not main bodies of troops, have been involved in combat. The truth (not yet disclosed) is that General Giraud at the head of the French Seventh Army has already penetrated as far as the Dutch-Belgian frontier near the coast and tomorrow actually will enter Zeeland, the southwestern province of the Netherlands. Some motorized

French units in these days even go so far (according to Premier Reynaud's statement of May 21, *q.v.*) as Hertogenbosch, a small place near the junction of the Maas and the Rhine. And in eastern Belgium (the press will learn tomorrow) French tanks are clashing today with German tanks and planes at Tongres and St. Trond, just to the rear of the broken Belgian positions along the Albert Canal near Hasselt and Maastricht. British planes are coöperating by bombing German reserves *en route* from concentration points to the Netherland and Belgian fronts. And a "token force" of about a thousand British troops lands from transports today at the Dutch port of Flushing, in Zeeland.

A retrospective view will show that as of this date British and French aid in the form of motorized divisions has been sent promptly to the Belgians on their first line of defense, the Albert Canal, while in Holland some of General Giraud's advance units have even reached the lower Maas. But it is too late. The Belgian first line has been pierced in the opening hours of the German attack on May 10; and the Germans will never allow the Belgian command a respite in which to re-form its broken troops on the second Belgian line, Namur-Louvain-Antwerp. In moving up towards that line the larger British forces are being impeded by civilian refugees and dispersed Belgian troops; and they will be given no time in which to take up positions there properly. For the German forces now beginning to cross the Meuse at Dinant and Sedan, where the French occupation of advance positions has been dilatory and ineffective, will threaten the British-French flank, force General Giraud's rapid withdrawal in the north, and in the end render resistance on the Namur-Louvain-Antwerp line impossible.

Premier Mussolini orders that Italy's western Alpine defenses be further perfected. The move is regarded as political as well as military, for it will both intensify anti-Allied feeling in Italy and worry the Allies. Four new classes — 1,000,000 men — are called to the colors. At Rome and throughout Italy demonstrations are arranged by the Fascist Party to arouse a war spirit and to create hostility towards the British. Insulting placards are posted in the streets and Englishmen and other foreigners are involved in many brawls. Italians found buying or reading the Vatican organ, the *Osservatore Romano*, are beaten or thrown into fountains, for it prints the news from both camps at equal length.

The Spanish Foreign Ministry reaffirms Spain's neutrality.

At Tokyo objections are voiced to the landing of Allied forces in the Netherland possessions in the Caribbean. Japan fears that this will be a precedent for disturbing the *status quo* in the Netherland East Indies.

May 13

The Nazi Blitzkrieg continues in full violence. The Dutch resist stubbornly but are driven back with heavy losses. Their country is

split in two. In the southern sector, German columns link up with the German troops which have taken the Moerdijk Bridge from the air. This bridge across the Maas estuary just south of Rotterdam is of great strategic importance and is the chief Dutch link with Belgium. At this point the Germans are only 30 miles from The Hague. Queen Wilhelmina arrives in England in the evening aboard a British warship. She had been preceded earlier in the day by Crown Princess Juliana and her family.

In Belgium, the Germans drive ahead into the northern plain, northwest of Liège. Here, as in other areas, the German columns are supported by low-flying planes, which help disorganize Allied transport not only by direct attacks on it but by bombing and machine-gunning retreating Belgian troops and the refugees from Liège, Namur and other towns who choke the roads in the rear. The Germans say they have now taken Liège itself, but its forts, apart from Eben Emael, still hold. French tanks, the French High Command claims, are counter-attacking in the region of St. Trond (a few miles southwest of Hasselt). Apprehensions rise in French military circles regarding both the conduct of the Belgian Army and the personal rôle of King Leopold. M. Daladier visits Belgian headquarters. It is believed that he remonstrates with the King for not consenting to subordinate his command more thoroughly to the Allied Supreme Command.

Communiqués from both sides provide very little current information about the action on the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan. German tanks and airplanes are hurrying down from northern Belgium to coöperate with the German forces that have come through the Ardennes in the exploitation of a shining German opportunity.

Winston Churchill, appearing in Parliament for the first time as Prime Minister, receives a vote of confidence 381 to 0. He tells the House that he has "nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat." His only policy, he says, is "to wage war, by sea, land and air," and his only aim is victory — "victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror . . . for without victory, there is no survival." No survival, he explains, either for the British Empire or for what it has stood for, "no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal."

Anti-British demonstrations continue in Rome and some other Italian cities.

2. The Collapse of Holland and Belgium

MAY 14

In northern and eastern Belgium units of the British and French forces which went to the assistance of Belgium and Holland are by now beginning to retire (although M. Reynaud will state on May 21 that

the formal order to the Allied forces in Belgium to retire was not given until the evening of May 15). In the south, a series of fierce stabs, executed largely by tanks and motorcyclists, has carried the Germans to the right bank of the Meuse north as well as south of Namur. From Namur to Dinant the French lines hold. British bombers go into action in the effort to eliminate vital bridges which the French have failed to destroy, as well as pontoon bridges which German engineers have been throwing across the river. But south of Dinant the Germans have been concentrating ever stronger forces at the crossing points secured yesterday and the day before. The sector of the line between Dinant and Sedan is becoming the main German front of attack.

The Netherland Prime Minister and other Ministers reach London this morning, and soon after their arrival Queen Wilhelmina issues a proclamation. She declares London the seat of the Netherland Government, but asserts the intention to reëstablish the régime in the Netherlands as soon as possible. She delegates authority in the home country to the military command. The Government has taken these steps, says the Queen, because it wanted to avoid ever being placed in such a position that it would have to capitulate. Consequently, any territories remaining in its hands, including those in the East and West Indies, still form a sovereign state and will be in a position to continue coöperation with Holland's allies.

About noon German bombers begin a terrific attack on Rotterdam which lasts an hour and a half. The anti-aircraft defenses of the city had never been perfected. Many incendiary bombs are dropped. Block after block is demolished. The waterfront is set aflame. The Dutch air force has become virtually non-existent. Following the bombing raid, German troops and squads of fifth columnists which had been expelled or held at bay take the center of the city.

After five days of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherland Army, General Henri G. Winkelman, issues an order late in the afternoon that fighting is to cease. He however excludes Zeeland, the southwestern province which has been cut off by the Germans, and where there is a small body of British troops (see May 12). It is also explained that the order does not affect the Dutch Navy, which will continue to defend the Dutch colonies in both hemispheres. General Winkelman specifically orders resistance to cease in Rotterdam and Utrecht, "to save the civil population and to prevent further sacrifice of life," and asks that order be maintained "until the arrival of the German regular armies." He concludes his order, which is published by radio at 8 P.M., by saying: "By a vast superiority of the most modern arms the enemy has been able to break our resistance. We have nothing with which to reproach ourselves. We appeal to the Dutch people to remain calm. Ultimately the Netherlands will rise again as a free nation. Long live

our Queen!" In a broadcast at 11 P.M. the Commander-in-Chief explains further that "the war was completely one-sided" and that "it was impossible to go on." Losses in the Dutch regular army are stated to have been very heavy, due to its stubborn resistance.

Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front, writes in today's *Angriff* that National Socialism is now to be considered an article of export. Adolf Hitler's "God-given natural mission," he says, is to make the world happy and reasonable. "He brought Germany to reason," writes Herr Ley, "and thereby made us happy. We are convinced he will bring Europe and the world to reason and thereby make Europe and the world happy. That is his irrevocable mission."

The British Admiralty broadcasts an order that owners of small craft, 30 to 100 feet long, must send in particulars regarding them within 14 days. These vessels become the so-called "Small Vessels Pool," which will prove so valuable during the evacuation from Dunkerque (*cf.* May 26 and May 28–June 4).

The German military successes are having their effect in Italy. Stimulated by the Fascist Party, war fever rises. Anti-British demonstrations throughout the country are climaxed by the burning in Rome, before the British Embassy, of a mock coffin covered by French and British flags and surmounted by an umbrella. Premier Mussolini, smiling, makes three balcony appearances before demonstrators in the Piazza Venezia. The American Ambassador in Rome, Mr. Phillips, decides to advise Americans in Italy to quit the country, and asks American newspapermen in Rome to meet him tomorrow in order that he may inform them of this decision.

MAY 15

The Battle of the Meuse increases in intensity. The French Ninth Army has failed in its efforts to recover the lost bridgeheads, and it has now been completely defeated and overrun. The Germans press westward with all their mechanized and aërial might. In the region of Mézières they do not attack in strength. But the units crossing the river between Namur and Dinant strike forward toward the Sambre, while the forces which have crossed near Sedan press southwest in the direction of Rethel. The French positions at Mézières thus become untenable. In a communiqué today the French admit for the first time that the enemy have crossed the Meuse; it is stated that counter-attacks are being made. But the German advance is too swift to permit the bringing up of reinforcements. And the pocket now being formed west and south of the Meuse is to be expanded during the coming week until eventually it reaches the Channel and cuts off the British and French forces which on May 10 and 11 were rushed across Flanders from northern France and which are now in retreat. General Corap is

dismissed from command of the Ninth Army; General Giraud is appointed in his place.

Further north, the German pressure towards Brussels continues. Louvain, 15 miles east of the capital, is heavily bombarded, but the British Command announces that in this sector the enemy are being held up successfully. German General Headquarters charges that Brussels is the scene of so many troop movements that it no longer can be regarded as an "open city," and threatens it with all the horrors of war if the Belgians do not cease fortifying it and using it for the transit of troops. The situation in the capital is critical. The staff of many government offices is evacuated to the coast. The telegraph office ceases to function, and a bomb explosion puts the radio out of commission for a period in the evening. The British Air Force makes its heaviest attack so far on German road and rail communications east of the Rhine.

The capitulation of the Netherland Army is signed at 11 A.M. by the German and Dutch Commanders-in-Chief. German mechanized forces occupy The Hague. At Amsterdam the Mayor broadcasts an appeal to the population to maintain calm and orderly conduct towards the German troops, who enter the city during the day. Berlin hails the collapse of Dutch resistance as providing airplane bases nearer the heart of England. In Paris, the Netherland Foreign Minister, E. N. van Kleffens, declares in an interview with the foreign press that "the Dutch people have not surrendered" and that "the struggle for a common cause will continue and be kept on to victory." He adds that his country's great possessions, including the Netherland East Indies, exist untouched. "They have been placed at the disposition of the Allies," he says, "and their contributions may be important for the final issue." He estimates that one-fourth of the Netherlands home army of 400,000 have been killed and 80 percent of the Royal Guard have become casualties in the German Blitzkrieg.

In the German regions facing Switzerland reports of a concentration of artillery and motorized divisions give the impression that preparations are being made for a German push into Switzerland east of Basel. The Swiss Army completes mobilization.

After a long conference last night with Secretary Hull and other advisers, President Roosevelt drafted a personal appeal to Premier Mussolini not to enlarge the area of the European war. His message (the text of which is not published) is delivered by Ambassador Phillips to Count Ciano about 10 o'clock this morning. It is eloquent, in some places almost monitory. It warns that if the conflict should spread to include the 200,000,000 people in the Mediterranean area and the Near East there would be much less hope that it could be kept from spreading in the end to include the whole world, with unpredictable social and political results alike for all peoples and for their rulers.

MAY 16

Until now Belgian and British forces have been able to hold off the heavy German attacks in front of Brussels and Antwerp. Bitter fighting has been taking place at Louvain, where the British drive back the German troops which attacked it yesterday. The Belgian Government nevertheless leaves Brussels for Ostend. In accordance with last night's orders of the High Command, British forces in Flanders are beginning to withdraw west of Brussels — a measure which some military critics will afterwards say was long overdue. In the southern sector, German tanks and motorcyclists are penetrating deeply into the French front, supported by low-flying German planes armed with machine guns and bombs. They advance in two main lines. That moving from Givet-Namur just south of the Sambre encounters heavy resistance from the French First Army, which seems to give a very good account of itself. The other moving southwest from Sedan makes progress without very heavy fighting. There is no French army in reserve in this region.

This is a day of uneasiness in Paris, among both officials and public. Stragglers and remnants of units from General Corap's defeated forces have already begun appearing in the outskirts of the city, bringing stories of German domination in the air and of the deadly coördination of German planes and tanks. But the alarm is even more intense in Government circles than among the general public, for early in the morning news has come that a German armored column has penetrated almost to Laon, 60 miles west of Sedan and midway between Reims and St. Quentin. At a special meeting called by M. Reynaud in his office and attended by French military chiefs and the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate, General Gamelin states that in the light of this information he cannot guarantee that the Germans may not reach Paris this very night. The military governor of Paris adds the request that the Government quit the capital at once in order to facilitate measures for its defense. General Gamelin's admission alarms Premier Reynaud and his colleagues, and doubtless it is now that the Premier sees an opportunity of replacing the Minister of Defense, M. Daladier, with whom he has for some time been in disagreement. The Government is determined to continue resistance, but word spreads in official circles that the capital may have to be abandoned. About 11 A.M. M. Reynaud even orders that the Foreign Ministry archives be burned. About three o'clock, however, a reassuring message comes from General Touchon, a vigorous and plucky commander, that the situation around St. Quentin and Laon is better.

In the afternoon Premier Reynaud makes a brief statement to the Chamber of Deputies on the military situation. He is slightly more optimistic than he could have been in the morning. He says that the

Government is perfectly aware of the extent of the danger which threatens. He hints at a change in military leadership when he says: "We may be induced to take measures which would have appeared revolutionary yesterday. Perhaps we shall have to change methods and men." He adds: "For every weakness there will be the penalty of death. We must forge new weapons immediately. We are full of hope and our lives count for nothing. One thing alone counts: preserve France." In a broadcast in the evening, the Premier brands as "untrue" the alarming and "most absurd rumors" which have been circulating in Paris that the Government is preparing to leave the capital. He declares that "the Government is in Paris and stays in Paris." He also calls false other rumors that the Germans have reached Reims, about 85 miles northeast of Paris, or even Meaux, on the outskirts of the capital, and that they are using "new, irresistible weapons." He admits that the Germans have succeeded in forming a pocket west of the Meuse, but he declares that the French forces are reducing it.

Shortly after Premier Reynaud's radio speech the French Government issues a decree extending the Army Zone so as to include Paris. The decree, proclaimed without any official explanations, transfers the control of the capital from civilian to military authority. A close guard is posted over the city gates and many foreigners are rounded up. Those of German origin are interned as a precaution against any fifth column uprising. Eight Communists have been sentenced today to terms of imprisonment up to five years for anti-French propaganda.

Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Paris in the evening and goes into conference with M. Reynaud, M. Daladier and General Gamelin.

The Italian Foreign Office confirms without comment the fact of the receipt of President Roosevelt's personal message to Premier Mussolini. The press continues its attack on the British and French, but there are only minor street demonstrations.

President Roosevelt, addressing a joint session of Congress, grimly warns that the United States must be prepared to defend itself if it is not to suffer the fate of the Low Countries, and requests an additional $1,182,000,000 for defense to give the United States a bigger navy and army and an air force of 50,000 war planes.

MAY 17

The Germans press their advance in northern Belgium, occupying Brussels, Louvain and Malines. The front of advance in France is being steadily widened, and now reaches from a point ten miles west of Sedan to Maubeuge, in all between sixty and seventy miles. The advancing columns have penetrated into French territory as far as Le Cateau (45 miles from the frontier) and La Capelle; and a new front has been formed north of Rethel. The Germans declare that

beyond these points the Allies are "in full retreat" westward, and they claim the capture of 12,000 French prisoners, including two generals.

In London the War Office confirms this evening that the British Army in Belgium retired during last night to positions west of Brussels, "certain adjustments at the front having become necessary." The communiqué says that this readjustment was executed "without interference" and that there "is no question of any collapse or break-through in this sector," as claimed in German official announcements. The Air Ministry adds that the German advance is not being made without cost. It estimates German plane losses in the last seven days at 1,000. However, it is admitted that large German reserves, estimated at 23,000 planes, may enable the Germans to sustain their present large-scale air effort for some time.

Uncounted hordes of refugees choke all roads in Belgium and Northern France and the congestion impedes the movement of troops and guns forward to the new fronts.

The French admit that the situation is critical. General Gamelin issues an Order of the Day which recalls Marshal Joffre's famous message to the French Armies before the First Battle of the Marne in 1914: "The fate of our country and that of our Allies and the destiny of the world depend on the battle now being fought. English, Belgian and Polish soldiers and foreign volunteers fight at our side. The British Air Force is engaged up to the hilt, like ours. Every unit that is unable to advance must accept death rather than abandon that part of the national territory entrusted to it. As always in the critical hours of our history the watchword today is 'Conquer or die.' We must conquer."

May 18

The Germans reach the Aisne River. It becomes apparent that their major objective is not Paris but the Channel coast, in the hope of cutting off the British and Belgian armies as well as the French divisions in Belgium. The French do not claim that the Germans have been halted, but say they have been slowed down. The Germans claim that they are within 60 miles of Paris, but the French say 90 miles. French military circles estimate that the Germans are using 80 divisions, 11 of them motorized. They are said to have thrown in from 2,500 to 3,000 tanks, some of them of 70 tons. To deal with the heaviest tanks the French have found they must use their famous 75s, their supply of anti-tank guns and ammunition being far from sufficient.

In Belgium, the Germans announce the occupation of Antwerp, accomplishing in nine days what took sixty-six days in 1914. The Liège and Namur fortifications are isolated but are not yet captured. King Leopold by radio calls on their garrisons to "resist to the utmost."

The British Air Ministry states that the Royal Air Force is carrying

the war into Germany with a series of successful raids on communications centers and fuel depots. Bombers have attacked and fired gasoline storage tanks and have damaged other supplies in Bremen and Hamburg.

As a result of the impression made by the German successes Premier Reynaud is enabled to reorganize his Cabinet. He brings in Marshal Pétain as Vice-Premier. The "conqueror of Verdun," now 84 years of age, has recently been serving as Ambassador to General Franco's Government in Madrid. To consolidate political and military leadership, Premier Reynaud himself takes over the Ministry of Defense. M. Daladier, thus replaced, becomes Foreign Minister. M. Mandel is transferred from the Ministry of Colonies to the Ministry of the Interior, indicating that the domestic situation will be controlled with a stronger hand.

In the evening Premier Reynaud broadcasts to the nation. He informs it of the Cabinet reorganization and calls the situation "serious but certainly not desperate." He pays special tribute to Marshal Pétain, and says he will remain as Vice Premier "until final victory." He concludes: "It is imperative that the feeling of war prevail in all governmental offices as it does elsewhere. Every Frenchman, whether he is in the army or the interior, should this night make with me a solemn oath to win."

The French Government orders a 12-hour day for all workers in aircraft factories, including Sundays and holidays. All engineers engaged in aeronautical design or connected with the aircraft industry are "militarized."

Premier Mussolini replies perfunctorily to the message from President Roosevelt. The *Popolo d'Italia*, dealing with Italy's attitude toward Germany, says: "We consider ourselves in fact as having already intervened."

The 21 republics of the Western Hemisphere make public the text of a joint declaration protesting strongly against the German invasion of the Low Countries. The document asserts that the American republics "consider unjustifiable the ruthless violation by Germany of the neutrality and sovereignty" of the countries attacked.

MAY 19

The German salient or pocket is being extended by a series of quick German stabs. The front now stretches from the Sambre to the Aisne Rivers, and includes the upper valley of the Oise. There is extreme pressure on the northern side of the pocket between Le Cateau and St. Quentin, which latter city the Germans claim to have captured. This presages a push towards the Channel in collaboration with the German troops gathering to the south of Brussels. In the fighting northeast of

St. Quentin the Germans are using masses of tanks. The French deny the loss of St. Quentin and insist that in this region their stubborn resistance is on the whole successful. The German High Command states that since the beginning of the campaign ten days ago they have taken 110,000 prisoners, exclusive of Hollanders, and numerous guns.

The withdrawal of the British and Belgians from Belgium is reported to be proceeding "satisfactorily." Their precarious situation is plain to the High Command but is not discussed in the press and is not yet grasped by the general public. The British troops are taking up positions north of Cambrai, with the Belgians on their left (to the east) and the French First Army on their right. Ostend, where the Belgian Government has its headquarters, is bombed several times.

Berlin reports that the last bit of resistance in the Netherlands proper has been crushed with the surrender of the Island of Walcheren, in Zeeland. The Netherland Legation in Paris states that at least 100,000 people were killed and a third of the city destroyed during the German air attacks on Rotterdam.

In the evening the French Government announces that, after consultation with the British, 73-year-old General Maxime Weygand has been appointed Chief of the French General Staff and Allied Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of operations, supplanting General Gamelin. Rumors begin to be heard in Paris of the arrest of French officers responsible for the break-through at Sedan and other places, and of the dismissal of various Préfets who have permitted the chaotic civilian evacuation of threatened areas.

Prime Minister Churchill, in a speech broadcast to the world, summons the British people to total war against Germany. It is, he says, "a solemn hour for the life of our country, of our Empire, of our allies, and above all of the cause of freedom." The Germans "have broken through the French defenses north of the Maginot Line and strong columns of their armored vehicles are ravaging the country, which for the first day or two was without defenders." He says, however, that the French armies are being regrouped, and he looks with confidence for the stabilization of the front in France. When that time comes, he warns, the British must expect to have turned upon them "that hideous apparatus of aggression which dashed Holland into ruins and slavery." Calling for the utmost exertions, he hints at drastic sacrifices by capital and labor. "I have received from the Chiefs of the French Republic," he continues, "and in particular from its indomitable Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, the most sacred pledges that, whatever happens, they will fight to the end, be it bitter or be it glorious. Nay, if we fight to the end it can only be glorious."

Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, speaking at Milan at a celebration honoring the first anniversary of the "pact of steel" with

Germany, declares that "Italy cannot remain absent from the present terrible struggle which will forge the destinies of the world." Her aspirations, he says, are well known. The Fascist crowd breaks into frenzied cheering and cries of "Corsica! Nice! Savoy!"

In the United States, Charles A. Lindbergh broadcasts a speech in which he declares that the United States "must stop this hysterical chatter of calamity and invasion that has been running rife the last few days." He declares that the United States cannot be invaded successfully by air. He denies that the country is in any danger unless it meddles in matters which do not concern it. He refrains from comment indicating any preference between the contending European belligerents, and does not reveal that he feels the outcome will necessarily affect American interests.

MAY 20

A Council of Ministers is held in Paris. Marshal Pétain gives a pessimistic report. He refers to indications that strategic cohesion among the various French armies has begun to disappear.

The German High Command announces that its forces have captured Laon, 75 miles northeast of Paris. But the main German drive is seen definitely to be towards the Channel rather than towards Paris, with the next immediate objective Péronne. Indeed (though no hint of this appears in today's press) there is reason to believe that on this date German tanks and motorcycle units have already passed around Péronne and are heading down the valley of the Somme towards Amiens. Reports reach military circles in Paris that advance German motorcycle units have even dashed into the suburbs of Amiens and have been destroyed only after causing great confusion and terror. Amiens is only 70 miles from the capital. The evening is one of alternating alarming and reassuring news. Rumors are again heard that the Government is preparing to move.

General Ironside, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, visits B. E. F. headquarters in Flanders for consultations with General Gort and with Generals Billotte and Blanchard, French commanders in the north. A Franco-British counter-offensive is planned for tomorrow. That part of the Royal Air Force made available for service on the Continent is exerting great efforts to disrupt German lines of communication.

Field Marshal Goering, on a brief visit to Berlin, gives a press interview. He likens Hitler to Frederick the Great, and says that he is wholly responsible for the German plan of campaign. Hitler works out in advance all phases of the offensive, says Marshal Goering, and even "outlines minor actions."

Hundreds of Belgian trawlers have been arriving at ports on the northern coast of France loaded with refugees. Belgians, and added

hordes of refugees from northern France, continue to stream across the country. They move in box cars and by road — in private motors, business vehicles, farm carts, on bicycles and on foot.

3. The Battle of Flanders

May 21

The German spearhead reaches the Channel. Nazi motorized units have taken Péronne and Amiens and followed the Somme down to Abbeville. They do not encounter any strong forces here and continue at full speed toward Boulogne. They also take Arras. The Belgian, British and French troops in western Belgium and northeastern France are thus cut off between the German columns and the Channel. The number is estimated by the German High Command at up to a million men. On the southern side of the great wedge, or pocket, as it is called in the French press, Rethel falls to the invaders. The furthest point of German penetration in the direction of Paris is not known precisely.

Premier Reynaud makes an important address in the afternoon to the French Senate. He says that "the country is in danger" and that it is his duty to tell the truth about what has happened. He begins by explaining the main elements of the French defense position as it was at the start of this campaign:

"Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg having been invaded, the left wing of the French Army left its fortifications between Sedan and the sea and pivoting on Sedan went forward to a line between Sedan and Antwerp, and even to Hertogenbosch in Holland. Confronted with this situation, which he had foreseen and provided for, the enemy launched a formidable attack against the hinge of the French Army which was behind the Meuse between Sedan and Namur.

"The Meuse, which is in appearance a difficult river, had been mistakenly considered as a serious obstacle to the enemy. For that reason the French divisions which had been charged with its defense were not numerous and were spread out along a great length of river bank. Moreover the troops of General Corap [the French Ninth Army] which were in position there were less solidly officered and less well trained, the best troops having been sent on the wing which advanced into Belgium. While it is true that the Meuse is a river which appears difficult, it is precisely because it is sinuous, enclosed and wooded that it is difficult to defend. Flanking fire by machine guns is impossible there. On the other hand infiltration by manœuvring troops is easy. To that should be added that over half of the infantry divisions of the Corap Army had not yet reached the Meuse although it had the shortest movement to make, being nearest the pivot.

"That is not all. Through unbelievable faults, which will be punished, bridges over the Meuse were not destroyed. Across these bridges the

Panzer divisions passed to the attack, preceded by fighting planes which attacked our scattered, badly organized, badly trained divisions. You understand now the disaster — the total disorganization of the Corap Army. It was in that way that the hinge of the French Army was forced."

Premier Reynaud continues that when he took over the War Ministry he found that the breach opened in the French defenses as a result of the above developments was already over 60 miles wide. "Through this breach," he says, "a German army composed of armored divisions followed by motorized divisions had poured, and, after opening a large pocket in the direction of Paris, was turning toward the west and the sea, taking in the rear our whole system of fortifications along the Franco-Belgian frontier and threatening the Allied forces still engaged in Belgium to whom the order to retire had not been given until the evening of May 15." In the last 48 hours, he says, the situation has become worse. The High Command has received information that the Germans have taken Arras and Amiens "and even that a bridgehead has been established at Amiens south of the Somme."

In explaining how this all came to pass, M. Reynaud says that the morale of the French troops is not in question. "The truth is," he said, "that our classic conception of warfare has run counter to a new conception. The basis of this conception is not only in the massive use of armored divisions and of fighting airplanes; it is in the disorganization of the enemy rear by deep raids by parachutists, who in Holland just failed to capture The Hague and who in Belgium seized the most powerful fort of Liège. I shall not speak about false news and telephone orders to the civilian authorities, provoking precipitate evacuations."

The French Premier here recalls the black days of the last war which were lived through successfully. Two of that war's heroes are again serving their country, Pétain and Weygand. He makes a plea that the whole population rise to the heights of their capabilities in the service of France. He warns that "no weakness will be tolerated," that "death is inadequate punishment for any error against the vital interests of the country," and that "while our soldiers are dying there will be no more dilatory procedure against traitors, defeatists and cowards."

Supplementing the Reynaud speech, authoritative quarters in Paris report that General Corap was absent from the headquarters of the Ninth Army on the night the Nazi attack began. Today Berlin tells of the recent capture, apparently on May 19, of the new commander of that Army, General Henri Giraud. The first story is that he was taken prisoner as he arrived at his new headquarters in a château in the Cambrai sector; it seems afterwards that he was captured in a tank while on a visit to encourage brigade officers in the front lines. The War Ministry in Paris admits tonight that it has been "out of com-

munication" with General Giraud for 48 hours. Last night's alarm in official circles in the capital is renewed.

General Weygand has made a visit today by plane across the enemy lines to the French headquarters north of the Somme. He does not visit British headquarters or see General Gort. But General Billotte later transmits Weygand's plan to General Gort and to King Leopold at Ypres. The plan is for an Anglo-French drive southward from Valenciennes and Douai simultaneously with a French drive northward from below the Somme, the aim being, of course, to close the German gap. Meanwhile the British have begun the counter-attack agreed upon yesterday, and register some progress. But they will later claim (in a semi-official statement, July 7) that the French were unable to move simultaneously, as planned.

MAY 22

Back in Paris from his visit to Flanders, General Weygand reports to Premier Reynaud. M. Reynaud passes on to the public the General's words that he is "full of confidence, if everyone does his duty with driving energy." Some military circles in Paris say that the General did not profess "confidence" so much as "determination." Premier Reynaud adds his own conviction that "if we hold for a month — and we shall hold as long as it is necessary — we shall have covered three-quarters of the road to victory."

During the morning Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Paris and at once confers with Premier Reynaud and General Weygand. He hears General Weygand's report on the military situation and his demands as to the course of action to be taken by the British forces in the north. Immediately afterwards he returns to London.

The Allies recapture Arras, and there is hard fighting south of a line between that city and Cambrai, where the French Seventh Army is making a desperate effort to extricate itself by cutting its way southward. But there is no serious attempt to cut the German salient by a drive from the south. The main French Army seems not to be in a position for an offensive. It is busy hurrying up troops to positions south of the Somme and the Aisne, which rivers are to be General Weygand's new line of defense.

At the tip of the German spearhead German motorized units are attacking Boulogne. Port installations there and at Ostend, Dunkerque, Calais and Dieppe are being bombed, evidently with the aim of hampering the evacuation of the British troops caught in Flanders. German planes also bomb and set fire to stations in the important railway cities of Compiègne and Creil, the latter only 30 miles from Paris, and bomb Senlis, Chantilly and other nearby towns. British planes in turn bomb bridges across the Meuse, and Ruhr railway centers.

The British Parliament in two hours and a half passes the "Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940," an unprecedented measure giving the Government the right to conscript every person and every piece of property and all the financial resources in the realm. The Government receives full power over industry, property and labor to insure the maximum war effort. The excess profits tax is raised to 100 percent. The British Parliament also passes a bill providing that the death penalty may be imposed in grave cases of espionage and sabotage.

Italy marks the first anniversary of the signing of the alliance with Germany by press articles eulogizing the statesmanship which brought together two nations united in common aims. King Victor Emanuel III confers the Order of the Annunziata on Field Marshal Goering, thus making him a "cousin."

Increasing numbers of refugees are streaming west and south through France. Their plight awakens American concern and Ambassador Bullitt communicates with President Roosevelt regarding the possibility of American Red Cross aid.

MAY 23

The British have held their slight gains north of the German gap, but today their right is menaced by a German advance from Lens (just north of Arras) and they are forced to withdraw. French Channel ports, especially Boulogne and Havre, are heavily bombed.

In the afternoon, Prime Minister Churchill informs a grave House of Commons of the German successes. He admits that the German armored columns which forced their way through the breach in the French defenses are advancing against the rear of the British and other Allied troops in Belgium. He confirms the fact that Abbeville is in German hands, and that heavy fighting is in progress around and in Boulogne. The Prime Minister adds that General Weygand is conducting the operations involving all the Allied Armies "with a view to restoring and reconstituting their combined front." In the evening Boulogne is relinquished to the Germans, after desperate resistance by Guards regiments and after demolition of the port installations. Survivors are taken off on British destroyers under heavy fire.

A military spokesman in Paris states that since May 10 at least 1,000 German planes have been brought down on French soil. The French Cabinet decides that no department shall be evacuated without a written order of the High Command, and that none of the administrative services shall leave Paris. It also decides that there shall be no evacuation of industries, except for the continued transfer of munitions factories. Forty Communists are arrested at Avignon.

In London, Sir Oswald Mosley and eight of his Fascist workers are arrested and the headquarters of the British Union of Fascists is raided

by the police. Other Right and Left extremists are taken into custody also as the British Government moves to short-circuit fifth column activities. Among them is Captain A. H. M. Ramsay, M.P., who is arrested under the defense laws as they stood before they were recently amended.

May 24

The Battle of Flanders still rages. The Germans state they have pushed up the coast as far as Calais. Tournai is captured. There is sharp fighting in the streets of Ghent. The plight of the refugees within the Ghent-Abbeville pocket is a mass tragedy. The last fort at Maubeuge is captured. General Weygand, back from a second visit to the forces in the north, reports to M. Reynaud. The French evening communiqué admits ominously that "the continuity of the front has not been reëstablished" — implying that the reuniting of the British-French-Belgian forces in Flanders with the main body of the French armies is no longer to be expected.

Later accounts by French political spokesmen (*e.g.* Foreign Minister Baudouin's newspaper interview at Bordeaux, July 5) will criticize the extent of the British effort in these days. They will allege that General Ironside has hesitated at a vital moment to order British troops to take necessary risks in striking southward and that this is the reason for the failure of the Allied attempt to close the German corridor to the coast. "If the British Army had obeyed Weygand's orders," M. Baudouin will say, "the gap would have been closed." The British will reply (June 7) that: 1, they agreed to counter-attack on May 21, and did, whereas the French did not; 2, they were forced to withdraw on May 23, as the Germans had appeared on their right flank and threatened to encircle them entirely; 3, they nevertheless agreed on May 24 to execute the Weygand plan for a simultaneous attack on the Germans from both north and south, and that Generals Gort and Blanchard (Billotte having meanwhile died of automobile injuries) fixed on May 26 for it to begin; 4, but the next day, May 25, the Belgians were routed, exposing the British left flank and necessitating a withdrawal of troops to support the Belgian front. The British semi-official statement will conclude: "The plan drawn up by General Weygand was excellent, but it came too late. The disaster which took place was unaffected by anything that happened between May 23 and 26, and was in no sense the fault of General Weygand. It was due to the faulty dispositions of General Gamelin."

The Germans claim that in Brussels they seized diplomatic documents which will provide a sensation when published. The hint is that they will reveal Belgian and Dutch connivance in Allied war plans.

M. Mandel, French Minister of the Interior, calls on all government

officials to work a minimum of 52 hours a week and to keep their offices open 12 hours a day. He dismisses a number of Préfets and other functionaries. He also undertakes new measures against fifth columnists.

King George VI, addressing his 500,000,000 subjects in celebration of Empire Day, warns that Hitler's ultimate aim is "the conquest of the world." "There is a word," he says, "which our enemies use against us — Imperialism. By it they mean the spirit of domination and the lust of conquest. We free peoples of the Empire cast that word back in their teeth. It is they who have these evil aspirations." The peoples of the Empire, he says, "have risen in just wrath against a thing which they detest and despise. Nothing can shake their resolution. In perfect unity of purpose they will defend their lives and all that makes life worth living."

Lord Halifax gives a Spanish correspondent a most cordial interview regarding Anglo-Spanish relations. It is confirmed in London that Sir Samuel Hoare will be appointed Ambassador to Spain on a special mission.

A British Air Ministry communiqué states that more than 1,500 German planes have been destroyed in the two weeks since the war began in the Low Countries.

The 25th anniversary of Italy's entry into the First World War on the side of the Allies is marked by an intensification of anti-Allied propaganda. The Government "postpones" the departure of all trans-Atlantic liners scheduled to sail from Italian ports in the near future.

The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, carries to Secretary Hull an appeal from the British, French and Belgian Governments for aid in succoring the huge numbers of refugees who are fleeing before the advancing German armies.

The House of Representatives in Washington passes by 391 votes to 1 a defense bill to allow unlimited expansion of the Army Air Corps, soon after President Roosevelt announces plans for training 50,000 volunteer airplane pilots during the fiscal year starting July 1.

May 25

The Battle of Flanders moves into a new phase as the German High Command announces the closing in of its troops around much of the Belgian Army, the remnants of the First and Seventh French Armies, and the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force. Calais, Ostend and Dunkerque remain in Allied hands. Calais is being defended desperately by a small British force. The aim is to compel the Germans to concentrate armored units against this city instead of against Dunkerque, where the evacuation of the trapped British and French armies is to take place, and also to give the French time to carry out flooding

operations at Gravelines, between Calais and Dunkerque. On the eastern side of the German ring the capture is reported of Ghent and Courtrai. The Germans say their next objective will be to cut the trapped forces into small detachments and to dispose of them piecemeal. The Belgian forces are being subjected to a particularly heavy attack. They are thrown into confusion, with most serious military and political results.

The French assert that they are making frequent counter-attacks in the Somme region, but do not claim that they have been able to retake the lost bridgeheads on the south bank. About operations further south the French communiqué is fairly optimistic. It says that "Between the Aisne and the Meuse activity continues as fierce as ever. However, since yesterday we dominate the enemy." Subsequent events will not substantiate the latter claim, though it seems to be true that on this date in this southern part of the active front only small German advances are registered.

The French War Ministry issues a communiqué headed "Penalties," announcing the dismissal from their commands of fifteen French generals, including army and corps commanders, several divisional commanders and other high officers. Their commands have already been taken over by new men appointed by General Weygand. Simultaneously, Minister of the Interior Mandel dismisses eight senior police officials in the Department du Nord.

The most important events of the day are in Belgium, though they are not yet known publicly. Several high Belgian officials, including Premier Pierlot, Minister of Foreign Affairs Spaak, Defense Minister General Denis and Minister of the Interior Vanderpoorten, arrive in London. Subsequent revelations in an interview by M. Spaak on May 29 will indicate that *King Leopold has already reached the decision to surrender the Belgian Army*. The Ministers are come to England to discuss the future course of the Belgian Government. The King's decision was taken this morning at 5 A.M. at Wynondal Castle, south of Bruges, following an all-night argument with Pierlot, Spaak and two other Ministers.

May 26

The French only now acknowledge the German occupation of Boulogne. They claim that elsewhere their lines are holding. Paris dispatches speak repeatedly of the heavy price in dead and wounded the Germans are paying to keep their pressure up, but admit that it is not lessening. The British are attempting to maintain their positions and also aid the Belgians. The German High Command reports the capture of Calais (denied by the Allies), new fighting between the Aisne and the Meuse, accentuated pressure on the Somme, and the repulse of

enemy attacks on the northern front. London reports a four-hour air battle over the French coast between Dunkerque and Calais, as well as the bombing of German columns near Boulogne and in the River Lys sector.

In London, Premier Pierlot and Foreign Minister Spaak consult with Foreign Secretary Halifax. Later in the day Premier Reynaud arrives in London by plane for a brief visit. He confers with Prime Minister Churchill and other members of the War Cabinet on the military and strategic situation confronting the Allies, the problems arising from the increasingly hostile attitude of Italy, and the doubtful attitude of King Leopold.

While M. Reynaud is still in London it is announced that Lieutenant General Sir John Greer Dill has been appointed Chief of the British Imperial Staff, replacing General Sir Edmund Ironside, who becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces.

The British Admiralty this evening makes its first call on the "Small Vessels Pool" (*cf.* May 14) to provide boats to help in withdrawing troops from Dunkerque. These and other volunteer small craft of every conceivable sort and size will act courageously and adventurously during the coming week in conjunction with naval vessels under the Dover Commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay.

The French Government warns that the Germans are issuing false orders to the French civil authorities, often over the telephone. Announcement is made of the dismissal of police chiefs in several cities, including Lille and Valenciennes in the Flanders battlefield area. An official order is issued calling on all foreigners over 15 years old who have arrived in France since May 10 to report to the authorities before May 31.

The signs of approaching intervention by Italy on the side of Germany become stronger. Premier Mussolini confers with his high army officers and with munitions manufacturers. The text is published of a bill to "control citizens in wartime." The circulation of private vehicles using gasoline is to cease on June 1 except for those with special permits. Giovanni Ansaldo, in his weekly broadcast to the armed forces, says: "Hitler has broken the steel ring round Germany. So we, under the guidance of the Duce, will break the bonds imprisoning Italians in the Mediterranean." Virginio Gayda boasts that Italian "non-belligerency" is forcing the Allies to keep about 1,200,000 men idle on the borders of Italy and her colonies, as well as in the Near East, and notes that "this is solid, silent help which Italy has given Germany during these eight months of war." The word heard on every side in Rome is that Italy will enter the war between June 10 and 20, when, it is said, the Germans will have taken Paris and have their major offensive against England well under way.

President Roosevelt, in a radio address to the nation on the state of the national defense, assures the country that whatever may be needed will be done to secure the armed defenses of the United States at this time, when the world "is threatened by forces of destruction." He says the United States will build its defenses to whatever heights the future may require, and voices confidence that it will not have to abandon its democratic way of life in the effort to match the strength of the aggressors.

MAY 27

The area occupied by the Allies in the north is being steadily constricted. Their armies are forced to abandon the salient which they have maintained at Valenciennes and retreat northward. Stubborn British resistance has been overcome in Calais. Communication between Calais and the main B. E. F. was broken some days ago. It will later be reported that the British Navy evacuated only 30 of the city's 4,000 defenders. A War Office communiqué on May 30 will say of the defense of Calais that it "will count among the most heroic deeds in the annals of the British Army." The French communiqués in general continue not unhopeful. But London admits that the situation in northern France is becoming increasingly grave, and reports that German bombers are attacking Channel shipping and causing serious loss of life.

The French Cabinet meets to discuss the current situation and hear M. Reynaud's report on his visit to London. It is decided to continue the struggle on the Somme and Aisne, and later, if necessary, on other rivers further south.

In the evening still worse news for the Allies comes from Belgium. Premier Pierlot has hardly announced over the French radio that the refugee Belgian Cabinet met in Paris during the day and unanimously affirmed its will to continue the struggle beside the Allies until common victory was won, when it becomes known to the Allied Governments that, without previously consulting them, King Leopold, as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, has sent a plenipotentiary to the German Army Headquarters with a request for an armistice. The Belgian Army is already withdrawing from important positions. Premier Pierlot and other Belgian Ministers meet in the evening with Premier Reynaud, Foreign Minister Daladier and General Weygand. A French Cabinet meeting follows and lasts far into the night.

Four workers in French factories are sentenced to death for sabotage, and others engaged in defense activities are arrested for "abandoning work."

As part of the policy aimed at keeping Italy out of the war, London reports that the Allies are preparing to modify their blockade by

allowing Italian ships to reach Italy without inspection at contraband control points, in return for which Italy will guarantee that nothing imported into Italy in Italian ships will be reëxported to Germany.

London announces that Sir Stafford Cripps, Laborite member of Parliament, has departed for Moscow as head of an official trade mission, and that the Soviet Government has signified its qualified willingness to receive him.

MAY 28

The German Government refuses King Leopold's request for an armistice. He thereupon accepts the German demand for unconditional surrender. On his orders, the Belgian Army lays down its arms at 4 A.M. It had fought for 18 days.

The Belgian Cabinet meets in Paris at 7 A.M. and unanimously refuses to be associated with King Leopold's action. Premier Reynaud, in a five-minute radio broadcast at 8:30 A.M., hastily arranged after last night's emergency meeting of the French Cabinet, informs the French public of the King's capitulation. He calls the action "without precedent in history" and says that it was taken without warning to General Georges Blanchard, commander of the three allied forces fighting in Belgium. He adds that it is the intention of the Belgian Government to raise a new army to take its place beside the French. A group of Belgian Senators and Deputies, meeting in Paris, expresses its disapproval of the King's action. In the evening Premier Pierlot, in a radio broadcast from Paris, calls the King's action "illegal and unconstitutional." He points out that not one Minister has concurred in it, and reaffirms the Government's decision to continue the struggle. Foreign Minister Spaak, in a press interview, reveals that King Leopold had decided as long ago as the morning of May 25 to surrender. The King reached his decision over the objections of Premier Pierlot and Foreign Minister Spaak, on the ground that Belgium was bearing the brunt of the German attack and suffering losses beyond its strength. Before M. Pierlot's speech he and M. Spaak visit the statue of King Albert I in the Cours la Reine and lay a crêpe-bound wreath at its foot.

The German press praises the courage and independence of King Leopold, his sense of realism, and his humanity in desiring to spare his country useless suffering.

Prime Minister Churchill, reporting to the House of Commons in the afternoon on the Belgian surrender, emphasizes that the British and French Armies are entirely disassociated from that procedure and will "persevere in the operations in which they are now engaged." He says: "I have no intention of suggesting to the House that we should attempt at this moment to pass judgment upon the action of the King of the

Belgians in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army. This Army has fought very bravely and has both inflicted and suffered heavy losses." The situation of the British and French Armies is, he says, "evidently extremely grave," and the Commons "should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings." But nothing that can happen, declares Mr. Churchill, can relieve Britain of her duty of defending "the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way — as on former occasions in our history — through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies."

The Belgian surrender almost monopolizes the world's attention. But the German High Command reports progress north of Valenciennes, where there is strong pressure in the direction of Lille, and speaks of heavy bombing of roads and railways back of Ostend, Dunkerque and other Channel ports. The R. A. F. raids German communication lines in that area as well as military objectives further afield.

May 29

Allied troops begin the evacuation of Flanders by sea under heavy German fire. Ostend has fallen. But the port of Dunkerque remains in Allied possession and small transport vessels of every sort are gathering to remove the Allied soldiers. Sandy beaches extend along the coast on either side of Dunkerque. The waters are shoal for some 12 miles out into the Channel, and even light-draught vessels must lie at least half a mile from shore. No warship larger than a destroyer can enter the port of Dunkerque itself or even approach the jetties that protect it. Nevertheless, from these beaches and jetties over 300,000 men are beginning to embark. Back of Dunkerque there is going on what the London *Times* describes as "a fierce mêlée." Just to the east, beyond where the River Yser reaches the Channel, it will report tomorrow that the Germans have advanced "through silent masses of disarmed Belgians."

The Allies capture Narvik in northern Norway.

President Roosevelt, concerned by the collapse of the Allied campaign in Flanders, reappraises American defense plans and decides to ask Congress for $750,000,000 in addition to the $3,300,000,000 already projected. Secretary Hull modifies the Neutrality Act restrictions to permit American pilots to deliver American planes to ports in the eastern Canadian provinces.

May 30

Thousands of British and French troops land in England under the protection of the R. A. F. and the British Navy while their comrades engage in fierce rear guard actions against superior Nazi air and land forces. The perimeter of the Dunkerque defense area is steadily narrow-

ing. Berlin reports the capture of General Prioux, successor to General Billotte as commander of the French First Army in Flanders, and his staff. London announces that new British troops have reached France and taken up their position on the left flank of the main French force south of the Somme. (Later information will be that they number only about a division.) In England further preparations are in course to resist Germany's advertised invasion, which is recognized to have been rendered much easier for her by the capture of Holland, Belgium and points on the French Channel.

The Belgian Cabinet meets in France and approves a decree declaring that "in the name of the Belgian people, in pursuance of Article 32 of the Constitution, and in view of the fact that the King is in the power of the invader . . . it is impossible for the King to reign."

The French Government sends a note to Rome asking for negotiations on outstanding differences, and hinting that it is prepared to go very far to give satisfaction. Mobilization of the Italian Army continues, with 1,500,000 to 1,800,000 men now believed to be under arms.

German civil rule is established in the Netherlands under Dr. Seyss-Inquart, one of the Austrian Ministers who helped arrange their country's annexation to the Reich.

MAY 31

The evacuation of the British forces from Dunkerque continues, with fog aiding the embarkation. London estimates that three-quarters of the British Expeditionary Force have so far been safely evacuated. The German High Command announces that the Flanders and Artois campaigns are virtually over, releasing the German troops in that area "for other tasks." The stage is being set for the second phase of the Battle for France.

The Allied Supreme War Council meets in Paris. Britain is represented by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Attlee, General Dill and others, and France by M. Reynaud, Marshal Pétain, General Weygand and others.

The Belgian Parliament meets at Limoges, France, and adopts a resolution unanimously expressing indignation at the surrender of King Leopold and describing it as an act for which he will bear a heavy responsibility in history. It repeats the affirmation of the Belgian Cabinet that it is now morally and legally impossible for the King to reign. It proclaims the wish of the Belgians to fight by the side of the Allies until victory has been won. The session is attended by 54 Senators and 89 Deputies.

It is reported from Rome that Mussolini has been so busy with military consultations that he was unable yesterday to receive United States Ambassador Phillips for the presentation of another personal message from President Roosevelt. Presumably it has been delivered to

Count Ciano. The French offer to negotiate is rejected, with an intimation that the time for negotiations has passed.

In a special message to Congress, President Roosevelt warns that the conflict may spread to all continents, asks for an additional $1,000,000,000 to supplement defense appropriations, and requests special legislation empowering him to call out the National Guard for active service.

June 1

The embarkation of Allied troops in Flanders is carried forward under increasing difficulties. The Germans take the initiative on the Somme west of Amiens. Berlin predicts a drive into the heart of France and claims that resistance around Lille has been broken and that 26,000 prisoners have been captured. German planes bomb Marseille and industrial centers in the Rhône Valley, killing 46 persons and wounding more than 100.

An official statement issued in London says that the Supreme War Council is in full agreement concerning all the measures required in the situation, and that the two Governments "are more than ever implacably resolved to pursue in the closest possible concord their present struggle until complete victory is achieved." Though the communiqué does not allude to the fact, the Italian situation has been discussed, also relations with Soviet Russia. It has been decided to evacuate Narvik.

Relazioni Internazionali, generally regarded as the organ of the Italian Foreign Office, bluntly declares that Italy is going to intervene with arms against France and Britain. The breaking off of French commercial negotiations with Italy is announced, following the rupture of Anglo-Italian discussions on contraband control.

Grigore Gafencu, pro-Ally Foreign Minister of Rumania, is replaced by Ion Gigurtu, a pro-Nazi.

June 2

Nazi bombers continue their raids down the Rhône valley, doubtless intended to show Premier Mussolini that Germany is able to support any ventures the Duce might make across the French frontier. Heavy German guns pound Maginot Line positions west of the Moselle, but there is no infantry action.

The evacuation at Dunkerque goes on. War Secretary Anthony Eden, in a brief radio talk, says that the British have saved "more than four-fifths of that B. E. F. which the Germans claimed were surrounded," and calls on his countrymen to work as never before to keep the army supplied.

Prepared to enter the war, Italy is told by Signor Ansaldo, in a broadcast to Italian troops, that "Italy must enter the conflict to keep

abreast of the changing times." Articles in the Italian press assume that Italy's claims to Corsica, Bizerta, Nice, Jibuti and Suez can be satisfied only by armed conquest.

Turkish Premier Refik Saydam warns his people they "must not forget that it may be necessary to take up arms to protect this country." London and Paris hope that Italian intervention in the war would result immediately in Turkey's entry.

JUNE 3

A swarm of about 200 German planes drops more than a thousand explosive and incendiary bombs on Paris and its suburbs, killing 254 and injuring 652.

German forces close in on Dunkerque, but the embarkation of troops continues successfully despite attacks of great ferocity. The Germans say that in the Battle of Flanders their casualties are only 10,000 dead and 40,000 wounded.

Count Ciano implies quite clearly to several foreign diplomats that Mussolini's decision to enter the war has already been taken in principle.

JUNE 4

The evacuation from Dunkerque is completed and the town is relinquished to the Germans. At 7 A.M. Admiral Jean Marie Abrial, commander of the port, clears away in a fast launch. He is the last to leave. There have been house-to-house fighting and hand-to-hand encounters on the beaches and jetties to the very end.

In a long report to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill admits bluntly that the Belgian campaign was a "colossal military disaster." He says that from the moment the Meuse defenses were broken at Sedan "only a rapid retreat to Amiens and the south could have saved the British and French Armies who had entered Belgium at the appeal of the Belgian King, but this strategic fact was not immediately realized." He recapitulates the military results of that failure, describes King Leopold's subsequent surrender of the Belgian Army, and gives a vivid story of the fierce fighting in Calais and Dunkerque and on the Channel and in the air. He acknowledges the enormous loss of material — nearly 1,000 guns and all the transport and armored vehicles of the army in the north — and estimates British dead, wounded and missing at over 30,000. He puts the number rescued at 335,000. Nearly a thousand vessels of all kinds have been used. He pays glowing tribute to the many acts of valor performed, but warns: "Wars are not won by evacuations."

Britain, Mr. Churchill continues, will not be content with a defensive scheme of operations. "We have our duty to our Ally." The B. E. F. will be at once rebuilt. To this end, the defenses in the British Isles

must be so perfected "that the largest possible potential of offensive effort may be realized." Mr. Churchill refers with satisfaction to "the solid assurances of sea power" and to Britain's rapidly developing strength in the air. He says he himself has full confidence that "if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone." He concludes: "We shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old."

The Germans estimate that since the start of the Blitzkrieg they have taken a total of 1,200,000 prisoners, which is far in excess of Allied calculations, and that the booty captured is enough to equip 80 divisions, a figure which seems exaggerated. The High Command calls the campaign in Belgium, and northern France "the greatest destructive battle of all times," and says its successful conclusion makes certain the "final victory."

A neutral estimate of the current situation might be as follows: The result of the successful German drive to the Channel has been to deprive the Allies for the time being of the nine fully trained and equipped divisions of the British Expeditionary Force proper; also of three British territorial divisions sent over mainly for construction work and training behind the front (parts of these were thrown into the fighting around Arras); and of three French Armies (the First, Seventh and Ninth) — a total of perhaps thirty divisions, French and British together. Without these General Weygand has had to form, in the utmost haste, a new front from Abbeville to Montmédy, 165 miles as the crow flies. He has picked up odds and ends of French units from the rear and from other fronts (*e.g.*, the Maginot Line and the Italian frontier), and is utilizing one British division (the 51st) brought over from a quiet sector of the Maginot Line and a new British armored division which is just disembarking. A Canadian division will arrive in Normandy while the Battle of the Somme is in progress, but too late for the actual fighting. It will afterwards be evacuated with difficulty from western ports. So thin is the "Weygand Line" on this date that the single British division now in position on the lower Somme has to hold a frontage of about 24 miles — in other words, it is hardly more than an outpost line.

In swift reprisal for the German bombings of Paris, the French and British air forces raid Munich, the Ruhr and Frankfurt.

Premier Reynaud tells the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission that if Italy enters the conflict she will be doing so deliberately for the sole purpose of waging war. Both before and after September 1 the French Government made known to the Italian Government its willingness to find a friendly basis for settling all questions outstanding between the two countries. These overtures met no response. In the past few days they had been renewed, in full accord with the British. Mussolini is well aware, says the French Premier, that the Allies had never closed, and do not now close, the door to any negotiations.

King George sends President Lebrun a message stating that the gallant comradeship in arms shown during the ordeal of the Dunkerque evacuation has revealed to the enemy the full measure of Allied bravery and resolution.

The exchanges between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mussolini have been continuing (see May 15, 16, 18 and 31). Mr. Matthews, Rome correspondent of the *New York Times*, notes that the President's message of May 30 was answered a few days later, and that today the President's rejoinder has been received in the Italian capital. The White House confirms that there have been exchanges, and that they are continuing, but authorizes the statement that "not a single true and accurate report on the President's correspondence with Mussolini has yet come from Rome."

The Soviet Union accepts Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador.

A short-wave radio broadcast, heard in London, reports a large-scale demonstration in Barcelona by Spanish students shouting "Gibraltar is Spanish."

Prime Minister Mackenzie King informs the Canadian House of Commons that in the present emergency Canada has placed all her military, naval and air forces completely at the disposal of the British Government.

4. The Battle of the Somme

JUNE 5

At 4 A.M. on a front more than a hundred miles long, from the Channel to near Laon, the Germans launch their second major offensive in the West. Paris is the avowed objective. By some it is called the Battle of the Somme, by others the Battle of France.

In an Order of the Day from Field Headquarters, Chancellor Hitler thanks his soldiers for winning "the greatest battle in the world's history" and announces that "today another great battle begins on the Western Front." He says that "this fight for the freedom and existence of our people now and in the future will be continued until the enemy rulers in London and Paris . . . are annihilated." In a proclamation to the German people, Hitler says that the greatest

battle of all times has been brought to a victorious conclusion and that the danger of an invasion of the Ruhr territory has been definitely prevented. He orders flags to be flown for eight days and bells to be rung for three days.

General Weygand's Order of the Day announces that the Battle of France has begun, and that "the order is to defend our positions without thought of retirement." He says: "Cling to our soil, and look only forward; in the rear the High Command has made the necessary dispositions to support you." A communiqué issued after M. Reynaud has appeared before the Military Commission of the Chamber of Deputies announces that the Premier gave details of the withdrawal from Flanders and said that the French nation "is now more than ever determined to fight with its Allies for the liberty of the world." President Lebrun, replying to yesterday's message from King George, says that England's welcome of the French troops and wounded had provided "a new example of the comradeship between our two peoples."

After several days of discussion, Premier Reynaud decides that in the present critical situation he is justified in ignoring usual diplomatic channels. He therefore himself telephones President Roosevelt this afternoon from a private apartment in the Place du Palais Bourbon, making a personal appeal for more American airplanes.

Certain French publicists are arrested, including Robert Fabre-Luce, Serpeille de Gobineau, Alain Laubreaux, Paul Mouton, and Charles Lesca of *Je Suis Partout* — the only occasion during the war, so far as can be ascertained, when the activities of any important French elements favorable to Fascism or Nazism were interfered with by the French police. Charles Julien Masson, former captain in the French Air Corps, is sentenced to death by a military court, together with three associates, one of them a German "traveling salesman," for operating a spy ring which provided the information that enabled the German Air Force to bombard French airports so accurately in the first phase of the war.

Paris announces that General Eugène Mittelhauser has been appointed to succeed General Weygand as Commander of the Allied forces in the Near East, and that he has arrived in Syria after a visit yesterday in Ankara, where he talked with Turkish staff officers.

Under a ruling prepared by Attorney General Jackson, immediate sale to the Allies of at least 600,000 World War rifles and 2,500 field guns, with ammunition, is permitted.

JUNE 6

News comes early in the morning that Premier Reynaud has reconstituted his Cabinet, following the meeting which began at 11:30 last night at the Elysée Palace. M. Reynaud himself takes over the port-

folio of Foreign Affairs from M. Daladier, having previously taken over M. Daladier's earlier post at the War Office. There has been strong criticism of M. Daladier's past record as Minister of Defense in recent sessions of both the Military Commission of the Senate and the Military Commission of the Chamber. Other political holdovers from previous régimes are also dropped, including MM. Albert Sarraut and Anatole de Monzie. M. Yvon Delbos becomes Minister of Education; M. Jean Prouvost, owner of *Paris-Soir*, becomes Minister of Information. General Charles de Gaulle is appointed as Under Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, M. Paul Baudouin as Under Secretary in the Foreign Ministry.

In an evening broadcast Premier Reynaud, who as a result of the Cabinet shakeup now exercises an exceptional degree of political control, tells the nation that he can give it "reason to hope" that the German drive will be stopped. "The battle," he says, "has hardly begun." In this crisis there is no time to lose debating responsibilities for past errors. "We shall not weaken France by dividing her." He adds an indirect offer to Italy to settle outstanding differences without a conflict. In a passage apparently directed to the United States he declares that all spectators of the Battle of France must comprehend quickly what immense values are at stake because "time is limited."

While this is going on in the French political field, German hammer blows continue at the Allied positions along the Somme. The Allies are driven back on both wings of the 120-mile battle front, giving way near Abbeville and losing the crest of the Chemin-des-Dames. Admitting the German advance along the Channel coast below Abbeville and on the Ailette Canal near Soissons, the French High Command nevertheless calls the situation generally favorable. There has been no important break-through such as occurred in the Battle of the Meuse, and it is claimed that the new strategy of permitting the tanks to penetrate the front and then destroying them is working out successfully. A first-hand description of the battlefront describes it as an "immense hell," with 10,000 German tanks being hurled into the engagement. British planes bomb German troops and supply concentrations behind the front, also strategic rail and road connections and oil depots in conquered Belgium, and make raids deep into Germany.

Prime Minister Churchill, replying to questions in Parliament, says that Britain recognizes the Belgian Government at present established in France as the legal Government of Belgium. He declares that "the unswerving aim" of Britain and France is "to secure for Belgium the effective restoration of her freedom and independence."

Orders are issued in Washington that 50 Curtis-Wright airplanes just delivered to the Navy be returned to the makers, to be exchanged for later models. It is understood they will go to the Allies.

JUNE 7

The tide of the Somme battle turns in favor of the invaders. The German High Command claims to have broken through the "Weygand Line" at several points. British planes continue their bombing attacks immediately behind the lines and on railheads and oil depots in Belgium and Germany. Nazi bombers, in turn, raid the south and east coasts of England.

The French War Cabinet is reduced from 11 to 8 members: Premier Reynaud, Marshal Pétain and MM. Chautemps, Marin, Ybarnégaray, Mandel, Monnet and Dautry.

An ominous sign that Italian participation in the war is imminent is an order withdrawing Italian shipping from all seas.

Lord Beaverbrook, British Minister of Aircraft Supplies, says a 62 percent speed-up in Britain's aircraft production since May 11 has enabled her to replace all plane losses to date.

JUNE 8

The fourth day of the German offensive on the Somme is decisive. The French have to withdraw along the entire western portion of their line, and at some points in the center. The left wing is penetrated by 200 to 300 tanks that cross the Bresle River and reach Forges-les-Eaux, midway between the Bresle and the Seine, only 20 miles from Rouen and 58 miles from Paris. The French center has fallen back 15 to 20 miles along a 60-mile front south of the Somme. The Germans throw in fresh divisions. No fresh French troops are available.

The German success in the Battle of the Somme further encourages Italian interventionists and whets the country's appetite for a share in the prospective booty. Some anxiety is shown about future American policy toward the war, but the prevalent newspaper opinion is that even if the United States should decide to intervene it will do so too late.

Sir Samuel Hoare, new British Ambassador to Spain, presents his credentials at Madrid, and says he finds much in common between Britain and Spain. General Franco replies that he appreciates the choice of Sir Samuel as Ambassador, for he showed a friendly and understanding attitude during National Spain's critical period. Street crowds exploit the occasion to shout "Gibraltar is Spanish!"

A spokesman of the Allied Purchasing Commission in the United States says that 8,000 planes have been ordered to date, and more than 2,000 delivered.

JUNE 9

The Germans widen their front of attack to the east and open an offensive in great force from Rethel to the Argonne. Some observers

say it is the greatest mechanized action of the war. This advance threatens the rear zones of the French armies in the Maginot Line. Further west, the German intention is evidently to advance down the valley of the Marne towards Paris.

In a general order to all troops issued at 10 A.M., an hour after the German attack has begun in the Argonne, General Weygand says: "The enemy has suffered considerable losses. Soon he will reach the end of his effort. This is the last quarter-hour. Hold fast." He predicts that tomorrow the front of attack will extend all the way to Switzerland. Reports in Paris are that the French troops on the new front are resisting and have counter-attacked. But since the collapse on the Somme all the news reaching French General Headquarters is delayed and confused, resulting in communiqués that are already out of date before they can be distributed. At a Cabinet meeting preparations are made to quit Paris. It is the last held in the capital. An exodus of civilians begins.

In the western sector of the front, meanwhile, German motorized units thrust forward to the Seine and reach the outskirts of Rouen. Southwest of Beauvais they reach Gisors, 35 miles from Paris. The French center also is being roughly treated. One thrust carries the Germans across the Aisne on either side of Soissons. Approximately 2,000,000 Germans are estimated to be taking part along the whole line in what the French term an "all-or-nothing" drive for Paris.

The German High Command announces the sinking of the British aircraft carrier *Glorious*, a British destroyer, a 21,000-ton transport, a naval tanker and a submarine chaser in an engagement in the North Sea.

The war in Norway comes to an end as King Haakon and Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold issue an order to the forces in the north to cease hostilities at midnight. Their proclamation, broadcast by Foreign Minister Koht from Tromsö, Norway, states that the hard necessities of war have forced the Allies to concentrate all their strength on other fronts, and explains that the Norwegian troops have not enough ammunition or combat planes to continue the struggle alone. (Early tomorrow morning, June 10, the Norwegian Government will announce that the Allied forces have withdrawn from Narvik and that King Haakon has arrived in England.)

The Allied Purchasing Commission in the United States announces that, thanks to the ruling in Washington regarding the release of surplus government equipment and material, the flow of munitions of all kinds exported to Europe will be immediately increased.

JUNE 10

The German invaders move closer to Paris, and at one point — south of Beauvais — they are said to be within 25 miles of their goal.

A semi-circle has been thrown around the capital from which three wedges are being driven forward. On the French left, one drive carries the Germans across the lower Seine at several points. In the center they press through to the Ourcq valley. The third push is east of Reims.

Prime Minister Churchill telegraphs Premier Reynaud that "the maximum possible support is being given by British forces" in the battle in which the French armies are now so courageously engaging; that "all available means are being used to give help on land, sea, and in the air;" that the Royal Air Force has been constantly engaged over the battle area; and that during the last few days fresh British troops have landed in France to join those already engaged in the common fight, "whilst further extensive reënforcements are being rapidly organized and will shortly be available."

Today, exactly one month after the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries, Fascist Italy enters the war. Foreign Minister Ciano sends for M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, at 4:30 P.M. and hands him a note stating, "His Majesty the King and Emperor declares that from tomorrow, June 11, Italy considers herself at war with France." Fifteen minutes later a similar communication is made to Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador. Italy's declaration of war is to become effective at 12:01 A.M., Rome time. At 6 P.M., before a crowd that packs the Piazza Venezia and adjacent streets, Premier Mussolini declares that "this is the hour of irrevocable decisions," announces that the declaration of war has already been handed to the British and French Ambassadors, and says that Italy is going to war against "the plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the West, who have hindered the advance and often threatened the existence even of the Italian people." He solemnly declares that "Italy does not intend to drag other peoples who are her neighbors into this conflict. Let Switzerland, Jugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, and Greece take note of these words of mine, for it will depend entirely upon them if they are fully confirmed or not."

Hitler telegraphs to King Victor Emanuel III saying that, "Providence has willed that, against our own intentions, we are compelled to defend the freedom and future of our peoples against Great Britain and France," and expressing the certainty that Germany and Italy will "win a victory . . . and then the vital rights of our two nations will be secure for all time." He telegraphs to the Duce declaring that he is "deeply moved" by the world-historic decision just announced. He says that in September, Great Britain had declared war on Germany without reason. "The increasing contempt for vital national rights by those in power in London and Paris has led us together," he says, "in the great fight for the freedom and future of our countries."

Two hours after the Mussolini speech Premier Reynaud broadcasts a

message of defiance and encouragement to the French people. "France," he says, "has gone through still rougher tests and has, at such times, always drawn strength for victory. France cannot die." He claims that enemy gains have been made at the cost of heavy losses in tanks and planes. "The times ahead are hard, but we are ready, and heads will not be bowed." The French Premier recalls how both he and his predecessors have attempted to settle questions between France and Italy by friendly negotiation; but "Mussolini decided that blood should flow," and on the declaration of war which he has now made "the world that looks at us will judge."

A communiqué issued at Paris in the evening says that Premier Reynaud has gone to visit the armies and that at the request of the High Command the Ministers have left Paris for "the provinces." Some left last night following the Cabinet meeting. Their destination, not yet announced publicly, is Tours. Already the Army Headquarters has been transferred from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre (between Château-Thierry and Meaux) to Briare, on the Loire, about a hundred miles south of Paris.

Across the Atlantic the Italian declaration of war has repercussions also. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, speaking in the Canadian House of Commons, denounces Premier Mussolini as "a carrion bird of prey waiting for brave men to die," and then moves a resolution asking Parliament's approval of a declaration of war against Italy. It is adopted with only one dissenting voice.

After listening to a radio translation of Mussolini's speech, Secretary Hull at his press conference expresses the "deliberate opinion" that Italy's entry into the war "is a great disappointment to peoples everywhere and a great human tragedy." Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, declares that it will accelerate American efforts to aid the Allies with "every possible resource short of man-power."

President Roosevelt, in a broadcast speech delivered at 7:15 P.M. (daylight time) before the University of Virginia, at Charlottesville, discusses the philosophy of force which has been adopted by certain countries in Europe and terms it a threat to the American way of life. He describes in some detail his correspondence with Signor Mussolini and reveals that he offered to act as intermediary in transmitting to the British and French Governments any suggestions that the Italian Government might have for securing readjustments which would preserve peace in the Mediterranean area. "Unfortunately," he says, "to the regret of all of us, and to the regret of humanity, the Chief of the Italian Government was unwilling to accept the procedure suggested, and he has made no counter-proposal." The President adds: "On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor." Mr. Roosevelt says that "the whole of

our sympathies lies with those nations that are giving their life-blood" in the struggle against "the gods of force and hate." And he says: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. All roads leading to the accomplishment of these objectives must be kept clean of obstructions. We will not slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for speed — full speed ahead."

A personal message from Premier Reynaud to President Roosevelt, transmitted through Ambassador Bullitt, is received in Washington at 10:13 P.M. M. Reynaud expresses his gratitude to the President for "the generous aid" he has decided to give in planes and armament on the basis of a previous appeal (*cf.* June 5). After mentioning the "crushing superiority" of the German Army, both in numbers and material, and saying that "today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris," Premier Reynaud declares: "We shall fight in front of Paris; we shall fight behind Paris; we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight; and if we should be driven out of it we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight, and if necessary in our American possessions." He says that France will not abandon the struggle although "this very hour another dictatorship has stabbed France in the back." These words are almost identical with a sentence spoken by President Roosevelt at Charlottesville a few hours earlier. The similarity may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that before sending his formal message M. Reynaud is believed to have again talked over the telephone with Mr. Roosevelt from a private apartment in Paris. The French Premier goes on to declare that it is now his duty to ask the President for "new and even larger assistance," beseeching him "to declare publicly" and "before it is too late" that "the United States will give the Allies aid and material support by all means 'short of an expeditionary force.'" Recalling President Roosevelt's words on October 5, 1937, about the peace, freedom and security of 90 percent of the people of the world being jeopardized by the remaining 10 percent, he declares that "the hour has now come" for the 90 percent "to make their will prevail." (The text of the message will be made available in Washington for publication on June 14.)

5. The French Government at Tours

JUNE 11

The French lines of defense break all along the Marne under fierce German tank and airplane assaults, and the main body of French troops takes up new positions south of the river.

Further west, the French fight bitterly to prevent the Germans from

spanning the Seine with pontoon bridges which would provide crossings for major units. But the Seine defenses already have been penetrated in some places, and through one such gap the Germans push an advance motorized detachment to the western outskirts of Paris. French military authorities take over charge of the city, and gates and streets are barricaded in preparation for house-to-house fighting. The city is under a pall of smoke from fires in the suburbs, supposedly set by German bombers, and surrounding roads are clogged with fleeing refugees. But officials say that though Paris may be destroyed she will never be surrendered.

In the east the French also are under tremendous pressure, the German objective being to break the "hinge" where the fluid front from the Channel to Montmédy joins the Maginot Line. In the Channel region, Havre has again been bombed and Allied shipping sunk or damaged.

The French Government reaches Tours. Foreign diplomats and refugees pour into the city; the population quadruples within a few hours. Premier Reynaud arrives in Tours after an overnight visit to the front. He has stopped on the way back for a meeting with the French military chiefs at their new headquarters at Briare. His own headquarters are established near Tours in an old château lacking most of the facilities for serving efficiently as a center of government. The dislocation of government services due to the withdrawal from the capital is much greater than had been anticipated. Conditions in Tours border on the chaotic.

Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, General Dill and other British officials go by air from England to consult with Premier Reynaud, General Weygand and Marshal Pétain. They remain at Tours for further consultations tomorrow.

Mr. Attlee, in the absence of Prime Minister Churchill, makes a statement in Parliament on the British Government's attitude towards the Italian declaration of war. He says that hardly ever before in history could a decision to embroil a great nation in conflict have been taken so wantonly and with so little excuse. Britain and France have repeatedly attempted to come to some agreement with Italy to prevent the extension of the war, and they have been patient under constant abuse. Mr. Attlee accuses Premier Mussolini of having declared war for completely sordid motives, seeing an opportunity of securing spoils cheaply at the expense of the western democracies. He uses the analogy of the jackal which tries to obtain some scraps from another beast's kill and of the petty sneak-thief who robs the pockets of a murderer's victim. But Mussolini has made a profound mistake, he says, and the Italians will find that they have to deal with most determined resistance.

The French Finance Minister gives instructions for the seizure of all Italian holdings in France, personal and corporate, and prohibits all

transactions with Italy. The police are rounding up Italian fifth column suspects, especially in Marseille and elsewhere in southern France. Anti-Italian demonstrations occur in various places. In England about 1,600 Italians are detained during the day.

Italian planes bomb the British naval base at Malta — the first act of Italian belligerency. They also attack Aden, in an attempt to cut British communications in the Red Sea. The Royal Air Force in turn bombs air fields in Libya and Eritrea. The Franco-Italian frontier is the scene of light skirmishes only.

As a result of Italy's entry into the war, President Roosevelt proclaims the Mediterranean Sea a combat zone, and closes it to American ships, airplanes and citizens.

June 12

The German High Command reports that "full success" has now crowned the operations begun June 5 along the Somme front from the English Channel to a point south of Laon. After recapitulating German successes, the communiqué says the German troops are now approaching Paris on three sides. At the nearest point they are only 12½ miles distant from the capital. Berlin says Rouen has been in German hands "for several days," and announces the capture of Reims; but the French concede only that the latter is under attack. In the coastal region below Dieppe, the Germans speak of capturing an Allied force of 20,000 men, including six generals, along with "vast quantities" of war materials. This, they say, opens the way for a drive towards Havre.

From Tours, the French Government admits that the enemy has reached the "outworks of Paris" and reveals that the Marne has been crossed by the enemy between Meaux and Château-Thierry. But high officials, both military and civilian, know that their information is scrappy and out of date. Communication with troops that have been engaged in intense fighting is suffering badly from the fact that there is no longer any real "front" in the accepted sense of the word. Local commanders are being forced to deal with current emergencies on their own responsibility. In some cases, it seems, the general discouragement and disorder following the collapse on the Somme and the Marne and the abandonment of Paris are leading individual officers and groups of men to start for "home." In the eastern section of the front, however, the hinge of the Maginot Line at Montmédy still holds.

Tours is bombed by German planes. Mr. Churchill and his colleagues confer again this morning with M. Reynaud, Marshal Pétain and General Weygand, and return to London. They have received black reports on the military position and are disturbed by the French political situation. But the communiqué issued later in London, after Mr.

Churchill has seen King George, is indefinite, merely stating that "complete agreement was reached as to the measures to be taken to meet developments in the war situation." Lord Lloyd, Colonial Minister, also goes back to England after seeing various French ministers.

The French Cabinet meets at the Château de Cangé, about ten miles outside Tours, and hears from General Weygand that the military situation is desperate, and that he believes there is no longer any hope of preventing the German occupation of all France. The question arises of asking for an armistice. General Weygand says that for military reasons it is highly advisable. Passing somewhat outside the realm of his military competence, he adds the argument that peace must be made at once, before the appearance of the social disorders which he considers imminent. He allegedly alarms the Cabinet and President Lebrun by saying he has just been informed that Maurice Thorez, Communist leader, is already installed in the Elysée Palace. But M. Mandel, who as Minister of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of public order, is able to confirm, by telephoning to M. Langeron, Préfet of Paris, that the city is quiet and that there has been no Communist uprising. The general conclusion of the Cabinet is that in view of General Weygand's advice Mr. Churchill should be asked to visit Tours again for further discussions aiming to relieve France of her obligation not to make a separate peace. (A statement issued in Bordeaux by Propaganda Commissioner Prouvost on June 24, *q.v.*, will state merely that "the predominating opinion" in the Cabinet on this date was that "France, with or without an armistice, could not escape total occupation," and that Mr. Churchill should return "for consultation.")

The obligation not to make a separate peace, referred to above, was assumed by each of the two nations under the Anglo-French Agreement adopted at the sixth meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council in London on March 28. At that time the two Governments agreed to a "solemn declaration," as follows: "The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security. Finally, they undertake to maintain, after the conclusion of peace, a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law, and the maintenance of peace in Europe."

British planes bomb Genoa, Milan and Turin. These raids, repeated

frequently in succeeding days, give the Italian population its first taste of modern warfare.

Turkey severs commercial relations with Italy, orders all her ships to proceed immediately to the nearest Turkish port to await instructions, and is reported to be sending her battle fleet through the Sea of Marmora towards the Dardanelles. The Government is thought to await a hint from Russia before making a decision between war and peace. Doubtless it also is watching military events in France with close attention. In the evening the Turkish Cabinet meets and decides to stay out of the war at present, but to redouble defensive preparations. But the Government emphasizes that Turkey is not retreating from her pledge to go to the aid of the Allies in the event of aggression leading to full war in the Mediterranean area.

The Egyptian Government severs diplomatic relations with Italy. It intimates that a state of war will automatically ensue if Egyptian soil is attacked by air, land or sea.

The new British and French Ambassadors to Soviet Russia, Sir Stafford Cripps and M. Erik Labonne, arrive in Moscow. Signor Augusto Rosso, Italian Ambassador to Russia, also arrives back at his post. The Russian Ambassador to Italy, Ivan Gorelkin, is en route to Italy, marking the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Rome and Moscow. Mr. Gorelkin left Rome last December, before he had presented his credentials, following Italian student demonstrations against Russia, then at war with Finland.

Eighty additional United States Army attack bombers are released for use by the Allies as the President's orders for "full speed ahead" in efforts to aid "the opponents of force" begin to produce results (*cf.* June 6). The House passes and sends to the Senate a $1,706,053,908 supplemental defense appropriation. The President signs the $1,308,-171,000 Naval Appropriation Bill.

JUNE 13

With the Germans in the outskirts of Paris on three sides, Ambassador Bullitt, acting at the request of General Dentz, Commander of the Paris area, transmits to the German Government formal notice that the capital has been declared an open city and that the defending army is being withdrawn. Mr. Bullitt, who has found himself almost without communication with the outside world since the French Government moved to Tours, is able to forward General Dentz's message to Berlin as a result of an unexpected telephone call which comes through this morning from the American Legation in Berne. The object is to spare Paris from destruction. Notices that the capital has been declared an open city are posted in public places. The Préfet orders the police to stay at their posts; the firemen also remain. Mr. Bullitt has

decided that he should remain in Paris, with the principal members of the Embassy staff, in the hope of arranging that the transfer of the city administration to the Germans take place without loss of life.

Meanwhile motorized and armored German columns are pouring over the Seine bridges between Rouen and Paris, especially at Louviers, Les Andelys and Vernon. Towns further west, including Dreux and Evreux, are heavily bombed. North of the city, in the neighborhood of Senlis, at least twelve German divisions are closing in. Further east the enemy has crossed the Marne just above Château-Thierry, and still further east is at Châlons-sur-Marne. The forces thrown into the attack between the Seine and the Meuse are estimated to total 100 divisions as a minimum. The German left wing is threatening to turn the Maginot Line.

An official British statement announces that south of the Seine fresh British troops have taken their place in the line with the French, and that additional troops and material are on the way. This refers evidently to the residual units already on the Continent, but which were outside the German sweep into Flanders, and certain new units hurried across the Channel (*cf.* June 4). British planes continue to be very active, and give a good account of themselves in encounters with the superior enemy air forces.

The French Cabinet gathers at 3 P.M. and considers further the possibility of requesting Germany for an armistice. It suggests that Prime Minister Churchill, who has returned to Tours, should meet with them to discuss the whole question. He declines to be put in such a false position. Instead, he talks with the French Prime Minister, also with M. Georges Mandel, Minister of the Interior (Clemenceau's former associate, and like Clemenceau always a partisan of strong resistance to Germany). Afterwards he starts back again for London. He has been accompanied on this trip by Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, and Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production. At 5 P.M. MM. Reynaud and Mandel carry to the French Cabinet the information that they have seen Mr. Churchill and the other British Ministers, and that these have now left for home.

According to the French version (published by M. Prouvost, High Commissioner for Propaganda, at Bordeaux, June 24, *q.v.*), M. Reynaud's report to the Cabinet is as follows: "The British Premier, in accord with Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook, who accompanied him to France, declared that the British Government will continue to give France, as in the past, the maximum military, air and naval support in its power; but that if events force France to demand an armistice from Germany, the opinion of Churchill, Halifax and Beaverbrook was that England in no event would heap blame on her ally in trouble and would understand the situation in which France found herself, much

against her will." This version adds that M. Reynaud's statement was made in the presence of M. Baudouin, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, subsequently Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Pétain Cabinet. It continues: "The decision to ask for an armistice was again put off 24 hours for two reasons: first, to await President Roosevelt's reply to France's supreme appeal and, second, to give the London Cabinet more precise information regarding the situation and the apparent consequences." And the accusation is added that in the meantime "certain French Ministers, notably Georges Mandel, acting without government instructions, intervened with the British Government so that the Churchill, Beaverbrook and Halifax declarations could not be maintained and so that Britain could take toward France a much less comprehensive and a more imperative attitude."

The British version (presented by Mr. Churchill in Parliament June 25) is that the invitation to come to Tours had been made directly to him by M. Reynaud "when it became clear that the defeat and subjugation of France was imminent, and that her fine Army on which so many hopes were set was reeling under the German flail." At this meeting, according to Mr. Churchill, M. Reynaud, "after dwelling on the conditions at the front and the state of the French Army," asks him "whether Great Britain would release France from her obligation not to negotiate for an armistice or peace without the consent of her British ally. Although I knew how great French sufferings were, and that we had not so far endured equal trials or made an equal contribution in the field, I felt bound to say that I could not give consent. . . . We agreed that a further appeal should be made by M. Reynaud to the United States, and that if the reply was not sufficient to enable M. Reynaud to go on fighting — and he, after all, was the fighting spirit — then we should meet again and take a decision in the light of the new factors."

The two versions, it will be noted, coincide in stating that the French Cabinet, which has already half-way made up its mind to ask for an armistice, consents to postpone action pending a reply to an appeal to be made by M. Reynaud to President Roosevelt. The French omits any reference to an agreement that if the response is inadequate there shall be another Anglo-French consultation before decisive action is taken.

In a broadcast at 11:30 in the evening Premier Reynaud announces that he has sent President Roosevelt "a new and final appeal" — evidently in accordance with the procedure cited above. He calls for "clouds of war planes" to come across the Atlantic "to crush the evil force that dominates Europe." He says that each time he has asked Mr. Roosevelt to increase the assistance permitted under American law, the President has generously complied and the American people have approved. After declaring that wounded France "has the right

to turn to other democracies and to say: 'We have claims on you'," M. Reynaud asks whether the American people will "hesitate still to declare themselves against Nazi Germany." The Premier asserts that "despite our reverses the power of the democracies remains immense." Declaring that "the world must know of the sufferings of France," he says the hour has come for it to pay its debt. He declares ominously that "our fight, each day more painful, has no further sense if in continuing we do not see even far away the hope of a common victory growing." He concludes: "In the great trials of their history our people have known days when they were troubled by defeatist counsel. It is because they never abdicated that they were great. No matter what happens in the coming days, the French are going to suffer. May they be worthy of the past of their nation. May they become brothers. May they unite about their wounded fatherland. The day of resurrection will come!"

After word comes from Tours quoting Premier Reynaud as saying that he has sent Mr. Roosevelt a "final appeal," Stephen T. Early, White House Secretary, authorizes correspondents to say that the text of the Premier's statement has not yet been received, but that "everything possible is being done to forward supplies to France." (And in actual fact, in the confusion which prevails at Tours, the text of the appeal has not yet been put on the wires, and will not be until tomorrow morning.)

Late in the evening the British Government dispatches a message to the French Government paying high tribute to the heroism and constancy of the French Army in its battle against enormous odds. It says it takes "this opportunity of proclaiming the indissoluble union of our two peoples and our two Empires." It continues: "We cannot measure the various forms of tribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the near future. We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuse them together into one unconquerable whole. We renew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve to continue the struggle at all costs in France, in this island, upon the oceans, and in the air, wherever it may lead us, using all our resources to the utmost limits, and sharing together the burden of repairing the ravages of war. We shall never turn from the conflict until France stands safe and erect in all her grandeur, until the wronged and enslaved States and peoples have been liberated, and until civilization is free from the nightmare of Nazidom. That this day will dawn we are more sure than ever. It may dawn sooner than we now have right to expect."

For the third time since the beginning of the war Generalissimo Franco announces that Spain is remaining outside the conflict. But the decree published in Madrid differs from previous statements in proclaiming Spain's "non-belligerency" instead of "neutrality."

JUNE 14

Paris falls. Ambassador Bullitt expected the German troops yesterday, but the first detachment which presented itself at the Porte de Pantin, in the northwest corner of the city, was fired on by an irresponsible French soldier and withdrew. The occupation was delayed until today, when soon after 7 A.M. the first motorcyclists enter the capital. They are followed by German cameramen, radio technicians and announcers, who station themselves in the Place de la Concorde to record the scene as German troops pass through the center of the city. It is a sunny morning. The swastika floats from the Arc de Triomphe and from the Eiffel Tower.

According to a German version published August 12, Nazi officers yesterday sent an "open message over the radio" offering to treat Paris as a non-belligerent zone if the city would surrender at once. They then attempted to get in touch with the French occupying forces under a flag of truce. But the effort failed when the German delegation was fired on by mistake by French Senegalese troops. At 6 A.M. today French delegates arrive at the village of Ecouen, some 10 miles from Paris on the road to Chantilly, and begin negotiations with German officers regarding the conditions for the surrender and occupation of Paris. The French in general accept the conditions of the German High Command, but raise a question as to what area constitutes Paris. They explain that they are empowered to surrender only the city proper and not its environs. Under threats that a concentric attack with artillery of the heaviest calibers will begin at once if the German demand is not accepted, the French signature is affixed to the protocol of surrender. At about 7:45 A.M. armored cars, tanks and infantry advance into Paris from the northwest, passing through Neuilly and following the Champs Elysées into the heart of the city.

The Parisians stand grimly on the curb as Germans march through their boulevards for the first time since 1871. It is the ninth recorded invasion of Paris. Only a third of the citizens remain. Shops are closed and shuttered. The police and civil guards remain on duty but surrender their arms.

In Berlin the fall of Paris provokes scenes of wild rejoicing. On Chancellor Hitler's orders church bells are rung and the Nazi flag is ordered displayed for three days. Berlin describes the event as "catastrophic" morally and economically for the French and says it completes the second phase of the war. The first was the Battle of Flanders. The third will be the pursuit and "final destruction" of all the French forces.

The major objective of the Germans in this third and "final" phase of the war is evidently going to be to turn the flank of the Maginot Line

by pressing straight south from the Argonne through Champagne. Montmédy, westernmost fort of the Line, has already been taken; and the German advance now reaches Vitry-le-François, threatening Verdun and Nancy. They also open an artillery attack on the Maginot Line in the region of the Saar. On the Channel they claim to be in Havre and to be advancing down the coast towards Cherbourg.

The French High Command says Paris was abandoned because there was no valid strategic reason why it should be defended and in order to avoid its destruction. The communiqué says that the French Army is retreating in good order. Military circles admit that the rapid German advance in Champagne threatens the Maginot Line, as its guns are useless against an attack from the rear.

The French Government moves from Tours to Bordeaux. Before leaving Tours by car about noon Premier Reynaud arranges to dispatch to Washington the text of the appeal referred to in last night's broadcast. The text of this appeal (which is not made public) corresponds in part to the radio speech itself, but is even more urgent and dramatic. It is transmitted via Ambassador Biddle, who calls at the Premier's château about 9:30 A.M. to inquire about it. The British are incensed when they hear that M. Reynaud has implied in this message that if France is forced to withdraw from the war they will not be able to continue the struggle alone with any hope of success.

In an interview with Karl von Wiegand, chief foreign correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, Chancellor Hitler seeks to offset the French appeals for increased American help. He says that his policy is "Europe for the Europeans and America for the Americans." He denounces as a lie the idea that he has ever dreamed of interfering with affairs in the Western Hemisphere, describing American fears on that score as childish and grotesque. He also denies that he wants to smash the British Empire, but says he will simply destroy those who are destroying that Empire. He asserts that in any event American assistance will not affect the outcome of the war, and hence that American policy is not his affair and really does not interest him. As for his more remote aims, he tells Mr. von Wiegand he has only one — peace. Informed of the von Wiegand story, Mr. Roosevelt remarks at a press conference: "That brings up recollections."

In London it is stated in government circles that Britain has agreed to accept whatever military and political decisions France feels she must make, provided they are preceded by full and frank consultation. If France is lost as an ally, Britain will continue the struggle alone.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King reads to the Canadian House of Commons the communication sent last night by the British Government to the French Government, as also a message which he has sent today to M. Reynaud declaring that "Canada pledges to France as she

has to Britain her unwavering support to the utmost limit of her power and resources."

6. *The French Request for an Armistice*

JUNE 15

German troops penetrate with amazing speed into central France. One German spearhead reaches Chaumont, 50 miles up the Marne from Vitry-le-François, reported yesterday as just captured. Verdun falls, and further east the Germans cross the Rhine into Alsace. Berlin says 200,000 prisoners have been taken in the past ten days. The swastika flies over the Palace of Versailles.

The Italians report that they have launched two drives into France, one north of Nice, the other through difficult Alpine passes into Savoy. This is the first Italian military activity of any importance. It begins as the power of the French to defend themselves has already come nearly to an end. Even so, Italian military accomplishments in this area will be negligible.

President Roosevelt discusses the Reynaud appeal with the French and British Ambassadors, Count de Saint-Quentin and Lord Lothian. They call at the White House at noon, and the conference lasts about an hour. The possibilities of continued French resistance outside France proper and the future of the French fleet are two of the questions coming under review. The two Ambassadors urge the President to make his reply public, but receive no promise to that effect. The intimation at the State Department yesterday was that it would not be published. Soon after they leave, however, the text is given out. In it the President pledges redoubled efforts to supply all possible moral and material assistance "so long as the Allied Governments continue to resist." He writes: "I believe it is possible to say that every week that goes by will see additional materiel on its way to the Allied nations." In accordance with the American Government's policy of not recognizing "the results of conquest of territory acquired through military aggression," he says that it "will not consider as valid any attempts to infringe by force the independence and territorial integrity of France." The President's message concludes: "I know that you will understand that these statements carry with them no implication of military commitments. Only the Congress can make such commitments."

British officials issue a denial of reports that the French contemplate making a separate peace. The Foreign Office asserts that stories of a disagreement between the British and French civil and military authorities are "completely devoid of foundation," and that the Allies will continue, as hitherto, in close consultation and complete agreement. No effort is made to minimize the critical nature of the military situation, but it is said flatly that intimations of an imminent French

surrender or collapse have no basis in fact. The war will continue, no matter what blows Germany may strike, no matter what losses the Allies may suffer.

The French Cabinet meets in the evening in Bordeaux. The session, which lasts 3½ hours, is presided over by President Lebrun and attended by General Weygand, Admiral Jean Darlan, French naval chief, and General Joseph Vuillemin, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. Another session is announced for tomorrow.

After several days of intensive consultation with the British and French Ambassadors, the Turkish Government decides that for the present it will continue its attitude of non-belligerency.

Soviet troops occupy Lithuania after a Russian ultimatum that the Lithuanian Government resign in favor of one which is pro-Communist.

Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh returns to the air in another address on the international situation. He criticizes the Administration for "making gestures with an empty gun after we have already lost the draw," and says there are "men among us" who "have baited the trap of war with requests for modest assistance."

June 16

This Sunday is a decisive date in French history. The French Cabinet has three meetings in the Prefecture at Bordeaux. In fact, it is in almost continuous session. While these meetings are going on, Premier Reynaud is several times in communication with London, sometimes *via* the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, sometimes directly over the telephone with General de Gaulle, French Under-Secretary of War, who happens to be in London on one of his frequent liaison missions for the Reynaud Government. He also talks with M. Herriot and M. Jeanneney, heads respectively of the Chamber and Senate. M. Reynaud has sent word to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt's reply to the appeal for fuller and more immediate American help is not satisfactory, and has renewed his demand that France be released from the obligation not to make a separate peace. The British Government reminds him formally that the obligation depends on an agreement made by the French Republic, not the promise of any single statesman or administration. The British Government nevertheless tells him (as reported by Mr. Churchill in the Commons on June 25) that in view of French sufferings it will give approval to the French Government's engaging in separate armistice negotiations on one condition — namely, that the French fleet be dispatched to British ports and that it remain there while the negotiations are in progress. The British Government makes clear that in any event it is resolved to continue the war, and it repudiates "any association with such enquiries about an armistice." In one of his telephone talks with

Bordeaux, General de Gaulle sends word that an important affirmative proposal will be submitted from London later in the day, and he urges M. Reynaud not to allow the Cabinet to make any important decisions in advance of its arrival.

The British proposal, presented to Premier Reynaud about 5 P.M. by Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador, consists of the draft for an "Act of Union" between Great Britain and France. The idea is not new, but has never been raised before in such concrete form. It is suggested that there shall at once be formed an "indissoluble union" between the two nations, with a Constitution providing for joint organs of defense and the joint conduct of foreign, financial and economic policies. "Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France." During the present war there will be a single war cabinet, and all the forces of the two nations on land, sea and air will be placed under its direction. "The two Parliaments will be formally associated." New armies are being raised; and "France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air." The Union will appeal for American aid in strengthening its joint economic resources. "The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be. And thus we shall conquer." In the course of one of his talks with London about this very sweeping plan M. Reynaud is allegedly told that if it is immediately accepted by the French Government there is a possibility that he can at once become the first head of the new unified war cabinet — in fact, Prime Minister of the Franco-British Union.

M. Reynaud carries the British offer to the Cabinet, which has been discussing President Roosevelt's reply to the "final and supreme" French appeal. That reply is accepted as representing about all that Mr. Roosevelt could promise; but his reference to the power of the American Congress to prevent any military commitment recalls French disappointments over the American Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and it is used as a strong argument by the members of the Cabinet who favor prompt surrender. The division in the Cabinet is almost even. Those who favor continuation of the war, if necessary from North Africa, include MM. Mandel, Campinchi, Delbos, Monnet, Marin and Dautry. Some, it will be noted, are Rightists, some are Leftists. They are supported from outside the Cabinet by MM. Herriot and Jeanneney. Admiral Darlan is also said to wish to continue the war on sea and from Algeria, Tunisia and French Morocco. The opponents of continued resistance are headed by Vice Premier Pétain, who is in accord with General Weygand. They are said to believe, in addition to the other reasons already noted in support of their position, that Britain, too, must soon succumb to the invincible Nazis. Outside

the Cabinet, ex-Premier Laval is active in favor of making terms at once. It is accepted in Bordeaux that he is in touch with the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Lequerica, who, it is suggested, might serve as an intermediary in the event the French authorities decided to get into touch with Chancellor Hitler. Several Cabinet members, including M. Chautemps, vacillate. No definite action is taken on the British proposal. The Cabinet adjourns at 7:45 P.M.

When the French Cabinet reassembles about 10 P.M. General Weygand is called in for a final report. There is further discussion of the British offer of union. Some reports say that it is rejected 14–10, others that no formal vote is taken. In any event, a vote is now taken on the proposal to ask Germany for terms. *The Cabinet votes 13 to 11 in favor of an armistice, and M. Reynaud resigns. President Lebrun asks Marshal Pétain to form a Government.* One report is that he promptly pulls the list of his Cabinet members out of his pocket; another is that he goes into an adjoining room to consult President Lebrun, and that while he is there the ex-Ministers who had voted for resistance leave the room. In Marshal Pétain's new Cabinet the Vice Premier is M. Chautemps. General Weygand becomes Minister of Defense; M. Baudouin, Foreign Minister; General Louis Colson, Minister of War; Admiral Darlan, Minister of the Navy and Merchant Marine; General Bertrand Pujo, Minister of Air; M. Ybarnégaray, Minister of War Veterans and Families. By 10:30 M. Reynaud has left the meeting. At 11:30 P.M. the French radio announces that he is out and that Marshal Pétain heads the new Government. *Marshal Pétain this same evening sends for Señor Lequerica, the Spanish Ambassador, and asks that Madrid communicate to Chancellor Hitler the French Government's request for an armistice.* The Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Valerio Valeri, also participates in the negotiations.

News of the overthrow of the French Cabinet comes to Prime Minister Churchill as he is seated in a train in a London station. M. Reynaud has asked him to come to Bordeaux for the final consultation agreed upon at Tours on June 13, and he is about to start. He alights from the train and returns to 10 Downing Street; and after consulting the Cabinet sends word to the new Pétain Government reminding it of the formal conditions which the British Government has enjoined upon the preceding French Government regarding a separate peace, specifically the guarantees about the French fleet. He points out (according to his June 25 statement) that there still is plenty of time for the Pétain Government to give the necessary orders about the fleet even while starting to get into touch with Berlin. After the emergency meeting of the Cabinet, newspapermen are merely informed that Britain will continue the war under any and all conditions.

General de Gaulle has already started by air for Bordeaux to report

about the British offer in more detail. He arrives to find M. Reynaud out of office and the new Cabinet committed to making peace. His friends say that he calls on M. Reynaud at his hotel, salutes, and without any more than a formal interchange of remarks regains his plane and returns to London. He there begins making plans to organize those Frenchmen who wish to continue to fight.

Throughout this day of such momentous political negotiations the German Armies have not stood still. *The Maginot Line, taken in the rear by the German advance, is virtually abandoned.* From Switzerland it is reported that most of the French divisions in the Line have been successfully withdrawn, leaving only small detachments to harass the Germans, and that the French intention seems to be to establish a new defense line across France from the Swiss border to the Loire. But Berlin says that the German armies which are racing towards the Loire have no real contact with the French forces at any point.

Waves of German and Italian bombing planes visit Tours and wreck whole blocks of homes and business houses. The city is crowded with refugees and the dead and injured number several hundreds.

The activity of the Italian Army on the French frontier fails to develop into a major offensive. The Italian air force raids several air bases in southern France. It also bombs Malta for the twentieth time, as well as two Egyptian ports near Libya. The British report four Italian submarines sunk and two bases in Italian East Africa raided. Raids of this sort will from now on be of almost daily occurrence.

Soviet troops occupy Latvia and Estonia.

JUNE 17

Marshal Pétain broadcasts a statement in the morning announcing that he has assumed direction of the Government and declaring that France no longer has the military power to continue the war "against an enemy superior in numbers and in arms." He says: "It is with a heavy heart I say we must cease the fight. I have applied to our opponent to ask him if he is ready to sign with us, as between soldiers after the fight and in honor, means to put an end to hostilities."

At 4:30 P.M. Berlin announces that Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini will at once meet in Munich to discuss what terms to offer France, the strategy of the war against Britain, and policies in the Balkans. In the evening Mussolini sets out, accompanied by Count Ciano. The Berlin radio also makes plain that the French request for negotiations is not a capitulation nor even a formal plea for an armistice; Marshal Pétain's order to cease fire does not portend that an armistice will automatically be concluded. "The pursuit of the French Army," it says, "will continue."

In a broadcast at 9:30 P.M. Foreign Minister Baudouin rectifies the

impression given by Premier Pétain that fighting has already ceased. He says that the Government has had to ask for conditions of peace because, although the British fleet has not lost mastery of the seas, and though Britain's troops and "magnificent Air Force" have "shared our battles," forty million Frenchmen are now facing "almost alone" eighty million Germans, plus the Italians. "Modern war cannot be improvised, and our friends have not been able to bring us the support necessary to the advance guard which the French Army represented." But though the Government has had to ask for terms, "they have not abandoned their arms." France is ready to seek an honorable peace. "But she will never be ready to accept shameful conditions which would mean the end of spiritual freedom for her people." And the evening communiqué of the French Army, broadcast by the French radio, affirms that "at all points of contact our troops are still fighting with the same bravery for the honor of the flag."

The fighting is, in fact, continuing in some areas with great stubbornness on the French side. Berlin reports that a German column has penetrated to the French-Swiss border southwest of Besançon and that the Maginot Line in consequence is completely isolated. A desperate fight is put up by the French to keep the foe from crossing the middle Loire. But the French evening communiqué admits that it has been crossed. A flying German column captures Orléans. In northern Lorraine, German troops are approaching St. Mihiel, and are also advancing through the Maginot Line south of Saarbrücken. Sarrebourg and other cities in that area have been taken, despite strong French resistance. A later German communiqué announces the capture of the fortress of Metz. French military spokesmen in Bordeaux admit to the Associated Press that the Army has been split into four parts. No continuous front is being held. The French radio announces, however, that the French fleet and air force are "intact."

In the evening Prime Minister Churchill broadcasts the following brief message: "The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for the gallant French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune. Nothing will alter our feelings towards them, or our faith that the genius of France will rise again. What has happened in France makes no difference to British faith and purpose. We have become the sole champions now in arms to defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honor. We shall defend our island, and, with the British Empire around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men. We are sure that in the end all will be well." The text of yesterday's offer to France of an "Act of Union" is also made public in London. It remains unknown generally in France, due to interference with the transmission of radio news from England.

There have been some other events in Bordeaux during the day which though minor are worth recording. Ex-Premier Reynaud has received a private message from President Roosevelt expressing his personal regret over the fall of the Cabinet and the failure of the policy of resistance. M. Reynaud has replied with an expression of thanks, adding that he realizes the President went to the limit of his powers in offering assistance to France. M. Mandel, until last evening Minister of the Interior, has been arrested while lunching at the Chapon Fin restaurant in Bordeaux. He is released shortly afterwards, however, upon urgent representations to Premier Pétain made jointly and in person by M. Herriot, President of the Chamber, and M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

On receipt of definite information that the French Government has opened negotiations with Germany, President Roosevelt issues an order "freezing" the assets in the United States of France and her nationals. This will prevent Germany from realizing on those assets, amounting to approximately $1,000,000,000. In New York, the British Purchasing Commission announces that it is taking over all French war orders.

The United States Senate, by a vote of 76 to 0, adopts a joint resolution declaring that the United States will refuse to recognize change of title from one European Power to another of "any geographic region in the Western Hemisphere." Today also (though announcement will not be made until June 19) Secretary Hull instructs American diplomatic representatives in Berlin and Rome to make the American Government's position in this matter clear to the German and Italian Foreign Ministers. Each of them is told that the United States, having heard of the French request for an armistice, "feels it desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, to inform Your Excellency that in accordance with its traditional policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." The French, British and Netherland Governments receive similar notices. Thus the United States is committed to oppose any such transfer, whether it be French Guiana or the Dutch West Indies to Germany or Italy, or even Greenland to Great Britain. In preparation for maintaining this position, the United States today sends notes inviting the Foreign Ministers of the other 20 American Republics to meet in emergency session to discuss the new problems in the Western Hemisphere arising from the European war. (Announcement that invitations have been sent for this conference, which meets in Habana July 21, will be made June 19.)

JUNE 18

Despite the French request for an armistice, the Germans press forward in all directions, determined to scourge France until their terms are accepted. After some violent actions, advance German forces enter Cherbourg (77 miles across the Channel from Britain's great naval base at Portsmouth) and Rennes, capital of Brittany. In the eastern part of the country the Germans claim that the French military collapse proceeds apace, and that their troops have thrust beyond the headwaters of the Loire and south along the Swiss border. Among the cities occupied are Nevers, Dijon, Belfort and Metz. On the upper Rhine, Colmar has been taken.

Chancellor Hitler arrives in Munich at noon, and greets Premier Mussolini when the latter's special train pulls in three hours later. The arrival of the two dictators is heralded with what is reported as "unprecedented jubilation." Their conference opens at the Fuehrer House shortly after 4 and ends at 8:10, when a communiqué is issued stating merely that they have reached "an agreement on the attitude of both Governments toward the French request for an armistice." In a blaze of Nazi and Italian flags and a din of "Heils" and "Vivas" Signor Mussolini entrains for Rome, and shortly afterwards Herr Hitler starts back for his army headquarters. German radio bulletins state that "peace with honor was denied in 1918 to a Germany starved by the blockade," and that Germany's present victory will be based on a stark sense of reality. The war will go on until the political and military system of France is smashed.

There are air raid alarms in Bordeaux. The opinion there, states a Reuter dispatch, is that they are part of the tactics of the Germans to "harry the French Government in a physical way as much as possible in order to obtain the kind of peace they want."

The French radio repeats over and over again that France will accept only honorable conditions of peace and that, pending the German reply, she will continue the struggle. At 6:30 P.M. the French station announces that, according to certain information reaching the French Government, German columns are flying white flags in the hope that the French troops will discontinue their resistance. The announcer says: "All combatants, French and Allied, on land, on sea and in the air, are reminded that no armistice or suspension of hostilities has supervened. Negotiations alone are contemplated, and they have not yet begun. It is the duty of all, therefore, to continue the resistance."

Premier Pétain and General Weygand issue an order in the evening that all French land, sea and air forces are to "continue resistance" at the side of Great Britain until there is assurance that Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini will agree to an armistice on honorable terms. At the same

time, all French cities and towns of more than 20,000 population are for practical purposes surrendered to the Germans by an official proclamation declaring them to be "open cities." This proclamation is made in the hope of saving them, like Paris, from bombardment. Minister of Interior Charles Pomaret who makes the announcement over the radio also orders all civilians to halt immediately their "immense and tragic" flight southward and to remain in their homes even if they are "on the point of being invaded." Order is the first element of a country's security, he says, and food supplies can be assured only if every civilian remains in his place. The French Minister for Refugees estimates that six millions are homeless.

In the evening, Madrid reports that the decisions taken by Hitler and Mussolini at Munich have been transmitted to the German Embassy in Madrid, and are being passed on to the Spanish Foreign Office. They will be sent overnight to José Felix Lequerica, Spanish Ambassador to France, who is with the French Government at Bordeaux. Nothing specific is disclosed, but it is rumored that the eventual terms will be unconditional surrender, including the giving up of the French fleet.

The actual position of the French fleet remains uncertain. Several important fighting units are in any case operating with the British fleet at Alexandria, under the orders of a British admiral. Certain other naval units are said to have left French ports during the day for undisclosed destinations. The attitude of individual commanders towards an eventual order for surrender cannot be foretold. Meanwhile, the Spanish press reports that airplanes have been sighted over the Balearic Islands, flying in the direction of Africa. This suggestion that perhaps French planes are fleeing to Algeria is never confirmed. The situation in Syria and French North Africa is also obscure. Reports reaching French circles in London are that General Mittelhauser in Syria and General Auguste Noguès in French Morocco have "probably" decided to fight on. From Bordeaux come reports by American newspapermen that the spirit of French resistance is not dead, even inside the present French Cabinet. Ex-Premier Reynaud gives Mr. P. J. Philip of the *New York Times* a one-word interview: "Fidelity."

Prime Minister Churchill tells the House of Commons in the afternoon that "the French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting away their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them." He says, nevertheless: "However matters may go in France, or with the French Government, or with another French Government, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people." If final victory rewards Great Britain, she will share the gains with them. Freedom will be restored to all the peoples subjugated by Germany — Czechs,

Poles, Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians. Mr. Churchill reminds his listeners, however, that "it is not yet certain that military resistance by France will come to an end." He refers to "the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse," adding that "this delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action the whole of the British Expeditionary Force." Mr. Churchill says that today Great Britain has 1,250,000 men under arms and 500,000 local defense volunteers; and that she is "now assured of the immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States, and especially of the airplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans." "The Battle of France is over," and now "the Battle of Britain is about to begin." The Prime Minister concludes: "Let us therefore address ourselves to our duty, so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years, men will still say 'This was their finest hour'."

From London, General de Gaulle broadcasts in the evening an appeal to the French people not to cease resistance. He says: "The generals who for many years have commanded the French armies have formed a Government. That Government, alleging that our armies have been defeated, has opened negotiations with the enemy to put an end to the fighting. We certainly have been, and still are, submerged by the mechanical strength of the enemy, both on land and in the air. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans far more than their numbers were responsible for our retirement. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans astounded our generals to such an extent that they have been brought to the pass which they are in today. But has the last word been said? Has all hope disappeared? Is the defeat final? No. Believe me, I speak with knowledge and I tell you that France is not lost. The same methods which have brought about our defeat can quite well one day bring victory. For France is not alone. She is not alone — she is not alone. She has a vast empire behind her. She can unite with the British Empire, which holds the seas, and is continuing the struggle. She can utilize to the full, as England is doing, the vast industrial resources of the United States. . . . This war is a World War. In spite of all our mistakes, all our deficiencies, all our sufferings, there are in the universe sufficient means to enable us one day to crush our enemies. Shattered today by mechanical force, we shall be able to conquer in the future by stronger mechanical force. The fate of the world depends on it." He concludes by inviting "all French officers and men who are on British soil, or who may arrive here with or without their arms," also French engineers and skilled work-

men, to get into touch with him. "Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not and shall not be extinguished."

As a prelude to the "Battle of Britain," German planes launch their biggest air attack of the war late this evening. They drop explosive and incendiary bombs along the lower Thames River and in East Coast areas, killing and injuring numbers of civilians. It is revealed that last night and early this morning the Royal Air Force made what are described as the greatest raids of the war into Germany, striking at 12 German cities and bombing factories, airdromes, and railway centers in the Rhineland, the Ruhr Valley and the northwestern section of the Reich.

There are grounds for believing that Washington has not remained inactive with regard to the situation developing between France and Britain. Ambassador Bullitt decided (*cf.* July 13) to remain in Paris when the French Government fled to Tours. But his functions are being performed in part by Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Ambassador to Poland, who had followed the Poles to France. Mr. Biddle was at first in Angers, the seat of the Polish Government in exile, then went to Tours when the French Government established itself there, and has since been with it in Bordeaux. It is thought that through Ambassador Biddle and through the French Embassy in Washington the United States Government has been able to send Foreign Minister Baudouin intimations of the concern felt in American official circles over a possible surrender of the French fleet to Germany, this being a matter which affects the relative naval strength of the United States. It appears that today the French Foreign Minister has let Washington know that American apprehensions on this score are unnecessary in view of the personal assurances already given privately by various members of the French Government, himself included.

The United States House of Representatives adopts the resolution passed yesterday by the Senate against changes in title of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. A bill is also introduced to increase the nation's naval strength by 70 percent and provide a navy adequate to defend both its coasts and all its possessions. President Roosevelt at his press conference indicates that a scheme of compulsory government service for all young men and women is being studied. In two neighboring countries plans for military conscription are making progress. The Canadian Government today introduces a bill for immediate conscription for home service of able-bodied males up to 45 years, only exempting those needed for vital industries. The Mexican Cabinet approves a compulsory military training law affecting all males between 18 and 45 years.

JUNE 19

Yesterday Bordeaux was waiting anxiously for the German reply to

Premier Pétain's request for an armistice. This morning it arrives *via* Madrid. Air raid warnings during the night have not calmed the nerves of either populace or officials. Newspapermen report the city a bedlam. At 9 A.M. the French Cabinet assembles, with President Lebrun presiding. A communiqué issued later merely reports that the German note has been transmitted by the Spanish Ambassador, and that according to its terms the Reich Government is ready to present its conditions for the cessation of hostilities. As soon as the French plenipotentiaries are named (continues the communiqué), the German Government will say where and when it will receive them. The announcement is made that they have already been appointed, but the names are not made public.

Although the French Government refuses to admit that preliminary conditions have been set by Germany, there seems reason to believe that agents of the two governments have exchanged views through the Spanish Ambassador. Reports current in Bordeaux are that the terms which Germany intends to impose are so humiliating that they cannot possibly be accepted. Indeed, it is even believed in many quarters that the Government has now reverted to the idea of moving to French North Africa and continuing the struggle from there. This rumor receives some confirmation from the fact that the Government has practically decided to move to Perpignan, a city in the extreme south of the country and close to several little Mediterranean ports which give easy access to French Morocco and Algeria. Also, it is well known that certain deputies and former cabinet ministers still are urging that the war be continued outside of France proper, on the theory that Germany's treatment of France will not thereby be made any the worse; that the Pétain-Weygand tendency to believe Britain already beaten may be incorrect; and that all help should be given toward a British victory as the only hopeful way out of France's desperate plight. Some two dozen deputies who are said to hold this view, including MM. Daladier, Mandel, Delbos and Campinchi, have today boarded the steamship *Massilia* at Le Verdon, on the Gironde estuary, with French North Africa as their destination. (Later on, they will be severely criticized by government spokesmen on this account, indeed some of them who are army officers as well as deputies will be accused of desertion. At Vichy on July 10, however, M. Herriot will compel M. Laval to acknowledge that the French authorities have facilitated the departure of the *Massilia*. Some will interpret this as indicating that at the present juncture the Pétain Government really had an intention of joining the "die hards" in French North Africa; others that members of the Government merely were willing to see their political rivals lay themselves open to the charge of being cowards and deserters.) By afternoon the idea of moving to Perpignan is more or less abandoned. It is not till late in the evening, however, that the French Government

sends to Madrid the names of the four French plenipotentiaries for transmission to Berlin. Some observers attribute the delay to the difficulty of finding a formula which Germany will accept for camouflaging the surrender of the French fleet. Whether or not the Germans will occupy all of France supposedly depends on the disposal of the French fleet.

Several high British officials have reached Bordeaux to argue against any French tendency to turn the French fleet over to Germany. They include the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander; the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound; and Lord Lloyd, Colonial Minister. They have conversations with Premier Pétain, Foreign Minister Baudouin and other French statesmen. They renew earlier offers of British warships and other vessels to help transport French troops and officials to North Africa should the Government decide to prolong resistance. (They subsequently will maintain that in these talks they received many assurances that France would fulfill her undertaking under the Anglo-French Agreement of March 28. But it will not be claimed in London that the British Ambassador in Bordeaux ever was able to secure a formal assurance regarding the French fleet from the Pétain Government, though the matter was brought formally to its attention by Prime Minister Churchill the same evening it took office.) Mr. Alexander leaves for home from the Biscarosse airport soon after midnight.

In London, meanwhile, every item of news from Bordeaux is being closely scanned and the claim is made that some slight but encouraging change can be noted in the attitude of the Pétain Government. The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Times* finds that the French Government is laying greater emphasis on its determination to fight rather than accept terms which are dishonorable; also that it seems to be giving more encouragement to the French armies which still are carrying on courageous rearguard actions. Before each announcement on the French radio still come the slow, distant-sounding notes of the Marseillaise — "Aux armes, citoyens!" The announcements themselves are shorter and sound more resolute. "Let us wait calmly," says one broadcast heard in London, "and let us have full confidence in the men who in a most tragic hour have taken on the heavy burden of responsibility for the country's destiny. Let us thank all our soldiers who are fighting unceasingly with fierce energy and with a courage more than human." The director of the French radio services, in a broadcast explaining the request for an armistice, says that while the Government is ready to put an end to the struggle, it will "not accept anything that interferes with the structure of our country. We are capitulating with honor, but if it is sought to impose upon France conditions incompatible with that honor she will continue the struggle with her

Allies." On the other hand, Minister of the Interior Pomaret has publicly rebuked General Charles de Gaulle for having urged in his broadcast from London last evening that resistance against Germany be kept up. M. Pomaret says General de Gaulle has been ordered back to France.

The retreat of the French forces continues. The Germans push ahead relentlessly in western and central France, while in Burgundy motorized troops are advancing on Lyon, only 200 miles from the Mediterranean. The French are still resisting in the Maginot Line on both sides of Thionville; but the Germans claim the capture of Lunéville and Toul and say Strasbourg has been entered and the swastika raised. Almost half of France is in German hands.

Germany makes it clear that Italy will have no part in the meeting between the French and German representatives. A Berlin spokesman explains that "Italian interests are in good hands after yesterday's Munich agreement." Berlin stresses that nothing less than the complete capitulation of France will satisfy Chancellor Hitler. The *Völkischer Beobachter* comments that Germans are not revengeful, but "have at last ceased to be good-natured German blockheads." The *Berliner 12 Uhr Blatt* writes: "The old Europe was the product of the blind and furious hatred of a Richelieu and a Clemenceau. The new Europe will be built by the love and faith of the Fuehrer."

Reports reaching London indicate that Europe faces a major famine this coming winter. Germany's food situation is described as bad, but things are even worse in the occupied countries, as the Germans have been removing livestock, fodder and reserves of provisions.

The note of the United States of June 17 to Germany and Italy warning those Powers to keep their hands off the Western Hemisphere is released to the press. The Government's position is reinforced by an announcement by Under Secretary of State Welles that two days ago the United States also delivered invitations to the other American Republics to meet for a discussion of the new problems in the Western Hemisphere arising from the European conflict. Mr. Welles says that 16 nations have already replied favorably.

Lord Lothian, British Ambassador, tells 1,200 alumni of Yale University that "if Hitler beats us, the totalitarian Powers will possess airplane building facilities, naval and shipbuilding dockyards and industrial resources all over Europe, and especially in Germany, France and Britain, to say nothing of Italy, which will enable them vastly to outbuild your own defensive preparations, whatever they may be, and that indefinitely." He adds that "if Hitler gets our fleet, or destroys it, the whole foundation on which the security of both our countries has rested for 120 years will have disappeared."

Japan announces that she considers maintenance of the *status quo* in

French Indo-China "equally important" to its maintenance in the Netherland Indies. A Foreign Office spokesman informs the press that Japan's interest in Indo-China arises from her position as the "stabilizing" influence in the Far East, and also from concern over the munitions traffic through the French colony. The Japanese Government is understood to have informed Germany and Italy that it expects to be consulted concerning the future of Indo-China, on the grounds that Japan's interests there are both military and economic.

7. *The Armistice with Germany and Italy*

JUNE 20

The Pétain Government's message announcing the names of its four plenipotentiaries, dispatched last evening by way of Madrid, is delayed in transmission and does not reach Berlin until 1 A.M. No action on it is taken until 4 A.M., when it reaches Chancellor Hitler at his army headquarters. But another type of German action occurs meanwhile, calculated to spur on the Bordeaux Government to prompt surrender. At about the moment when the French note arrives in Berlin waves of German bombers appear over the city of Bordeaux and the docks along the Gironde River. Their bombs fall over a 50-mile radius. Some of the Nazi planes sweep over the city only 400 yards above the rooftops, bombing buildings jammed with refugees and the squares where they are encamped. In the two visitations, one at 1 A.M., the other at 6 A.M., about 150 persons are killed and 300 injured. The Government had declared Bordeaux an open city, therefore not a military objective in the French view. In Rome it is announced that Italian planes aided the German air force in the attack.

On receipt of the Pétain note Chancellor Hitler gives instructions as to where and how the French representatives shall present themselves to receive his terms. In accordance with his orders, the French delegation, headed by General Charles Huntziger, and including Rear-Admiral Maurice Leluc, General of the Air Force Bergeret, and Léon Noel, formerly Ambassador to Poland, leave Bordeaux later in the morning. One story is that they use a white airplane. The United Press will report from Bordeaux tomorrow that in fact they drive north by motor, and are greatly delayed when they encounter retreating French troops south of the Loire. They reach the German pontoon bridge across the Loire at Tours about midnight, where they are met by a German officer who had been waiting for them for some hours. They proceed to Paris and there spend the remainder of the night. Their ultimate destination is not disclosed in Bordeaux. But in Berlin it is said their meeting with the German delegates will take place in the historic forest of Compiègne, where was signed in November 1918 the armistice that ended hostilities in the First World War.

A communiqué in Rome announces: "The French Government this morning sent word to the Italian Government through the Spanish Government asking to negotiate an armistice with Italy. The Italian Government has replied through the same medium in terms analogous to those of the German Government: namely, that it awaits knowledge of the names of the French plenipotentiaries, to whom the place and date of the meeting will later be given." While waiting for the French reply, the Italian press, like the German, is demanding unconditional surrender and warning against any feeling of pity for the French. Thus the *Tevere* writes: "Stop crying for France. What more could they have done to merit our heel in their necks? Let that country of carrion burn once and for all in the torture of the direst defeat. . . . Let them stay on their knees for centuries."

A meeting of the French Cabinet is followed by an important radio address by Marshal Pétain. He speaks as follows:

"I have asked the enemy to put an end to hostilities. The Government yesterday appointed plenipotentiaries to receive their conditions. I took this decision with the stout heart of a soldier because the military situation imposed it. We had hoped to resist on the Somme-Aisne line. General Weygand had regrouped our forces and his name alone presaged victory. The line yielded, however, under the pressure of the enemy, and forced our troops to retreat. From June 13 the request for an armistice was inevitable. The blow surprised you, and remembering 1914–1918, you sought the reasons for it. I am going to give you them.

"On May 1, 1917, we still had 3,280,000 men under arms, in spite of three years of murderous fighting. On the eve of the present battle we had 500,000 fewer. In May 1918 we had 85 British divisions; in May 1940 we only had 10. In 1918 we had with us 58 Italian divisions and 42 American divisions. The inferiority of our materiel was even greater than that of our effectives. French aviation has fought at odds of one to six. Not so strong as 22 years ago, we had also fewer friends, too few children, too few arms, too few allies. There is the cause of our defeat.

"The French people do not deny the blow. All peoples have known ups and downs. It is by the way they react that they show themselves to be weak or great. We shall learn a lesson from the battle which has been lost. Since the victory, the spirit of pleasure prevailed over the spirit of sacrifice. People have demanded more than they have given. They have wanted to spare themselves effort. Today misfortunes come. I was with you in the glorious days. As head of the Government I shall remain with you in the dark days. Stand by me. The fight still goes on. It is for France, the soil of her sons."

This address must come as a special blow to those French units

which have up to the last moment been carrying on courageously against the advancing German flood. It is taken by the French public as sealing the nation's surrender even though the armistice terms are not yet known. The old Marshal probably has more prestige than any other French leader today. Even so, opinion remains divided both in France and among Frenchmen abroad about the inevitability of his decision to ask for an armistice rather than to attempt continuing resistance in company with Britain. Foreign journalists in Bordeaux report that the speech has finally awakened the city to the full extent of the national tragedy, which hitherto, somehow, has not seemed real. Marshal Pétain himself, passing today in his automobile through the streets, is the object of respectful sympathy; but there is none of the cheering which marked his appearance on previous days.

In spite of the fatalistic tone of the Pétain speech rumors again revive in Bordeaux that the French Government is preparing to leave for a new provisional capital, perhaps Biarritz. A Reuter dispatch states that the Government made a decision in this sense after the bombing attack of this morning in order to remove all excuse for the Germans to consider Bordeaux anything but an open town. There continues to be great confusion as to the status of what are called the "negotiations" with Germany. The United Press says that the French emissaries, having crossed the Nazi lines, already have received Hitler's conditions. It revives the report that if these prove too strong the Government may go to North Africa. The Rome radio announces that the French representatives have already returned to Bordeaux. None of these reports coincide with actual developments.

At a late hour in the evening Berlin still has not announced the names of the German delegates to tomorrow's meeting. Officials continue to be uncommunicative about the terms to be imposed, but comments by the Nazi press leave no doubt that Germany will claim overflowing vengeance for what took place in 1918. The *Nachtausgabe* says that the French delegates will receive an ultimatum of unconditional surrender, involving the complete and permanent military annihilation of France. It writes: "The hour of pity in Europe is past." Though the press refrains from speculating about specific terms, it universally assumes that French territory will now serve as a German military base in the campaign against Britain. This implies at least the occupation of the French coasts on the Channel and the Atlantic, leaving Mediterranean areas and ports to the domination of Italy.

No armistice having yet been declared, the German armies continue their advance. The French radio announces the fall of Lyon, second city of France. A Nazi spearhead is driving up the Rhône Valley towards Geneva. The Germans announce the capture of Brest, the French naval base at the tip of Brittany, and say that further south

the lower Loire from Nantes to Tours has been crossed at many points. At Tours there has been bitter fighting, with hand-to-hand actions being waged in the streets of the city for many hours. Below the Loire the Nazi bombers without respite attack the French forces that are streaming southwards, also the refugees, whether still on the roads or gathered in hamlets or towns. In northern Lorraine remnants of the defeated French eastern army are either taken prisoner or are driven still closer together in the Moselle area between Epinal and Toul and in the central part of the upper Vosges. The German News Agency reports that French troops in the Maginot Line north of Metz are still resisting fiercely, though without any prospect of relief. Berlin claims that over 200,000 prisoners were taken yesterday alone, including General Altmeyer, commander of the French Tenth Army.

The British Parliament meets in secret session to hold an inquest on past military strategy and presumably to discuss the defense problems rendered so acute by the French surrender. There is a movement afoot, especially in Labor circles, to force out Mr. Chamberlain, who still retains a place in the Cabinet as Lord President of the Council. German planes raid England. British aircraft bomb northwest Germany, parts of occupied France and the Netherlands. The first contingents of Australian and New Zealand troops land in Great Britain. Their 10,000-mile trip has been made without an attack.

Thousands of persons whose past activities make them especially obnoxious to the present régimes of Germany and Italy, or who might find themselves in difficulties under a pro-Fascist régime in France, are seeking to leave the country. Many are trying to get to Spain or Portugal. The consulates of both countries are besieged for visas. Conditions on the Spanish frontier are chaotic. Among those admitted are the former Empress Zita of Austria-Hungary and her son, the Archduke Otto, also the three children of King Leopold of Belgium. Other refugees are making their way to England on cargo boats or on British warships. One ship arriving in Falmouth today from Bordeaux brings 1,300 refugees, among them prominent French politicians and publicists, as well as most of the English journalists who have been serving in France during the war. This and the other ships arriving during the next few days, though crowded mainly with returning British subjects and French anti-Fascists, also carry refugee German and Italian intellectuals and some contingents of the Polish and Czech forces that have been fighting in France. The Polish Embassy in London announces today that Premier Wladislas Sikorski and Foreign Minister August Zaleski have reached England safely. Members of the Belgian Government, which has been installed in France, also are expected. Representatives of Ethiopia, Czecho-Slovakia, Norway, and the Netherlands are in London already.

The *Massilia*, carrying some two dozen French deputies, among them M. Daladier and a number of other ex-cabinet ministers, sails today from Le Verdon near Bordeaux (*cf.* June 19). Conflicting rumors will be flying around during the next week or so as to its whereabouts. Actually it will arrive two or three days hence in Casablanca, a seaport on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. (About June 25 General Gort and Mr. Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, will arrive *via* Tangier at Rabat, the capital of French Morocco. They will find General Noguès, French Resident General and Commander in Chief, absent in Algiers. But his Secretary General, M. Morize, has received instructions not to permit the British envoys to communicate with ex-Premier Daladier, M. Mandel, or any of the other Frenchmen aboard the *Massilia*. General Gort and Mr. Duff Cooper will therefore leave without being able to present their argument that the French statesmen in question should continue resistance to Germany outside France proper. They will return to London by air, *via* Gibraltar, on June 27. Eventually the passengers on the *Massilia* will be brought back to France, some of them to face trial at Riom. According to statements by MM. Herriot and Jeanneney before the National Assembly at Vichy, July 10, apparently not disputed by M. Laval, they wished to return in time to attend that session, but the German-French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden denied them transport facilities.)

The French Government has been receiving from Algeria and Tunisia, and from colonies of French citizens in various foreign countries, offers to place all their resources at its disposal if it desires to continue the war. But the eventual attitude of French military commanders in the colonies towards an armistice with Germany and Italy still remains obscure (*cf.* June 22, 23 and 24).

"Competent quarters" in Istanbul state that Turkey will never permit the installation of a Power other than France in Syria. If any change is to be made, she will accept only an independent status for Syria.

President Roosevelt nominates Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy, both of them Republicans. A bill for selective compulsory military service is introduced in the Senate. That body passes the $1,777,489,788 Army and Navy Emergency Appropriation Bill.

JUNE 21

Preparations for the reception of the French delegation in the Forest of Compiègne are carried out with considerable secrecy. Not until noon is it known that Chancellor Hitler himself will participate in the ceremony. He reaches the spot, marked by various monuments, about 3 P.M. Awaiting him are Field Marshal Hermann Goering; Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the

Army; Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Grand Admiral Erich Raeder; Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop; and Rudolf Hess, Deputy Party Leader. The historic railway coach in which General Foch handed the German representatives the armistice terms on November 11, 1918, is at the original spot. Nearby is a tent, with tables and chairs for the French delegates and a large notice reminding them of the date — June 21, 1940 — as though (said one newspaper writer) to expunge the previous date of 1918. Near at hand the plaque commemorating the 1918 armistice has been covered by the war standard of the German Reich, and in front of it flies Hitler's own standard. Hitler climbs into the coach. Fifteen minutes later the French delegates appear. After silently saluting the Hitler standard, they enter the car where Herr Hitler and his staff are already seated at the rectangular table. The Germans stand up and give the Nazi salute, whereupon the entire party sits down, Herr Hitler facing General Huntziger. The formalities begin. General Keitel rises and reads (in German) Hitler's introductory message, the preamble to the armistice terms and the terms themselves. Only the preamble is given to the press at this time. The actual terms, it is stated, will not be published until after they have been accepted.

The preamble begins by giving the Nazi version of what happened in 1918. The German forces laid down their arms, it says, relying on the promises of President Wilson. This ended "a war which the German people and their Government had not desired, and in which, in spite of tremendously superior forces, the enemy had not defeated the German Army, Navy or Air Force in any decisive action." Then had begun a long period of suffering, dishonor and humiliation for the German people. "On September 3, 1939, — twenty-five years after the outbreak of the World War — Great Britain and France without any reason again declared war on Germany. Now arms have decided and France is defeated. The French Government have requested the Reich Government to state the conditions for an armistice. The historic Compiègne Forest was chosen for the presentation of these conditions in order to blot out once and for all by this act of justice and restitution a remembrance which represented for France no glorious deed and which the German people felt to be the greatest humiliation of all time. France, after heroic resistance, has been defeated and has collapsed after a unique series of terrible battles. Germany does not, therefore, propose to give to the terms or negotiations for an armistice the character of insult to so brave an opponent." The preamble concludes by outlining the objects of the German demands: "(1) To prevent a resumption of hostilities. (2) To provide all necessary safeguards to Germany for the continuation of the war forced upon her by Great Britain. (3) To create the necessary conditions for a new peace, the basic elements of which shall be

reparation of the injustice committed by force against the Reich."

After the preamble has been read, Hitler at 3:42 P.M. leaves the railway carriage, followed by Marshal Goering and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The four French delegates remain in the coach with General Keitel while a translation of the preamble and the terms is read to them by Herr Schmidt, the interpreter. Some ten minutes later they withdraw to their tent to begin a discussion of the terms. During these discussions they are in direct telephonic communication with Bordeaux. Shortly after 6 P.M. they return to the railway car to resume contact with General Keitel. The conversations continue intermittently through the evening. Late in the night the French delegates return to Paris.

Having wiped out Germany's "deepest shame of all time," Chancellor Hitler orders all traces of the 1918 humiliation removed from Compiègne. The historic railway car and memorial stone monument "to Gallic triumph" are to be shipped to Berlin. Furthermore, at the Fuehrer's orders, the positions and stones of both "armistice coach" and Kaiser Wilhelm's train will be destroyed. Only the monument to Marshal Foch is to be preserved unharmed.

Bordeaux recognizes that French military operations have ceased. The fiction of a military conference for the press is abandoned this afternoon. Isolated French armies may continue to resist for honor's sake until surrounded or annihilated, but that is all. War news now consists mainly of a record of the enemy's daily advance. Everybody is awaiting the "fatal news" — the conditions imposed by Germany. Foreign correspondents report that some people realize that the terms will be severe, but that the mass of the people know nothing and are told nothing. The papers print nothing beyond the fact that the French envoys have left for the German lines. The *Temps* speaks bluntly of the coming "Diktat." But the man in the street speaks of "peace negotiations," estimating how much French territory will have to be ceded and preparing to return home as soon as possible. The masses have failed to understand the real nature of an armistice, for the censor up to now has not permitted any discussion on this point. Today for the first time the public is informed that a request for the cessation of hostilities is an admission that it is impossible to continue the war, *e.g.*, there will be an unconditional surrender, and the conditions will be imposed by the victors. The *Petite Gironde* points out the need for making this clear in order that "when the truth can no longer be concealed" there will be "no brutal reactions" among the people.

An informal meeting of the members of the French Parliament now in Bordeaux is attended by some 50 senators and deputies. They are reported to have decided to stand by Marshal Pétain regardless of their individual opinions; and they applaud M. Laval's statement that it is not by leaving France that they can save her.

While their government's representatives discuss armistice terms the French soldiers continue to fight. A French communiqué states that the troops in the Vosges have formed themselves into a vast square and are giving battle vigorously. Berlin's evening news (according to the British United Press) is that the most bitter fighting is now taking place near Thionville, in northern Lorraine, near the Luxembourg frontier, where the French occupy positions which are extremely difficult to capture. In general, no major advances are claimed in western or central France, where positions reached yesterday by advance motorized units apparently are being consolidated. German bombers have been active against shipping, however, especially off La Rochelle and in the Gironde; and the interchange of air attacks on Germany and Britain continues.

The first that the French public hears of the British offer of June 16 to establish an Anglo-French union is a public announcement in Bordeaux this evening that the plan had to be rejected because of lack of time for putting it into operation. There has been no mention of the French fleet in any of the press dispatches from Compiègne or Berlin, nor is anything said about it at Bordeaux. But a dispatch to the *New York Times* from Rome notes that in the Italian capital this question is considered "the key problem of the parleys under way."

In the evening the final text of the German terms for an armistice reach Bordeaux from Compiègne. At 9:30 P.M. the French radio merely announces that no precise indications can be given "concerning the actual stage of the negotiations." Word is sent to Cabinet members that they are to meet in emergency session at 1 A.M.

Italy, meanwhile, awaits notification from France of the names of the plenipotentiaries who will discuss armistice terms with her direct. Rome looks on the French situation as already liquidated. Moreover, as the British will now be deprived of the aid of the French fleet and air force, as well as the French bases in Tunis, Corsica and Syria, they will be obliged to withdraw from the Mediterranean. Italy thus will be able to achieve all her aims. The Rome radio says in the evening that if France agrees to the German armistice terms, Italy will coöperate with Germany in the military occupation of France.

The Associated Press reports from Cairo that the French forces and fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean seem ready to continue the war "whatever the outcome of the French-German negotiations."

Rumania, apparently feeling that she can no longer rely on Allied protection, moves towards a rapprochement with Germany. After several conferences with the German Minister, King Carol issues a decree in the evening transforming Rumania into a totalitarian state.

President Roosevelt proclaims the intention of the United States to safeguard the welfare and security of the countries of the Western

Hemisphere by economic as well as military means, and invites other nations to join in the fight against totalitarian economics. He suggests an export corporation to implement the plan, with a capital of between one and two billion dollars.

JUNE 22

Shortly before midnight last night the French Cabinet was summoned to meet at 1 A.M. this morning to study the German armistice terms as transmitted by General Huntziger from Compiègne. The session lasts until 3 A.M. Individual members are up all night continuing their discussions. The Cabinet meets again after breakfast and continues in session, with brief intervals for meals, throughout the day. The wording of the preamble and its publication in advance of the detailed terms are recognized in Bordeaux as clever German manœuvers. Correspondents report that the tribute paid in the preamble to French valor and bravery has been seized on by the man in the street as helping to save French honor. The statement that Germany is to receive safeguards for prosecuting the war against England, which the British Government emphasizes would be contrary to the French pledge against a separate peace, is glossed over.

After a night in Paris the French delegates return to Compiègne, reaching there at 10 A.M., and continue their deliberations throughout the day. They have direct telephone communication with Bordeaux, but the connection is bad. The French Government proposes various amendments to the original German terms; it is understood that these are accepted in some relatively unimportant cases, but most are rejected. At 6:30 P.M. General Keitel presents a written demand for a final answer within an hour. General Huntziger has trouble explaining this over the telephone to Bordeaux and in getting his Government's final assent. *The armistice is signed at 6:50 p.m.* General Keitel signs for Germany and General Huntziger for France. A little more than 27 hours have elapsed since the German demands were presented in Hitler's presence. The German account records that General Huntziger, in a choked voice, announces that his Government has ordered him to sign. "Before carrying out my Government's order," he says, "the French delegation deems it necessary to declare that in a moment when France is compelled by fate of arms to give up the fight, she has a right to expect that the coming negotiations will be dominated by a spirit that will give two great neighboring nations a chance to live and work once more. As a soldier you will understand the onerous moment that has now come for me to sign." After the signatures are affixed, General Keitel requests all present to rise from their seats, and then says: "It is honorable for the victor to do honor to the vanquished. We have risen in commemoration of those who gave their blood to their countries."

It is announced that no details of the armistice terms will be made public until after the agreement has been reached with Italy. There is no positive assurance that the terms will be published even then. Nor does the agreement signed at Compiègne provide for immediate cessation of hostilities. It merely is stated that the fighting is to end six hours after the Italian Government has notified the German High Command of the signing of an armistice treaty between Italy and France. To execute this second treaty the French emissaries leave at once for Rome.

The Franco-German armistice provides as follows:[1]

"*Article 1:* The French Government directs a cessation of fighting against the German Reich in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories and mandates, as well as on the seas. It directs the immediate laying down of arms of French units already encircled by German troops."

Article 2 provides that French territory north and west of the line shown on the map on page 131 will be occupied by German troops. Those areas which are to be occupied and which are not yet in control of German troops shall be turned over to them immediately.

"*Article 3:* In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying Power. The French Government obligates itself to support with every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and to carry them out with the aid of the French administration. . . . It is the intention of the German Government to limit the occupation of the west coast, after ending hostilities with England, to the extent absolutely necessary. The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris."

"*Article 4:* French armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength. The French armed forces in the territory to be occupied by Germany are to be hastily withdrawn into territory not to be occupied and be discharged. These troops, before marching out, shall lay down their weapons and equipment at the places where they are stationed at the time this treaty becomes effective. They are responsible for orderly delivery to German troops."

Article 5 provides that Germany may demand the surrender, in good condition, of all guns, tanks, planes, means of conveyance and ammunition of French units which are still resisting and which at the time this agreement becomes effective are in the territory not to be occupied.

Article 6 provides that such of the above war materials as are not allocated to French use are to be stored under German or Italian control. The manufacture of new war material in the unoccupied territory is to be stopped immediately.

Article 7 provides that land and coastal fortifications in the occupied territory are to be surrendered to the Germans undamaged, together with the plans of these fortifications.

"*Article 8:* The French war fleet is to collect in ports to be designated more particularly, and under German and (or) Italian control, there to be demobilized and laid up — with the exception of those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire. The peacetime stations of ships should control the designation of ports.

[1] Based on the Associated Press translation of the official German text given out in Berlin on June 25.

"The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use the French war fleet which is in harbors under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines. It further solemnly and expressly declares that



The heavy solid line on the above map shows the limits of the German zone of occupation in France, as indicated in Article 2 of the German-French Armistice of June 22. The broken line shows the approximate limits of the demilitarized zone along the Franco-Italian frontier, as specified in Article 3 of the Italian-French Armistice of June 24.

it does not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French war fleet at the conclusion of a peace.

"All warships outside France are to be recalled to France, with the exception of that portion of the French war fleet which shall be designated to represent French interests in the colonial empire."

Article 9 provides that the Germans are to be given the exact location of all mines, and that they may require that French forces sweep them away.

"*Article 10:* The French Government is obligated to forbid any portion of its remaining armed forces to undertake hostilities against Germany in any manner.

"The French Government also will prevent members of its armed forces from leaving the country and prevent armaments of any sort, including ships, planes, etc., being taken to England or any other place abroad.

"The French Government will forbid French citizens to fight against Germany in the service of States with which the German Reich is still at war. French citizens who violate this provision are to be treated by German troops as insurgents."

Article 11 provides that no French merchant shipping may leave port until further notice without the approval of the German and Italian Governments. French merchant vessels will either be recalled by the French Government or instructed to enter neutral ports.

Article 12 provides that no airplane flights may be made over French territory without German approval. Airfields in the unoccupied territory shall be placed under German and Italian control.

Article 13 obligates the French Government to turn over to German troops in the occupied region all facilities and properties of the French armed forces, in undamaged condition; also harbors, industrial facilities and docks; also transportation and communications facilities. Further, the French Government shall perform all necessary labor to restore these facilities, and will see to it that the necessary technical personnel and rolling stock of the railways be retained in service, also other transportation equipment, to a degree normal in peacetime.

Article 14 prohibits further transmission from all French wireless stations. Resumption of wireless communication from unoccupied France will require special permission.

Article 15 obligates the French Government to convey transit freight between the German Reich and Italy through unoccupied territory.

"*Article 16:* The French Government, in agreement with the responsible German officials, will carry out the return of the population into occupied territory."

Article 17 obligates the French Government to prevent transfers of economic valuables and provisions from the occupied to the non-occupied territory or abroad without German permission. "In that connection, the German Government will consider the necessities of life of the population in unoccupied territory."

"*Article 18:* The French Government will bear the costs of maintenance of German occupation troops on French soil."

"*Article 19:* All German war and civil prisoners in French custody, including those under arrest and convicted, who were seized and sentenced because of acts in favor of the Reich, shall be surrendered immediately to the German troops. The French Government is obliged to surrender upon demand all Germans designated by the German Government in France, as well as in the French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories and mandates. . . ."

"*Article 20:* French troops in German prison camps will remain prisoners of war until conclusion of a peace."

Article 21 makes the French Government responsible for the security of all objects whose surrender is demanded in this agreement, and binds it to make compensation for any damage or removal contrary to the agreement.

Article 22 gives the Armistice Commission, acting in accordance with the direction of the German High Command, authority to regulate and supervise the carrying out of the armistice agreement. The French Government will send a delegation to the seat of the German Armistice Commission to present French wishes and to receive rulings with regard to them.

Article 23 provides that this agreement becomes effective as soon as the French Government has also reached an agreement with the Italian Government. Hostilities will

cease six hours after the Italian Government has notified the German Government of conclusion of such an agreement.

"*Article 24:* This agreement is valid until conclusion of a peace treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement at any time with immediate effect if the French Government fails to fulfill the obligations it assumes under the agreement."

The German High Command announces that approximately 500,000 French troops surrounded in Alsace Lorraine "have capitulated after a desperate resistance." Among them, in addition to many other high officers, are the Commanders of the Third, Fifth and Eighth Armies. A later communiqué says that only isolated sections of the Maginot Line in Lower Alsace and Lorraine, and certain units in the Vosges, continue to resist. In Brittany, the important harbor towns of St. Malo and Lorient have been occupied. Berlin puts the number of prisoners taken in western France in the past few days at over 200,000.

The French High Command reports that during the day German units pushed south of the lower Loire, and that the German thrust down the Rhône toward the junction with the Isère is somewhat intensified. On the southern front, the Italians have attacked at several points from Mont Blanc to the sea, but according to the French High Command they have been held. According to Swiss reports, a body of men belonging to the French Foreign Legion, their backs to the Swiss frontier and completely cut off from other French troops, have repulsed Nazi assaults against the forts of L'Ecluse and Le Joux. The town of Bellegarde near Fort L'Ecluse is lost to the Germans, regained, and then lost again between dawn and dusk. Bitter fighting is said to continue in this section.

General de Gaulle in an evening broadcast from London repeats his request of June 18 for the support of "all French people who wish to remain free." He says that an armistice will be not only a capitulation but "a submission to slavery." The French people have lost the Battle of France, but "there remains to us a vast empire, an intact fleet, much gold; and honor, common sense, and the interest of the country demand that all free Frenchmen should fight wherever they are."

The French colony at Beirut telegraphs to President Lebrun and Marshal Pétain stating that it puts all its confidence in them for safeguarding French honor, and placing at their disposal all its resources, material and moral. It implores the French leaders "to make every effort to continue the struggle, in company with our Allies and with the Anglo-French fleet, in the territories of the French Empire, territories which the enemy has not penetrated and which intend to continue an indomitable resistance." General Mittelhauser, French commander in Syria, telegraphs to the French colony in Egypt thanking it for its message of June 20 to President Lebrun and stating that "Frenchmen overseas with their forces still intact, constitute a sure token of

victory. The French Army and residents in the Levant are at one with you." (*Cf.* June 20 and 24.)

Three hours after the signature of the armistice at Compiègne the fact is notified to the German people by radio, though the actual terms are withheld. Later a transcription of General Huntziger's words is also put on the air. The *Angriff* predicts: "After this war France will take the first step toward a new era which the young authoritarian states of Europe have already taken."

Late in the evening the French Government announces officially the signature of the armistice with Germany, on "hard but honorable" terms. The terms are not given out. (Even after some months it will remain doubtful whether they have ever been published in full in France.)

Fascist quarters in Rome believe that French possessions in Africa will be demilitarized in a few days under the terms of the Italian-French armistice, leaving Italy's armed forces free to deal with Britain in the Mediterranean and Africa. The semi-official *Relazioni Internazionali* writes: "Once the French problem has been solved Italian and German armies must crush the British hegemony. . . . England will be totally occupied and the British Empire will be cut into pieces. Although Italy and Germany have not issued any common declaration on the aims of their war, as the French and British did, the Axis partners have in common their revolutions, their chiefs, and they have a single ideal and a single will. This is the true foundation of their victorious success."

June 23

Early this morning Prime Minister Churchill for the second time appeals to the French people over the heads of their leaders. In a statement issued in London he says that the British Government "have heard with grief and amazement that the terms dictated by the Germans have been accepted by the French Government at Bordeaux. They cannot feel that such, or similar terms, could have been submitted to by any French Government which possessed freedom, independence, and constitutional authority." Such terms, "if accepted by all Frenchmen," would place not only France but the French Empire entirely at the mercy of the German and Italian Dictators. "Not only would the French people be held down and forced to work against their ally," says Mr. Churchill, "not only would the soil of France be used with the approval of the Bordeaux Government as the means of attacking their ally, but the whole resources of the French Empire and of the French Navy would speedily pass into the hands of the adversary for the fulfilment of his purpose." The British will be able to carry on the war to a successful conclusion. "When Great Britain is victorious," he continues, "she will, in spite of the action of the Bordeaux Govern-

ment, cherish the cause of the French people, and a British victory is the only possible hope for the restoration of the greatness of France and the freedom of its people." He concludes: "Brave men from other countries overrun by Nazi invasion are steadfastly fighting in the ranks of freedom. Accordingly His Majesty's Government call upon all Frenchmen outside the power of the enemy to aid them in their task and thereby render its accomplishment more sure and more swift."

Following the issuance of Mr. Churchill's statement, the British War Cabinet sits for two and a half hours to determine how best to defend the British Isles and Empire now that the French capitulation has left them fighting alone against Germany and Italy.

The Bordeaux Government meets at 11:30 A.M. with President Lebrun presiding. Pierre Laval is appointed Minister of State and Vice-Premier, and M. Adrien Marquet is appointed Minister of State. M. Laval states in an interview that out of France's misfortune some good should come. "We must and we will rebuild," he says. "France will live again."

Ex-Premier Reynaud is offered the French Ambassadorship at Washington by the Pétain Government, and accepts. The French Embassy there receives notification of the appointment; but an hour or so later word arrives from Bordeaux that it has been cancelled.

The French Government strips General de Gaulle of his military rank. In an official statement, the Government says that General de Gaulle will be tried at the "earliest court martial," charged with refusing to return to his post and with addressing an appeal to French officers and soldiers while abroad.

The French newspaper *Le Temps* asserts that if Great Britain had been able to send a large and well-equipped army to France, the nation would not have been compelled to sue for peace on Chancellor Hitler's terms. In the evening the French radio announces that during the day the last of the B.E.F. have been taken back to England. No announcement is made regarding the Polish and Czech troops in France; but as many of these as possible are being transported to England in British warships, some from Brittany, others from St. Jean de Luz, others from Mediterranean ports. The 6,000 Polish troops in Syria will cross into Palestine later this week to join the British there.

Marshal Pétain, in a broadcast this evening, says that the French Government and people heard the statement of Prime Minister Churchill "with grief and amazement." He continues: "We can understand the anguish that prompted it. Mr. Churchill fears that the fate that has fallen upon our country during the past month may overtake his own. Mr. Churchill is a good judge of the interest of his country, but not of ours, and still less of French honor. Our flag remains unstained. Our army has fought loyally. Inferior in armaments and in numbers, it

had to ask for a cessation of the fighting. It did so, I affirm, in independence and in dignity. No one will succeed in dividing Frenchmen in the hour when their country is suffering."

The airplanes bringing the French delegates to Rome reach the Littorio airfield about 3 P.M. Their whereabouts have been something of a mystery. According to the Rome correspondent of the *New York Times* they drove from Compiègne to Munich last night, and this morning came on by air to the Italian capital. The delegation is the same as at Compiègne, plus General Parisot, former French Military Attaché in Rome. After a brief welcome by Italian officials the delegates drive to the Villa Manzoni, about five miles north of Rome. Some Italian officials join them there, and preliminary discussions begin. Around 7 P.M. the French delegation motors to the Villa Incisa, 12 miles from Rome, where further negotiations take place. Mussolini is not present. The Italian plenipotentiaries are Count Ciano, Foreign Minister; Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Chief of the General Staff; Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, Naval Chief of Staff; General Francesco Pricolo, Chief of the Air Staff; and General Mario Roatta, Army Corps Commander. They greet the Frenchmen with the Fascist salute. The two groups then sit down on opposite sides of a table. Count Ciano rises and announces that on Premier Mussolini's orders Marshal Badoglio will give the armistice conditions to the French plenipotentiaries. Marshal Badoglio then asks General Roatta to read them, which he does. General Huntziger says the French delegates have taken note of the terms and asks to be allowed to convey them to the French Government, "giving the decision at the next meeting." The French delegates return to the Villa Manzoni, where they spend the greater part of the night discussing the terms among themselves and by telephone with the Bordeaux Government. The terms are not disclosed; Rome is full of reports that Italy will occupy the Mediterranean coast of France or that perhaps a buffer state will be created around Nice in the corner of France adjoining Italy.

General de Gaulle, in an evening broadcast in French from London, announces the formation of a Provisional French National Committee. He begins by saying that the Bordeaux Government capitulated before all its means of resistance had been exhausted. "There is no longer on the soil of France herself any independent Government capable of upholding the interests of France and of the French overseas. Moreover our political institutions are no longer in a position to function freely, and the people of France have at the moment no opportunity of expressing their true will. Consequently, and owing to *force majeure*, a French National Committee will be formed, in agreement with the British Government, representing the interests of the country and the people and resolved to maintain the independence of France; to honor the alliances

to which she is committed; and to contribute to the war efforts of the Allies until the final victory." The Committee will account for its acts either to a legal French Government as soon as one exists, or to the representatives of the people as soon as they can assemble freely. Meanwhile it will take under its jurisdiction all French citizens now on British territory.

General de Gaulle's speech goes out over the facilities of the British Broadcasting System. He is followed on the radio by a British announcer who says in French: "His Majesty's Government find that the terms of the armistice, just signed in contravention of agreements solemnly made between the Allied Governments, reduce the Bordeaux Government to a state of complete subjection to the enemy and deprive it of all liberty and all right to represent free French citizens. The Government therefore now declare that they can no longer regard the Bordeaux Government as the government of an independent country." Britain, it is declared, has decided to recognize the Provisional French National Committee, which is determined to observe the treaty obligations of France, in preference to the Bordeaux Government.

The terms of the armistice imposed upon France leave no room for hope in England that any vestige of resistance can be maintained on the Continent. There still remains the hope, however, that parts of the French Colonial Empire and units of the French fleet will continue to fight beside the British. In this connection, the following statement is issued in London in the evening: "The signature of the armistice by the French Government brings to an end the organized resistance of the French forces at home. In the French Colonial Empire, however, there are encouraging signs that a more robust spirit prevails." Reference is made to various statements or actions by General Mittelhauser in Syria; by the Governor-General of Indo-China; by the Resident-General in Tunis; and by various military or civil authorities in Morocco, Senegal, Cameroun and Jibuti. The whereabouts of the various units of the French fleet is a closely guarded secret. British officials will not discuss the matter. An Admiralty spokesman says: "There is no speculation about it even invited in this country."

A French army communiqué states that the military situation is without notable change except along the Atlantic coast, where the Germans continue their advance towards Rochefort and Cognac. On the Alpine front Italian attempts to progress are still held in check. A German communiqué states that the battle in Alsace and Lorraine ended yesterday with the capitulation of the French armies.

Edwin C. Wilson, American Minister to Uruguay, in a speech at Montevideo at a luncheon given by the Uruguayan Foreign Minister for the officers of the *U.S.S. Quincy*, says that he is "authorized to state that it is the intention and the avowed policy of my Government to

coöperate fully, whenever such coöperation is desired, with all the other American Governments in crushing all activities that arise from non-American sources and that imperil our political and economic freedom."

JUNE 24

During the morning the French delegates study the Italian conditions at the Villa Manzoni. In the afternoon they proceed again to the Villa Incisa, where the full Italian delegation awaits them. The afternoon session does not have the calm and formal character of the first meeting, and as the hours pass and high Italian officers drive back and forth between the Villa and Premier Mussolini's office in the Palazzo Venezia the impression deepens that these negotiations are less of a cut-and-dried affair than was the German-French parley. The Pétain Government cannot lose sight, however, of the fact that although they have made terms with Germany they still are formally at war with that country, and that French soldiers will continue being sacrificed until after an agreement has been signed with Italy.

Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador to France, has left Bordeaux overnight aboard a British destroyer, accompanied by the remaining members of his staff. They will reach London tomorrow.

Chancellor Hitler, who is sightseeing in Paris, visits the Eiffel Tower and the tomb of Napoleon.

In London, General de Gaulle is asked who will form the proposed National Committee. He replies that this will depend on the arrival of certain important personalities reported to be *en route* from France to Britain. (However, rumors that ex-Premier Reynaud is coming to London do not materialize; nor is it true, as reported on several occasions, that ex-Premier Blum or ex-Premier Herriot visit England. All stay in southern France and will be present at the meeting of the French Parliament at Vichy on July 9. M. Reynaud will be seriously injured in an automobile accident near Montpellier on June 28, at which time Countess de Portes is killed; and he will appear at Vichy with his head swathed in bandages.) In a statement to the Press Association General de Gaulle says he has "reason to believe that the French fleet will not surrender." He also says that he is in telegraphic communication with General Noguès, commander of the French forces in Morocco, with General Mittelhauser, French commander in Syria, and with General Catroux, in charge of French forces in Indo-China, and expresses the conviction "that all parts of the French Empire will go on fighting." (Actually, urgent messages and commands from General Weygand to Generals Mittelhauser and Noguès will suffice to hold them in line with the policy of the Bordeaux Government.)

The French Government issues an official statement in Bordeaux, through M. Prouvost, Propaganda Commissioner, criticizing Britain's

"insufficient" war effort as well as her current policy towards France. The assertion is made that the French had been led to expect to see 26 British divisions in France "in the first months of the war." The statement continues: "The Daladier and Reynaud Governments continually drew to the British Government's attention our difficulty in maintaining under arms men 48 years old, while young Britishers of 28 years had not yet been mobilized." It comments that "England, as at the time of Pitt, believed in the efficacy of the blockade and the Government continued to rule England in accordance with compromises and traditions." The statement then proceeds to give the French version of what happened at the critical Cabinet meetings in Tours on June 12 and 13 (*cf.* under the second of these dates). Regarding events after France requested an armistice, it says: "The Government considered that it was its duty to remain in France and share the fate of all Frenchmen. . . . It was in complete independence that the French Government took its decision and definitely refused to go abroad. Some members of Parliament and former Ministers thought otherwise. French public opinion will have no indulgence for them. . . ." The statement asks Great Britain "to receive only with extreme caution those Frenchmen our country disavows and wants to forget at any price, and not to allow London to become a hotbed of agitation for politicians and dissenters." It concludes: "Our foreign policy will be dictated neither by England, nor by Germany and Italy. It will be purely French." British "authoritative circles" will reply tomorrow that the foregoing French statement is "inaccurate throughout." Denial will be made that the British Government ever promised to send 26 divisions to France in the early months of hostilities; quite the contrary, it was explained in the course of staff conversations that "during the first year of the war the British military effort must be on a limited scale." The statement will continue: "In the event, 400,000 British troops were sent to France, a contribution which, as Mr. Churchill explained in the House of Commons on June 18, came up to the undertaking assumed by His Majesty's Government. The British air contribution was greatly in excess of that promised and arranged with the French General Staff. It is true that owing to shortage of equipment fewer classes were called up in Great Britain than in France; but M. Prouvost takes no account of the fact that hundreds of thousands of volunteers of over 28 years of age were incorporated in the British forces."

This morning's French communiqué speaks of fighting near St. Etienne. In the Alps, Italian attacks are said not to be making any important progress. A later communiqué — the last French war communiqué to be issued — adds the information that slight progress is being made by the Germans in the Charente, where they occupy

Angoulême, and in the Rhône Valley, where they reach Aix. In the Alps the Italian attacks continue, but are checked everywhere except in the Maurienne district, where enemy troops advance just beyond the village of Lanslebourg, a French customs station two or three miles from the frontier, and on the coast, where they enter Menton. An Italian bulletin announces that a general attack which was started on June 21 from Mont Blanc to the sea met strong enemy resistance, but that this "did not slow down the impetuous advance of our troops, who everywhere achieved notable successes." It claims that Italian troops have taken certain important fortified works near Briançon and at Razet, and that larger units have reached the bottom of the valleys of the River Isère and its small tributary, the Arc, and of two small tributaries of the River Durance. The German communiqué states that the Atlantic coast has been occupied down to the Gironde estuary.

Late in the afternoon agreement is reached in Rome between the French and Italian delegations. *The Italo-French armistice is signed at 7:15 p.m., General Huntziger signing for France and Marshal Badoglio for Italy.* Afterwards the following statement is broadcast by the Rome radio: "The Italian Government have notified the French Government that the signing of the Armistice Convention between Italy and France was communicated to the German Government this afternoon at 7:35 P.M., Italian summer time. As a consequence hostilities between Italy and France will cease at 1:35 A.M. Italian summer time tomorrow morning, June 25, 1940, year XVIII of the Fascist Era."

At 9 P.M. the following special communiqué is issued in Berlin: "Today, Monday, June 24, at 7:15 P.M. the Treaty of Armistice was signed between Italy and France. The Reich Government were informed at 7:35. The Treaty of Armistice between Germany and France has therefore entered into force. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has ordered the cessation of hostilities against France at 1:35 A.M. on June 25. The war in the West is therefore ended." Soon afterwards loudspeakers in the streets of Berlin blare forth the news. Hitler issues a proclamation reading: "My People: Your soldiers after barely six weeks of heroic struggle against a brave opponent have ended the war in the West. Their deeds will go down to history as the most glorious victory of all time. We humbly thank the Almighty for his blessing. I order flags to be flown throughout the Reich for ten days and Church bells to be rung for seven days."

The terms of the Franco-Italian armistice are not yet announced, but they provide (according to the text to be published in Rome tomorrow evening) as follows:

"*Article 1:* France will cease hostilities in her metropolitan territory, in French North Africa, in the colonies, and in territories under French mandate. France will also cease hostilities in the air and on the sea."

"*Article 2:* When the armistice comes into force, and for the duration of the armistice, Italian troops will stand on their advanced lines in all theatres of operations."

"*Article 3:* In French metropolitan territory, a zone situated between the lines referred to in Article 2 and a line drawn fifty kilometers as the crow flies beyond the Italian lines proper shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice. [1]

"In Tunisia, the militarized zone between the present Libyan-Tunisian frontier and the line drawn on an attached map shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice. In Algeria and in French African territories south of Algeria that border on Libya, a zone 200 kilometers wide adjoining the Libyan frontier shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice. For the duration of hostilities between Italy and the British Empire and for the duration of the armistice, the French Somaliland coast shal be entirely demilitarized. Italy shall have full and constant right to use the port of Jibuti with all its equipment, together with the French section of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway, for all kinds of transport."

Article 4 provides that zones to be demilitarized shall be evacuated by French troops within ten days, except for the personnel necessary to supervise and maintain fortifications and military buildings.

Article 5 provides for the removal within 15 days of such arms and supplies in the demilitarized zones as Italy does not require France to surrender under Article 10. Fixed armaments in the coastal territory of French Somaliland are to be rendered useless.

Article 6 requires that so long as hostilities continue between Italy and Britain the maritime fortified areas and naval bases of Toulon, Bizerta, Ajaccio and Oran shall be demilitarized.

Articles 7 and 8 concern the procedure to be followed in demilitarizing the areas and bases mentioned in Article 6.

Articles 9 through 26 parallel in a general way the main provisions in Articles 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21 and 24 of the German armistice.

Neutral diplomatic circles in Berlin hear that the original Italian demands were whittled down considerably. The rôle of Germany in this process, and her reasons for adopting that rôle, are the subject of much speculation and contradictory comment. It is understood that the original Italian demands included the occupation of the Mediterranean coast up to and including Marseille, on the model of the German occupation of France's Channel and Atlantic coasts.

Today for the first time the French people have begun to hear what the Germans are requiring of them, but only through the British radio and other round-about methods. It was Germany's desire to keep the terms secret until the last Frenchman had laid down his arms and the German armies had moved into all the promised positions. Some observers note that the limits of the occupied zone are not an improvisation but closely resemble the line which appeared on maps issued by the Nazi Party in 1938.

The French Cabinet is called to meet tomorrow at 9 A.M. to examine

[1] No more precise definition of the line is given. So far as known, the Italian troops in 14 days of war against France took several narrow Alpine border areas between the Swiss frontier and the Mediterranean, including the town of Briançon, about five miles from the frontier, and Menton, a Mediterranean port about a mile from the frontier. No mention is made in the armistice terms of Nice, Savoy and Corsica, French territories long demanded by Fascist Italy. (*Cf.* map on p. 131.)

and accept the final agreements between Germany, Italy and France. It is decided that tomorrow will be observed as a day of mourning, with a memorial service in the Cathedral of Bordeaux to be attended by President Lebrun and members of the Bordeaux Government. Announcement is also made officially that the Government will soon leave Bordeaux for some place outside the zone designated for German occupation. German forces will not enter the city until afterwards.

8. "Peace"

And so France is formally "at peace." It is 45 days since Germany loosed her attack in the Low Countries. In all, France has been at war with Germany for 9 months and 21 days; with Italy for 14 days.

The Third Republic does not long survive the catastrophe which has overwhelmed it so swiftly. But before it is transformed into an authoritarian régime it must suffer one more blow both to its material strength and to its pride. In the Commons on June 25 Prime Minister Churchill announces that the separate armistice agreement involving the surrender of the French fleet is a clear breach of the promises of the French Government. In the following days efforts are made to persuade the commanders of those French ships which are not either in English harbors or at Alexandria to take precautions so that they never can be used against Britain. The French units in question are concentrated largely in the Algerian harbor of Oran and the adjacent naval port of Mers-el-Kebir, under command of Admiral Gensoul. No satisfaction can be obtained. The British refuse to accept the thesis that Chancellor Hitler's word and the word of Signor Mussolini, as given in the armistice treaties, are adequate safeguards.

Early in the morning of July 3 a British naval officer is sent to Admiral Gensoul with a document stating that in self-defense the British cannot allow the French warships to fall into German or Italian hands, hence that the British Government makes a formal demand that the French fleet act in accordance with one of the following alternatives: sail in company with the British and continue the war; sail with reduced crews under British control to a British port. In either case Britain promises to return the ships to France at the end of hostilities, or to make compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. If neither course is acceptable, a third is offered the French fleet: sail with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies, to be demilitarized and to remain there or

to be entrusted to the United States for safekeeping till the war is over. An ultimatum is added, to the effect that if one of these courses is not accepted, and provided the French do not themselves sink their ships within six hours, the British fleet will sink them by force. After the expiration of the time limit, the British fleet (at 5:58 P.M.) opens fire. The French fleet and shore batteries reply. When the action is over the French fleet has been destroyed, with the exception of a few vessels which escape to Toulon, including the battle cruiser *Strasbourg*.

Nazi anger finds expression in hyperbolic terms. The French are dazed and furious. Foreign Minister Baudouin informs Ambassador Bullitt of the British attack "in terms of the utmost indignation and strongest protest." He asks that his sentiments be transmitted to President Roosevelt, apparently in the hope that the President will act as a restraining influence on the British in the future. On July 4 Premier Pétain decides to communicate personally with the President. His communication (unpublished) states that the French fleet received a British ultimatum "requiring them either to join the British fleet or to scuttle." The British had already moored magnetic mines to bottle up the French fleet; and when the time-limit expired they cannonaded the French ships while at anchor. He asserts that the French Government "had been lavish in its assurance that in no case could the French naval forces be utilized against Great Britain," and that to achieve this result it had stoically accepted general conditions which were exceedingly harsh. The British Government knew this. Further, "It knew that our adversaries had recognized that they could not use our fleet against England, and that the Mediterranean ports of France proper and of French North Africa were to remain free of all foreign occupation." Premier Pétain notes that he has tried hard "to reconcile the situation in which circumstances placed him" with the maintenance of "normal and friendly relations between France and Great Britain." Now what he terms "an inexcusable *coup de force*" threatens to make this impossible. He says it is his duty to establish the "responsibilities" of the situation, and that this is the object of his communication. (It will be noted that Premier Pétain apparently has not been correctly informed regarding the terms of the British ultimatum.) On July 5 the French Cabinet announces the formal breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain.

The French Government, meanwhile has moved from Bor-

deaux to Clermont-Ferrand, and thence on July 2 to Vichy. There the fact soon becomes evident that a thoroughgoing transformation is to be made in the nature of the French State. On July 9 the French Parliament votes to give the Pétain Government full powers to establish a new constitution. The vote in the Chamber of Deputies is 395 to 3; in the Senate, 225 to 1. This constitution has been drawn up mainly by Vice-Premier Laval and provides for an authoritarian government under Marshal Pétain as "Chief of State." The following day the National Assembly meets and adopts the Pétain-Laval plan (subject to a national referendum) by 569 votes to 80. Nearly one-third of the elected representatives of the French people are absent. The next day Marshal Pétain calls on President Lebrun and informs him that he has taken over his powers and added them to his own powers as Premier; and on July 12 he designates M. Laval as his eventual successor. "Liberty, equality, fraternity" is abolished in favor of "Work, family, country."

On July 14 France observes the 151st anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. Last year the national festival was the occasion for a great display of military might in the Champs Elysées, in the presence, among other notables, of Mr. Winston Churchill. This year it falls on a Sunday and is observed as a national day of mourning. From London, Mr. Churchill, now Prime Minister, broadcasts as follows:

"Who could foresee what the course of a year would bring? Who can foresee what the course of other years will bring? Faith is given to us as a help and comfort when we stand in awe before the unfurling scroll of human destiny. And I proclaim my faith that some of us will live to see a Fourteenth of July when a liberated France will once again rejoice in her greatness and in her glory, and once again stand forward as the champion of the freedom and the rights of man. When that day dawns, as dawn it will, the soul of France will turn with comprehension and kindness to those Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, wherever they may be, who in the darkest hour did not despair of the Republic."

CUBA, AMERICA AND THE WAR

By Cosme de la Torriente

THE history of Cuba's rôle in international affairs since the establishment of the republic in 1902 falls into three well-defined periods. The first extends from 1902 to April 1917, when Cuba entered the World War, following the lead of the United States. The second extends from that time to May 29, 1934, when the Permanent Treaty, which gave the Platt Amendment legal force in Cuba, was abrogated.[1] The third period covers the years from 1934 to the present.

During all the forty-odd years that Cuba has been an independent and sovereign nation — including the era when the Platt Amendment governed her relations with the United States — she has always enjoyed all the attributes of a nation in full control of her own destinies. People of considerable legal attainments, like Dr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamente, Professor of International Law at the University of Havana and Member of the Permanent Court of International Justice, have continually maintained the thesis that the Platt Amendment did not impede Cuba's complete freedom of action. According to them, the Amendment embodied only two fundamental principles: one, that Cuba could in no way surrender her independence or any part of her territory, nor contract debts which would lead to foreign interference in order to collect them; and two, that Cuba should ensure the protection of the lives, property and liberty of all persons within her borders — an obligation incumbent upon all sovereign states.

Cuba has concluded treaties of all sorts with other Powers, and the good sense of the Cuban authorities, plus the prudence of the majority of those who have governed the United States since 1902, prevented the Platt Amendment from becoming the source of mischief which many people anticipated. Nevertheless, the patriotism of the Cuban people was affronted by those clauses that forbade them to do things which they never would have done anyway, because to have done them would have meant surrendering those very rights of absolute independence which Cuba had struggled for half a century to wrest from Spain.

[1] For further details concerning the history of this treaty see my article "The Platt Amendment," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1930, p. 364-378.

The most disturbing provision in the Platt Amendment was the right it conferred on the Government of the United States "to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . ." Although certain short-sighted American officials have from time to time presumed more or less openly to meddle with the domestic affairs of Cuba, this sort of interference made no headway whenever the Cuban authorities repudiated such pretensions and jealously strove to fulfill the Constitution, laws and treaties of the Republic.

During the two periods when I was Secretary of State — first in 1913 under President Menocal, and again in 1933 and 1934 during the provisional government of President Mendieta — I can state as a matter of personal knowledge that, far from interfering improperly in Cuban affairs, Washington at all times rendered me enthusiastic coöperation; nor was there a single matter in which the two governments failed to reach a mutually agreeable solution. This was also the case when I was Cuban Ambassador in Washington between 1923 and 1925. Furthermore, throughout my almost seven years as Chairman of the Commission on Foreign Relations in the Cuban Senate, I noticed, even during the worst periods of our political disturbances, that the relations between the Cuban and American Governments were always inspired by a spirit of accommodation.

II

This, of course, is not to say that the United States Government has never intervened in Cuba. In September 1906, the American Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, was obliged to assume the reins of government during the turmoil caused by interfactional disputes as to who should succeed Estrada Palma as President. As soon as the Republic was quiet, Taft's successor, Governor Magoon, called provincial, and then national, elections. When General José Miguel Gómez was elected President by the vote of the people, the Governor handed over to him the reins of government and the American troops withdrew from Cuba.

The disastrous elections of November 1916 produced another revolution in February 1917, this time against President Menocal. The American Government, then on the eve of entering the European War, resolutely refused to take over the government of Cuba, as certain Cuban politicians would have desired, though

it adopted various measures aimed at bringing about a general pacification of the island.

During the economic crisis of 1920–1921, the governments of Menocal and Zayas were subjected to interference, not only from General Crowder, whom President Wilson had sent to Cuba as his personal representative, but directly from the White House during Harding's term of office and the first months of Coolidge's administration. The Platt Amendment was constantly invoked as an excuse for intervening in every problem, whether political or economic. It was forgotten that Cuba had entered the World War at the side of the United States only a few hours after the latter's declaration of war; that Cuba had established compulsory military service with the idea of sending an army to Europe; that this idea was not carried out because the United States and the Allies themselves agreed that a small army from a tropical country would be of no practical use in Europe and that we should therefore concentrate all our efforts on increasing the production of sugar; and lastly, that President Zayas settled *in cash* a debt of ten million dollars which we had been obliged to contract with the United States for war preparations. It was also forgotten that Cuba's political disturbances were the result of the world economic crisis and of the new ideologies unleashed by the Communist Revolution in Russia.

The economic crisis in Cuba was aggravated by the tendency of the United States Congress to raise tariffs on the assumption that in this way the United States could reduce its purchases abroad while increasing its export of agricultural and industrial products. This absurd policy, by greatly stimulating the cultivation of sugar beets and cane in the United States and its island colonies, spelled disaster for Cuban sugar producers. The evil grew worse during the administration of President Hoover, who made no effort of any kind to help Cuba, despite the fact that during the war we had sold our sugar to the United States and the Allies at a price fixed by them, while in return taking quantities of American products which we were compelled to import at prohibitive prices.

On September 3, 1923, the day I was elected President of the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations, I received a cable from President Zayas asking me to accept the post of Ambassador in Washington. My mission there had two objects: one, to effect the cessation of the unlawful activities of General Crowder,

who by then had been given the status of Ambassador; and two, to secure the ratification of the treaty concerning the sovereignty of the Isle of Pines. This treaty had been waiting some twenty years for the approval of the Senate. Meanwhile it had been mislaid and several weeks were required to find it.

In 1925 General Machado succeeded Dr. Zayas as President. In spite of his promise not to stand for reëlection, Machado sought to have the Constitution of 1901 modified so that he could maintain himself in power. As a result, a widespread state of public disorder became almost permanent. It was under these circumstances that Machado was reëlected without opposition in 1928. Though the American Government succeeded in effecting an understanding between Machado and his opponents, this did not prevent an abortive revolution from breaking out in 1931. Shortly after assuming office in 1933, President Roosevelt authorized his new Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Sumner Welles, to act as mediator between Machado and the majority of his opponents. The proposal was accepted and the basis for an agreement was reached which would have ended the conflict between government and governed in Cuba, if General Machado had given effect to his offer to resign. Instead, influenced by the evil advice of some of his friends and by his own intemperance, he carried out acts of such violence that on August 11, 1933, the Cuban Army declared against his authority, thus obliging him to renounce his office and leave the country the very next day.

III

Everyone acquainted with the history of Cuba knows that during the last half of the nineteenth century the United States was the principal center for our revolutionary activity against Spain. Without the sympathy of the American people, the liberty of Cuba would have been very slow in coming. Although some have dared to deny it, the Cubans are grateful. The Protocol of Peace signed at Washington on August 12, 1898, by which Spain undertook to give up Cuba and to withdraw her military and naval forces, together with the Joint Resolution of the American Congress of April 20, 1898, in effect created an unwritten treaty of mutual aid between Cuba and the United States, one that is eternal because it exists nowhere except in the hearts of the two fraternal nations. We declared war against Germany almost simultaneously with the United States to fulfill

our sacred debt of gratitude. And for the same reason, I believe, as do most good Cubans, that Cuba would again immediately follow the United States if it were to enter the new and terrible war which today threatens the very foundations of civilization. We would do so, not merely to fulfill our moral obligation to our northern neighbor, but because, like the American people, we must always be on the side of those fighting for democracy, liberty and justice.

On July 14 of this year the Cuban people elected a new President and Congress in accordance with our recently adopted constitution. When the new government assumes office on October 10, it will confront many grave problems. Its most important duty, in my opinion, will be to establish closer bonds of collaboration with the United States and with the other republics of this hemisphere. As I have already remarked, Cuba's only course, in case the United States should become involved in a war with the totalitarian Powers of Europe or Asia, would be to render full and immediate aid. Apart from other considerations our geographic situation demands this. Cuba is a small island, almost within sight of the United States, and she is in a position to dominate both entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, as well as one of the passages leading from the Atlantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea. Cuba thus guards not only the southern coast of the United States but one of the principal routes to the Panama Canal.

In the war now raging in Europe, it is absolutely essential to the United States and Cuba that Britain and her Allies should defeat the totalitarian Powers. It is with sincere grief that admirers of the French people like myself have witnessed the invasion, defeat and partition of their country. But I have great faith that Britain will not only defend herself successfully, but will in the end triumph, however difficult her own situation and that of her Allies may now appear. I also have great faith in immanent justice and the designs of Providence. I therefore cannot understand how intelligent men, as many of those who now rule Germany and Italy must be, can forget the obvious fact that he who resorts to brute force will, sooner or later, be destroyed by brute force.

However, if it should come to pass that Britain were defeated by Germany, the Americas would be faced with a most serious situation. The strength of the United States is so great that it might successfully defend itself against any invasion from Europe.

The issue would, however, be much more doubtful if the United States had to withstand an attack not only from Europe but also from the Orient — from Japan with her vast fleet, or from Russia whose military preparations along the Siberian coast opposite Alaska have recently assumed large proportions.

Were the United States called upon to defend itself from any such simultaneous attacks, it could count on the complete solidarity — economic, political and military — of Cuba. No other course would be conceivable for the Cuban people. We have always rebelled against any system resembling Nazism. We have always fought against tyranny, and whether it was inflicted upon us by the Spanish Monarchy or by a dictator of our nationality, we have in the end always succeeded in overthrowing it.

IV

Cuba's actual military contribution to the defense of this hemisphere cannot, of course, be great in view of her very limited resources. We are a people of less than five million, our navy is only large enough to patrol our coast and our army sufficient merely to maintain internal order. We could not possibly defend ourselves for a single day, if a formidable enemy attacked us with the object of establishing bases on our soil from which in turn to attack the United States or any other area in the Caribbean.

Cuba's rôle in any American defense program naturally raises the question of Guantánamo Bay. In 1934, at the time of the negotiations which culminated in the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, the United States possessed not only the naval station at Guantánamo, but also the right to establish another at Bahía Honda. This right was later abandoned in a treaty, which however automatically lapsed upon failure to ratify it. Because of the disturbed state of the world, and in particular because of the proximity of Guantánamo to the Panama Canal, the United States could not give up the naval station. Furthermore, from the Cuban point of view the existence of the station is highly useful. In any war involving the United States, Cuba would run the risk of being occupied by enemy Powers, and in this event the Guantánamo station would insure our receiving prompt help from the United States Army and Navy. For these reasons, the Cuban Government felt, during the 1934 negotiations, that the prudent policy was to leave the question of Guantánamo as it was.

Since then I have had occasion to declare that if the United

States Government should ever decide to abandon the Guantánamo station, Cuba might have to ask the United States to stay. Otherwise, enemy forces might occupy Cuban soil to the peril not only of Cuban independence but of the security of the United States. In my opinion, it is therefore to the mutual advantage of both countries that the American naval station be maintained at Guantánamo. I am certain that this opinion is shared by every sensible Cuban who loves his country and aspires to see it fulfill its obligations with dignity. In the troubled world in which we are living today, Cuba will continue to stand beside the United States, without prejudice to the liberty and independence which free nations must enjoy if they are to live in harmony.

I believe that, since the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, Cuba has proved that she desires to cultivate the best possible relations with the United States, despite the radicalism of a very small number of our leaders. But I also believe, since our two nations need each other and since ours is the poorer and weaker, that it is urgently necessary for the United States to devise with us certain economic agreements or regulations which will enable Cuba to live more than a mere hand-to-mouth existence. Only in this way can we remove the fear that American interests, through some change in the United States tariff laws, may again plunge us into serious economic distress, as happened, for example, at the time of the Hawley-Smoot Act. Increased preferential treatment by each country for the products of the other would, from our point of view, be beneficial not only to Cuban capital and workers, but to those American investors who have put their money in Cuban agriculture, industry and commerce. The more Cuba sells to the United States, the more the farmers and manufacturers of the United States will sell to Cuba, and the more work and higher wages there will be for American labor. Nor would lowered tariff rates adversely affect the American and Cuban budgets, for in the long run the expansion of trade would increase the total customs receipts of each country.

V

It is my belief that the Monroe Doctrine should be converted, by agreement among all the American republics, from a unilateral into an Inter-American doctrine, so formulated that each would regard an attack on the integrity of any other as an attack upon itself. The watchword should be "one for all and all for one."

Unless Britain wins in her heroic struggle, democratic government will almost completely disappear from Europe; and if this should happen, the Americas, from the Arctic to the Antarctic, will sooner or later have to face the grave danger of an invasion by the totalitarian Powers of Europe or Asia, or both.

That the responsible statesmen of this hemisphere are fully alive to this threat was clearly indicated at the Second Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Havana during the last ten days of July 1940. Even the most optimistic person could hardly have anticipated that the Conference would take place in such a friendly atmosphere and that its results would be so substantial. All of the absurd intrigues of the totalitarian Powers to accentuate differences between the various states, and in particular to create the impression that serious dissensions divided the United States and Argentina, ended in ridiculous failure.

At Havana, as at the First Consultative Meeting in Panama in September and October 1939, each state was represented by its Foreign Minister (or Secretary of State) or by his personal deputy. In order to carry on their work more expeditiously, the twenty-one delegates — for technically each country had only one delegate — were divided into three committees of seven members each. The Neutrality Committee was presided over by Señor Leopoldo Melo of Argentina; Mr. Hull was chairman of the Committee on the Protection of Peace in the Western Hemisphere; while Señor Eduardo Suárez of Mexico headed the Committee on Economic Coöperation. Within a week these Committees had drawn up and agreed upon an Act of Havana, a Convention of Havana, a Declaration on Economics, and various other resolutions. The most important of these were the Act and the Convention, which provided for the provisional administration of European colonies in America in the event that their occupation by one or more American Powers should become necessary in order to forestall a change of sovereignty. Germany, it was feared, might try to occupy the Dutch or French possessions in the Caribbean, and against such contingency the American republics naturally had to take a stand.

In my own view, the best policy to follow in regard to these European possessions is to maintain the *status quo* until the end of the war. As long as Britain controls the sea, her American colonies will run no risk of invasion. As for the Netherlands, its

Government showed considerable adroitness by evacuating to London, leaving the home country in charge of General Winkelman, who, when he surrendered, could hand over only the territory under his own command — which did not include the Dutch colonies overseas. The Netherland Government still controls a navy and a merchant marine, and as long as Britain is mistress of the seas Germany and Italy cannot occupy the Dutch colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The most likely source of trouble for the American republics lies in the ambiguous situation of the French colonies. The principal danger here is that the British may suspect the French colonial officials of becoming agents for the German Government. This might lead to an open conflict in the Caribbean, especially if the French Government permitted German raiders to prey on British commerce and colonial possessions from bases in the French colonies.

The essential difference between the Act and the Convention is that the Act provides a temporary apparatus for administering orphaned European colonies until the more formal and deliberate procedure laid down in the Convention can come into operation. The Act came into force upon its signature, whereas the Convention must await ratification by two-thirds of its signatories. The Act and Convention, taken together, thus determine very clearly the procedure which the American republics will adopt in the event a conflict should arise over an attempt by a non-American Power to occupy a British, French or Dutch colony in this hemisphere. To forestall, or defeat, any such attempt, the Conference agreed that, in the name of all the American nations, provisional administrations would be set up in any or all of the European colonies. This administration is, according to the terms of the Act, to "be exercised with the twofold purpose of contributing to the security and defense of the Continent, and to the economic, political and social progress" of the areas so administered. Furthermore, the Act provides that when the emergency is over, the provisional administration on behalf of the American republics will cease and the colonies will either "be organized as autonomous states if it shall appear that they are able to constitute and maintain themselves in such condition, or be restored to their previous status. . . ."

The Act also pledged the twenty-one signatory states to create an Emergency Committee, composed of one representative from each of them, to "assume the administration of the region at-

tacked or menaced" until such time as the more complicated procedure of the Convention can come into effect. The Act further stipulates — and this is of first-rate importance — that if "the need for emergency action be so urgent that action by the committee cannot be awaited, any of the American Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the continent requires."

Next in importance among the concrete accomplishments of the Conference is the Declaration on Economics. At Havana there obviously was not sufficient time for the delegates to examine the countless details involved in any large-scale program for Inter-American economic coöperation. This explains why the Declaration confines itself largely to the enunciation of general principles and recommendations, leaving it up to the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, which sits in Washington, to develop the specific methods for giving them practical application. It will be up to this Committee to seek solutions for the very serious economic problems imposed upon the American nations by the war in Europe. In particular it must seek a way for disposing of the surplus products on the export of which depends the economic life of the American nations, without at the same time obliging them to adopt such devices as the barter system, so beneficial to Germany and so disastrous for the rest of us. I need hardly add that economic difficulties may easily lead to social crises. If the economic life of the American nations should come to a standstill because of the disappearance of their old markets, serious disturbances would soon ensue among the working classes.

Numerous other resolutions were adopted at Havana. Among them I might mention in particular those aimed at suppressing the various subversive activities now being carried on against the democratic institutions of the American republics by foreign agents, whether they are diplomatic agents or not.

VI

Alongside these measures for political and economic collaboration there must, of course, also be coöperation in building up the military defenses of the Americas against the totalitarian danger. The United States is the only nation in this hemisphere with a powerful fleet; but its force would be greatly weakened if it had to extend its protection to the lower part of South America. The

nations in that section of the continent should therefore do their utmost to prepare, not only to defend themselves, but to act with the assistance of the United States. It is true that the relations, commercial and otherwise, of those countries are more intimate with Europe than with North America and that this consideration might persuade them not to pursue policies detrimental to their trade. Yet it must be remembered that it is precisely these countries which would suffer the most if they were obliged to deal with Germany on a purely barter basis to the exclusion of commerce with the northern part of our hemisphere.

However, if these countries should nevertheless feel compelled to turn to Europe, the United States and all the nations in and around the Caribbean Sea (including those on the Pacific in the vicinity of the Panama Canal) ought then to come to an agreement among themselves. Such an agreement would cover not only military and economic but also social matters; for contrary to what many maintain, any economic understanding among these nations necessarily implies an agreement concerning wages and salaries for every class of worker and employee. Otherwise there would ensue ruinous competition between those countries where wages are miserable and those where they are high, with the inevitable result of lowering the living standards in the latter.

In conclusion, let me reiterate my belief that Cuba should draw as close as possible in her unwritten alliance to the United States, and that all the nations of Latin America should continue the good work initiated at Havana until a complete understanding has been reached between them on all matters of common concern. All of us in the Americas who think as I do and who have any influence in their own countries, should not rest for a moment until we have perfected our joint means for the protection of the entire hemisphere. Such solidarity will not only make us strong and respected, it will promote better conditions of life among our own peoples.

THE DIPLOMACY OF AIR TRANSPORT

By Oliver J. Lissitzyn

GOVERNMENTS have always shown special concern over the means of transportation and communication at their disposal. This is particularly true of nations that regard themselves as World Powers. Such states can assure their national and imperial unity, their economic progress and their military power only if they possess reliable and speedy methods of transportation and communication. For this reason highways, railroads, shipping, cables and radio are the objects of special solicitude, regulation and protection, even by governments which in other ways practice a high degree of *laissez-faire* toward the economic life of their countries. Air transport is no exception to this rule. Indeed, since aircraft have become one of the most powerful weapons in war, air transport is governed much more by political and military criteria than, for instance, are railroads and cables. Air transport is an instrument of national policy.

This being the case, what rules and policies have nations adopted to control the establishment and operation of international air lines? Does, for instance, commerce in the air possess the same legal rights as commerce on the sea, or do special rules prevail for aërial navigation? And what have been the practical consequences of the legal principles that have come to govern international air commerce? These are questions which have arisen only in the last few decades. Yet, though in some respects the law and usage of the air have not been clearly defined, certain broad legal principles can now be regarded as well fixed.

These principles may be stated as follows: (1) Each state has complete jurisdiction over the air space above its territory, including territorial waters. (2) Each state has complete discretion as to the admission of any aircraft to the air space under its jurisdiction. (3) The air space over the high seas, and over other parts of the earth's surface not subject to any state's jurisdiction, is free to the aircraft of all states. As one can readily see, these principles mean in effect that international air commerce is not free. They mean that a company can establish an air line between two or more countries only after specific flying and landing rights have been secured by special bargaining with each of them.

Although of recent origin, these principles are now among the

least disputed in international law. Prior to the World War many learned societies passed resolutions in favor of the freedom of the air. The practice of nations, however, pointed the other way, and the experience of the war dispelled all doubt, for aircraft had already become, even in its embryonic forms, a potent weapon not only of reconnaissance and espionage, but of attack.

When the Paris Peace Conference undertook to prepare a general convention regulating international air navigation, there could be no doubt that each state possessed full sovereignty over the air space above it; the only subject of controversy was the extent to which the rigor of this sovereignty could be mitigated in favor of peaceful air commerce. The Convention of 1919 elaborated at the Conference, although it accorded limited freedom of passage to the occasional private flier of one contracting state through the air space of the others, gave no such freedom to the regular scheduled air carrier.[1] The latter remained at the mercy of each individual state. If any lingering doubts persisted on this point, they were dispelled at the extraordinary meeting in 1929 of the International Commission for Air Navigation (established by the Convention), when only four of the thirty-one participants voted in favor of freedom for international air commerce. The majority voted to amplify the text of Article 15 of the 1919 Convention so as to leave no doubt that each contracting state had the right to bar regular international air lines from its air space, with or without good reason.[2] The United States, however, although it signed the 1919 Convention and took part by special invitation in the 1929 meeting of the International Commission, has not ratified that instrument and is not bound by its provisions.

Although the United States, at the meeting of the International Commission in 1929, favored greater freedom for international air lines, it could not afford to practice such liberality on a unilateral basis. The Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, declares that the United States has "complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United States." Foreign air carriers are required to obtain special permits for operations into or within the United

[1] The third paragraph of Article 15 read: "The establishment of international airways shall be subject to the consent of the States flown over."

[2] The new text reads: "Every contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorization the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory."

States. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the power to grant or refuse authorization for foreign aircraft to navigate in the United States belonged to the Secretary of Commerce, who could exercise it without making public either the proceedings or the reasons for his decisions. Today the Civil Aeronautics Board exercises the power to issue permits if it finds that the foreign carrier is "fit, willing, and able properly to perform" the service proposed, and that such service "will be in the public interest." The Board is required to hold public hearings on all applications for such permits.

These provisions clearly contemplate special authorization in each particular case and can hardly be reconciled with a régime of general freedom of the air. In addition, the Board apparently must follow the rule prescribed in Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended:

> (b). Foreign aircraft not a part of the armed forces of the foreign nation shall be navigated in the United States only if authorized as hereinafter in this section provided.
>
> (c). *If a foreign nation grants a similar privilege in respect of aircraft of the United States,*[1] and/or airmen serving in connection therewith, the Civil Aeronautics Board may authorize aircraft registered under the law of the foreign nation and not a part of the armed forces thereof to be navigated in the United States. No foreign aircraft shall engage in air commerce otherwise than between any State, Territory, or possession of the United States (including the Philippine Islands) or the District of Columbia, and a foreign country.

This provision lays down in very general terms the principle of reciprocity for the granting of air navigation privileges. The term "a similar privilege" has in practice been interpreted to mean some privilege, specific or general, granted by the other party and deemed by the competent United States authority to be a substantial equivalent for the privilege requested of the United States. It does not necessarily mean that in each case the reciprocal privileges must be identical in all respects. The prohibition against foreign aircraft engaging in domestic trade within the United States corresponds to the legislation reserving American coastwise water-borne commerce to American vessels.

In practice the policy of the United States toward foreign applicants for air transport privileges depends on the location and the type of services involved. A rather liberal attitude prevails toward air commerce between the United States and Canada. On the Seattle-Vancouver route, for instance, a Canadian air carrier

[1] Italics ours.

is permitted to operate on a more frequent schedule than the United States carrier whose schedule is restricted by the Canadian authorities. On the great intercontinental routes, however, the policy of the United States seems to be "that there shall be no regular commercial operation into the United States under a foreign flag without simultaneous provision for an equal amount of American flying on the same route."[4] The American Government has not looked with much favor upon foreign efforts to compete with Pan American Airways in the Caribbean: in 1937 the Secretary of Commerce turned down an application of K. L. M., the Dutch air transport company, for landing privileges in Miami when it desired to extend its West Indian services to the United States. In 1938, British and Dutch companies were denied landing privileges at Hawaii for military reasons.

When two governments negotiate over flying or landing rights, considerations of national prestige usually demand that the privileges they grant be substantially reciprocal, at least in cases where the termini of the proposed route are located in the two states; where mere transit rights are desired, reciprocity is not always required. Often when such privileges are obtained by small states, they remain unused; in some cases they may even provide a means for the interests of a third nation to slip in. Article 7 of the 1919 Convention sought to control such situations by providing that the head and at least two-thirds of the directors of any air navigation corporation must be of the same nationality as the company. This limitation was designed principally to prevent German interests from obtaining a foothold in international air navigation under a non-German guise. In 1929, largely at Germany's insistence, this limitation was removed.

In negotiations between a government and an air transport operator of another nationality, the latter is rarely if ever in a position to commit his own government to a grant of reciprocal privileges. However, some agreements which embody the results of such negotiations contain clauses empowering the government granting the privileges to cancel them if a company of its own nationality is denied reciprocal privileges by the operator's government. The agreement between Pan American Airways and Argentina contains a clause of this type. The characteristic of such a clause is that, while it may place the operator in an embarrassing position, it leaves the operator's government free

[4] Edward P. Warner, "Atlantic Airways," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1938, 482.

of commitments. Some governments, notably the French, have as a general rule insisted that all applications for air transport rights be made to them directly through diplomatic channels rather than by the foreign operators. Even France, however, has admitted exceptions to this policy, as in 1939 when Pan American Airways directly applied for and received permission to land at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on its Honolulu-Auckland route.

In this matter the United States Government has wisely followed a flexible policy. It has permitted and encouraged Pan American Airways to negotiate for its own privileges in Latin America and the Pacific, although on occasion the State Department has exerted its influence to smooth Pan American's way.[5] This policy has enabled the company to compete successfully with European companies for privileges in South America. Moreover, this policy has not committed the American Government to grant reciprocal privileges — privileges that might be used, for instance, by companies organized under South American laws but controlled by German interests.

In the case of trans-Atlantic services, however, the United States adopted a different policy. The authorities in Washington "decided, after consultations between this Department [of State] and members of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, that the question of obtaining transatlantic operating rights for American air transport companies should be a matter of negotiations between the Government of the United States and the foreign Government concerned." [6] The reasons for this decision have not been made public, but they may be surmised to include the following: (1) some European states insist that applications for air navigation privileges be made to them through the government of the foreign operator; (2) important European nations are not likely to grant landing rights to an American operator without being assured of receiving reciprocal rights in the United States; (3) an American company, if permitted to negotiate for itself, might be able to obtain a virtual monopoly of the trans-Atlantic air service under the American flag. Pan American Airways did in fact obtain a temporary monopoly, as against other American operators, of landing rights in Portugal by its agreement of April 27, 1937, with the Portuguese Government. Yet the United

[5] As an exception, the United States negotiated in 1929 an air transport agreement with Colombia providing for reciprocal flying and landing privileges.

[6] *Letter of R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the Department of State,* to Wm. H. Coverdale, President of American Export Lines, Inc., January 23, 1939. Civil Aeronautics Authority, Docket

States Government has not been willing to see any one American operator monopolize the commercially promising trans-Atlantic air routes, a fact underlined in July 1940 when it issued a certificate authorizing American Export Airlines to establish services to Europe in direct competition with Pan American. On the other hand, the United States may find it embarrassing to have two or more American companies vying for favors from foreign governments. Such rivalry might enable the latter to drive hard bargains and impose terms harmful to American interests as a whole. All these difficulties can be avoided if the negotiations for privileges are conducted by the United States Government. Such landing rights as it obtains may then be apportioned among various American companies. The United States may so apportion, for instance, its landing rights in France under the agreement of July 15, 1939, with that nation.

The development of the world's air commerce has been undoubtedly retarded by the international law of the air which imposes on operators, or their governments, the necessity to bargain for landing rights. Routes which are technically feasible and commercially promising have remained unopened. The present map of international air lines therefore reflects political as well as commercial considerations. One of the best examples of this is the lack of direct air communication between the United States and Japan, in spite of the fact that the volume of trade and communication between these two countries is much larger than, for instance, that between the United States and New Zealand. The distance between Guam and Yokohama is actually shorter than that between Guam and Manila, regularly flown today by Pan American's clippers. Only political and strategic considerations have prevented the opening of this route. There are also no air ties between Japan and Siberia. China for a long time refused to grant any foreign company landing rights at Canton because she feared that Japan would demand similar privileges. There is no air service between Batavia and Manila, though the Dutch have long been anxious to establish one. Negotiations for such a service have been proceeding in Washington in deep secrecy. It is known, however, that the consent of the Philippine Common-

No. 238, Exhibit 19, 34. Apparently this policy is itself subject to exceptions, for after the decision just quoted, American Export Airlines, with the knowledge and assistance of the State Department, obtained landing rights in Italy through direct negotiations with the Italian Government.

wealth Government for the operation of this route is deemed necessary in view of the expected independence of the Islands.

Some of the smaller countries have at times taken advantage of their geographical position to exact, in return for the grant of landing rights, conditions that are financially burdensome to the foreign carriers involved.[1] Italy, at a time when Italian air transport was weak and highly unprofitable, refused to grant landing rights to Imperial Airways on its route to the East unless the British company's receipts on a certain run were divided equally with the Italian company, which had much less traffic. Turkey bars all foreign airlines from passing over its territory in an east-west direction, primarily for military reasons; as a result, European services to Southern Asia are unable to use the shortest route. Turkey's attitude redounds to the advantage of Greece, which is reported to require all foreign airliners passing over her territory to land at Athens and to coördinate their schedules with those of the internal Greek air services. Similar illustrations could be multiplied almost indefinitely.

Very frequently air transport relations between two or more nations depend upon the state of their political relations. For several years after the World War, Germany was barred from signing the Convention of 1919 (to which in fact she did not adhere after the bar had been lifted) and from establishing air services into the territories of her erstwhile enemies. France, on the other hand, developed an extensive system of air services to the Little Entente countries and to Poland, with the aid of subsidies from all those states. But in recent years the general eclipse of the prestige and power of France has handicapped French air transport in Southeast Europe. In 1939, for instance, Jugoslavia refused to renew her air convention with Air France. The Polish-German rapprochement of 1934 was accompanied by the ratification of an air transport agreement made in 1929. The establishment of an airline from Prague to Moscow across Rumania but avoiding Poland was agreed upon when Czechoslovakia and Russia had reached a political entente. More recently, with the improvement of Soviet-Bulgarian relations, a Soviet airline from Odessa to Sofia was inaugurated under a special convention. In Nationalist Spain, Italian and German air transport enjoys wide privileges, while the French, British and Dutch airlines cannot enter the

[1] For a description of various types of such conditions, see L. H. Slotemaker, *Freedom of Passage or International Air Services*, Leiden, n.d. (1932?), 44–57. See also Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

country. Report has it that Spain's refusal to grant landing rights to the Dutch was in retaliation for the alleged refusal of their government to turn over to Franco certain funds deposited in Amsterdam for the account of the Spanish Republican Government. If this is so, it is a good illustration of how the power to deny air transport privileges is sometimes used as a weapon for gaining ends which have nothing to do with air transport.

The vicissitudes of the political relations between Germany and Russia have been reflected in their air transport policies towards each other. Deruluft, an air transport enterprise in which German interests and the Soviet Government held equal shares, was organized in 1921, even before the German-Soviet friendship was solemnized by the Treaty of Rapallo. Deruluft began regular operations between Berlin and Moscow in 1922. But when Hitler took power, German-Soviet friendship cooled off. This led among other things to Moscow's rebuffing a German plan for the creation of an overland air service to China. Early in 1937 Deruluft service was indefinitely suspended. However, after the diplomatic revolution of August 1939, a new German-Soviet air transport understanding was reached, and in February 1940 a new air service between Berlin and Moscow was established, operated jointly by the German Lufthansa and the Soviet Aeroflot.

Trans-Atlantic air routes have been the object of particularly intricate diplomacy. An understanding between the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the Irish Free State for trans-oceanic services was reached as early as 1935. Pan American Airways was apparently ready to inaugurate services on this route before Imperial Airways, for technical reasons, was able to participate in them. In accordance with the understanding of 1935, Great Britain in 1937 gave Pan American a permit to land in Newfoundland, England and Bermuda; similar permits were also obtained from Canada and Eire.[8] The British permit was conditioned, however, upon the simultaneous start of trans-Atlantic operations to the United States by the British company. In view of Imperial Airways' tardiness, Washington asked London to waive this condition; but the British long remained deaf, probably being reluctant for reasons of prestige to see the American company be the first to operate across the Atlantic.

[8] At the same time a reciprocal permit was issued by the United States to Imperial Airways. The assets of Imperial Airways were acquired early in 1940 by the new British Overseas Airways Corporation, which has organized a subsidiary, Airways Atlantic, Ltd., to operate the trans-Atlantic service.

In January 1939, after very brief negotiations, the United States obtained temporary landing rights in France, rights which were made more permanent by an air transport agreement between the two governments on July 15, 1939. Pan American already held landing rights in Portugal, and it was therefore now in a position to open a trans-Atlantic service along the southern route, regardless of the British attitude. Great Britain, perhaps realizing the futility of her stand, in February 1939 waived the requirement of simultaneity; on May 20, 1939, Pan American inaugurated a regular service on the northern route, to be followed a few months later by Imperial Airways. In the meantime, the German Lufthansa, which had conducted over fifty successful experimental flights across the Atlantic, had been loud in insisting that it could begin regular operations to the United States if it obtained landing rights on both sides of the ocean. Unfortunately for Germany, she had nothing to offer in return for such rights; nor did her general policies endear her to the democratic nations. It is clear that the international bargaining involved in contemporary air transport diplomacy was responsible for delaying, perhaps by several years, the establishment of regular intercontinental air service across the Atlantic.

Comparison is often made between the many restrictions under which international air commerce labors and the freedom enjoyed by ocean shipping. No special diplomatic negotiations are required to enable a merchant ship to put in at a foreign port. Furthermore, merchant ships enjoy the right of "innocent passage" through foreign territorial waters. As the law now stands, the sovereignty of a state over the air space above its territorial waters is more complete than its sovereignty over the territorial waters themselves, since the former is not limited by any right of innocent passage. For example, an American vessel on a voyage from Seattle to Alaska may pass through Canadian territorial waters without asking anybody's permission, but an American airliner flying over the same waters would have to obtain special authorization from Ottawa. As a result, the recently opened airline from Seattle to Juneau, Alaska, follows a somewhat circuitous route along the ocean side of Vancouver Island which adds some hundred miles to the length of the flight.

In other respects the fundamental status of aircraft in international law is not different from that of ocean vessels. The air space above the high seas is as free as the sea itself. States are tech-

nically entitled, in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary, to close their ports and their internal waterways to foreign vessels, unless they are in distress. In practice, however, the qualification stated — "in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary" — has been of enormous importance. Most countries are today linked by general treaties of navigation and commerce which provide for mutual freedom of entrance into ports without discrimination. In air transport, on the contrary, such general permission is uncommon, and agreements must, as already pointed out, be made for particular services. In the case of maritime traffic it is unusual for a state, even in the absence of a treaty obligation, to forbid ships of any other nation merely to enter its ports, although restrictions upon foreign vessels carrying certain exports or imports are somewhat more common. The actual difference between the status of water-borne shipping and that of air transport is thus more a matter of tradition than of law. The freedom enjoyed by shipping is peculiar to it and is not shared by any other means of transportation or communication.

The diplomacy of air transport has an analogy in the history of international bargaining over cable-landing rights. The early days of the cable business — before it had begun to feel the competition of the radio and air mail — were marked by an intricate and often fiercely fought "cable diplomacy." There never existed any "freedom of cables" except under the high seas. Nations jealously guarded their right to bar foreign cables from being landed on their shores, and many a hard bargain was driven by the fortunate possessor of a piece of territory essential for a cable station. In 1875 President Grant formulated the cable policy of the United States as one under which we refused cable-landing rights to a foreign company which enjoyed in any country a monopoly that excluded American cables. Here in embryonic form was a reciprocity policy similar to that later enunciated for air transport.

Companies subsidized by the British Government long exercised a virtual monopoly over cable communication with certain parts of South America, and at times discriminated against American interests. Shortly after the World War an acrimonious diplomatic controversy occurred when the United States endeavored to break this British monopoly. Britain replied by putting pressure on the Portuguese Government to prevent it from granting landing rights in the Azores to American companies un-

til they had agreed, in effect, to respect the British monopoly of cable communication between Europe and South America. Air transport diplomacy is thus not without precedent.

There are many reasons why nations have been reluctant to accord general freedom to international air lines. One argument has been that too much freedom of international air navigation would make it difficult for individual nations to enforce traffic and safety rules. Today a state may attach any condition it sees fit to the privileges it grants to a foreign air transport enterprise, and it is free to bar an enterprise unable or unwilling to coöperate in insuring a safe and smooth flow of air traffic. Congestion at certain airports, such as La Guardia Field in New York and on certain air traffic lanes is already becoming serious. Some experts argue that a state would be hampered in enforcing traffic and safety standards if it had to admit all the foreign commercial aircraft wishing to enter its territory, especially if they failed to give a reasonable advance notice of their arrival. Yet this problem is surely not insoluble. Regular air transport operates on definite schedules. An international code of safety and traffic rules, supplemented by permission for each state to make and enforce such additional regulations as may be required by its particular circumstances, would probably overcome this difficulty.

One obstacle to greater freedom of the air is the attitude of certain states lying across important world air routes. Such states, many of which are small and of little importance in the air, may use their geographical position to exact a stiff price for flying and landing rights. Even if they do not always take advantage of this opportunity, they naturally enough see no reason why they should give up an asset bestowed upon them by nature. Their nuisance value, however, may diminish as the cruising range of commercial aircraft increases. Today, for instance, American Export Airlines plans eventually to operate a trans-Atlantic service omitting the Azores as a landing point.

Military considerations also play a part in the restriction of the freedom of international air commerce. Army and navy authorities are always afraid that their fortifications, bases and other military preparations will be observed from the air, or that foreigners will make surreptitious aërial surveys of the country. When in 1938 the United States denied landing privileges in Hawaii to British and Dutch companies, "the major reason for refusal was this Government's unwillingness to expose its

Hawaiian defenses to view from foreign-flag airliners over which it would have little control." [9] Yet it should be noted that the occasional private flier, who has greater freedom under the 1919 Convention and many bilateral agreements (to some of which the United States is a party) than the regular airliner, has just as many, if not more, opportunities for observation from above, and is no easier to control. Furthermore, the military authorities of many a country fear that foreign pilots flying regular services over it will become so accustomed to the route and so familiar with the country's weather, terrain and local ground facilities that an aërial invasion will be made much easier. One story has it that when an Englishman asked why he had been refused permission to fly in a certain country the answer was — "You will know the country when you come again." It is reported that the German aërial invasions of Poland and Norway were aided by the presence among the squadron leaders of airmen who had been pilots on the commercial routes operated by Lufthansa over those countries. Yet the question again arises whether the same objections would not equally apply to the occasional flier, who indeed would not be necessarily restricted to the air routes used by regular commercial liners. Perhaps after all, military considerations of this type are not as insuperable an obstacle to freedom of the air as they are often alleged to be.

And in fact, political and financial considerations are probably more important today than those of a purely military character. All but one of the great international airlines are now flown at the expense of some government. The one exception is the trans-Atlantic service of Pan American Airways. Indeed, since December 1939 this line may be regarded as financially profitable to the United States Government since air mail revenues it derives from this route have exceeded its mail payments to the carrier. But the European War has probably been responsible for much of the exceptionally heavy air mail traffic now carried over the Atlantic. As a rule, international air commerce is still dependent for its existence upon governmental assistance — either in the form of direct subsidies, or of heavy air mail payments, or both. Those who oppose a régime of freedom for all companies regardless of nationality argue that such a policy would bring about further

[9] *Washington News*, March 10, 1938, as quoted by Clinton M. Hester, Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Department, appearing for the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation, in his testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, March 23, 1938. *Hearings* on H.R. 9738, 75th Congress, 3d session, 1938, p. 148.

division of the available traffic and would require still heavier subsidies to keep the carriers from bankruptcy. They point out that most of the important ocean shipping lines today are not self-supporting, and that this situation results in part from the traditional freedom of shipping which permits the existence of an almost unlimited number of subsidized and competing lines of different nationalities. Governments, according to this reasoning, thus have a financial interest in restricting air commerce.

Yet it is possible to argue that freedom of the air might in the long run hasten rather than postpone the day when subsidies would become unnecessary. Free competition would oblige the weaker and less efficient operators to choose between going out of business, amalgamating with some stronger foreign enterprise, or obtaining much higher subsidies. Many of the smaller states might be unwilling, or unable, to grant the latter. As a result, there would ensue a struggle ending in the survival of the fittest. The stronger, more efficient concerns would eventually eliminate their hot-house rivals, develop more routes and more traffic, and become self-supporting. To those whose interests lie primarily in encouraging international commerce, such a result might be welcome. It should, for instance, occasion no surprise that such a theory has been advocated by a Dutchman, since the Dutch air transport company — K. L. M. — is one of the most efficient and least politically-minded in the world. But most nations are too much interested in possessing their own air transport enterprises, however inefficient, to be willing to risk their fate by throwing the contest open to all comers on a *laissez-faire* basis.

The possession of rapid means of communication such as air transport may be an important competitive asset in international trade. The United States, for instance, could not afford to remain fifteen days away from a city in South America, such as Rio de Janeiro, if the latter were only four days by air from Europe. Rapid air mail communication between North and South America has had important consequences in speeding up business between the two continents. Shipping documents, notices of dishonor, letters of credit, drafts, various instructions and explanations, credit inquiries and replies, as well as specifications, samples and emergency shipments, may be sent by air with a great saving of time and a frequent saving of cable or storage expenses. The use of air mail for business correspondence eliminates cable charges that might be prohibitive in small transactions.

Politically, the possession of a well-developed air transport network, especially in international traffic, is a factor enhancing the prestige of a nation — at home, in its colonies and abroad. The very fact that a nation has extensively developed its air transport facilities is taken to indicate that it is progressive, efficient, highly civilized and entitled to respect. Such prestige has both economic and military value. It is good publicity for the nation's industries; it is also good publicity for the nation's military power. Air transport also serves to bring overseas colonies more closely in touch with the homeland. It aids Great Powers to penetrate politically and economically into weaker and more backward countries. And not to be overlooked is the fact that the possession of a rapid means of communication is a decided asset in the eternal diplomatic competition among nations.

The development of commercial air transport has, of course, a very close connection with a nation's military air power. The most important military advantage derived from air transport probably lies in the development of airways, of air navigation aids and of ground organization — all of which enormously facilitate the rapid movement of military aircraft. Furthermore, the existence of airlines makes it possible in emergencies to transport essential war materials and personnel rapidly. This factor is especially important on the great world routes, such as the British routes to Australia and South Africa, and the American routes in South America and the Pacific. For instance, the new line from Hawaii to New Zealand makes it possible to shift units of the American air force to Australasia along a surveyed route already supplied with facilities for refuelling, repairs and rest. And once the force has been shifted, it can be supplied with spare parts, ground crews, replacements of personnel, etc. It is hardly necessary to point out the similar value to hemisphere defense of Pan American's routes in Latin America.

Though the value of air transport as a reservoir of equipment and personnel for military aviation can be easily overestimated, it is nevertheless real. The number of planes in use as airliners is small in comparison with the number of military planes possessed by the Great Powers. The comparison should properly be made, however, with the number of military planes of the larger types only, such as bombers and transports. In 1938, aircraft in possession of American scheduled air carriers, domestic and international, numbered 345; while at the same time the number of

military bombing and transport planes in the United States forces probably did not exceed 1,200. Although civilian models are said to be diverging more and more from the military, it is still possible to convert many of the modern airliners into fairly efficient bombers; a number of such conversions have been reported during the present war. Civilian aircraft can also be used for military training purposes. Even more important, however, is the potential use of airliners for the transportation of troops and supplies. The Germans, for instance, are understood to have used Junkers commercial planes to "ferry" troops to Norway and elsewhere. Commercial airlines also provide an opportunity for reserve pilots to familiarize themselves with flying conditions on many important routes abroad. In the United States, airline pilots, who number about 1,300, "are constantly kept at the very peak of training on large equipment which is comparable to Army Air Corps bombing equipment and capable of flying both day and night through all sorts of weather." [10]

It may be well to note that the distinction between economic, political and military considerations, while convenient, is in a sense artificial. The sum-total of a nation's power, however hard to define, is never based on any one or two of these factors to the exclusion of the others. In the constant flux of history, specific aims and objectives change as well as methods. Military power may be used for the promotion of commercial as well as political interests; in turn, economic power may be used for political and military ends. Since air transport is an instrument of national policy, it would be idle to expect nations to bow before some commercially efficient foreign air transport company and give up their own enterprises.

If the present war eliminates the smaller independent states, it may simplify air transport diplomacy by removing one of the obstacles to greater freedom of the air. On the other hand, if the world of tomorrow is to be one in which a few states of continental dimensions struggle to maintain, or upset, a precarious balance of world power, the political and military aspects of air transport will increasingly overshadow its commercial significance. In such a world, freedom of the air can hardly thrive.

[10] Testimony of David L. Behncke, President of Air Line Pilots Association, March 29, 1938. *Hearings* on H.R. 9738, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

THE SOUTH LOOKS ABROAD

By Virginius Dabney

AS the people of the Southern States look across the Atlantic toward a Europe prostrate under the hobnailed boots of storm troopers, their sympathies are almost solidly against the totalitarians. They are particularly distraught over the plight of Great Britain, which for so many of them is the European motherland. That country's resolute stand against the combined might of Hitler and Mussolini probably has evoked a more lively and enthusiastic response below the Potomac and the Ohio than in any other section of the United States.

The catastrophe in Europe has roused Americans of whatever latitude and longitude to a keen realization of their country's intimate relationship to the rest of the world. Almost everyone now realizes that this war will determine the fate of Europe and the British and French empires, and bring a settlement one way or the other of Japan's efforts to rivet her hegemony upon the vast riches of eastern and southeastern Asia. It will settle the question, too, as to what philosophy of government is to predominate not only in those regions, but in Africa and in other parts of Asia, and very likely in South America. But though all this is pretty generally agreed, there is disagreement as to the best policy for the United States to pursue in the crisis.

Geographically nearer to Central and South America than other sections, and also less isolationist by nature than the Mid-West and Far West, the Southeastern part of the United States is especially concerned over what is happening overseas. When I say the Southeast I include all the states below the Potomac and the Ohio, and east of the Mississippi (except West Virginia) together with Louisiana and Arkansas. These states, eleven in number, were found to be relatively homogeneous by Dr. Howard W. Odum in his comprehensive work, "Southern Regions of the United States." They comprise slightly more than seventeen percent of the nation's area and have a total population of approximately 28,500,000 (according to latest estimates) out of the entire country's 130,000,000. Less than one-third of this population is colored. It is this region that I have in mind when in this article I use the word "South."

Cotton and tobacco are still the predominant forms of agricul-

ture, though dairy and poultry farming and cattle raising are forging ahead rapidly. It may come as a surprise to many that during 1939 the cash income from cotton and cottonseed in fourteen Southeastern and Southwestern states was only $598,000,000 as against $666,000,000 from live stock and live stock products. To those who have long sought to persuade the South to break the bondage of the one-crop economy, with its vicious and enslaving tenancy and credit systems, this is one of the most sensational and heartening advances ever made in the former Confederacy. It is partly the fruit of decades of hammering on the idea that the Southern farmer ought to diversify his farming and raise more of his own food, and thus strike off the shackles forged upon him by the sharecropping and "furnishing merchant" system — a rank weed which sprouted from the wreckage of the Civil War. Nor should sight be lost of the important rôle played by the soil conservation, crop diversification and farm rehabilitation program of the New Deal.

In the realm of manufacture, the South has made marked advances in recent years; but a notable fact is that there has been a relative lack of diversification in its finished goods. The bulk of Southern manufactures is to be found in textiles, tobacco, paper, iron, steel, chemicals and furniture. Further, a distressingly large percentage of the region's major industries are controlled by "outside" capital. To this extent the South has a status resembling that of a colonial economy. Although it is an overwhelmingly rural region, with few large cities and none with as much as 500,000 inhabitants, the value of its manufactured products is two-and-one-half times that of its agricultural products. The magazine *Fortune* asserted late in 1938, on the basis of an exhaustive survey, that the South is "the nation's Number One economic opportunity" viewed from the standpoint of its industrial potentialities. Viewed from other standpoints, it admittedly is the nation's Economic Problem Number One.

Southern agriculture has long been dependent upon exports for its prosperity. From fifty to sixty percent of the South's cotton and forty percent of its tobacco have normally been exported. So have more than half of its rosin and turpentine, as well as substantial percentages of its fruit and other farm products. Hitler's admission that Nazi Germany must "export or die" is equally applicable to the South under existing conditions. Cotton and tobacco, crops around which a major share of the

entire Southern economy is woven, already have lost a considerable part of their foreign markets as a result of the war. Both of them, particularly cotton, had already suffered severely in the foreign field before the present war. The Hawley-Smoot tariff began the process of restricting American exports of nearly all kinds, by sharply reducing imports and thus provoking other nations in the early 1930's to raise similar barriers against American goods. The AAA, with its price-pegging policies, gave a fillip to the restrictive tendencies already under way. Other countries began raising cotton in large quantities. For example, between 1931 and 1936, Brazil's exports of raw cotton increased tenfold.

The program of reciprocal trade pacts inaugurated in 1934 under the leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull tended definitely to widen the foreign markets for Southern cotton and tobacco, as well as other products. It had made good progress when the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 set in motion destructive forces which have well-nigh nullified its beneficent effects. As matters stand today, the trade pacts may still become extremely important elements in the reconstruction of the postwar world; but as wider and wider areas fall beneath the blight of totalitarianism they have relatively little current significance.

Some Southern industrialists have desired protection. But as a whole the South has always suffered from high American tariffs which have forced it to buy in a protected domestic market but to sell most of its products in an unprotected foreign market. Peter Molyneaux of Texas discussed the region's historic attitude on the tariff a few years ago in the following cogent language:

> The leaders of the Old South were right when they concluded, more than a century ago, that the high-tariff policy meant the ruin of the cotton states. When sixty-four of the sixty-seven representatives of the Southern states then in Congress voted against the tariff of 1824, and all but two Southern Senators did likewise, they acted in recognition of the fact that the measure was "utterly destructive" of the South's interests. It is well-nigh forgotten today, but the first talk of secession in the South, the first proposal by a Southerner that the time had come to "calculate the value of the Union," was occasioned by a realization that the high-tariff policy, which the Federal Congress had forced upon the South, condemned the cotton states to economic decline and perpetual economic inferiority; and this happened more than thirty years before the Civil War. It is not remarkable that during the more than one hundred years that have elapsed since then the people of the South have stubbornly opposed that policy. . . .

This Southern opposition had little effect, except at rare intervals, until the enactment of the Hull reciprocal trade program.

Two years ago Dr. Gallup found that 92 percent of the Southern people favored the general principles of trade underlying the Hull program, but that half of them had never even heard of Mr. Hull's efforts to put them into effect. Some of those who had heard of them didn't understand them. On the whole, as it became understood the program seems to have met with overwhelming favor in the South. There was a protest from Louisiana and Florida sugar producers against the method of fixing Cuba's quota in the agreement signed with that country; but the fundamental desirability of such agreements was not called into question. If the program had not made all the headway which some had hoped for by the time the present war broke out, it nevertheless had established itself in Southern favor and may yet become a major factor in the South's economic rehabilitation.

Although the National Cotton Council of America, under the leadership of Oscar Johnston, has launched an intensive drive to increase the use of cotton products, and to discover new uses for the South's great staple, there still remains the need for less cotton farming in the South and more farming of other kinds. Domestic consumption is now almost at its all-time high. Not only is the foreign trade situation as a whole growing increasingly acute as a result of the war, but the foreign market for American cotton may never come all the way back, or anywhere near it. As noted above, too many other countries are expanding production.

The Japanese situation is one which will definitely bear watching. Japan has been one of the largest buyers of Southern products, and in particular has been the region's best cotton market. The normal Japanese importation of 1,650,000 bales of cotton a year provides employment for 350,000 Southerners, with approximately 1,400,000 dependents, or a total of 1,750,000 of the 11,000,000 persons in the Southeast and Southwest who are dependent upon cotton for a livelihood. But Japanese importations of American cotton have been dropping sharply since 1937, owing to the fact that Japan has been using more and more of her foreign exchange to buy essential war materials.[1] Apparently the market for American cotton in Japan is destined to shrink still further, for it is reported that Tokyo plans to increase cotton production in conquered North China by forcing Chinese labor

[1] The United States has supplied a very large percentage of those materials used by Japan in her war on China. Much of the scrap metal shipped to Japan from this country in 1937–38 left from Southern ports. Some of this business may be cut off shortly, under the new Federal requirement that licenses are necessary for shipments of certain types of scrap steel.

to raise it at from three to four cents per pound. Similar plans are understood to be under way with respect to the growing of American-type leaf tobacco.

The old Southeast has a far less promising future with respect to cotton culture than the newer Southwest. Its relatively worn-out and eroded lands, its smaller farms, contrast unfavorably with the huge mechanized plantations on the rich plains of Texas and Oklahoma. Cotton can be raised there in bulk much more cheaply. In addition, the Southeast is the home of the entire American bright leaf tobacco crop, and the present plight of the foreign markets for this crop is serious. North Carolina is by far the primary bright leaf state, but the bright leaf belt covers parts of all the seaboard states from Virginia to Florida.

From two-thirds to three-fourths of the whole American tobacco export market is either lost or threatened as a result of wars in Europe and Asia. The once substantial shipments to China and Great Britain, to Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, have practically disappeared. Drastic readjustments have, of course, become necessary. Southern growers voted in late July by a 7-to-1 majority for a three-year control program, designed to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage. The crisis in the bright leaf market had come in the fall of 1939, when the British companies found it necessary to withdraw as a result of British governmental restrictions put into effect to conserve foreign exchange to meet urgent war needs. These companies had been buying one-third of the American crop annually and paying the American tobacco farmer half the total money he received. To the rescue of the Southern tobacco farmers came the Commodity Credit Corporation. It bought 175,000,000 pounds of tobacco for the British concerns, and is now holding it for them. Whether the corporation will buy a portion of this year's crop for the same companies has not been decided at this writing. But in any event the Southern tobacco planter must look forward to some far-reaching adjustments in his way of life. The recent referendum fixing his total production at 618,000,000 pounds for each of the next three years, compares with 676,000,000 for this year, under the control program voted last fall after the first débâcle; 1,100,000,000 for 1939 when control was voted down; 786,000,000 for 1938; and 866,000,000 for 1937 (both control years). The three-year acreage limitation just inaugurated enables the United States Department of Agriculture to plan for a self-sufficiency

program in the tobacco belt, whereby farmers would add vegetable gardens, chickens, a cow and pigs to the one-crop economy which now too commonly prevails. As in the case of cotton, this reorientation is long overdue. There consequently is no occasion for unmitigated lamentations, even though the crop of bright leaf for the next three years will not bring the prices it has often brought in the past, and though the volume will also be slashed.

Southern agriculture has been hit harder than Southern industry by the loss of foreign markets incident to the war. Accurate and up-to-date statistics on the industrial exports are extremely hard to come by. But it would appear that whereas exports from Southern factories of such products as steel, textiles, machinery, chemicals and paper to the countries of Latin America have increased in the past year, there has been a net loss in such exports, owing to decreases in shipments to Europe and the Far East.

This will be compensated for in part by the work which the manufacturing plants of the South are to play in the nation's gigantic defense effort. Abundant power, both in TVA territory and elsewhere, and many essential raw materials, are to be found in the region. The great Birmingham steel industry is to have an important part in the defense program. The development of aircraft manufacturing is expected to bring additional factories to the South. At Nashville, for example, the largest plant of this kind in the United States has just been completed. The great textile industry in the Piedmont region from Virginia to Alabama can also be geared to the country's defense requirements.

A number of the "strategic," "critical" and "essential" raw materials for defense are found in large quantities in the territory we are considering. It contains more than half of the country's bauxite deposits, from which aluminum is made, chiefly in Arkansas, Alabama and Georgia. The last-named is also a leading state in manganese reserves, essential in the manufacture of armor plate for battleships and hard steel used in tanks. Tennessee, Virginia and Alabama likewise have considerable deposits of this strategic mineral. Alabama's plant at Anniston for converting low-grade manganese ore is considered particularly significant, for whereas the country is deficient in high-grade manganese, the South has large deposits in the lower grades. North Carolina's great mica supply is important, as are the quantities of titanium in Virginia. In Louisiana, the Standard Oil Company is erecting a "buna" synthetic rubber plant, to which

the state's vast petroleum and natural gas deposits are essential. And this is only a partial list; many others might be named.

Since the Gulf states, as well as Georgia, have important Hispanic elements in their cultural backgrounds, and since there is also the factor of geographic proximity, they feel more closely drawn to Latin America than do other sections of the country. This interest is increased by the activities of the great port of New Orleans, with its network of shipping to all Latin America, and by the airplane services which radiate out to Central and South America from Miami. The Southern states also have long been interested in the project for a Nicaraguan canal. Numerous prominent Southerners were directors of the company which first undertook work on the canal three-score years ago. In the late nineteenth century, Southern business interests were active champions of a Nicaraguan canal, as opposed to the Panama route. Interest in it is still alive in the South, not only for the general reason that it would give the country the safeguard of an alternate route for the fleet in case the Panama Canal were put out of commission, but also because it would supply a shorter route from Gulf ports to our Pacific Coast and the Orient. The distance from New Orleans to San Francisco would be nearly 600 miles shorter via Nicaragua than it is via Panama.

Isolationist sentiment is probably weaker in the South than in any other section of the United States. The leading polls indicate that the region has the largest percentage of citizens who desire to render all possible aid to Britain and her allies, even at the cost of war. The fact that this region originally was so largely settled by the English, Scotch and Scotch-Irish, doubtless accounts, in part, for the strongly pro-British trend of thought among its people. Then too it has a much smaller percentage of foreign-born than any other region. It tends to be Anglo-Saxon in its political and cultural attitudes, except that in Louisiana the French influence is dominant while in all the Gulf states Spanish overtones are discernible. According to 1930 figures, only about 500,000 native whites of foreign or mixed parentage, and 200,000 of foreign-born white stock, were then living in the eleven Southeastern states. The largest single group of foreign-born, or of foreign-born or mixed parentage, were 180,000 Germans, with 95,000 Italians second. Obviously neither can carry much weight in a population of twenty-eight and a half million.

All over the country it is true that people today are better in-

formed about European problems than their forebears were a generation ago. The improvement is particularly marked in the South, where the illiteracy rate has lately been brought down to fairly respectable levels. It was considerably higher a quarter of a century ago, and was positively appalling in certain areas among both whites and Negroes. As a result of the wider diffusion of knowledge which has followed the development of the public school system, the newspapers now have a bigger, better-educated and more articulate audience than they enjoyed from 1914 to 1918. In addition, the radio provides a new medium of public information which did not exist at the time of the First World War. Another factor in the general improvement has been the development of university extension courses.

The South is no clearer than any other part of the United States as to precisely what it has to fear from the Axis Powers; but it wants to be ready for anything. Careful observation of the methods and aims of the predatory tyrants operating across the Atlantic has convinced the average citizen in the area we are discussing that this is no time for taking chances. He doesn't anticipate direct invasion of the United States in the near future. But he does feel that this country is heading for an inevitable clash with the Axis Powers in Latin America, a clash which may call for fast and decisive action in that theatre by the armed forces of the United States. He intends to take no nonsense from Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini below the Rio Grande.

For this reason sentiment in the South is overwhelmingly in favor of the fullest and most rapid rearmament program possible. It is also in favor of committing mayhem upon anyone who desires Uncle Sam to offer appeasement to Hitler and Mussolini. The Anglo-Saxon background of the region, to which I have already referred, is doubtless a partial explanation for its bellicose attitude toward the dictators. Another reason for its relative willingness to go to war against them may be found in the fact that its great heroes have usually been soldiers. The military tradition of the South has not only been kept alive in the sagas of its idols, but also in the training its youth receives at such schools as the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel. Then, too, there is the fact that despite the Old South's development of a slave society, the new South is conscious of the Virginia parentage of George Mason's immortal Bill of Rights, a document completely incompatible with totalitarianism.

THE NON–POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE

By Arthur Sweetser

THE anxious drama of the political and economic crises that have convulsed the world during the past twenty years has tended to detract attention from many of the more prosaic yet profound changes that have taken place in the organization of international life. For these changes the League of Nations, more than any other institution, has been responsible. The place which that institution deserves in the history of our time will doubtless be the subject of controversy for decades to come. Some students will feel that it was doomed to failure by the very form of its constitution or by its political environment; others that it might have succeeded if only certain events had turned out differently — if, for instance, the United States had not withdrawn at the start, or if the Allied Governments controlling its destinies had been more positive in conciliating Germany, or if the League Powers (with the United States) had been more firm in putting down aggression when it first occurred in Manchuria or Ethiopia, or finally, if the so-called Have-Not Powers had been content to wait till the operation of the natural forces of history had given them the new resources they desired.

But however widely opinion may differ concerning the accomplishments of the League as a whole, there is unanimity of judgment as to the value of its technical and non-political work. Unhappily, that work has been obscured by the more exciting events of postwar history. It is one of the lesser tragedies of this tragic period that few people know and appreciate the great progress which has been made on the humble level of what might be called the world's daily business. The League's own reverses, particularly in the Disarmament and Economic Conferences and in the Manchurian and Ethiopian disputes, have distracted attention from its solid but less conspicuous successes. This is the more regrettable because, by distorting our understanding of events since 1919, valuable clues as to what the future may hold in store for us have been concealed.

Any political institution is a reflection of the society from which it has sprung. The League is a particularly good example of this rule. Contrary to the picture often drawn of it, the League has

not lived a separate life of its own in a rarefied atmosphere detached from the world about it, but has been a very vivid expression of the period into which it was born. Its record is valuable both as an index of the stage which international life has at present attained, and as an augury of the course we may expect it to take in the future. That course cannot be mapped out by following theory alone; it must be based on actual experience, it must grow out of the daily life of nations.

The present moment is peculiarly auspicious for an appraisal of the League's non-political accomplishments. Chapter One of the League's history — a compact twenty-year period from the end of the First World War to the outbreak of the Second — has come to a sharp close. The great and varied work of international coöperation carried on at Geneva for two decades has been suspended. The conferences which had become almost daily events have for the time being ceased; the international staff has been drastically reduced; some of the technical services, beginning with the financial and economic, are being transferred to the United States on the joint invitation of three educational institutions at Princeton — the University, the Institute for Advanced Study and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.

At the same time, thinking people everywhere are taking stock of the assets that remain, for on these will be built the new organization of international coöperation that will inevitably rise when the present nightmare has passed. There can be no doubt that in the future there will be a need for more international coöperation than in the past, not only because the ravages of the present conflict will have to be repaired but because the world is growing constantly smaller. The advance of science is relentless; the needs of industry are pushing commerce ever farther afield in the search for specialized materials; the world's population is approaching the two and a quarter billion mark. In a word, the world's highways are becoming dangerously crowded, and the necessity for some kind of an international traffic system will thus be more indispensable than ever. After this war the greatest single problem confronting mankind will once again be — how can the world organize life so as to prevent another and even more calamitous disaster?

It is hence very important, at this moment of world-wide disruption and discouragement, to understand how great have been the advances made since 1919 in the field of technical and non-

political collaboration between nations. As Secretary of State Hull declared on February 2, 1939, "The League . . . has been responsible for the development of mutual exchange and discussion of ideas and methods to a greater extent and in more fields of humanitarian and scientific endeavor than any other organization in history. . . . The United States Government is keenly aware of the value of this type of general interchange and desires to see it extended." Upon a later occasion, President Roosevelt, when commenting on the creation of an American committee concerned with the League's technical activities, stated that "without in any way becoming involved in the political affairs of Europe, it has been the continuous policy of this Government for many years to coöperate in the world-wide technical and humanitarian activities of the League. Certain of them, indeed, are not only worthy but definitely essential. . . . However Governments may divide, human problems are common the world over, and we shall never realize peace until these common interests take precedence as the major work of civilization."

The tremendous growth of international coöperation that marked the period following 1919 was due more than anything else to the fact that the League provided a center where all international activities, particularly those of a technical and non-political nature, could concentrate and draw strength. For the first time in history there existed a central agency where the affairs of the world were constantly surveyed by specially created groups of experts who were provided with a meeting place, a staff and working funds. The significance of this humble and little appreciated fact cannot be exaggerated. Before the establishment of the League, a major diplomatic effort was required to assemble an international conference on any subject, even one of pressing importance; the great majority of questions were of such secondary interest that no attempt was even made to convene a meeting to consider them. With the coming of the League, delegations from all corners of the world met every year in the League's Assembly, under which were plenary committees: Legal, Social and Humanitarian, Financial and Economic, Political, and Disarmament. Any question not sufficiently urgent to call for a special conference could be taken in its stride by the appropriate Assembly committee.

A flexible and efficient mechanism existed for carrying out the work thus authorized. The League Council, a kind of executive

committee meeting quarterly, has been on hand to take administrative steps, such as appointing committees and fixing dates of meeting. The Secretariat, an international civil service of some seven hundred officials at its maximum, has been constantly available to collect information, prepare preliminary documentation, and provide for translations, the keeping of records and other secretarial work. Finally, a network of expert committees was built up, ranging over almost the entire field of international affairs. This system, as a system, was as nearly complete as it could reasonably be expected to be; that it did not succeed in its primary purpose of preventing another world war should not obscure its very real achievements in other less important fields.

Among the League's technical agencies the most highly developed is the Economic and Financial Organization, part of the work of which has recently been established in the United States. This organization, set up on the recommendation of the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920, afforded invaluable assistance to such important gatherings as the World Economic Conferences of Geneva (1927) and London (1933). Less well-known yet important activities included the sponsoring of many specialized conferences, in addition to a vast amount of unspectacular but highly useful day-to-day work. The principal agencies of the Organization are the Economic and Financial Committees, composed of experts who are often high-ranking government officials but who for the moment drop their official status in order to exchange views more freely. These two committees are served by the permanent staff of the Secretariat, assisted by specialized committees on subjects as diversified as double taxation, statistics, economic depressions, raw materials, demographic problems, and the gold standard. The result is a kind of specialized economic and financial league within the general League — one with which non-members, particularly the United States, have been closely associated. However far the world may have moved in the opposite direction from the liberal policies of free and unrestricted trade recommended by the League's experts, the fact remains that in the end these policies will prove to have been the right ones.

The foundation of the League's work in this almost unlimited field lies in its scientific publications. These, for the first time in history, afford a perspective of the world looking down from

above rather than the usual foreshortened view as seen horizontally from the window of a particular nation. The *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, the *Statistical Year Book*, *International Trade Statistics*, and *International Trade in Certain Raw Materials and Foodstuffs* have provided essential statistical information on the world's economic life. Other, more analytical publications such as the *Review of World Trade*, *World Production and Prices*, *Monetary Review*, and *Money and Banking*, have been widely used, particularly in the United States and Germany. Other more popular ones such as the *World Economic Survey* have been useful in giving a picture of world economy as a whole; while one specialized study has found its way into use as a college textbook. Though these publications do not claim to be the final word on their subjects, they have demonstrated a new and useful approach to world problems.

The various special committees set up in this field have also made definite, if modest, contributions to the cause of international economic organization. The Fiscal Committee has by years of effort perfected several model conventions on fiscal and double taxation problems which have been used as the basis for over a hundred bilateral treaties. The Committee of Statistical Experts, comprising some of the world's foremost statisticians, has evolved a series of standard forms which have already been widely adopted. The Committees on Raw Materials, Economic Depressions, Demographic Problems and the like have made, or are making, similarly valuable studies.

While most of this work has taken the form of analysis or recommendation, some of it has been given precise or even contractual expression. A number of international treaties have been drawn up dealing with subjects as varied as customs formalities, commercial arbitration, treatment of foreigners, counterfeiting of currency, bills of exchange, regulation of whaling, and veterinary problems. Though these agreements cover but a part of the field of international affairs, they constitute a useful contribution to the international law of economic and financial relations which would hardly have been possible without some such permanent agency as the League.

Mention should also be made of the reconstruction loans totalling something over $400,000,000 issued under League auspices on behalf of such countries as Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece. These loans undoubtedly saw Europe over a

serious crisis and demonstrated a method of international investigation and control far superior to the disastrous and unchecked loans which followed. The experience received from them offers useful suggestions for the large-scale financing which will doubtless follow the present conflict.

Then there is the League's work in communications and transit. This activity made a promising start at the Barcelona Conference in 1920, when a new international law of communications and transit was outlined and an autonomous agency was created, in which participation was later opened to non-member states on a basis of full equality. Its subsequent development did not, however, fully carry out the early promise, partly because it tended to follow the pathways of international conventions rather than of analytical studies, and partly because several of its most important aspects — such as posts, telegraph, telephone and aviation — were already entrusted to other bodies which were unwilling to pool their activities with the more general agency. Even so, the latter was able to demonstrate its value. Few travelers at sea today realize that the League's Transit Organization has been working for years on the standardization of buoyage and the lighting of coasts; still fewer automobilists in Europe, particularly in Germany, realize that the traffic signs on many roadways were given a standard form at League meetings.

In the field of health, the success of the League has been outstanding. Born during the dangerous emergency when typhus threatened Western Europe after the First World War, its work has been practical to a degree which ought to satisfy even the most cynical critic of international coöperation. It has operated on the principle that disease is no respecter of national frontiers. Two of its foremost officials have met death in its service, an American in Syria and a Dutchman in China.

The League's Health Organization, going far beyond any previous efforts in its field, has woven together a world-wide coöperative system embracing governments and individuals, institutions and foundations, hospitals and laboratories. Its work has been directed by a Health Committee consisting of the foremost authorities, often Ministers of Public Health serving unofficially, assisted by an expert permanent staff in the Secretariat, by a network of committees on special problems, and by an annual review on the part of the plenipotentiary delegates at the Assembly. It has thus been able to move fast and far, with

complete independence and impartiality and with full access to existing agencies for the protection and improvement of health. Its first task has been to prevent the spread of diseases. This has necessitated sending commissions to several points of danger, as to Poland in 1920 and Spain in 1937. Far more constant, however, has been the watch which it maintains against the outbreak of disease. These activities are centered in the Epidemiological Intelligence Service, which has an Eastern Bureau at Singapore and which operates a radio service embracing no less than 186 ports, working day and night, unseen and unsung, as a vital part of the world's health protection.

Not content merely to prevent disease, the League has sought to improve health facilities throughout the world. Probably not one person in a million, when treated with any of a score of different serums and pharmaceutical products, realizes that the "international" standard on which they are based and on which depends the patient's health, or even life, is in reality a League of Nations standard worked out with infinite patience by laboratories and experts coöperating all over the world. Still fewer are aware that League committees have studied malaria in London, Hamburg, Paris, Rome and Singapore, have even developed a wholly new drug, totaquina, which is far cheaper and quite as effective as quinine, or that they have organized a leprosy research institute in Brazil, or made comparative tests of syphilis treatment in many countries, or studied sleeping sickness in Africa and pellagra in the rural districts of Rumania. Here, indeed, unperceived by the public at large, has been a world coöperative campaign against man's most ancient and implacable enemy.

Another innovation has been the assistance which the League has afforded to individual governments for improving their own health services. For the first time in history, a nation in need of such assistance has been able to apply for it from an international association, without having to fear political complications. Almost from the start of the League, China has drawn heavily upon the advice and aid of its experts in caring for her colossal public health problem. Greece likewise received considerable assistance when reorganizing her health services in 1928. Various other nations have benefited, though less extensively. The League has also organized collective tours by which over 700 health officers from thirty-five different countries have been enabled to study medical methods abroad.

The most timely of all the League's health functions has perhaps been its work in the field of nutrition. Incidentally, this work clearly illustrates the cumulative method of League procedure and the interplay between different zones of interest and authority. The first embryo of this work may be found in an inquiry which the League carried out at the request of the Government of Japan into the food problems of that country. Shortly thereafter, the ravages of the depression led the Health Committee to set up a group of experts to study its specific effects on health. In its turn the International Labour Conference took steps to consider the effect of widespread malnutrition on the health of workers. It remained, however, for the Australian delegation to put the subject on a universal basis by proposing to a somewhat skeptical Assembly in 1935 that the League undertake a study of nutrition in all its aspects — health, social, economic and industrial. As a result, a Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition was set up, the personnel of which included agricultural, economic and health experts. Enlisting the aid of the Advisory Committee on Social Questions, the International Labour Office and the International Institute of Agriculture, it arrived at certain basic principles of nutrition which are embodied in its final report of 1937.

The subject continued to expand, however, and national committees have accordingly been set up in different countries, until there were over a score of them that have proved so effective that their representatives have twice been called into general conference at Geneva. Similarly, a regional approach to specific aspects of the problem has been made through conferences of government representatives. Out of all this study and consultation has evolved a scientific knowledge concerning foods and food values, a maximum and minimum standard of nutrition, a framework of policy for governments and health ministries, and an exposure of the unnecessarily low standards of nutrition prevalent throughout the world. To quote President Roosevelt again: "The world-wide efforts for better nutrition standards have already shown that the way towards solution of health problems may also be the way towards definite improvement of economic conditions."

Housing, commonly regarded as a very individual problem, is another subject in which the League has recently shown an interest. Here again, the subject has been approached from two

widely different angles. On one side, a group of health and building experts has, on the basis of the comparative experience of all countries, worked out certain fundamental, scientific requirements for air, heat, light, noise prevention, sanitation and other structural necessities. On another side, a group of financial experts has elaborated various methods for meeting the problem of financing. In the field of housing each nation has much to learn from the others, for where one has excelled in design, another has excelled in interior equipment, and still another in financing. Housing very definitely offers a field of comparative experience in which a free exchange of all available knowledge and techniques is urgently needed in order to aid the millions of ill-housed people in all lands.

It is in the sphere of drug control, however, that the League has most nearly approached direct international government. Before the First World War only timid attempts were made to reduce this terrible scourge. Since the creation of the League, however, these efforts have been accentuated until today they have culminated in the most advanced form of international administration so far accepted by sovereign nations. As in other fields, an Advisory Committee was created, which in this case was composed of government representatives. Its domain kept continually widening as the pursuit of the illegitimate drug producer and trafficker went ever farther afield. Special world conferences were called in 1924–25, 1931 and 1936; and new conventions, some of them the most widely ratified international agreements on record, were adopted. Control progressed step by step: first, over the international traffic by means of a universally adopted system of import and export certificates; next, over the manufacture of drugs by estimating world needs and bringing about a reduction in production; and then, over national administrations by imposing an embargo against offending nations. More recently, there has been drafted a Convention for limiting the production of raw materials. One group of League experts has authority to estimate what quantities of drugs should be manufactured; another surveys the traffic as it actually exists and as it is reported by the separate governments. In case the Convention is violated, this latter group, sitting as an impartial international tribunal, has the power to embargo further commerce in drugs with the offending nation. Never before have the nations given an international agency such wide authority. The results, however,

have been dramatically justified by the fifty percent reduction in morphine production between 1929 and 1932, the large reduction in heroin and cocaine production and the decrease in the number of drug addicts, *e.g.*, from 100,000 to 50,000 in the United States. This effort has, fortunately, called forth the coöperation of practically all nations, not only of former members like Germany and Italy, but more particularly of the United States, which has been a most militant participant from the beginning.

Such have been the principal technical and non-political activities of the League. Many others less conspicuous or less continuous exist in nearly all phases of international relations, but we need not examine them in detail, for the principles they involve have already been described. The only two we might mention in passing are the League's Child Welfare work and its committees on intellectual coöperation — both typical of the new and useful fields of international action which the League has opened up.

These multifarious activities have come to the League from very different sources. Some, such as opium control, health and the suppression of prostitution, were already in an embryonic stage before the First World War. Others, such as communications and transit, were given special stimulus in the peace treaties. Still others, such as parts of the economic and financial work, originated in plenipotentiary conferences which later entrusted to the League permanent duties that they were not equipped to continue. The great majority, however, represent new activities generated by discussion at the League itself.

As the historical origins of these activities have been different, so necessarily have been their legal bases. Some, though interwoven with the League, are firmly embedded in international convention or treaty, notably the opium work which has behind it the conventions of 1912, 1925, 1931 and 1936. Others are grounded in the League's organization itself, particularly its economic and financial work, which has developed through analysis and report rather than by juridical expression. Still others, such as the institutes of intellectual coöperation at Paris, cinematography at Rome, and leprosy at Rio de Janeiro, have been established as autonomous agencies associated with the League but having their own governing bodies and, unfortunately, as experience has shown, an ultimate dependence on the governments that give them hospitality.

The various activities have also manifested very different and

uneven rates of progress. Some have developed rapidly, others slowly, and often quite contrary to expectations. The speed has depended in part on the nature of the subject and in part on the energy with which it has been pursued. Where a government has taken a strong position, as the British on slavery or the American on opium, progress has tended to be rapid. Where there has been a resolute group of people interested in the question or where a tradition of activity has already been built up, as in the campaign against organized international prostitution, work has likewise gone ahead quickly. In some cases, notably as regards refugees or double taxation, energetic support from individuals has brought great progress. The League method has been simple, informal and receptive; a government or group desiring action could usually secure it unless the opposition was very determined. Very often hostility, if not irreconcilable, has contented itself with mere abstention; an indifferent majority has frequently allowed an energetic minority to have its way.

Any general evaluation of the League's non-political activities inevitably returns us to the point stressed at the beginning of this article: that by its mere existence the League has given an unprecedented stimulus to international coöperation. The very fact that there has been in operation a permanent agency with an annual Assembly, a quarterly Council, manifold committees, a permanent staff and an adequate budget, has made it possible for many international activities to catch the world's attention, receive a hearing, and be given whatever encouragement they deserved.

One of the little understood phenomena of this system has been the development of something which might almost be described as spontaneous combustion in generating new ideas and plans. Bring together the representatives of many nations and many viewpoints in periodic conferences, and the result is almost sure to be the formulation of ideas of the most unexpected sorts. No one would have predicted, for instance, that the most ambitious Press Conference ever convened would develop out of a curious Chilean complex; or that a world-wide campaign for better nutrition would find its origin in Japan and Australia; or that many other activities, in particular those concerning the suppression of the drug traffic and prostitution, would originate among Americans — whose government was not even a member of the League. The League has made it possible

for the world to tap its wealth of human experience, wisdom and leadership in a way heretofore impossible. Governments, organizations and individuals which in the past had often had considerable difficulty in discovering a forum in which to present their ideas have found in the League a hospitable medium.

Another important feature of the League method has been its flexibility. It has been able to work without undue haste or pressure, but with periodic revision and checking. It could proceed stage by stage — preliminary study in the Secretariat, more formal discussion in a group of experts, still more formal discussion in the Assembly, and finally full diplomatic action in a special conference. The League has been under none of that compelling urgency so prevalent before the First World War when things were either accomplished suddenly at *ad hoc* conferences or had to wait for years until, as in the case of the old Hague Conferences, public interest demanded the calling of a new meeting.

The League has also been able to carry on its work in a far more scientific and non-political spirit than had been possible in the past. This is well stated in the Report of the Special Committee on the Development of International Coöperation in Economic and Social Affairs (known as the Bruce Committee), which says:

> In the early days of the League, it was perhaps too often assumed that international coöperation necessarily implied international contractual obligations and that the success of such coöperation could be measured by the new obligations entered into. In certain fields, indeed, notably in the control of the drug traffic, and in numerous problems connected with the régime of international communications and transit — such methods have met with striking success and continue to be appropriate. But it is coming to be realised that many of the really vital problems, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to settlement by formal conferences and treaties — that the primary object of international coöperation should be rather mutual help than reciprocal contract — above all, the exchange of knowledge and of the fruits of experience.

This philosophy has introduced the expert into international life to an unprecedented degree. There, as elsewhere, the first necessity is to know the facts without fear or favor; once they have been ascertained, the action to be taken is often surprisingly clear and is generally accepted. It is when facts are but half-known, or are partially obscured by extraneous elements, that conflict is most likely to develop.

Another important and seldom appreciated advantage inherent

in a permanent international mechanism like the League is that it permits those working in one field of activity to cross professional lines and obtain assistance from those engaged in cognate fields. The Opium Committee, for instance, has frequently turned to the Health Committee for its judgment on certain drugs; the Nutrition Committee has drawn upon the Health, Economic and Labor Committees; the Child Welfare Committee has turned to the Cinematographic Institute; and so on around the circle. Interesting to note is the fact that the World Disarmament Conference examined the system of international drug control in search of ideas it might use for setting up a similar system of control over world armaments.

The League's twenty years of experience have brought out sources of weakness as well as of strength. First of all, this experience has shown that delegates at Geneva all too frequently vote a resolution only to have their governments fail to carry it out. This has often been interpreted as bad faith, but more likely it is merely a difference of tempo. At Geneva the delegates find themselves in a new atmosphere: as a result of free discussion they gradually come to accept the fairness of other viewpoints; this leads them slowly to modify their own ideas; and thus they eventually come to an agreement representing the greatest common good. The governments at home, however, feel these stimuli but faintly, for their outlook is limited by national interests and in the formulation of their policies they are particularly subject to local group pressures. One can readily understand, then, why there is often a gap between what a diplomat viewing the world as a whole recommends and what a local politician at home is willing to accept. How to narrow this gap is one of the great problems facing the future.

Another difficulty has been the tendency on the part of certain totalitarian governments to make no differentiation between the political and the non-political functions of the League. When Japan left the League, she continued for a while to coöperate in its non-political activities; subsequently, however, she severed her connections with all branches of the League's work. Similarly, when Germany and Italy withdrew, they left the League and all its works. The only exception was that Germany continued to participate in its opium control because this work had originated in a special treaty. It is worth mentioning that the United States, though not a member of the League, has pursued a gradually ex-

panding policy of selective coöperation, until today the American Government is widely represented in the League's technical work.

Another difficulty, this time one of organization rather than of politics, is that several specialized international agencies already in the field before the League's creation have guarded their independence so jealously that they have kept certain important activities from coming under League control. The situation has differed from case to case, but the principle has been substantially the same. The International Postal and Telegraphic Unions, for instance, remain almost without contact with the League; the International Institute of Agriculture has coöperated somewhat uncertainly; the Bank of International Settlements has been kept rather conspicuously apart from the League. The International Health Bureau has, on the contrary, become largely overshadowed by the League's Health Organization. It is true that during the present world upheaval these agencies have been able to maintain a sort of precarious life, whereas the League has seen its work badly crippled. But in normal times, their insistence upon a completely separate individuality often leads to conflicts and duplications of effort injurious alike to the international community as a whole and to the agencies themselves. Another problem to be faced after this war will therefore be to establish a greater degree of unity and coöperation among the various international bodies that render service to the world at large.

The record of the League of Nations in these past twenty years is neither all black nor all white. The League proved inadequate to avert the great catastrophe which many had hoped it might avert. Yet this failure cannot destroy the fact that the League experiment, during its first brief period of life, made appreciable contributions not only to the solution of day-to-day problems but even more to the opening up of new subjects and new methods from which we may derive inspiration and hope for the future. This experience has been deeply valuable, for it marks a phase in the slow transition of mankind from international anarchy to the world community.

THE BLITZKRIEG IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

By M. W. Fodor

"THE Germans are bound to attack in the late spring or early summer. They simply cannot wait until we and the British attain superiority in manpower and materials." It is the French Minister at the Hague speaking, the clever and charming Baron de Vitrolles, and the date of my conversation with him is January 1940. He continues: "Where will the battle be fought out? There are two traditional battlefields in Europe — Lombardy and Flanders. The second will be the scene of the big battle of the present war, just as it was of another great war — Waterloo. The Germans will attack via the Netherlands and Belgium and the decisive battle of this war will develop somewhere within a radius of fifty miles from Waterloo. It will be a war of movement. And in this kind of warfare we always have been superior to the Teutons." The Minister's words, except the last sentence, were almost prophetic. They showed that responsible French quarters knew that the attack on their country was bound to come and that it would come via the Low Countries.

Why did France and the Low Countries not do everything in their power to forestall the German move? The answer is a sad one. It is a tragic story of lack of statesmanship in Belgium and the Netherlands, where King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina refused to conclude an alliance with the Western Powers or to make military arrangements between the respective general staffs. It is a story, moreover, of incompetence, inefficiency and fifth column activities both in the Low Countries and in France.

For two years the Low Countries had been living in constant fear that their mighty neighbor, Nazi Germany, might launch a sudden attack against them and would start its advertised Blitzkrieg against France across their territories. Though this fear had existed for a long time, both Belgium and the Netherlands refused to make alliances or initiate staff talks with the Western Powers. And though they refused to make arrangements for the crisis, they expected these two Powers to help them when it came. As far back as the end of March 1939 the world press published alarming reports of Germany's intention to launch an attack against Switzerland and Holland. All the small neutrals

felt it necessary to take certain military precautions. Then in August 1939 the war clouds started to gather in earnest. Again the small countries were compelled to effect precautionary measures. Both Holland and Belgium took for granted that if war should break out over Danzig, the Western Powers would try to help Poland by moving against Germany; whereupon Germany, to counteract this move, would launch her motorized divisions into the Low Countries with a view to pushing through into Northern France. Now Belgium had been constructing considerable defense works ever since 1931. As the threat of war became more imminent she increased the pace. Holland, owing to Socialist and other pacifist influences and a long tradition of neutrality, had considerably neglected her defenses. Yet she also started to develop fortifications and defense works, coupled with inundation preparations.

When I arrived in Holland in October 1939 there were persistent rumors, based on the concentration of forty Nazi divisions opposite the Low Countries, of an imminent German attack. At the beginning of November the situation became so tense that King Leopold, tipped off by German friends, rushed to The Hague to see Queen Wilhelmina in the hope that the two countries might avoid an invasion by making a conciliatory offer to Berlin jointly. The meeting of the two rulers took place on November 6. The next day steel-helmeted police, armed with carbines and revolvers, suddenly appeared around all public buildings in Dutch cities. Today we know that the Dutch Nazis had organized a putsch for November 11. But the authorities discovered the plan in time and arrested many Nazis, among them several score officers and soldiers. Furthermore, the head of the British secret service, Captain Stevens, and his assistant, Sigismund Payne Best, were kidnapped on November 9 by the Gestapo at a Dutch frontier village, Venloo. The next day the German troop concentrations were augmented. Holland mobilized all her forces in readiness to repel what seemed an imminent attack.

While I realized the seriousness of the situation, I was of the opinion at that time that this German move was partly a measure of intimidation, but that most of all it was tactical. One of the probable purposes of the German feint seemed to me to find out how Belgium and Holland would act in case a Blitz attack really occurred; but more than that, its purpose was to find out what the French and the British would do.

If this was the aim of the Germans they succeeded in attaining it. In November of last year they knew exactly where and when the Dutch were going to flood their territories and what regiments would be rushed where. They knew how quickly the first line of the Dutch defenses could be manned in a crisis. The same occurred in Belgium. This was the information the Germans needed to enable them to calculate the moves of their own army so as always to be hours — or even only a few minutes — ahead of the respective defensive moves of their opponents.

The Germans also learned through their spies about the movements of the French and British troops along the extension of the Maginot Line. They came to the conclusion that the French and British could not send help fast enough to Belgium and the Netherlands to be effective if no special arrangements had been concluded in advance between those four countries. They also wanted to find out whether the Allies were going to rush important air forces to Holland. From their knowledge of Allied dispositions in the November 1939 crisis in the Low Countries the German Staff came to the conclusion that neither Holland nor Belgium could count on really substantial aërial help from Britain, and that almost none would come from France.

Nevertheless, there were factors in both the Dutch and the Belgian defense moves — the Belgian especially — which necessitated certain alterations in the original Blitzkrieg plans. The Germans noticed that Belgium had been feverishly improving her defenses along the Albert Canal. Yet the German plan was to launch the first blow at exactly the same spot as in August 1914. It was a return to the original Schlieffen Plan, which did not make the 1914 mistake of leaving out Holland. In 1914 the first Uhlans crossed the Meuse south of Visé; in 1940 the German motorized divisions crossed the river north of Visé, only a few miles distant. "On revient toujours à son premier amour."

But before actually launching their blow the Germans wanted to make a further rehearsal which would also serve the purpose of attracting the Belgians' attention to a part of their defenses where the Germans had no intention of attacking. For this purpose an "incident" was shrewdly staged. An airplane with two German staff majors landed near the Belgian frontier, allegedly because of lack of gas. In the plane were found the plans of an impending attack, presumably scheduled for January 13, 1940. According to these plans the Germans contemplated piercing the

Belgian defense lines between Andenne and Huy on the Meuse River. The subterfuge worked. The Belgians now started feverishly to fortify their positions in that sector, diverting their attention from the Lower Meuse and the Albert Canal where four months later the decisive German attack was actually launched.

After this second *alerte* in Belgium in January 1940, came a third at the beginning of April. It, too, turned out to be another feint, this time designed to divert attention from the German movement of troops in preparation for the attack against Denmark and Norway. Two days afterwards that attack took place. The *alerte* of January 1940 had already caused Belgium to take a further step towards completing her mobilization. The Belgian mobilization consisted of five phases, of which "D" was the last. By it virtually all men who could carry arms or were experts were mobilized. Belgium had now put phase "D" into operation. In April Holland also took further mobilization measures and continued feverishly working on her defenses.

Hardly had the excitement caused by the start of the Norwegian campaign died down when it was renewed by fresh rumors of an impending attack on the Low Countries. It became known that the Germans had constructed concrete piers in the Moselle and Sauer Rivers opposite Wasserbillig and Echternach (both in Luxembourg), and it seemed obvious that these piers were part of a construction by which German tanks were to ford the two rivers. The fright in the city of Luxembourg reached such proportions that many persons fled into neighboring Belgium. There also were great German troop movements which obviously were intended to intimidate the Netherlands and Belgium. Along the whole stretch of German frontier from the North Sea down to the Saar — that is, facing the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg — the Germans had by then concentrated eighty divisions (including, as I said above, fourteen of their seventeen motorized divisions). About May 6 there was every evidence that the German attack was soon to be launched. All leaves in the Dutch and Belgian Armies were stopped and for three nights Dutch patrols had to stay constantly in their foremost defense positions in a state of complete readiness.

May 9 apparently brought some alleviation of the strain. Military circles in Brussels became convinced that the attack was postponed, at least for a few days. Why did the Belgian General Staff think the Germans had postponed the date of the

attack? According to a semi-official Belgian explanation, the relaxation of tension came from the fact that several of the German motorized divisions were known to have been moved away from the district of Aix-la-Chapelle. (Where they were taken was not then known. We found out later that they had been moved overnight to positions opposite Luxembourg!) The fifth column in Belgium helped to emphasize this "change for the better" by talking about the new disposition of the German tank corps. Some of my Belgian friends have openly said that members of the Belgian General Staff must have been, knowingly or unknowingly, tools of the German secret service. At any rate, they accepted the illusion of a *détente* to such a degree that on May 9 leaves were restored in the Belgian Army.

Only a few hours later the truth was known. About 4:30 A.M., when dawn was just breaking, more than a hundred German bombing planes appeared over Brussels and discharged their deadly cargoes. At the same time an attack was launched against the frontiers of the three Low Countries from the North Sea to the Saar. But the brunt of the attack was directed at two points: against the undefended small Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and against the Maastricht "appendix." The old Schlieffen Plan! The chief attack did not come where the Germans feigned it was coming in January, namely between Namur and Liège on the Meuse, but on the Meuse above Liège and on the Albert Canal.

Undoubtedly the Germans knew that this Maastricht corner was probably the weakest spot in the Albert Canal defenses. They had laid their plans well to subdue it. The bridge on the Meuse (Maas) at Maastricht, in Dutch territory, fell into their hands through treason. The bridge across the Albert Canal which continued the railroad and highway coming from this Maastricht bridge was also of great strategical importance. It fell to them intact. The Belgians alleged that the officer in charge of the dynamite chamber was killed by a German aërial bomb, and thus was unable to carry out the blowing up of the bridge. The Germans openly boast that they bought the whole group which was to blow up the bridge. As a matter of fact, much the same thing happened twenty miles to the northwest, where another important bridge on the Albert Canal was not blown up. It is given as an extenuating circumstance that this bridge was full of refugees and that the officers were hesitant to blow up their own compatriots. This may or may not be true. But if it is true, then

their hesitation contributed heavily to bring about the downfall of their whole country.

Another bad case was that of the fortress Eben Emael. This formidable group of strong forts was one of the strongest parts of the Liège system. That system consisted of the Liège fortress proper and of the four other fortresses of the Liège plateau: Neufchâteau, Pepinster, Battice and Eben Emael. Battice was the mighty fort which dominated Aix-la-Chapelle; Eben Emael's function was to rule the road from Aix-la-Chapelle to Maastricht and beyond. It was put out of action by the Germans as early as noon on the very first day of the campaign, May 10.

According to the Belgian semi-official version, Eben Emael was taken so soon because the Germans concentrated all their surprise technique on it — an extraordinarily violent barrage of heavy guns and vigorous aërial bombardment, in combination with an attack by parachutists. Now it is true that this sudden onslaught on a garrison not yet tried in war must have confused the defenders; but Eben Emael consisted of a whole series of forts and pillboxes. The Germans made similar extremely heavy attacks on other fortresses in the Liège district, and these fortresses were still holding out five and six days later. Why did the strongest and most modern of them all surrender so quickly? One cannot help feeling that what was believed by some military attachés must have been true, namely that Flemish traitors contributed to the result.

The capture of the key fortress of Eben Emael and of three bridges on the Meuse and the Albert Canal opened the way to the German motorized columns. When I visited the Albert Canal defenses in April of this year, Belgian staff officers told me that they calculated these defenses could hold out for twenty days. Other more conservative foreign observers believed that the Belgians would be able to hold on at the Albert Canal for at least five days. Five days were considered enough to bring French and British troops up to the second line, Antwerp-Louvain-Namur. On the very first day of the German invasion, the Germans had succeeded in piercing the defense line which was expected to hold out anywhere from several days to several weeks.

While German motorized troops were pouring into Belgium through the gap thus created, German bombing planes (allegedly numbering about two thousand, and in any event many hundreds strong) were busy all the morning bombing the remaining Belgian

positions between Hasselt and Liège, as well as the rest of the Belgian lines. It seems that the material damage caused by these German bombers was small in proportion to the numbers used, but the moral effect was devastating. According to Belgian officers who participated in the last war, the air bombardments of this year were not nearly so deadly and efficient as the old heavy-artillery barrages used to be. But German propaganda succeeded in all countries in creating such a psychosis about aërial bombardments that when the deadly cargoes of the bombing planes were released on the Belgian troops their morale completely collapsed; and by the afternoon of May 10 the Belgian line between Hasselt and Liège was already in dissolution. This bombardment was carried through with the evident aim of spreading fear. According to what I learned from Belgian officers, many of the German flyers were quite young and had only had from four to eight weeks of training. Their machines were inferior. All this was by design. The Germans did not think it necessary to sacrifice good machines to spread "frightfulness." Any young aviator who knew how to fly in formation and had been taught how to release bombs was good enough; there was no need for dive bombing or even for flying low. It was different with the airplanes sent to bomb Brussels or military objectives behind the lines. Those were excellent Heinkels or Dorniers, with highly trained crews.

When I visited the eastern suburbs of Brussels in the morning of May 11 I found to my great amazement that they were filled with Belgian soldiers, in full equipment, already back from the front. They were surrounded by anxious crowds inquiring what had happened. They told of a complete débâcle. In exaggerating the magnitude of the German attack they helped create further uneasiness amongst the Brussels population, already panicky as a result of the constant bombardment of the city by German planes. Soon the streets of Brussels itself were full of returning soldiers, mixed with refugees coming from northeastern Belgium. I saw trucks bearing the inscriptions of various cities — Liège, Verviers, Tongres. Three Belgian divisions were in complete dissolution, and others had been badly affected by desertions.

What I saw on this the second day of the totalitarian war in Brussels was a replica of the débâcle of the Italian Army described by Ernest Hemingway in his book "Farewell to Arms." It was another Caporetto. Half-hearted attempts were made to collect the demoralized troops and reform them at the "Cinquan-

tenaire" exhibition grounds. The effort was in vain. Most of them continued their hasty retreat and I encountered some of them again a few weeks later in southern France.

A remaining section of the Belgian Army tried to reorganize on the second line of defense, namely on the line Antwerp-Louvain-Namur. By May 12 two British divisions and some French troops had arrived on this line and tried to bolster up the badly shattered Belgian forces. Though many of the British were unexperienced territorials, they fought bravely against heavy German odds, standing up heroically under the devastating mass-bombardments of the German airplanes. British fighting planes were still absent, or present in very small numbers. The Germans were able to bomb the British troops unpunished.

On this day, May 12, the Germans repeated their technique of the first day, sending an incredibly large number of planes (arriving in groups of 300 every half hour) to bomb the Belgian-British positions between Louvain and Namur. The bombardment along the center of the line was done by inexperienced flyers who loosed bombs in masses just to terrorize; but on the two wings expert bombers were working on the two fortress cities of Namur and Louvain. Within a few hours they were reduced to smouldering ruins. The destruction of Louvain and Namur, and the partial destruction of Antwerp, deprived the British of important pivotal points; for by the time larger numbers of British troops reached these places there were no depots, stores or billets left. This made their continued defense almost impossible.

At this juncture an important question of responsibility must be raised. The débâcle of the Belgian Army in the northeast during the very first hours of the war must have been known to the British and French General Staffs. What a newspaper man like myself knew in the first 48 hours, British and French military observers must certainly have known too. Why was no urgent warning issued to dissuade the respective staffs from sending further troops into positions which were bound to prove traps? Or if such a warning was issued, why was it not heeded?

This is a question of judgment and responsibility in the field. The underlying responsibility rests largely with King Leopold as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian armies. It is almost impossible to send troops suddenly into a foreign country to assist an untried army efficiently if no previous plan has been concluded between the respective general staffs. King Leopold had abso-

lutely refused to conclude such an agreement. It was the death blow to his country. Even so, when the British heard (and they must have heard it, despite the optimistic reports sent out by the Belgian Army) that the Belgian troops had experienced a Caporetto on the Albert Canal, they should have desisted from sending further reinforcements into Belgium. Had they rested in their fortifications which formed an extension of the Maginot Line, they might have withstood the German attack with a fair chance of success. I believe (and some military experts share this view) that resistance was possible on the extension of the Maginot Line, despite the gap made by the Germans near Sedan. But let us now turn our attention to the southern part of the Belgian lines.

While the divisions of the British Army were extremely quick in reaching eastern Belgium, the French Army organization failed completely in getting its reinforcements fast enough to those places in Belgium which, according to the plans of the French General Staff, were to be protected by French troops. The British calculation had been that it would take them five days to reach the Louvain-Namur line; many British troops, however, reached this line on the second day. The French calculated that they could take over the Namur-Givet line within 48 hours; but after that period had passed they still were far from their positions.

Before examining what happened south of Namur, we must make an excursion to the Ardennes part of Belgium, a hilly, rough country, broken by many woods and rivers. This part was fortified by a system of pillboxes and small forts. At the beginning of the Blitzkrieg the Germans did not concentrate their attack on the Ardennes. Instead, they rushed their troops into undefended Luxembourg. The Luxembourg Army consisted of 156 men and the city was already full of German fifth columnists disguised as tourists. But everybody in Brussels believed that the French could launch their divisions into undefended Luxembourg just as quickly as the Germans could. In actual fact, the Germans succeeded in occupying almost the entire Grand Duchy within a few hours without meeting any serious resistance from the French. And when Luxembourg had been occupied, the Germans were able to rush their troops into southeastern Belgium. With their artillery they mowed down the first defenses. Instantly, German motorcyclist troops rushed cross-country into the Belgian Ardennes at a speed of sixty miles an hour. The motorcyclists did not wait to attack the pillboxes. That was left for the tanks

that followed. These passed the pillboxes and attacked them from the rear. The Ardennes was thus occupied within 48 hours. This done, the German motorized troops were able to proceed to the attack on the upper reaches of the Meuse, south of Namur.

It had been calculated, as I said above, that the French could take over the Belgian section of the Meuse between Namur and Givet within two days. Here happened the other tragedy of the war: the folding up of the French Ninth Army. It was this army, under the command of General Corap, which was supposed to take up the positions between Namur and Givet. Ever since the beginning of May extreme vigilance had been ordered along all the Allied fronts. Yet General Corap was absent from his headquarters when the war began and arrived back only some hours later. Six bridges on the Meuse were not blown up. By May 12 the whole Ninth Army was supposed to have taken over the defense of the Meuse below Namur. But only fractions of it had arrived. Over the unblown bridges, German motorized troops were pouring into France. No doubt, the German effort near Sedan was carried through with a large number of motorized divisions. But where were the French tanks? Where were the French troops, the French artillery, the French anti-tank guns? Is it any wonder that the word "treason" was spoken openly among the rank and file? And it either was treason or unforgivable incompetence. For General Corap and his staff failed absolutely to carry through a plan drafted and calculated in minute detail by the experts in Paris. It is true that there proved to be much inefficiency in the French Army. There also was a surprise element in the German attack. Granted. But there is no excuse for six unblown bridges, for troops far behind their schedule, for artillery unused.

Whatever the reason, on May 12 the German armored and motorized divisions were pouring into France. In a few hours the breach was fifty miles wide and almost as deep. Tanks, spreading fire and destruction, supported by airplanes with which they were connected by radio contact, were rapidly advancing. The task of bringing up French reinforcements was being impeded by the desperate flight of refugees from the invaded districts. German fifth columnists had been planted in advance in the border regions to induce panic. Others mingled with the refugees and carried the alarm from one town and village to the next.

Nevertheless, I still maintain that this breach between Dinant

and Sedan could have been filled up (just as the breach at Verdun in the March offensive in 1918 was filled up) if there had been a firm and continuous front along the Belgian-French border. But this front was in movement, because large numbers of British troops were still pouring into Flanders, not realizing that their right flank was in danger. On May 15 the French evacuated Namur, and on May 16 the British fell back on Brussels.

We heard the sound of the heavy guns in Brussels, and saw more and more British troops coming in to the defense of the Belgian capital. By that time the Seventh French Army, which had been sent to operate in the Zeeland part of Holland, was obliged to withdraw to Antwerp. Its able commander, General Giraud, was later captured by the Germans.

On May 17 I left Brussels, which now was in the war zone. The same day the British troops fell back to the Dendre River, a day later to the Scheldt River, where they offered heroic resistance. Only on May 20 did they give up their positions on the Scheldt. They then fell back on the Lys, the river where they fought so well 23 and 22 years ago. Their subsequent retreat and evacuation via Dunkerque is too well known to need description here.

While the British put up a magnificent fight, the behavior of the French divisions was irregular. Though some disappointed the friends of France, others upheld the best French traditions, and one heard of decimated regiments and companies offering resistance over and over again to the invaders. But nobody could make good the mistake committed by the British and French General Staffs in unwisely sending their troops too far into Belgium, and nothing could repair the Belgian catastrophe on the Meuse in the first hours of the campaign.

Let me now revert briefly to the causes of the defeat of the Netherland Army. The Dutch, unlike the Belgians, fought really heroically. When in February of this year I visited the Dutch defenses, one of the high officers told me confidentially that the Dutch expected to hold out two days on the first line, two days on the second — the Grebbe Line — and that altogether they hoped to resist the attacker for six or seven days. They kept the "time-table" in the first five days (except only at Maastricht) and capitulated only after the fifth. By that time fifth column activities had weakened their resistance, especially in the rear, and no more supplies could reach the fighting forces.

The fifth column in Holland was organized in part directly by

the Germans, in part by the Dutch Nazis under the leadership of A. Mussert and Rost van Tonningen working with the Germans. Mussert was a man of small abilities; the deputy leader, Rost van Tonningen, formerly League of Nations Commissioner for Austria, was an ambitious and more able man who coöperated very closely with Baron von Hahn, an official of the German Legation in The Hague.

Baron von Hahn was the "putsch expert" of the German Nazis. He had fled from Austria after helping to organize the putsch which ended Chancellor Dollfuss's life. He was asked to leave his posts in Hungary and Belgium, but the unfortunate Dutch Government allowed him to be installed as a member of the German Legation at The Hague. There he exploited to the full the pacifism of the ruling house and of the ruling class. Queen Wilhelmina's pacifism made her sympathize with the Oxford Movement. The representative of that movement for Scandinavia and Holland — an American, the Reverend Mr. Blake — was not only popular in high society in The Hague, but was seen in company with Baron von Hahn. Another and unsuspecting link between the Nazis and Dutch higher circles was Prince Bernhard, a good friend of the German Minister, Herr von Zech.

In all, the German Legation in The Hague had 43 members entitled to extraterritorial privileges, five of them with the rank of counsellors. In addition, there were the staffs of the German consulates in The Hague and other Dutch towns. In these headquarters the plans for fifth column activities were made and from them the various orders were distributed. In addition, the Germans had able journalists to help in their propaganda work. To The Hague they sent Herr Aschmann, the former Chief of the Press Bureau in the Wilhelmstrasse; and the present German press chief, Dr. Dietrich, repeatedly visited Amsterdam.

The Dutch Nazis had their "representatives" in the army, navy, air force, meteorological institute, as well as here and there throughout the government offices; in addition fifth columnists in large numbers were supplied direct from Germany in the form of tourists and businessmen. Some of these were actually camouflaged soldiers. Thus, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities three large Rhine barges arrived in Rotterdam, supposedly laden with German goods. In reality they contained German soldiers who on the morning of May 10 spread out to undertake various assigned jobs in the city. These first troops were soon reinforced

by Nazi officers and non-commissioned officers arriving on transport planes. In coöperation with parachutists and Dutch Nazi fifth columnists they captured a section of Rotterdam and the aerodrome of Waalhaven. Desperate attempts were made by the Dutch, and later by the British, to take Waalhaven back. But even with the help of the R.A.F. they never succeeded.

In Belgium, where the fifth column was not organized on the same scale as in the Netherlands, many parachutists were shot down descending from the air; the few who landed unnoticed in woods during the cover of the night proved no more dangerous than fifth columnists already present in the country. After all, resident fifth columnists can destroy railroad junctions and stores and put communications out of order even more effectively than parachutists. The parachutists become deadly when they can be advertised to such an extent that they create a psychosis. In Brussels and other Belgian towns I saw people shouting "parachutists" at a swallow, and the police and soldiers would have to abandon important jobs to scour the neighborhood.

Nor were the Germans particularly successful with their troop transport planes in the Netherlands except in cases where they managed to land on an uncontested flying field with fifth columnists ready in the neighborhood to help. Many of the Junker troop-transports, very bulky and heavy, were wrecked by anti-aircraft gunfire or by mishaps in landing on the soft Dutch soil.

The causes of the German successes in the Netherlands, as in Belgium and Northern France, were partly superiority in numbers of planes and tanks, partly better armament, such as double-breasted armorplate on tanks and rapid fire large-caliber anti-tank guns. But all this, I believe, would not have availed them had they not already enlisted other allies — incompetence, treason and fifth column sympathizers.

Back of these immediate factors was, in the case of Holland, the one I have mentioned already — the fact that the De Geer government always followed a policy of absolute, consistent and blind neutrality. It refused to treat on military and political matters, not only with England and France, but even with Belgium.

In Belgium the methods employed by the Germans were similar. They aimed at undermining civil government and at creating unrest in the army and air force as well as among the police. They also promoted pacifism. King Leopold was a weak and sentimental man, affected by a melancholy strain inherited from

both his father and his mother. His mother's Bavarian family had produced many gifted but abnormal people, among them Louis II of Bavaria and the Empress Elisabeth of Austria. He also disliked the English intensely. During the World War he was an exile in England, and it is an accepted axiom that a foreigner learns either to love or to hate England in an English public school. Leopold was not a success in his school days, and never got over it. The friendship of a brilliant German lady also helped to increase his pro-German sympathies. So did the advice of General van Overstraeten, his aide-de-camp, who always counselled him to blind "neutrality." The Roman Catholic Premier, Hubert Pierlot, and the Socialist Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, were definitely pacifists. Both also opposed military understandings with Britain and France. They fought with all the means at their disposal to maintain Belgian neutrality. This suited the Germans perfectly.

All these currents of pacifism were of course exploited by German agents. Otto Abetz, the well-known German agent who had such a part in influencing various French politicians and is now Hitler's diplomatic representative in France, was very active in Belgium also, both in spreading propaganda and in distributing funds. At the outbreak of the war, Abetz went back to Berlin to become the head of the propaganda section against France. His colleague, Liebe, then took over the "management" of German propaganda in Belgium. The Germans also naturally used the pro-Nazi elements among the German minorities in Eupen, Malmédy and St. Vith. They exploited to the full the divergences between the Flemish and the Walloon populations, and gave moral and financial support to the Flemish extremists, the "V.N.V." under the leadership of Declerq, as well as to the French-language Fascist movement of the Rexists, led by Léon Degrelle.

If in the case of both countries I have seemed to overemphasize the rôle of enemy agents and domestic sympathizers and pawns, this is because their activities were better organized than in other wars in modern times and because they were so astoundingly successful. I do not underestimate the other factors. I only say that the organizing skill and lavish expenditures of Nazi Germany's agents contributed directly to the defeat of the Netherlands, Belgium and, subsequently, France.

MEXICO SHIFTS HER FOREIGN POLICY

By Maurice Halperin

THE election of July 7, considered for months in advance as likely to be a turning point in Mexican affairs, undoubtedly deserves to be recorded as an event of singular importance, if only because it was both the freest and the most bitterly contested that had been held in that country for over a quarter of a century. Indeed, the violence of political rivalry which has marked the aftermath of the election bears witness to the intensity of the emotions and convictions which it brought into play. Nevertheless, in another and perhaps more significant sense, history may well refer to this consultation of the electorate as something of an anti-climax. Nearly a month before, the Mexican Government had already made what amounted to a declaration of policy, of which the full consequences cannot yet be determined but which disposed, at least for the time being, of the most acute issue of the day — the possibility of armed insurrection by the opposition candidate for the presidency, General Juan Andreu Almazán.

On June 11, the publishers of the metropolitan press of Mexico City were convoked by Señor García Téllez, Minister of the Interior and ranking member of the Mexican Cabinet. With considerable solemnity, he informed them that President Cárdenas had just sent the following cablegram to President Lebrun of France: "I wish to inform Your Excellency of the painful impression upon my Government caused by Italy's declaration of war against the great French people, which has traditionally been the spokesman of human liberties and the rights of man, as well as of international morality. I reiterate my best wishes for the prosperity of the French people and for the personal well being of Your Excellency."

Taken at its face value, this communication was merely Mexico's customary expression of sympathy for a victim of aggression — Italy having taken the initiative in declaring war on France. But viewed in relation to the trend of Mexican foreign policy since the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the message of President Cárdenas was of the utmost significance. In effect it marked a sharp reorientation in Mexico's attitude to the international situation created by the war. In other words, on June

11 Mexico entered a period of closer coöperation with the United States and, as a consequence, of partiality toward Britain in her struggle against Germany.

To be sure, the possibility that such a declaration might be made had been indicated by such straws in the wind as: the Government's agreement with the Sinclair oil interests, officially announced on May 8; the remarks of the official Mexican delegate to the International Petroleum Exposition at Tulsa, Oklahoma, whom the press on May 18 quoted as saying that Mexico "would probably follow the United States' attitude in the war;" and General Ávila Camacho's campaign speech delivered at Nogales, Sonora, on June 9, in which for the first time the candidate of the Party of the Mexican Revolution, now President-elect of Mexico, linked together "Fascists and Communists" as elements which "might pretend to initiate a movement against our democratic principles" — this despite the fact that the Communist Party (of only slight influence in Mexican politics, it is true) supported his candidacy.

The immediate repercussions, both domestic and international, of the message to France indicate its crucial importance. At once the peso made a twenty percent gain in terms of the dollar, without any apparent economic justification; anti-Mexican feeling among American Congressmen and Senators abruptly subsided; the executive committee of the Confederation of Latin American Workers, in session in Mexico City from June 12 to 15 and presided over by Mexico's foremost labor leader, Lombardo Toledano, studiously avoided giving offense to the United States;[1] and the daily press of Mexico City, both Right and Left, redoubled its attacks against the Axis Powers. On June 13, officials confirmed the rumor that Arthur Dietrich, Press Attaché at the German legation and director of Nazi propaganda for a large part of Latin America, had been declared *persona non grata* by the Mexican Government. Shortly after, it was announced that a law for compulsory military training, the first in Mexico's history, would be introduced at a special session of Congress. Last but not least, it was very soon apparent that the turn in Mexican-Ameri-

[1] In September 1939, Lombardo Toledano made a very strong pro-Allied statement. In November, the National Council of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (C. T. M.), with the approval of Lombardo, officially condemned both of the warring groups, thus supporting Cárdenas. Lombardo, though at times differing sharply with the Communist Party of Mexico, has for several years been sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. At present, he reiterates that sympathy, though in other respects his foreign outlook continues to be essentially that of the Mexican Government.

can relations would mean the postponement, if not the collapse, of the long awaited rebellion, since it could not very well succeed as long as the Mexican Government had the confidence of Washington. Later events, including the Pan American Conference of Foreign Ministers at Havana, have indicated that the Cárdenas régime, and presumably the government over which President-elect Ávila Camacho will preside after December 1, at present enjoy that confidence. Nevertheless, the internal situation in Mexico — to say nothing of possible international developments — is fluid enough to make even a short-term prediction concerning the effectiveness and durability of Mexican-American coöperation a very hazardous undertaking.

II

A nation's geographic situation and natural resources are generally regarded as determining, to a large extent, its conduct in international affairs; yet in the last analysis they limit rather than create foreign policy. The really decisive factor is the internal social and economic organization of the nation. Thus Mexico, saddled from the very beginning of its history as an independent republic with a primitive agricultural socio-economic order has always had the foreign policy of a weak country attempting to maintain not only its political, but even more, its economic independence in a world dominated by powerful, expanding industrial nations — particularly the United States. In this sense, the Cárdenas régime has sustained Mexico's traditional foreign policy: a defense of national interests, not by force, which Mexico lacks, but by the maintenance of peace and international law and order. What has distinguished Mexican foreign policy under Cárdenas from that of all his predecessors is the energetic and effective manner with which he has carried it out.

We need review only briefly Mexico's participation in world affairs during the past six years to discover that never before has her attitude been so positive and her rôle so significant. As early as April 1935, Mexico participated at the League of Nations, in the condemnation of German rearmament as a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1936, during the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Mexico urged that sanctions against Italy include an oil embargo, and when in July of that year all sanctions were raised, the Mexican delegate, Narciso Bassols, not only indicated with

devastating logic the inevitable consequences of this act, but refused to be a party to it by withdrawing from the League Assembly.

Mexico's attitude toward the Spanish Civil War is too well known to need elaboration here. From the beginning Mexico insisted on the strict application of the rule of international law which clearly distinguishes between a legally recognized government and a rebellious faction. Mexico officially called the world's attention to the Italo-German invasion of Spain. Mexico shipped arms and munitions to the Spanish Republic from the very start of the war, and as early as June 1937 gave hospitality to five hundred Spanish children. Mexico was the only country, with the possible exception of Russia, to abide by international law to the extent of openly lending both diplomatic and military aid to the legal Spanish Government.

On March 19, 1938, the Mexican delegate at Geneva raised his voice against the invasion of Austria, and on several occasions, both before the League of Nations and at the Nine Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, Mexico asked that concrete measures be adopted against Japan for violating the integrity of China. Then again in purely American affairs, Mexico played an active rôle in building up continental solidarity on the basis of mutual respect and of the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the Inter-American Conference held at Buenos Aires in December 1936, at the Eighth Pan American Conference in Lima two years later, and at the Panama meeting in September and October 1939, Mexico vigorously upheld the principle of inter-American consultation, and by inference at least rejected any unilateral scheme of action such as the Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, the expropriation of the American and British oil companies in March 1938 provided the conclusive test for the Cárdenas foreign policy. Here it was not merely a question of maintaining certain principles of international conduct which did not directly affect Mexico's interests, but of applying these principles in the defense of her own sovereignty and in the face of great odds. No matter what other issues were involved in the petroleum conflict, in the eyes of the Mexican Government — and indeed in the eyes of the entire people, for never before had there been such a unanimity of opinion in the country's history — the fundamental issue at stake was the sovereignty of the nation.

In more ways than one, as will be indicated later, the expropria-

tion of the foreign oil companies was an act of far-reaching significance. One immediate result was that Mexico felt obliged to take the drastic step of breaking off diplomatic relations with Great Britain. There followed the exchange of a series of notes between the two countries in which England characterized the Mexican action as "arbitrary" and to which Mexico replied by citing its laws to the effect that foreign investors may not invoke the intervention of their governments under pain of forfeiture. Then on May 11, 1938, the British sent a brusquely worded memorandum demanding immediate payment of a small debt four months overdue. Not a word was said about the oil expropriation. Judging this to be a manœuvre to embarrass the Mexican Government, especially in view of the trifling sum in question (approximately 371,000 pesos), and provoked by the language of the note, Mexico paid the debt on May 13 and simultaneously withdrew her Minister from London. Comments in Mexico referring to Great Britain's failure to pay her own huge debts and her complacency toward the powerful transgressors of international morality indicated the depth of Mexican resentment.

III

From what has been said above, it must be clear that Mexico has conducted her foreign affairs during most of the Cárdenas era not only with unaccustomed vigor but also with remarkable consistency. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the very nature of the Cárdenas government itself. Ever since the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century, Mexican history has been characterized by a deep yearning, often translated into bitter and violent conflict, to throw off the social and economic heritage of Spain. When régimes opposed to the fulfillment of that yearning have held power, Mexican foreign policy has not only been ineffective in defending the country's interests, as in the case of the war with the United States in 1846–48, but has even gone to the extent of sacrificing national integrity, as during the period of the French intervention and Maximilian's unhappy empire.

The Revolution of 1910 was the most dramatic manifestation of that persistent drive toward social and national liberation. After ten years of bloodshed and destruction, it succeeded in establishing a stable legal basis for Mexico's peaceful evolution from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country to an economically independent, capitalist and democratic nation. Today, thirty

years after the beginning of the Revolution, its objectives are still short of achievement, though considerable progress has been made. Most of that progress has, in fact, been made during the past six years.

Since Mexico is primarily a semi-feudal, agricultural nation, the most reliable barometer of the advance of its Revolution is the extent to which land has been distributed among the peasants. During the Cárdenas period more than 47 million acres have been divided among over a million peasants, whereas less than 20 million acres were turned over to three-quarters of a million peasants during the previous two decades. As regards education, at the end of 1934, Mexico had some 7,500 primary schools; today they number 20,000. Other public services — such as the building of roads and dams, sanitation, child welfare — have improved correspondingly. When Cárdenas took office, trade unions were weak and ineffective, and labor legislation existed merely on paper. Today, the C. T. M. is a relatively well-organized body of both industrial and craft unions numbering close to a million members, and labor laws, including provisions for collective bargaining, are ordinarily enforced.

Whatever inefficiencies, errors or injustice the above figures conceal, they nevertheless indicate that the régime of President Cárdenas pushed the Mexican Revolution ahead more resolutely and at a faster tempo than ever before. In the light of these figures, his foreign policy takes on its true meaning: it is the logical extension of his domestic policy. However, what Cárdenas left undone must also be considered. Today, at least half of the peasants are still without land, and it is estimated that some 175 million acres, chiefly in the form of great plantations and cattle ranges, are still in the hands of about 10,000 proprietors. Also, despite the nationalization of oil production and of the republic's principal railroad lines, the greater portion of Mexican industry, such as mining, electric power, telephone service and the largest textile factories are still operated by foreign corporations. In short, even the Cárdenas régime has failed by a considerable margin to carry the Mexican Revolution through to its conclusion. Mexico remains basically a semi-colonial country.

That the arrested development of Mexico's Revolution has a profound bearing on the immediate international problems now confronting that country will presently be made clear. The causes which have determined its successes and failures are, of course,

enmeshed in an extremely complicated historical process. But one obvious factor has always played a preponderant rôle: the active resistance on the part of both domestic and foreign groups whose interests have come unavoidably into conflict with the advance of the Revolution. During the last two or three decades, the foreign resistance of greatest practical consequence has originated in the United States. American investments in Mexico amount to nearly one-half billion dollars, the largest of any foreign country, while the United States ordinarily accounts for almost two-thirds of Mexico's international trade.

How much the "Good Neighbor" policy of the Roosevelt Administration contributed to the success of the Cárdenas program would be difficult to estimate, though it is certain that the cordial relations between the two governments, at least during the first half of the Cárdenas term, played some part in strengthening the Mexican Government. It was during this period — on April 13, 1937 — that the United States agreed to cancel Article 8 of the Mexican-American (Gadsden) Treaty of 1853. The elimination of this provision, which granted the United States the free passage of goods, mails, troops and supplies across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, was primarily an act of courtesy by the American Government; but at the same time it enhanced the prestige of the Cárdenas government. After the expropriation of the American oil companies, these relations became less than cordial, a situation that was aggravated still further by the terrific pressure brought to bear against Mexico by the expropriated companies.

The exchange of diplomatic notes which grew out of the oil controversy and the contingent problem of compensation for agrarian expropriations, proved that, though some progress had been made towards establishing a permanent basis of understanding between the two countries, serious obstacles still existed. By conceding to Mexico the right to expropriate foreign property on its territory, the American Government gave concrete evidence of its desire to respect Mexican sovereignty. However, by urging immediate payment for the expropriated property, by calling for international arbitration, and by insisting that it would be a violation of fundamental human rights to expropriate any more property without having the means to pay for it, the American Government raised what in Mexican opinion is the real point of conflict: the desire of the foreign investor or property-owner to get preferential treatment over the native owner.

Thus, commenting on the American notes of July 21 and August 22, 1938, President Cárdenas made the following pointed remark in his annual message to the Mexican Congress on September 1 of that year: ". . . the case under discussion accentuates the bitter reality that weak states must ever be obliged to increase their precaution in respect to foreign investors, who even if they do produce benefits for the state, and often with fabulous profit, come to be an obstacle to the very conduct of affairs of that government. The Ibero-American countries have felt this, and if a positive value can be given to Pan Americanism, it must be attributed to the conquest of the principle that foreigners may not aspire to a privileged treatment in prejudice to that of [our own] nationals."

From this moment on, the Mexican Government was faced with the difficult task of defending its position and at the same time of dealing with Washington with the utmost tact. This task was immediately complicated both by an economic crisis — caused partly by the Anglo-American oil boycott and partly by the general business slump in the United States, Mexico's chief customer — and by the increasing pressure of the native elements opposed to the Cárdenas program. The latter consisted not merely of the traditional opponents of the Mexican Revolution — the feudal landlords, the high salaried employees of the large foreign companies, and those who move in their orbit — but merchants, professional people, factory owners and bankers, some of them closely connected with the Cárdenas government itself, who in their apprehension over the effects of the economic crisis and over the growing strength of labor began to call for a halt in the revolutionary program.

On the whole these conservative elements, in particular those of the traditional type, consistently opposed the entire Cárdenas program, foreign as well as domestic. Hence, almost the entire Mexican press, with the exception of *El Nacional*, the government organ, and *El Popular*, the C. T. M. daily, leaned toward the totalitarian Powers, favored General Franco in the Spanish Civil War, praised the Munich Agreement, criticized the Roosevelt Administration and often attacked "Yankee imperialism" (though usually with reservations in favor of the Republican Party in the United States). No better example as to how these sympathies worked out in practice was the ill-fated rebellion of General Cedillo in May 1938. Authentic documents reveal that

Cedillo was, for a time at least, in contact with Arthur Dietrich, Nazi official mentioned earlier in this article, and that he enjoyed the friendship of persons close to the expropriated oil companies.

IV

The attitude of the Mexican Government toward the early stages of the European War was most clearly defined by President Cárdenas in a public address delivered on September 17, 1939, in which he made the following statement: "In this supreme hour marked by events of transcendent significance for our country, as it confronts the outbreak of an international conflict between ambitious, unscrupulous and imperialistic interests, we must again reiterate our social credo which condemns war as an absurd instrument for the solution of difficulties which arise between nations. We continue in our faith that we shall some day see arise out of the action of the organized workers of the world an effective system which will put an end to the disaster caused by ambition, and will defend the liberties and the sovereignty of nations, [and] the maintenance of organic peace."

This declaration of neutrality came as a considerable surprise to those who had expected Mexico's long-standing anti-Fascist attitude to lead her into the Allied camp. Some circles, both within and outside the republic, assumed that Cárdenas, in taking this position, was influenced by the Soviets' definition of the war in similar terms. No one, to be sure, can judge the purely intellectual effect of the Russian point of view on Mexican political theory; but to explain the statement of President Cárdenas on September 17 as merely a reflection of Russian policy is to ignore Mexico's experience during the prewar years and the concrete realities which the country faced when the war broke out. Moreover, Mexico's official condemnation of the invasion of Finland, made at Geneva in December 1939, can hardly be imputed to Soviet pressure. Nor could the fact that there have been no diplomatic relations between the two countries since January 1930 be blamed on Communist influence. As for the Fascist Powers, the subversive activities which they, in alliance with native reactionary groups, had been carrying on in Mexico were assuming serious proportions. However, Mexico's antipathy towards the totalitarian states was balanced by her lack of confidence in the European democracies as the defenders of weak nations and the upholders of international law. In the case of Britain, this

lack of confidence turned into positive hostility at the time of the oil expropriations. Thus, Mexico considered that there was little choice as between the contending Powers.

Mexico had repeatedly declared her willingness to make substantial sacrifices in order to maintain international law and collective security. But as far back as the Italo-Ethiopian dispute she had realistically refused to take any unilateral action that might jeopardize her own welfare. She therefore continued to sell oil and other products to Germany, Italy and Japan, and when the Anglo-American boycott took effect, she did not hesitate to compensate for her losses by entering into extensive trade agreements with Germany. As a matter of fact, the export of Mexican petroleum, after dropping (in terms of United States currency) from $2,500,000 in February 1938 — the month previous to the expropriation — to $300,000 in the following April, had again reached the $2,000,000 mark by July 1939. This phenomenal recuperation, vitally important to Mexican economy, was almost entirely due to German purchases. Hence, for economic as well as political reasons, the Mexican Government preserved an attitude of strict impartiality toward the belligerent Powers — without at the same time restraining her repugnance toward the political philosophy of the Fascist states.

V

Even more confusing than the Government's attitude towards the war were the regroupings that took place among the forces opposed to the Cárdenas régime. This phenomenon was not, however, unexpected in view of the new situation created by the war. To begin with, the representatives of British and German interests who, despite their prewar rivalries, could present a common front against the radical tendencies of the Cárdenas government, now found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to preserve that common front. Furthermore, the pro-Allied neutrality of the United States, as well as the shift of emphasis by the Roosevelt Administration from a "New Deal" to a war economy, were factors of great consequence. With or without reason, the most influential body of Mexican conservatives believed that because of the importance of Mexican raw materials to American war industries, the policy of the United States would now require that a halt be put to the advance of the Mexican Revolution.

Take, for example, Pedro Zuloaga, a prominent reactionary, who previous to the war actively opposed Pan Americanism in favor of General Franco's anti-Yankee "Hispanism." Now, to the dismay of many of his associates in the Acción Nacional, like the well-known Gómez Marín, he is trying desperately to reconcile a newly found tolerance toward the United States with his friendship for the Spanish "Caudillo." Likewise, the artist and anti-Cárdenas political leader, Diego Rivera, who recently turned pro-American, was publicly condemned by a prewar collaborator, León Ossorio, President of the Party of Public Salvation, as a traitor to his country and an accomplice of "international Jewry." The latter epithet perhaps makes it needless to add that Señor Ossorio receives spiritual and political guidance from the German legation. The result of these splits and new allegiances has been that the Nazis, though as active and persistent as ever, have been laboring under serious disadvantages; by far the largest section of the anti-government forces was able to unite under the leadership of General Almazán, a recognized friend of the expropriated oil companies and therefore likely to be favorably regarded by Washington.

Meanwhile, Mexican exports to Europe declined abruptly after the outbreak of the war: the sale of petroleum, for example, amounted in December 1939 to only $740,000. With the tightening of the British blockade early in 1940, the Mexican trade situation became appreciably worse, reaching its low point in June when the Italian market disappeared. The resultant financial crisis stimulated even greater pressure on the part of the more conservative elements within the government in favor of "consolidating" the Revolution — that is, slowing down the distribution of land, reducing expenditures for public services and assuring greater protection for both native and foreign capital.

At the same time, Almazán began to acquire a certain mass following because of increasing unemployment, the unsatisfied land hunger of hundreds of thousands of peasants, the rising cost of living and the rapidly growing crisis in the nationalized oil industry (only partially relieved by the Sinclair settlement) and in the government-owned railways. Everything indicated that the expected Almazán rebellion would develop into a civil war of devastating proportions.

This likelihood was enhanced by the increasingly hostile tone of the American press and of members of the United States

Congress toward Mexico. Some Mexican political analysts were led to believe that the Almazán uprising would not only have the unofficial support of influential groups within the American Government, but would also be the signal for the occupation of strategic points on Mexican territory by American troops. Even more disturbing was the proposed Townsend amendment to the Silver Purchase Act. Whatever its ultimate purpose may have been, its effects would automatically have been to deal Mexico's faltering economy a staggering blow.

The reply of the Mexican Government to this conglomeration of pressure was, as we have seen, the shift in its foreign policy as symbolized by the cablegram of June 11. A large section of Mexican conservatives considered this as a happy omen despite the fact that it seriously damaged the strength of General Almazán. Fundamentally, these people have aimed not so much at seizing direct control of the state — though this is still an ambition of the conservative leaders — as at putting an end to the further progress of the Mexican Revolution. The instruments by which the Revolution is to be liquidated are relatively unimportant. If the promise of greater concessions to outside capital will secure the direct or indirect support of a foreign Power, then the anti-revolutionary forces stand ready, now as in the past, to pay the price. If, on the other hand, the opposition leaders can force the Government to do their bidding by a formidable display of force, they are prepared to revise their attitude toward it.

Thus, for example, in the July 1 issue of *El Economista*, authoritative organ of the ultra-conservative Institute of Economic and Social Studies, an editorial article entitled "Will the Government Change its Orientation?" boldly answers in the affirmative. "It appears," writes the editorialist, referring to the Cárdenas government, "that on account of the world situation, what has not been done through conviction, will be accomplished through the friendly suggestion of our 'Good Neighbor.' . . . *El Economista*, faithful to its program, must see in the government's change of front — even though it is not spontaneous — a favorable indication for the economic resurrection of the country. . . . However, in view of the fact that proof [of the economic resurrection] is not yet available, we hope that the future president will be the one to take charge, at the proper time, of the task of providing an impetus to the new orientation." The "Good Neighbor" is, of course, the United States. Also to be noted is the neutral term

"future president," which in view of the journal's political complexion indicates an extraordinary tolerance for the candidate of the Party of the Mexican Revolution.

These remarks in *El Economista* may be considered as characteristic of scores of similar comments which, with varying degrees of emphasis, have appeared in the conservative and reactionary press since June 11. Thus on June 14, *Hombre Libre*, staunch partisan of General Almazán and frequently cited as a source of information on Mexico by the publications of the Standard Oil Company, declared: "Almazán has not had to make special efforts to explain himself to the United States. His ideas on the position that Mexico must maintain in order to live with that country in a state of perfect harmony, were perfectly well known years ago, having been expressed at a time when there could be no suspicion that he was inspired by the opportunism of an electoral campaign. . . . Ávila Camacho . . . has suddenly conceived the desire of giving guarantees to the United States. . . . But who can trust General Ávila Camacho?" And so on, though sometimes more circumspectly, in *Excelsior*, *El Universal*, *La Prensa*, *Novedades* and other papers.

At the same time, it is also becoming increasingly clear that a stubborn and irreconcilable wing of the Almazán movement has now turned to the Nazis for support in carrying through the originally planned rebellion. Its friendly attitude toward the declarations of Colonel Lindbergh with respect to the war in Europe indicates that this group entertains some hope of sympathy even from the United States. However, prospects for a successful rebellion in Mexico are not very good just now.

The pro-government leaders and press — Ávila Camacho, Lombardo Toledano, *El Nacional*, *El Popular*, etc. — vociferously pledge that they will carry on the program of the Mexican Revolution without let-up, flatly contradicting the hopes and insinuations of their opponents. However, on the problem of American influence they keep a discreet silence. What does this silence mean? A firm belief in the benevolent intentions of Washington? An admission that their opponents have correctly estimated the situation? Or a tactic which will permit them to face events if and as they occur? The next few months will very likely provide the answer, but in the meantime both the clearly expressed attitude of the conservative opposition and the silence within the ranks of the Party of the Mexican Revolution point

with equal vehemence to what looms as one of the key factors in determining the immediate future of Mexico: the current Latin American policy of the United States.

VI

At the Havana Conference, Eduardo Suárez, Minister of Finance in the Cárdenas Cabinet, tactfully but nonetheless sharply posed the chief problem of Mexican-American and, indeed, of all Pan American coöperation. Speaking before the full assembly on July 22, Señor Suárez declared that "the economic development of the American republics can be accelerated by means of a broad and liberal policy of investments, prudently made, which would increase their production and raise their purchasing power. These investments, however, must not imply the threat of an imperialist absorption, thus becoming a grave danger for our institutions, since foreign capital not only must not turn into an obstacle for the country in which it operates, but must faithfully comply with its laws and be a powerful factor in the development of collaboration, understanding and mutual aid."

Señor Suárez thus reveals that the Mexican Government, while fully prepared to follow the lead of the United States in the military and economic defense of the Western Hemisphere, recognizes the danger which an "imperialist absorption" represents for Mexican economy. This danger, moreover, is difficult to overcome, for it is not the simple result of good or evil intentions but of impersonal factors such as the contrast between the highly developed economic organization of the United States and the backward agricultural economy of its southern neighbors, the severe strain which a decade of depression and a year of war have placed on all these countries, and the inevitable clash of interests that arise not only within but between these countries, as each seeks to find relief from the crisis.

In 1938, the United States absorbed 67 percent of Mexico's exports. In 1939, which included four war months, the proportion rose to 74 percent. In January 1940, after the British blockade became effective, 87 percent of Mexican exports went to the United States. Since then, and particularly since June, that percentage has probably increased, though exact figures are not yet available. Mexico must continue to export its raw materials; but she has only one customer, the United States. She must purchase machinery and manufactured products, but she can buy them

only from one seller, the United States. Mexico can no longer count on international competition to protect her foreign commerce against monopoly control. The United States can now determine more effectively than ever the prices Mexico must pay for her imports and the returns she may receive for her exports.

It is the unwritten law of any business that, if it is to prosper, it must "buy cheap and sell dear." Is American business, now in possession of a great advantage in the Mexican market, willing or able to modify that law? Will American industry, in view of its extraordinary power and responsibility for building up the defenses of two continents, refrain from seeking higher returns on its mining, electric power and other investments in Mexico? Can the guarantee of greater security which American capital in Mexico requires be reconciled with the desire of Mexican labor for higher wages, or with Mexico's need for higher taxes in order to fulfill the basic program of the Mexican Revolution? In defending both American and Mexican soil against the possibility of outside attack, can the United States at the same time protect Mexico's economic independence against the intensification of American loans and investments envisaged by present plans for inter-American economic coöperation? These are some of the as yet unanswered questions and problems which, in effect, Señor Suárez raised by his reference to "imperialist absorption." The extent to which the solution of these problems does not delay the evolutionary process which has dominated Mexican history for over a century may well be the measure of the soundness and durability of the new phase of Mexican-American relations.

CANADA'S NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM

By Edgar Packard Dean

WITH her first war program reduced to a shambles by the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France, Canada lost no time in adjusting herself to the new situation. Indeed, her new war effort, though scarcely three months old, is already producing results. It is basically a *Canadian*, rather than a British, program — which is another way of saying that a good part of it relates to North American defense. The siege of Britain now going on has brought home to Canadians the fact that, if British sea power is shattered, the possibility of a German invasion will stare them squarely in the face. Nor is awareness of this danger confined to Canada, as was clearly demonstrated at Ogdensburg on August 17 and 18, when President Roosevelt arranged with Prime Minister Mackenzie King to create a Permanent Joint Board on Defense representing the General Staffs of the Canadian and United States armed forces.

The old program of the first nine months of the war, essentially a British program, crumbled during the weekend of May 24–27. First came a series of cables from England saying that the British could give Canada no further equipment. These were followed forty-eight hours later by appeals for assistance from London. On May 28 the Canadian Navy of seven destroyers sailed from Halifax to help guard the Channel, leaving the defense of Canada's east coast to one or two French submarines. The Dominion also sent 50 million rounds of small arms ammunition, stripping itself to such an extent that for a while training camps were obliged to suspend target practice. The first group of pilots, observers and gunners to graduate under the Air Training Plan sailed for England instead of remaining to act as instructors. Worse than this, London sent word that an invasion of Canada was by no means impossible, and that Ottawa should proceed accordingly. And from within Canada came a legion of questions from a public shocked by Germany's easy victories. Why didn't Canada have more soldiers in Europe? Why wasn't Canada manufacturing tanks and airplanes? Why was the Air Training Plan to attain full momentum only in 1942 when pilots were so badly needed now? By giving expression to these and

many similar doubts, Canadian opinion showed that it regarded the nation's war effort as too small and too slow.

II

The original Canadian war program — the one pursued from September 1939 to June 1940 — had five outstanding characteristics. (1) It was British in conception and Canadian only in execution. Of course, Ottawa was always consulted, and consultation frequently led to revision; but throughout Britain held the initiative. (2) The defense of Canada on a serious scale was never contemplated. The Rhine, not the St. Lawrence, was the Dominion's line of defense, and her training and production programs had an overseas objective. (3) All matériel was based on British rather than North American specifications, although this meant depending for parts and machine tools on a country three thousand miles away rather than on the United States next door. (4) Canada's unique contribution to the war was to be twofold: to train pilots recruited throughout the Empire, and to supply certain primary materials such as foodstuffs (wheat, bacon, cheese) and basic metals (nickel, copper). (5) Time was not a vital consideration.

One thing was clear from the outset — Canada would not send hundreds of thousands of men overseas as she had twenty-five years before. There are credible reports that Britain wanted no Canadian troops whatever; on the other hand, she may have been willing for the Dominions to send one or two divisions as a symbol of Empire solidarity. As for Mackenzie King, the indications are that in September 1939 he too would have preferred to send no Canadian division overseas. Public opinion, however, forced his hand. Mr. King was sincerely convinced that Canada's effort could be more effective in other ways, and this view was shared by others. When one of General Andrew McNaughton's friends congratulated him on his appointment as commander of the Canadian overseas forces, the General replied that he was by no means sure that to accept the appointment was the best way of serving his country. As the winter wore on, it also became clear that the British were placing very few orders for mechanized equipment in Canada. Many Canadian manufacturers went to London seeking contracts, but generally returned home empty-handed and disillusioned. They are fairly well agreed on three things: British military officials realized what was needed for the

new type of war but were unable to convince the Cabinet; Britain was not underestimating Canada's capacity to produce — she simply was not interested in using it; and British manufacturers definitely would not release blueprints, a fact which was confirmed by the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. Howe, in the Ottawa Parliament on May 22.

In retrospect it is all to the good that the British were not more generous. As far back as 1937 it had been agreed that equipment for the Canadian armed forces and matériel fabricated within Canada should follow British patterns. The decision had much to recommend it. Whenever Canada was at war, she would presumably be fighting *outside* Canada *in conjunction with* the British. Hence both Canadian and British equipment should be interchangeable. On the other hand, there were two distinct drawbacks. It meant that Canadian industry had to depend for supplies and parts on a country three thousand miles away, whereas by using American patterns its supply line was at all times assured. A greater disadvantage was the fact that identical equipment meant a complete retooling of Canada's factories. Canadian industrial methods and machine tools are American rather than British. To manufacture mechanized equipment on British specifications meant importing new machine tools across three thousand miles of ocean and a complete recasting of established practices, even down to such a detail as threading a bolt the opposite way.

Many of these facts were disclosed, either by direct statement or inference, in the speeches of Mackenzie King and the other ministers in the House of Commons during May and early June. When the heat of debate was over, several things had become apparent. (1) The King Government had done everything the British had asked it to do, and had unsuccessfully sought to convince London that Canada should do more. (2) In one respect, the Government may have done more than the British desired: it sent the First Division overseas. (3) Canadian factories were not turning out mechanized equipment — tanks, shells, shell casings — because, in the words of Mr. Howe, "One of our chief difficulties has been to obtain the latest British designs. . . . British industry has not been too willing to part with these designs. . . ." Conservatives have compared the war conduct of Mackenzie King with that of their own leader, Sir Robert Borden, twenty-five years ago. It was largely at Sir Robert's insistence

that the Imperial War Cabinet was created, in which the Dominions had representation and where important matters of policy were discussed. Sir Robert, these critics say, had a real hand in shaping British policy, whereas Mr. King merely executed what the British suggested. The comparison is interesting but lacks political realism. Borden was primarily concerned with Dominion autonomy and the Imperial War Cabinet was only a means to this end. That battle has been won and there is no reason why Mr. King should take up the cudgels again. Moreover, if Mr. King felt that the British program was inadequate, how could he have taken the bit in his teeth and announced that Canada was increasing her effort, whether or not the British approved? Given the quiescent war of the winter of 1939–40, he would have had everyone against him. The Conservatives and Imperialists would have accused him of interfering with British plans, the French Canadians would have been distinctly alarmed, and the North American-minded part of the population would have wondered why Mr. King was being more energetic, more British, than the British themselves.

III

Canada's new war effort, elaborated in June 1940, is along quite different lines. (1) In contrast with the old program it is Canadian in conception as well as execution. (2) It is fully as concerned with home defense as with aid to Britain. Indeed, the speeches of the Messrs. King, Ralston, Power and Howe in the Canadian House of Commons on July 29 and 30 lead one to believe that home defense is slightly the more important of the two objectives. (3) Canada is now producing war equipment on North American patterns, a system to which the Canadian industrial machine is geared and in terms of which it can easily expand by importing machinery from across the border. (4) Time has become of the essence.

Nothing better illustrates the nature of the new war effort than the National Resources Mobilization Act. This law — passed by Parliament and signed by the new Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, on June 20 — conscripts all wealth and man power in Canada and places them at the disposal of the Government. The mobilization of man power began August 19–21 when all Canadians over sixteen years of age were obliged to register. Conscription for military service starts about October 1, when the Domin-

ion will start training 30,000 men per month for periods of one month. Conscription is clearly a home defense measure.

The regular or permanent army, known as the Canadian Active Service Force, consisted of fewer than 4,000 men at the outbreak of war. In the first nine months it expanded to 91,000, and in the next two months, from mid-June to mid-August, to 154,000. At the end of the first year of war, Canada had over two divisions in Britain, and units in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and the Bahamas — a total of 40,000 men overseas. Within Canada, the Active Service Force numbers 114,000. The Third and Fourth Divisions have reached full strength, but they are obviously being kept for home defense. The reserve army, or Militia, accounts for another hundred thousand men whose training and experience range from good to indifferent. After October 1, conscripts who have completed their thirty-day training will become a part of the Militia. These men may be required to serve for the duration of the war, but by the terms of the Mobilization Act they cannot be required to serve outside Canada unless they express their willingness to do so. From present indications, training will be for short periods and the greater part of the Militia will not be doing permanent duty. Fundamentally, it will be a reservoir of men with various degrees of experience. Last, there are the Veterans' Home Guard Companies, ex-servicemen of the last war under 50 years of age. These are permanent, full-time units used for guarding strategic areas, internment camps, etc. The Home Guard Reserves do similar duty on a part-time basis.

The personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy has jumped from 1,774 men of all ratings to 9,000 (as of the end of July) and from 15 ships in active commission to 113. With the exception of a squadron of seven destroyers, all are small vessels such as mine sweepers, patrol boats, etc. The shipbuilding industry has orders from the Canadian and British navies for small craft to a total value of over 50 million dollars. It is converting three fast passenger vessels into armed merchant cruisers at a cost of 1.7 million dollars and is refitting several Great Lakes vessels for ocean duty. Shipyards and allied activities are employing 14,000 men, the number having trebled between April 30 and July 30.

Canada's greatest war effort, however, is not being made on land or on the water but in the air. This centers around the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which can best be described as a sort of a specialized university. Its faculty consists of the

Royal Canadian Air Force and civilian flying instructors. After the outbreak of war, the personnel of the R.C.A.F. was divided into two parts: the smaller, only about one-tenth, is either fighting overseas or doing active military air duty at home — reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, aërial protection for convoys, etc. Much the greater part constitutes the faculty and administrative staff of the Training Plan. Elementary flying is taught by civilian members of the Canadian Flying Clubs Association, who are full-time instructors under the supervision of R.C.A.F. officers. As for airdromes and buildings, this part of the program was enormously speeded up after the events of May, and by the close of 1940 construction will be a year ahead of schedule. The original plan called for 26 elementary training schools, 10 air observers schools, 10 bombing and gunnery schools, 16 service, *i.e.*, intermediate and advanced flying training schools (with three airdromes per school), and two air navigation schools, making a total of 96 projects. Construction will be 90 percent completed by November. Meanwhile the total number of projects has been increased to 120.

The procurement of planes has been a heartbreaking task. Elementary training planes have never been a problem — many are manufactured in Canada and others are easily obtainable from the United States. But to get advanced trainers and twin-engine craft, all of which were to come from Britain, has been quite a different matter. The cessation of shipments in late May threatened to undo the entire Plan. In desperation, Mackenzie King telephoned President Roosevelt, and, by placing the future of the Air Training Plan on a basis of North American defense, finally obtained a quantity of engines and planes in the United States. Subsequently, Mr. Arthur B. Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission directed to Canada a number of Harvard trainers originally ordered by France. Meanwhile, Canada is planning to manufacture twin-engine Avro-Ansons with Jacobs motors imported from the United States.

All these efforts are subordinate to the primary purpose of the Plan — to train pilots, observers and air gunners. Trainees are recruited by enlistment and although the majority are Canadians, there will be recruits from Australia, New Zealand, and some from Britain. They take a course which totals 25 weeks for pilots, and 26 weeks for observers and gunners. They are then ready to proceed overseas. It was the original intention to plow

back the first graduating classes as junior instructors; but so great is Britain's immediate need that they are being sent over in a constant trickle as soon as they are ready. The Air Training Plan was first proposed by the British in September 1939, but the details were not definitely agreed on until December. It began as a billion-dollar proposition, and the British rather naïvely assumed that Canada would pay for all of it. In its present form, the Plan will cost 600 million dollars over three years, and Canada's share will be 350 millions. When it reaches maturity, its permanent personnel of instructors, administrators, etc. — but not including trainees — will number forty thousand men.

The wheels of Canadian industry have likewise been turning much faster since June. The speeches of the ministers in the House on July 29 and 30 contain innumerable figures for those who want to know how many yards of cloth have been woven, how many barracks have been constructed, and how many ships are on the ways.[1] Some of the production figures seem a bit optimistic. Thus Mr. Howe stated that by late July Canada was turning out 600 mechanized units per day (trucks, gun-towing vehicles, ambulances, etc.). To anyone who knows the Canadian automotive industry, this seems high. However, there is no doubt that the industrial machine is proceeding at a faster and faster tempo, and that each month production increases in almost arithmetic proportion.

The Government's industrial policy is sound. Contracts are being let on a basis of efficiency and not of graft. Ottawa has developed a satisfactory policy of coöperation with industry. Factory expansion is sometimes financed by exempting the manufacturer from the war profits tax; more frequently the Government itself furnishes the capital for expansion: to date, the British and Canadian Governments have financed such expansion to the extent of nearly 175 million dollars. The Canadian Government has, in addition, created seven government-owned corporations: four are for manufacturing planes, shells, rifles and instruments; another for procuring machine tools; and two for purchasing vital war commodities. These corporations are staffed entirely by businessmen and are responsible only to the Minister of Supply. This is Ottawa's answer to the problem of how to get private industry to work for the Government without subjecting it to constant hampering and threats from politicians.

[1] *Hansard* or *House of Commons Debates*, July 29 and July 30, 1940, 2237 ff and 2260 ff.

IV

The new budget, presented to the House on June 24, has made the average citizen realize the intensity of the new war effort. A married man with an income of $3,000 per year and no dependents has seen his Federal income tax, which now includes a flat two percent national defense tax on gross income, jump from $36 to $195; a man similarly situated but with an income of $5,000 a year finds his tax increased from $144 to $555. An excise tax on new automobiles rises in geometric proportion from 10 percent on cars valued at less than $700 to 80 percent on those valued at over $1,200. The only cheer the Minister of Finance, Mr. Ralston, could offer was that Canadians of the lower and middle income groups were still paying far less in war taxes than their cousins in Britain. Thus a married man with an income of $3,000, assuming he lives in Ontario, pays a total Federal and provincial income tax of $208, which is only about 30 percent of the $704 paid by his equal in Britain.

For the first time in her history, Canada has a billion-dollar budget. "Regular" (or "ordinary") expenses are estimated at 448 millions and war expenses at 700 millions, making a total budget of 1,148 million dollars. However, the Finance Minister warned that war expenditures might be increased, depending on world conditions, and that this item alone might reach a billion dollars. But taking the total of 1,148 millions, he estimated that 760 millions would come from taxation and other sources, leaving a deficit of 390 millions to be met by borrowing. To this must be added a credit of 200 million advanced by the Government to finance British purchases in Canada. Thus there is an over-all deficit of 600 millions. Since under present conditions Canada cannot borrow abroad, Canadians must pay in taxes or lend their Government nearly 1.4 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1940–41. The national income for the present fiscal year is estimated at not less than 4.5 billion.

Both the incidence and nature of the new taxes show that the Government plans to kill several birds with one stone. By decreasing the nation's purchasing power, the income and national defense levies will help prevent inflation of prices. The cost of living has remained virtually stationary — in August 1939 the index stood at 83 and in June 1940 at 86 — at a time when general business activity is the greatest in history — during the first ten

months of the war the index of the physical volume of business was ten points above the 1929 level. With more people having more money to spend, prices during the second year of hostilities would inevitably have soared had there not been the steep rise in taxes. Further, the new income tax rates show that the Government has heeded the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations that the rich be taxed less severely and the middle-income groups less lightly. Under the new rates, taxes on the $3,000–$5,000 income group have been increased 400–500 percent, but on incomes of $50,000 and over, less than 50 percent. Lastly, by placing a greater emphasis on the income tax, the Government is taxing people in the industrial parts of the country, who are benefiting most by the war boom, while the farmer on the prairies, who is not making much money out of this war, pays little or no income tax.

Other taxes reveal other objectives. The stiff tax on automobiles is an attempt to discourage sales in order to allow industry to concentrate on trucks and other war equipment. On the higher priced cars — none of which are made in Canada — it is also a measure to conserve foreign exchange. A new 10 percent tax on all imports, except those entering under the British preferential tariff, is also admittedly a measure to conserve foreign exchange.

The ability of a government to collect taxes and to borrow from its citizens depends on the general prosperity of the country. As already indicated, business conditions in Canada are the best on record. Indices of business activity, tax receipts, retail sales all tell the same story. Unemployment has dropped by a hundred thousand and by the end of 1940 Canada will have no unemployed employables. Hog raising will have the best year in its history: since January 1940, Britain has taken 5.6 million pounds of Canadian bacon a week at a price considerably above the world level. Dairying, at least as far as cheese is concerned, also benefits by a special agreement with Britain. The pulp and paper industry has so many orders, because of the increased demand from the United States and the shutting off of Scandinavian supplies from world markets, that even bankrupt mills are reopening. Newsprint production for July was 332,689 tons, a new high record. Steel is working three shifts a day and seven days a week. Textiles and construction have gained enormously from government orders. These flourishing conditions are not, however, universal throughout the Dominion. The apple growers

of Nova Scotia and British Columbia — to cite an instance — have had a wretched year. The wheat farmers of the Prairie Provinces have also been having their troubles, as will be explained in greater detail presently.

Canada is a country whose prosperity depends not only on a healthy volume of internal trade, but on foreign trade as well. Whereas in the United States less than one-tenth of the nation's annual production must be sold abroad, in Canada the proportion is about one-third. For a country so dependent on foreign markets, she has made out exceedingly well during the first year of the war. This is due to the fact that 80 percent of her foreign trade is with Britain and the United States, and another 10 percent with the Empire. For the twelve months ending in June 1940, Canada's exports (gold excluded) of 1,062 million dollars and imports of 926 millions — were, taken together, the greatest of any year since 1929. Although the totals are impressive, there have, of course, been dislocations within the different items of trade. Nor do the sums just cited represent an immediate cash return, for Ottawa is financing a part of British purchases within Canada. In normal years four-fifths of Canada's foreign trade is with Great Britain and the United States. Unfortunately, this trade is not balanced: two-fifths of her exports go to Britain and two-fifths to the United States, but only one-fifth of her imports come from the former while three-fifths come from the latter. This situation has naturally produced serious foreign exchange problems. Since Britain buys more from Canada than she sells, the latter has had to finance Britain in some of her purchases in the Dominion. In 1939–40 Canada provided the British with 100 million dollars (Canadian) by repatriating government bonds of that amount held in Britain. Credits for Britain, and possibly repatriation, will continue during the second year of the war.

More acute is the exchange problem with the United States. Canada has a favorable balance of trade with all countries which in recent years has averaged 375 million dollars annually. But her trade with the United States is distinctly unfavorable: in the twelve months ending in June 1940, Canada bought 630 million dollars worth of merchandise in this country and sold but 377 millions. In addition she had to pay interest and amortization on 4 billions of debt held by Americans. To offset this she depends on sales of newly mined gold (nearly 200 million dollars worth last year) and the expenditures of American tourists. Obviously she

must hence guard her American dollars carefully, particularly since the rising tempo of business within Canada means greater imports from the United States. For, as Canadian industry expands, it consumes more coal and petroleum, the greater part of which comes from this country, and requires more steel, half of which is imported from the States in the form of semi-manufactures.

During the winter of 1939–40, Ottawa hoped that the exchange problem would not become too acute. She gambled on two possibilities. The first was a business recovery within the United States, for Canadian exports across the border increase or decrease in almost identical proportion to the rise and fall of American business activity. Unfortunately, the upswing of late 1939 in the United States did not hold and Canadian sales have not been as great as expected. The second gamble was on a good tourist season. But absurd rumors within the United States that a wartime Canada was not a safe place for travel, and the general effect of the new passport regulations instituted by Washington, dashed these hopes. Consequently, the Foreign Exchange Control Board proceeded to tighten its regulations. One measure we have already seen: a tax of 10 percent on all imports except those entering under British preference. Another was to limit Canadian travel in the United States to business purposes only. This action is quite defensible, but it has provoked regrettable reprisals. Because New England hotel owners lost many of their Canadian tourists this summer, some of them have abetted a whispering campaign against American travel in Canada. They are not likely to be moved by the argument that Canada is withholding exchange from her tourists so that she can buy more oil and steel from the United States.

If present conditions continue, exchange will probably become tighter rather than freer. It could be loosened by an American loan to Canada; but our Neutrality Act now prohibits this. It was because of loans during the last war that the exchange problem ceased to exist. Canada, to be sure, did not borrow in this country, but Britain did, and Canada could always get the necessary dollars in London. If no loans are forthcoming, the best Canada can hope for is an American business recovery which will quicken the flow of her exports southward.

There is one further aspect of Canada's international economic relations — the perennial problem of wheat. The Canadian

prairie West, even more than our cotton South, is a region that depends on one crop, and like the South it must sell most of that crop abroad. The crop year which ran from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940 (thus coinciding almost exactly with the first year of the war) was one of the best in the last decade. Factors in this prosperity were the government-guaranteed price of 70 cents a bushel for Number One Northern, the pegged price (after May 17) on the Winnipeg grain exchange, and the largest foreign sales in recent years. But the outlook for the future is disquieting as concerns both the foreign market and conditions at home.

Canada's best foreign market for wheat is the United Kingdom, which, during the two crop years preceding the outbreak of war, took almost 60 percent of all Canadian wheat and flour sold abroad. From August 1939 through May 1940, Britain took 68 percent. One of Canada's next best markets was Western Europe — Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France — which accounted for 20 percent of all sales during the same two years and 17 percent for the war period. But these countries are now under German control and subject to the British blockade. As long as this situation continues, Canada has lost one-fifth of her foreign markets. Nor is the outlook bright for the remaining markets. On August 2, Ottawa announced a British purchase of 100 million bushels of Canadian wheat at an unspecified price, but probably about 85 cents. Not only is this the greatest single transaction in wheat history, but, assuming the present international situation remains fixed, it is probably more than half of all the wheat Canada will sell during the crop year just beginning.

The problem on the home front is not only one of selling wheat. This year it is also one of finding enough storage space for wheat. On July 31, Canada had a record-breaking carry-over of 300 million bushels, of which 233 million were stored in Canadian elevators. To this must be added 10 million bushels of other grains. Since the capacity of all Canadian elevators is 424 million bushels, the theoretical maximum available for the new crop is about 180 million bushels. The new harvest will yield 560 million bushels. Where will it be stored? There is only one answer — on the individual farms. Thus the Government's new wheat policy calls for compensation to the individual farmer for constructing storage bins. It also provides that the minimum guaranteed price — 70 cents on a bushel of Number One Northern delivered at Fort William-Port Arthur or Vancouver — shall cover all such

wheat a farmer delivers and not merely the first five thousand bushels as formerly. However, because of restricted elevator space, he can deliver only eight or ten bushels per acre seeded until wheat begins to move from the terminal points. Another new provision is the imposition of a processing tax of 15 cents per bushel on all wheat processed for human consumption in Canada. The tax is estimated to yield about 8 million dollars and will become part of the revenues of the Wheat Board. The grain exchange at Winnipeg will remain open and the pegged prices will continue.

V

When Canada went to war last year, she had one great aim — to aid Britain. This is still an important objective, but to it has been added another — the defense of Canada. It is not that Canadian loyalty to Britain has in any way diminished, but that Canadians have become more conscious of a loyalty to their own North America. The necessity for home defense has, for the first time, made the Dominion's war effort begin to approximate something akin to a total effort, the first program having in reality been a policy of limited liability.

Home defense has entailed conscription, an even greater political hurdle in Canada than it is in the United States. In Canada conscription has odious connotations: to the French-speaking part of the population it recalls the attempt made in 1917 to impose universal military service by force and the desultory civil war that followed; in the English-speaking areas it revives animosities engendered by the feeling that Quebec failed to carry its share of the national burden. This time conscription was instituted with relatively little opposition. To be sure, Camilien Houde, the Mayor of Montreal, raised the banner of revolt in a press interview given on August 2. But Quebec did not follow. Four days later, Houde was arrested by the Federal authorities and bundled off to an internment camp.

Conscription has been possible for several reasons. Today, unlike 1917, compulsory service is fundamentally a matter of home defense and, as such, has gained much wider acquiescence in French Canada. Second, the most potent force in forming French Canadian opinion, the Catholic Church, gave national registration its blessing. On August 2 — the day of Mayor Houde's interview — Archbishop Villeneuve urged all French Canadians to obey the new law and register. Also, the Quebec provincial leg-

islature had already come out in support of the national conscription of men and wealth by a vote of 53 to 13. But most important of all was the astute way Mackenzie King handled the matter. In his knowledge and understanding of French Canada, Mr. King has no peer. He presented a conscription bill with the one necessary proviso that made it politically possible: conscripts were exclusively for home defense. There are seventy-odd French Canadian deputies in the House of Commons and one might expect some opposition on so crucial a measure. Yet the bill was passed by a vote of 202 to 2. It is a significant commentary on Quebec's confidence in Mr. King and its appreciation of the gravity of the situation.

Hitherto the Canadian General Staff has given little attention to North American problems. This is not said in criticism. Until June of this year they had always conceived their task as one of fighting as an ally of Britain outside Canada. During the course of the summer, small but responsible groups of Canadians realized the necessity of getting the Defense Department to begin thinking in North American terms. But how would Canadian opinion react to the idea of a military pact of mutual assistance with the United States? And how would American opinion receive such a proposal? For a few alert observers to anticipate these problems was one thing, to create a general consciousness of their vital importance was something quite different.

It was the meeting of Mr. King and Mr. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg on August 17 and 18, and the subsequent creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense that gave public opinion in both countries an awareness of the issues at stake. The first meetings of this Board, of which the joint chairmen are Mayor La Guardia of New York City and Colonel Oliver Biggar of Ottawa, were devoted to a consideration of defenses along the east coast of the continent. There have been hints, however, that subsequent discussions will extend to the economic sphere and that a loan may be made in order to ease the supply of Canadian dollars available for purchases in this country.

To Canada, the lone belligerent among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, Ogdensburg came as good news. There is only one cloud on the horizon. Canadians are wondering to what extent the policy announced at Ogdensburg will, within the United States, be regarded as a national policy and not merely Mr. Roosevelt's policy. Two things will reassure them. In the first

place, the American Army has always taken the position that an attack on Canada is equivalent to an attack on the United States. For it is axiomatic that such an invasion, possibly up the St. Lawrence valley, would merely be the prelude to an assault on the industrial heart of this country. Secondly, the isolationists in Congress, who have been so quick to interpret every move of the Administration as another step towards our involvement in the European war, have had little or nothing to say about the Ogdensburg agreement. Obviously, the defense of Canada is, for the United States, too vital a matter to be made an issue of party politics.

Meanwhile, the pundits in both countries are hard at work. In Canada they are trying to decide whether or not Ogdensburg will mean a weakening of the Imperial tie and the further development of Canada as an autonomous North American nation. Those in the United States are speculating as to whether the new joint defense policy is merely the first step leading to our large-scale support of Britain. Naturally, at the present moment no one can know what train of events was set in motion at Ogdensburg. The only thing of which we may be sure is that the agreement reached there has a revolutionary significance. It is not called an alliance; yet that is what it is, for an understanding between two General Staffs to trade information and bases is about as close an arrangement as one can imagine. Confirming this view is the fact that the name of the Joint Board on Defense is prefaced with the word "Permanent," suggesting that this is to be no mere emergency committee but an established long-term institution. Ogdensburg not only opens a new chapter in the history of Canadian-American relations; it marks an unprecedented departure from the traditional foreign policy of the United States.

TRANSYLVANIA PARTITIONED

By Philip E. Mosely

TRANSYLVANIA entered a new phase of its long and turbulent history on August 30, 1940, when Germany and Italy divided it between Hungary and Rumania. Never reconciled to the loss of Transylvania and the adjacent territories of Crişana, Maramureş and the Banat in 1918, Hungary pressed her claim for their return with even greater vigor when the Soviet seizure of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in June 1940 began the dismemberment of the Rumanian state.[1] In July negotiations were opened at Craiova for the return of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and on August 8 the first official admission was made, by Premier Ion Gigurtu, that Hitler's "ordering of the *Südostraum*" would involve the surrender of Rumanian territory to Hungary. At the behest of the Axis, direct negotiations were begun at Turnu Severin on August 16 between delegations from Bucharest and Budapest; but a week of memoranda and counter-memoranda left the two governments poles apart in their ideas as to what would constitute a satisfactory compromise. Anxious to settle this problem without a war, and perhaps fearful of opening the way for further Soviet aggrandizement, the Axis governments summoned Hungarian and Rumanian delegates to Vienna and presented them with a ready-made and drastic solution of the Transylvanian dispute. The new arrangement may prove to have been but a stop-gap, if Britain or Russia wins the war. But if the Axis is victorious, the Vienna award may, with minor changes, stand for some time to come, in spite of the fact that Magyar nationalists are still calling for the return of the Banat and the rest of Crişana and Transylvania. In any case, the fundamental facts — historical, geographical, ethnic and economic — will remain, and it is to an examination of these that this article is addressed.

II

To both Magyar and Rumanian nationalists Transylvania has long represented the keystone of the national integrity, the strategic security and the economic well-being of their peoples. For Hungarians, Transylvania is as sacred a center of Magyar national history and culture as is Hungary itself. From 1526 to 1689, when Hungary proper was divided between Turks and Hapsburgs, the "land beyond the forest," under its Magyar princes, played an independent and glorious rôle in European life. During the years that followed, national ambition impelled the Magyars ceaselessly to strive for its restoration to the Crown of St. Stephen. In 1848–9, the union was at last proclaimed by the revolutionary Hungarian government, but not without encountering the armed opposition of the Rumanians and Saxons. From 1850 to 1867 Hapsburg absolutism and Hungarian nationalism wrestled for control of Transylvania. Schmerling's attempt to reorganize Franz Josef's empire along federal lines was bitterly opposed by the Magyars, who boycotted the

[1] For a survey of the Bessarabian dispute see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1940, p. 557–562.

Transylvanian Diet of Sibiu (Nagyszeben, Hermannstadt)[2] of 1863, at which the Saxons and Rumanians joined hands to set up regional autonomy on a basis of equal rights for the Rumanian majority. The intransigence and political astuteness of the Magyars had their reward five years later when Transylvania again became an integral part of the Hungarian state. From 1868 to 1918 Hungary strove by every means, and with some success, to offset the Rumanian majority by strengthening the Magyar element in the region's official, educational, professional and business life. But in 1910 the Rumanians still accounted for 55 percent of the population.

Though the Rumanians cannot point to a long record of political domination over Transylvania, it is no less dear to them as the original home of modern Rumanian enlightenment and of some of the most authentically Rumanian peasant communities, such as the peasant nobles of Făgăraş (Fogaras), the mountaineers of the Western Mountains and Maramureş (Máramaros), and the frontiersmen of Năsăud (Naszod). During the long period of Hungarian rule, the Rumanians came to resent with increasing bitterness the numerous barriers placed in the way of their progress by a Magyarizing officialdom and middle class. When the 1910 census showed a Rumanian literacy of only 27.9 percent, compared with 59.9 for the Magyars, the Rumanians saw in these figures an argument for demanding their national and social emancipation rather than a proof of inherent Magyar superiority.[3] With the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918, the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians naturally voted to join Greater Rumania, for by then they cared as little for Transylvanian autonomy as had the Magyars in 1848, 1863 or 1868. No matter how peaceful the relations between Magyar peasants and Rumanian peasants or how profound their community of custom, ornament, music and superstition, the vocal classes of each nationality sought, and still seek, their own salvation within a Greater Rumania or a Greater Hungary.

A smaller but not unimportant element in Transylvanian life is represented by the quarter-million Saxons — German peasants and burghers whose ancestors were settled there by the Hungarian kings in the twelfth century. This people has no compact settlement; the greater part centers about Sibiu, a smaller group around Braşov (Brassó, Kronstadt), and a still smaller one around Bistriţa (Besztercze, Bistritz) in northeastern Transylvania.[4] They have developed a strong degree of cohesion through their church and school organization, and more recently through a Hitler-inspired nationalist movement. Living as they do, several hundred miles removed from the nearest compact German area, the Saxons are a genuine minority, not a frontier *irredenta*. In January 1919, their leaders accepted with as good grace as possible the change of sovereignty by voting for union with Rumania. Within the enlarged Rumanian state the Saxons became the leaders of all the scattered German groups in the Banat, Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja; under their guidance the German People's Party regularly made preëlection arrangements with the government coalition and thus secured some share of representation and protection. In

[1] Place names will be given in Rumanian, with Magyar and German forms cited in parentheses.

[2] "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations; An Account of the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S, from January to March, 1920," Budapest, 1921, v. III, p. 100.

[4] The Saxons form an absolute majority in no single district, and a relative majority (39.7 percent) in only one district, Târnava Mare (Nagy-Küküllö, Gross-Kokel).

the last Rumanian election, held in December 1937, the Germans split their vote for the first time, the conservative minority around Sibiu voting for the government bloc, while the pro-Nazi majority voted a separate German ticket and showed a tendency to coöperate with Codreanu's extremist Iron Guards. In general, the Saxons, with their peasant-burgher background, have a healthier social structure than either the Rumanians, whose middle class is weak, or the Magyars, for whom the city has a great attraction. In a special protocol attached to the settlement of August 30, 1940, both Rumania and Hungary promised full respect for the rights of the German minority.



At Paris there was no discussion about the disposition of Transylvania; the Rumanians and Saxons, representing two-thirds of its population, had already cast in their fate with the Rumanian Kingdom. But there was much dispute regarding the frontier provinces to the west and north of Transylvania. In the Banat the main difficulty was that the Magyars were less numerous than either the Germans, Serbs or Rumanians. Accordingly it was divided between Serbs and Rumanians. In Crişana — the border strip which extends from Arad to Satul Mare (Szatmár Németi) — the Trianon Treaty boundary was a compromise between the American and British lines, which would have moved the frontier about forty miles to the east, and the lines proposed by the French and Italians, which would have put it about the same distance west of the frontier finally adopted. The line as drawn was based on a combination of

ethnic, strategic and economic factors.[5] Finally, the district of Maramureş, to the north of Transylvania, was divided between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with the third of it lying south of the Tisa (Tisza) River going to Rumania.

The Rumanian census of 1930 showed a slight but significant relative increase of the Rumanian population in the annexed area, with 57.6 percent in Transylvania, 54.3 percent in the Banat and 60.7 percent in Crişana-Maramureş, whereas those who were of Magyar racial stock were only 29.1, 10.4 and 23.1 percent respectively in the same areas. Classified by mother tongue, Rumanians and Magyars showed slightly higher percentages than the above figures indicate, since most of the Gypsies are Rumanian-speaking and most of the Jews Magyar-speaking. The increase of the Rumanian population from 55 percent in 1910 to 57.6 percent in 1930 was quite natural, considering that in the latter year the Rumanians were 61.7 percent of the rural population, while the Magyars were only 27 percent.[6] In recent years the Rumanians have made a substantial start towards Rumanizing the cities and creating a Rumanian middle class — not however without arousing resentment and fear among the minorities.[7] A great effort has also been made to raise the cultural and technical level of the Rumanian villages.

While Transylvania's separation from the old Austro-Hungarian customs union was naturally followed by painful readjustments, it came through the postwar transition period in fairly good shape. Its textile, metal-working, wood-working and chemical industries, freed from Hungarian competition, found internal markets in Greater Rumania. Production of electrical and military equipment increased. While some cities stagnated, others grew considerably.[8] The chief economic complaints, apart from the effects of the world-wide depression, were threefold: Transylvania had to bear a disproportionate share of the country's total tax burden and received in return relatively meager benefits; the centralization of state control over foreign trade and currency operated to the disadvantage of cities remote from the capital; the state showed favoritism to Rumanian interests in levying taxes, assigning government contracts, and granting credits.

Since 1918 the Hungarian claim to Transylvania has perforce rested on historical, geographic, strategic and economic — but not on ethnic — arguments, for Rumania's ethnic claim to the region is certainly even stronger now than it was in 1918. Much has been made of the natural geographic unity of the Carpathian basin, of the way in which the uplands and mountains of Transylvania and Ruthenia complement the Hungarian plain. The regulation of common rivers, the protection of the plains against flood, and the promotion of reforestation are said to demand the reunion of the two regions. Furthermore, the Magyars assert that they can defend the middle Danube basin

[5] Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1928, p. 432–447.

[6] For a valuable study of differential fertility see D. C. Georgescu, "La Fertilité Différentielle en Roumanie," Bucharest, 1940.

[7] Timişoara (Temesvár) had 7,566 Rumanians in 1910, 33,369 in 1939; Sighet (Máramarossziget) had 2,001 in 1910, 7,565 in 1930.

[8] Several months of intensive travel in Transylvania on the part of the author in 1935–1938 did not substantiate Macartney's impression of universal decay; C. A. Macartney, "Hungary and Her Successors," London, 1937, p. 349.

against a possible Russian invasion only if they hold the entire sweep of the Carpathians. The restoration of Transylvania in its entirety would give Hungary a greater variety of climate, thus protecting her economy against the effects of extreme annual variations in temperature and rainfall. It would provide her with timber, which she otherwise has to import and with a variety of minerals which, except for coal and bauxite, she now lacks. The ultimate argument for the return of Transylvania has been that it was a part of Hungary for "a thousand years," that its political structure and culture have always been predominantly Magyar, and that Magyars are somehow a naturally superior people. As the Hungarian memorandum to the Peace Conference declared: . . . "Si, dans un pays de l'Amérique du Nord, le pouvoir venait à être exercé par les nègres ayant dans quelques États des États-Unis une majorité de 1 à 2 pour cent, la civilisation y tomberait aussi bas et aussi rapidement qu'en Transylvanie. . . ."[9] Needless to add, the Magyars' contemptuous attitude has its counterpart in the bitter hostility of the Rumanians towards Hungarian rule.

III

The jubilation with which the Hungarians have now accepted the partition of Transylvania and the recovery of half its area makes it clear that they do not take too seriously their own arguments regarding the "natural unity" of the region, but are delighted to have secured a large territorial increase which ethnic claims alone could not justify. An analysis of the census figures for 1910 (the 1910 Hungarian figures are admittedly favorable to the Magyar claims since they were based on mother tongue, not on racial stock or national consciousness) shows that the Magyars in the newly recovered districts number only 967,000 as against 1,154,000 Rumanians. Even though the area restored to Hungary includes the Magyar population of northwestern Crişana and the Szekely, or Szekler, region of eastern Transylvania, the Magyars there are in a decided minority as compared with the Rumanians. Since Rumania had 1,426,187 Magyar inhabitants in 1930 it is safe to say that Hungary has now acquired an ethnic problem almost as difficult as that of post-1918 Rumania.

The new provinces bring substantial economic advantages to Hungary. Her timber requirements can now be satisfied from the forests of the Carpathians. The salt-mines of Maramureş, added to those of Ruthenia, will make her self-sufficient in this respect. She gains a number of small mineral deposits, including the low-grade iron of Bihor (Bihar) and Odorhei (Udvarhely), the lead of Satul Mare and Maramureş, the gold, silver, zinc and manganese of Satul Mare, the antimony of Someş (Szolnok-Doboka), and the copper and bismuth of Bihor. These deposits, however, have little or no commercial importance. On the other hand, the chief mineral resources of Rumania are not affected, especially the oil of the Ploeşti region, the natural gas of Mediaş (Megyes, Mediasch), the coal and iron of the Banat and Hunedoara (Hunyad). Particularly, the great Reşiţa (Resicza) combine, now partly under German control, will continue to be by far the largest center of mining, metallurgy and machine-building in Rumania. Industrially speaking, Hungary, in recovering the relatively stagnant cities of Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), Satul Mare

[9] "Les Négociations de la Paix Hongroise," Budapest, 1921, v. II, p. 69.

and Sighet, has received the poorer portion while Rumania comes off better with Braşov, Mediaş, Arad, and Timişoara.

The internal communications of Transylvania have of course been completely disrupted by the partition. The strongly agricultural area of the Szekely is now cut off from its customary market in nearby Braşov; it will have to ship and receive goods over a roundabout and expensive route. From an international point of view, however, the new arrangement is not too destructive. Rumania will still have one main line from Braşov to Arad, while Hungary will have the other principal line, from Oradea (Nagyvárad, Grosswardein) to Cluj. Strategically, both lines are now completely vulnerable: the Rumanian one lies within gun-range of the new frontier, while the Oradea-Cluj line runs within a few miles of Rumania's new northern frontier.

The most important consequence of the partition lies in the sphere of continental, rather than local, strategy. Hungary, already brought face-to-face with the Soviets through her post-Munich reacquisition of Ruthenia and the recent Russian occupation of northern Bukovina, must once again fulfil her vaunted ambition of "standing guard for western civilization" along the Carpathians. From its new position at the eastern passes of those mountains the Hungarian Army, reënforced by German military aid, would represent a serious threat in case the Soviet armies should advance from Bukovina and Bessarabia into Moldavia. In 1854 the menace of the Austrian Army, poised at these passes, forced the troops of Nicholas I to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. On the other hand, any effective barrier to a new Soviet advance would necessarily rest on close coöperation between Rumania and Hungary. Whether the enforced partition of Transylvania will prove an effective step towards building up such coöperation is very much open to question.

It has sometimes been assumed that the redrawing of the frontier between Hungary and Rumania would be followed by an exchange of the minority populations. Ever since 1918 the Hungarians have frequently urged that a new frontier be drawn, leaving minorities of equal size on the two sides of the frontier, and that these minorities then be exchanged. Such an exchange is hardly practicable now, for under the terms of the Vienna settlement Hungary has gained 1,154,000 Rumanians (using the 1910 Hungarian figures for the districts ceded, except for Maramureş, for which the 1930 Rumanian statistics are used), while Rumania retains only 374,000 Magyars (again using 1910 figures, except for the Banat, for which 1930 Rumanian figures are used). Without substantial equality there can be no justice in an exchange. In addition Rumania will certainly not encourage the immigration of her lost nationals, for their departure would weaken her strong ethnic claim to most of the area ceded; she would also find it economically impossible to settle the immigrants in southern Transylvania or in the Old Kingdom. While many Rumanian officials and intellectuals will undoubtedly take advantage of the terms of option embodied in the settlement of August 30 in order to escape from Magyar rule, the Rumanian peasants will certainly cling to their ancestral lands in the ceded territory unless driven out by force.

IV

The Axis-imposed solution of the Transylvanian problem, of course, represents but one among many proposals which have been advanced since 1918.

These proposals (aside from the continuance of Rumanian control or a complete return to Hungary) fall into two main categories: territorial cessions and plans for autonomy. The demand for territorial rearrangement which was most frequently heard after 1920 was that Rumania's western strip, or Crişana, be restored to Hungary either up to the strict line of the ethnic majorities, or else as far as the watershed of the Bihor and Satul Mare mountains. Undoubtedly a line could have been drawn which would have returned to Hungary a considerable number of Magyars; but such a strip would have included only a part of Crişana, which is strongly Rumanian in the east and south.[10]

The Rumanian Banat presents a special problem. Here the Magyars are outnumbered by both Rumanians and Germans; Hungary's claims therefore cannot possibly rest on ethnic grounds.[11] The Rumanians form a relative majority in the plains and an absolute majority in the upland and mountain districts — the latter, containing the cities of Lugoj (Lugos) and Reşiţa, form Rumania's most important mining and metallurgical area.

Maramureş is another unique area.[12] Its only rail connection with the rest of Rumania has been through Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, territory which was formerly Czechoslovak and is now Hungarian. In this case, economics suggested rejoining Maramureş to Ruthenia, thus reopening the valley of the Tisa to the impoverished peasants who used to seek winter employment in the mountains and summer jobs in the plains.

The cession of a strip of Crişana — either narrow or wide, with or without Maramureş — would still not have solved the real Hungarian problem in Transylvania, which is that of the Szekely, or Szeklers, who live in its eastern part far removed from other Magyar areas.[13] Hungarian leaders had repeatedly expressed the hope of recovering the entire Szekely land, together with a Mureş-Cluj "corridor," to connect it with the main body of the Magyars. Northern Transylvania, still left to Rumania under this scheme, would then have had no connection with the rest of the country, except by an as yet uncompleted railway through the Bistriţa Carpathians to southern Bukovina. Its markets, grain supply and railways would have been cut off, and its plight would have been far more serious than that of Maramureş after 1918. At the same time this "corridor" would not have provided Hungary with any important timber or mineral resources. As events have turned out, the settlement of August 30 gives Hungary much more than she had been demanding since 1918 — Crişana (except the district of Arad with its Rumanian majority), Maramureş, the three Szekely districts, the connecting "corridor," and in addition the remainder of northern Transylvania with its strongly Rumanian

[10] The population of the Crişana in 1930 showed 880,000 Rumanians, 415,000 Magyars, 75,000 Germans, and 65,000 Jews, out of a total of 1,550,000. In April and May, 1920, the Hungarian Peace Delegation made a special effort to enlist the support of the Quai d'Orsay for the return of Crişana: Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry, editors, "Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, 1919–20," Budapest, 1939, v. I, p. 235–238, 250–254.

[11] Out of a total population of 942,000 for the Banat in 1930, 54.3 percent were Rumanians, 23.8 percent Germans, 10.4 percent Magyars, and 4.3 percent Serbs.

[12] In 1930 the district contained 93,200 Rumanians, 33,798 Jews, 19,305 Ruthenes, 11,181 Magyars, 3,239 Germans, and 780 others.

[13] The three Szekely districts are Ciuc (Csík) with 82.7 percent Magyars (1930 census), Trei Scaune (Háromszék) with 80 percent, and Odorhei (Udvarhely) with 91.6 percent. To the west is Mureş (Maros-Torda) with 42.6 percent Magyars and 3.9 percent Germans, and to the south, Braşov district, with 26 percent Magyars and 20 percent Germans.

majority. In brief, Rumania was compelled by the Axis Powers to turn over 1,154,000 Rumanians to Hungarian rule in order that Hungary might recover the 367,864 Magyars of the three Szekely districts (1910 census) and connect them with the Magyar plain far to the west.

Another type of proposal, rejecting the partition of Transylvania along ethnic lines as being economically harmful, looked instead to autonomy as the solution. In its counter-proposals to the Peace Conference of 1920, the Hungarian Delegation presented an elaborate scheme for the autonomy of the three Transylvanian nations, under which four types of districts — Magyar, Rumanian, German and mixed — were to be set up, and a wide autonomy assured to each type of district as well as to Transylvania as a whole.[14] After 1918 the Magyars repeatedly demanded autonomy for Transylvania, or even independence, although previously they had always insisted on the "unity of the Crown of St. Stephen." [15] It is highly improbable that at any time after 1918 autonomy could have been imposed on the hostile Rumanian majority. Even if that had been done, an autonomous Transylvania would still have been ruled by its Rumanian majority unless each of its districts had received a wide measure of self-government and could thus have been governed by whatever national group had a majority in it. As a matter of fact, many Magyars and Germans in Transylvania were sceptical of the practical value of autonomy for them, for they found it easier to get along with Rumanians of the Old Kingdom than with the more energetic and "hard-bitten" Rumanians of Transylvania. When a change in the status of Transylvania became the order of the day, the Magyars were as strongly opposed to autonomy as they had been in 1848 or 1863. In September 1940, Iuliu Maniu, the venerated leader of the Rumanians of Transylvania, pleaded in vain with the Hungarian leaders to establish autonomy and preserve the unity of the region. The Magyars preferred half of Transylvania firmly annexed to Hungary rather than an autonomous Transylvania with the Magyars in a conspicuous and hopeless minority.

[14] "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations . . . ," v. I, p. 149–150; Deák and Ujváry, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 235–238, 250–254.

[15] *E.g.*, Count Stephen Bethlen, "The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace," London, 1934, p. 134–142. The Hungarian state continues to reject the idea of granting even local or communal autonomy to its minorities. On June 8, 1940, Koloman Hubay, Nazi leader, proposed that all the minorities in Hungary be given full local autonomy, including the right to choose their own ministers, local officials and judges. On July 22 he was expelled from the Hungarian parliament as a "traitor."

ALASKA, OUTPOST OF AMERICAN DEFENSE

By William M. Franklin

THE late General William Mitchell once termed Alaska "the Achilles heel of American defense." This statement is significant, coming from a pioneer apostle of air power, for it is the tremendous growth in the importance of air power that has suddenly focused attention on the strategic importance of Alaska in our program for hemisphere defense.

Once known as "Seward's Folly," the Territory is now, in an age of aggressive imperialism, a rich prize, both for its strategic location and for its vast undeveloped resources. Alaska is known to possess extensive reserves of gold, silver, platinum and coal, along with valuable deposits of lesser-known extent comprising tin, oil, lead, copper, antimony, zinc, iron and bismuth. However, less than half the area of the Territory has been adequately surveyed for minerals. Supplies of timber, furs and fish (particularly salmon) are immense. Yet the total population inhabiting this vast and valuable region numbers slightly less than 60,000 souls, of whom only one-half belong to the white race. And, until a year ago, the "home defense" of Alaska was represented by 300 infantrymen in Chilkoot barracks, plus one antique cannon left by the Russians and now used as a flower-pot!

Greater even than the intrinsic importance of Alaska is its strategic significance in the Pacific area. A glance at the accompanying map reveals the fact that the Great Circle route between the American west coast and Japan passes close to the southern Aleutian Islands, of which the westernmost, Attu, is but 660 miles from the Japanese naval and air base at Paramushiro. The distance from Seattle to Yokohama via in the Aleutians is about 4,900 miles; via Honolulu and Midway Island it is around 6,500 miles. Furthermore, the journey can be made by way of Alaska and the Aleutians in easy stages, with no single "hop" longer than 900 miles; whereas the route via Pearl Harbor (near Honolulu) involves an initial leg of some 2,400 miles of open sea and a final lap through Japan's mandated islands, of which the military function would in time of war resemble that of a swarm of airplane carriers and submarine tenders. Were the United States Fleet to take the offensive in the Western Pacific, adequate bases in Alaska and the Aleutians would be indispensable. If, on the other hand, the United States were on the defensive in those waters, these same bases would give support to our fleet by preventing any flanking movement from turning our great fortress of Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands. We could insure aërial control of the Western Pacific by long-range patrol craft flying the strategic triangle: Seattle — Honolulu — Unalaska.

The development of aircraft is rapidly destroying the Arctic isolation which for so many years represented Alaska's best defense. In June 1940, Pan American Airways inaugurated regular passenger service between Seattle and Juneau, thus bringing Alaska some three days nearer to the United States than it had previously been by steamer. Connecting airlines of the Pacific Alaska Airways run from Juneau to White Horse, Fairbanks, Bethel and Nome.


Yellow Sea
MANCH.
U. S. S. R.
ARCTIC OCEAN
Wrangell I.
Shanghai
Nagasaki
KOREA
Formosa
Vladivostok
Khabarovsk
Japan
Sea of
Diomede Is.
Anadyr
Bering Str.
Pt Barrow
Aklavik
Mackenzie R.
Manila
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
1850
JAPAN
Sakhalin I.
Sea of Okhotsk
Kamchatka
ALASKA
Nome
Dawson
CANADA
Tokyo
Yokohama
Kurile Is.
Petropavlovsk
Bering I.
Komandorski Is.
Attu I.
Fairbanks
Anchorage
White Horse
Bering Sea
Bethel
Juneau
Seward
G. of Alaska
Kodiak I.
Sitka
Hazelton
Prince Rupert
Edmonton
Vancouver
Seattle
U.S.A.
1595
4875
Aleutian Is.
Unalaska I.
Bonin Is.
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Marianas Islands
Guam (U.S.)
JAPANESE MANDATE
Caroline Islands
1505
2725
2400
San Francisco
1200
Midway I. (U.S.)
Wake I. (U.S.)
1315
Scale of miles
0 400 800
Proposed Alaskan highway
Marshall Is.
Oahu
HAWAIIAN Is.
Honolulu (U.S.)

Trans-polar flights from the Eastern Hemisphere have been a distinct possibility ever since 1937, when three Soviet airmen flew non-stop from Moscow to Vancouver in 63 hours and 17 minutes. Many points in Alaska and the Aleutians are within easy bombing range of Russian and Japanese territory. The Japanese base at Paramushiro and the Russian submarine and air base at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka Peninsula lie within 700 miles of the westernmost island in the Aleutian chain. The Soviet base in the Komandorsky Islands is but 300 miles from American-owned territory, while Bering Strait, separating Alaska from Siberia, is only fifty-six miles wide.

Added significance is given these figures by recent press reports of considerable Russian activity of a military nature in this little-known area of the Northern Pacific. Last July the Soviets announced the establishment of a 1,400-mile passenger airline from Khabarovsk in Siberia to Petropavlovsk. Soviet military activity has also been reported on Big Diomede Island, approximately eight miles from Little Diomede Island, a part of Alaska, located in the Bering Strait. Additional construction activities by the Soviets have been reported on Bering Island and Medny Island in the Komandorsky group. Landing fields are known to exist on both of these, while Bering Island harbors a submarine base. Ever since 1930 a zone of thirty miles around the Komandorsky and nearby islands has, for military reasons, been closed to all foreigners and many Japanese fishing vessels have been mysteriously lost in this region during recent years. In December 1939, a group of German naval officers was reported to have visited the Komandorsky Islands in Russian naval planes and to have studied the Soviet bases for over a month.

There is no way of checking the accuracy of these reports, but they have come from "usually well-informed sources" and will bear careful consideration in the light of their relation to our Alaskan outpost. Last summer Governor Ernest Gruening of Alaska told an American reporter that "twenty parachuters could take Alaska." While the Governor was intentionally exaggerating for effect, his statement does serve to illustrate Alaska's relatively high degree of vulnerability to the ultra-modern methods of surprise and seizure from the air.

Since the vulnerability of Alaska to aërial attack, as well as the strategic value of the Territory in the American defense scheme, are of very recent origin, it is no criticism of American military and naval leaders to say that they have been reluctant to lavish the taxpayer's money on Alaskan defenses. In 1937 an official of the Army's War Plans Division reported that "there appears at present to be no necessity, from the viewpoint of national defense, of increasing the military garrison in Alaska;" and in the same year the Navy Department, in its comments to the Bureau of the Budget on House Bill 3996, stated that $100,000,000 allocated for the development of naval facilities in Alaska was "an excessive sum for the developments anticipated" and recommended that the amount be cut to $10,000,000.[1] A marked change in the attitude of the Navy Department, however, became noticeable in December of the following year when the report of the Hepburn Board on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine and Naval Air Bases was presented. The Hepburn Report called attention to the fact that "the dependability and radius of action of patrol

[1] *Regional Planning, Part VII—Alaska:* National Resources Committee, December, 1937, p. 206.

planes of recent type have greatly enhanced the value which Alaskan bases would have in their service to the fleet." The Report emphasized that naval air bases in the Alaskan area would be "essential in time of war" and that the Aleutian chain of islands was of the greatest strategic importance. After painstaking analysis of the geographic and meteorological conditions obtaining in the entire area, the Hepburn Board recommended the establishment of naval air bases at Sitka, Kodiak and Unalaska, together with submarine bases at the two latter points.

At the time the Hepburn Report was presented, the United States Navy possessed only one small base at Sitka where half-squadrons consisting of six patrol planes operated in rotation for periods of from three to six months, utilizing the buildings of an old naval fuel depot on nearby Japonski Island. In the opinion of the Board these installations were "meager and makeshift," and should be improved and expanded in order to make Sitka a secondary air base with adequate facilities for one patrol plane squadron together with extra housing and beaching facilities for "an occasional heavy overload." As for the Aleutian Archipelago, the Board felt that considerations of pure strategy would indicate a base as far west as possible, perhaps on Attu Island. However, the Board was of the opinion that Unalaska Island represented the "westernmost point at which a base could be maintained in time of peace without inordinate maintenance charges. . . ." Consequently, the Hepburn Report recommended that facilities for one squadron of patrol planes and one submarine division be created on Unalaska Island. Kodiak Island offered, in the opinion of the Board, the best possibility for development into a major air base capable of supplying the immediate needs of three patrol squadrons as well as the mechanical and fuel requirements of the other two secondary bases in the Alaskan outpost. Installations for handling one division of submarines were also to be made at Kodiak. The Board recommended the submarine base at Unalaska and the naval air bases at Sitka and Kodiak for the earliest possible completion.

Late in 1937 the Navy acquired by Executive Order a tract of land at Women's Bay on Kodiak Island, and work was begun shortly thereafter on all three bases mentioned in the Report. For work at Kodiak $9,000,000 were appropriated, and more than $2,000,000 for the Sitka project. During the last session of Congress these amounts were increased to nearly $30,000,000 for the three bases, upon which construction is now proceeding at a rapid pace. In conjunction with these projects the United States Coast Guard and the Navy Hydrographic Office have instituted a detailed survey of Alaskan waters, including the Aleutian Islands whose many bays and passes have never been adequately charted.

Meanwhile the Army has not been inactive. Land has been acquired for military bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, the latter to be specially equipped to serve as an experimental station for cold-weather flying (72° F. below zero has been registered at that city). During the past twelve months work has been pushed on the landing fields of the Air Corps at these two bases, and as a result of the Army's improved techniques for working during the Arctic winter, the ground has already been prepared for two tremendous runways, reported to be over 10,000 feet in length. During the summer of 1940 Major General H. H.

Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Corps, flew to Alaska on a tour of inspection, while 764 enlisted men and 30 officers were sent to the base at Anchorage. In the near future, when construction now under way is completed, an additional 200 officers and 3,000 enlisted men, including anti-aircraft and artillery units, will be sent to the Territory.

In Alaska the weather is a subject for intensive research rather than idle conversation. Troops, planes and equipment must all be tested in sub-zero temperatures, while additional knowledge must be obtained of fog conditions, wind directions and those peculiar Alaskan gales known locally as "williwaws." Since weather data have become important factors in ballistics as well as in flying, the military significance of this research is apparent. In conjunction with the development of our new bases in the Alaskan outpost, radio and weather stations are being rapidly increased and plans are under way to establish a chain of observation posts along the Aleutian Islands as far west as Attu, which is in the very center of that "weather factory" which originates many of the great cyclonic movements influencing the climate of North America as far east as the Great Lakes. Such meteorological information would not only be of direct value to military and naval operations, but would also be of use in furthering the development of Alaska through commercial aviation, which is playing a rôle there not unlike that of the railroads in frontier America.

The economic and commercial development of Alaska has been recognized by both the War and Navy Departments as important for national defense. The Territory's transportation deficiencies are, for instance, proving a real problem — Alaska boasts but one really useful railway (from Seward to Fairbanks) and its highway system is both limited in extent and primitive in character. Furthermore, the absence of adequate housing and manufacturing facilities has naturally occasioned considerable inconvenience and extra expense in the construction of the new naval and air bases. Alaska is also totally dependent upon the continental United States for many types of labor and materials, a dependence which the construction of bases will tend to increase unless it is accompanied by economic development within the Territory.

During recent years Alaska has produced almost enough coal to supply the local demand; and expansion of this industry would be highly desirable. Additional geologic surveys are necessary to determine the exact extent of Alaska's mineral resources and to serve as a basis for increasing the output, particularly of "strategic minerals." Petroleum has been discovered in a number of locations, but production has been small and sporadic. With the establishment of naval bases it would seem strategically advisable to increase oil production by additional surveys and drillings. Even the agricultural production of Alaska could be greatly expanded by setting up other colonies similar to the one in the Matanuska valley north of Anchorage, which, after a difficult beginning in 1935, has now attained a prosperous stability.

Advocates of Alaskan development have maintained for many years that one of the greatest aids to industry and agriculture in the Territory would be a road connection with the United States. Except for the semi-weekly air service recently inaugurated from Seattle to Juneau, all transport between Alaska and the United States must now go by boat. The construction of a highway to Alaska across western Canada was seriously suggested as long ago as 1929; and

in the following year President Hoover appointed a three-man commission to study the proposal and report its findings to Congress. Its report, presented on May 1, 1933, endorsed the highway as being entirely feasible and obviously advantageous to the development of the Territory. In 1938 President Roosevelt appointed a second commission to investigate the project still further. This commission has been reappointed for four more years and its first report is now on the press.

Meanwhile, on June 11, 1940, Mr. Anthony J. Dimond, Alaska's delegate to Congress, introduced in the House a bill authorizing the construction of such a highway and appropriating not more than $25,000,000 for this purpose. In the hope of speedy Congressional action Mr. Dimond tied his bill to our present defense effort by inserting the provision that "The President shall cause such a highway to be located and built on the route that in his judgment will best serve the needs of national defense." This reference to the military value of the proposed highway gives the project an entirely new turn, since the report of the President's commission in 1933 made no mention whatever of any military advantages though it treated in great detail all other possible advantages of such a road. Apparently the Nazis' successful campaign in Norway has been responsible for the change in emphasis regarding the Alaskan highway. A number of influential persons have been struck by the similarity between the British position *vis-à-vis* Norway and the American position regarding Alaska. In the event of a sudden seizure of Alaskan territory, the United States forces would have to operate from the sea, effecting difficult landings under conditions not unlike those which faced the British forces in Norway. Doubtless the analogy should not be pushed too far, but the similarity in situations has provided additional evidence of the need for an overland highway to Alaska which would furnish an interior line of communication relatively safe from hostile bombers and the perils of sea-borne transport.

The distance by land from Seattle to Fairbanks is roughly 2,300 miles, of which some 1,100 miles of existing road could be utilized. Most of the new construction would be through the undeveloped territory between Hazelton (British Columbia) and the Alaska-Yukon border. Considerable surveying and aërial photographing of this terrain have indicated that no serious geographic obstacles bar the building of the highway. Snow conditions, of course, would present a problem, but this difficulty would probably be no greater than in many parts of the northern United States and Canada.

Obviously the coöperation of the Dominion of Canada is a prerequisite for the construction of this highway. The bill at present before Congress provides that the American money to be used in building the highway should be spent on American labor and materials. Further negotiations with Canada will doubtless be necessary to iron out these details and to decide upon the precise route which the highway is to follow. The Dominion, however, seems to be well aware of the advantages which British Columbia and the Yukon Territory would reap from such a highway; nor can it forget that Canadian defenses on the Pacific depend largely upon the United States. In the event of a British defeat in the present war, our Alaskan outpost would acquire an additional political and military significance which might well influence the future orientation of Canadian policy.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE. By WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 516 p. $4.00.

Chapters on "peace as a war aim during the World War," "the quest for peace at the Peace Conference," and the history of such post-war phenomena as arbitration, collective security and disarmament. The author has for many years served as Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva.

NATIONALISM. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 360 p. $3.75.

The report of a study group which examined the history and philosophy of nationalism not only as a general phenomenon but in its peculiar manifestations in the individual "nations" of the world, large and small. Those who are thinking about the future political organization of mankind will derive much profit from this thoughtful book.

IMPERIALISMI IN LOTTA NEL MONDO. By GIORGIO MARIA SANGIORGI. Milan: Bompiani, 1939, 198 p. L. 10.

Current history popularly interpreted as a conflict among rival imperialist states.

THE PULSE OF DEMOCRACY. By GEORGE GALLUP AND SAUL FORBES RAE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 335 p. $2.50.

An explanation of how the public opinion poll works, by its most successful practitioner and one of his assistants.

THE IMPASSE OF DEMOCRACY. By ERNEST S. GRIFFITH. New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1939, 380 p. $3.00.

A searching analysis of democratic government throughout the world and of the causes for its decay, with suggested measures for preserving its basic essentials in the United States, by the dean of the graduate school at the American University.

LEVIATHAN AND THE PEOPLE. By R. M. MACIVER. University: Louisiana State University Press, 1939, 182 p. $2.00.

Lectures on the problems of democracy and dictatorship, delivered at Louisiana State University by a professor of social science at Columbia University.

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY? By W. D. STEWART. London: King, 1939, 121 p. 7/6.

Concise lectures on history and political science.

MANKIND SET FREE. By MAURICE L. ROWNTREE. London: Cape, 1939, 349 p. 10/6.

Sweetness and light, or the problem of peace and war by a British Quaker.

GÉOGRAPHIE DES FRONTIÈRES. By JACQUES ANCEL. Paris: Gallimard, 1938, 209 p. Fr. 45.

A detailed answer by a French authority to the Pan German expansionistic doctrines promulgated by the "Geopolitical" school in Germany.

EAST VERSUS WEST. By P. Kodanda Rao. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 256 p. 10/6.

An effort to disprove that there is a cultural cleavage between Occident and Orient.

L'ISLAM ET L'OCCIDENT. By Marcel Lobet. Paris: Casterman, 1939, 182 p. Fr. 15.

A superficial survey, organized by countries.

THE INSIDE STORY. Edited by Robert Spiers Benjamin. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 263 p. $2.75.

Twenty stories of varying importance and interest by a score of members of the Overseas Press Club of America.

WAYS AND BY-WAYS IN DIPLOMACY. By William J. Oudendyk. London: Davies, 1939, 386 p. 15/.

The informative memoirs of a Dutch diplomat who served in Russia, Iran and China.

THE CONFESSIONS OF AN INDIVIDUALIST. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 320 p. $3.00.

Mr. Chamberlin, best known for his books on Soviet Russia, in this volume reviews his journalistic career during the last two decades and philosophizes on the behavior of the human animal as revealed in many places and under varied conditions.

EUROPE DOWNSTREAM. By Leonard O. Mosley. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 330 p. $2.75.

A good job of reporting by an English journalist who was on hand to cover crucial events in Spain, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Danzig.

EUROPEAN JUNGLE. By F. Yeats-Brown. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1939, 409 p. $3.00.

Major Yeats-Brown is one of those who believe the worst of Communists and Soviet Russia and the best of Nazism and Fascism. His book, written before the present war, is thus an interesting if badly warped interpretation of recent European history.

L'ANNÉE DE MUNICH. By André Tardieu. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 252 p. Fr. 18.50.

Weekly pronouncements and admonitions by a well-known French politician.

VINGT ANS D'EUROPE: 1919–1939. By Charles d'Ydewalle. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 267 p. Fr. 18.

A readable if not profound narrative by a Belgian Catholic, in which the trees are clear but not the forest.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE BETWEEN TWO WARS. By Arnold Wolfers. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 467 p. $3.75.

A diplomatic history of the last twenty years — when the policies of the two countries were more often in conflict than in concert. There is a chronology and a selected bibliography. The author is professor of international relations at Yale.

MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK. By George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Peace Book Company, 1939, 219 p. 6/.

Two professors at the University of London seek to discover why international law is more honored in the breach than in the observance.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By George W. Keeton. London: Peace Book Company, 1939, 190 p. 7/6.

The Director of the New Commonwealth Institute analyzes the League's failure and suggests remedies.

LEGAL TECHNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Hans Kelsen. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1939, 178 p. 40 cents.

A jurist analyzes the mistakes made in drafting the League Covenant.

LA COMPETENZA A STIPULARE I TRATTATI NELLA STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI. By Giuseppe Vedovato. Florence: Le Monnier, 1939, 166 p. L. 20.

A closely reasoned legal monograph.

THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE. By Hermann Foertsch. New York: Veritas, 1940, 273 p. $2.75.

This book reveals, in a clear and concise form, the essential features of those German military doctrines which have led to the rapid succession of Nazi victories.

L'ÉCONOMIE DE GUERRE. By André Piatier. Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1939, 304 p. Fr. 31.50.

A study based on the voluminous German literature concerning *Wehrwirtschaft*.

AEROSPHERE, 1939. Edited by Glenn D. Angle. New York: Aircraft Publications, 1940, 1420 p. $15.00.

A massive compendium of information on the modern airplane.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1940. Edited by M. Epstein. London: Macmillan, 1940, 1488 p. $5.00.

The current issue of a famous annual.

General: Economic and Social

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD ECONOMIC HISTORY SINCE THE GREAT WAR. By J. P. Day. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 161 p. $1.15.

A succinct summary of "the economic damage caused by the Great War and of the subsequent progress toward recovery."

CAPITALISM THE CREATOR. By Carl Snyder. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 473 p. $3.75.

A vigorous and original defense of capitalism by a prominent statistician.

LES CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DES SANCTIONS. By Pierre Bartholin. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 200 p. Fr. 35.

An analysis dealing with both Italy and the League Powers.

LA POLITICA FINANZIARIA DEI GRANDI STATI DAL DOPOGUERRA AD OGGI. By Ernesto d'Albergo. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 277 p. L. 19.

Covers Italy, the United States, France and Britain.

CHING-CHI TUNG-YUAN YU TUNG-CHI CHING-CHI. By D. K. Lieu. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939, 172 p.

Essays on economic mobilization and controlled economy.

NATIONAL RESERVES FOR SAFETY AND STABILIZATION. By L. St. Clare Grondona. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 189 p. 7/6.

How to stabilize prices by a process involving the accumulation of large stocks of many primary products. Most economists will doubtless find the scheme somewhat naïve.

RAZMESHCHENIE TRANSPORTA V KAPITALISTICHESKIKH STRANAKH I V SSSR. By T. S. Khachaturov. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939, 719 p. $3.00.

A study of the transportation systems of Russia and other countries.

FARMWARD MARCH: CHEMURGY TAKES COMMAND. By William J. Hale. New York: Coward-McCann, 1939, 222 p. $2.00.

A challenging, but unbalanced and occasionally hysterical, description of the achievements of chemistry in the field of agriculture and of the future marvels they portend.

THE COD FISHERIES: THE HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY.

By Harold A. Innis. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940, 520 p. $3.50.

An important contribution to diplomatic and economic history.

I CARBURANTI SINTETICI NELL'ECONOMIA MONDIALE. By Virgilio Dagnino. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 265 p. L. 21.

A semi-technical treatment of an important economic problem.

I PORTI FRANCHI. By Bruno Minoletti. Turin: Einaudi, 1939, 199 p. L. 15.

The aims, functions and advantages of free ports.

PROBLÈMES DE GÉOGRAPHIE HUMAINE. By P. Deffontaines, M. Jean-Brunhes Delamarre, P. Bertoquy. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939, 235 p. Fr. 21.

Illuminating essays on man's relation to his environment.

PROBLEMI DEMOGRAFICI. By Felice Vinci. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1939, 228 p. L. 20.

Some twenty-four essays on population problems.

INTRODUCCIÓN A LA ECONOMÍA SOCIAL Y OTROS ENSAYOS SOCIO-ECONOMICOS. By Mariano Alcocer. Mexico City: Editorial "Helios," 1939, 209 p.

Various social and economic problems discussed by a Mexican professor.

ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM. By H. D. Dickinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 262 p. $3.25.

A technical discussion showing how a Socialist economy might be made to work. The author, a lecturer at the University of Leeds, seeks to answer many of the objections raised against Socialist theory by skeptical economists and by democrats fearing for the loss of individual freedom.

ÉTUDE SOCIALE COMPARÉE DES RÉGIMES DE LIBERTÉ ET DES RÉGIMES AUTORITAIRES. By Jean Lescure. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1939, 479 p. Fr. 80.

A manual, primarily for students, comparing the economic policies of Russia, Germany and Italy with those of France.

NÉO-LIBÉRALISME, NÉO-CORPORATISME, NÉO-SOCIALISME. By Gaétan Pirou. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 219 p. Fr. 20.

A readable survey of the literature on the subject.

PROBLÈMES SOCIAUX: RÉPONSES CHRÉTIENNES. By Cardinal Verdier. Paris: Plon, 1939, 182 p.

The rights and duties of the working class discussed by the late Archbishop of Paris.

JUDAÏSME ET MARXISME. By Louis Massoutié. Paris: Perrin, 1939, 219 p. Fr. 15.

Things would have been better if the Jews had not forsaken Judaism for Marxism.

RACISME ET CHRISTIANISME. By Mgr. Bressolles and Others. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 211 p. Fr. 19.

Essays by several Catholic writers, with a preface by Cardinal Baudrillart.

CHIESA E STATO. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1939, 2 v. L. 125.

Some thirty-five historical and legal monographs published in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Vatican Treaty between Italy and the Holy See.

The Second World War

WHY EUROPE FIGHTS. By Walter Millis. New York: Morrow, 1940, 283 p. $2.50.

The author of "The Road to War" retraces, in seven-league boots, the route that led Europe from the Treaty of Versailles to the Second World War. The present book, unlike the other, aims primarily at telling a story, not at proving a thesis.

THE STRATEGY OF TERROR. By Edmond Taylor. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 278 p. $2.50.

This is one of the most significant and revealing books yet published about the background of the present war. The author, who was head of the Paris bureau of the *Chicago Tribune* from 1933 to the end of 1939, made a habit of trying to discover and understand the psychological undercurrents which conditioned the diplomatic history of Europe from the summer of 1938 to the winter of 1940. He lays bare the technique by which the Nazis, employing all the weapons in the arsenal of psychological warfare, broke down the unity, the confidence and the will-to-resist of the French people before a single shot was fired along the Maginot Line. Though Mr. Taylor's analysis is confined largely to events in France, the Nazis' methods of disintegrating the morale of their enemies, as described by him, are of universal application.

THE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OF THE WAR. By H. A. L. Fisher and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 141 p. $2.00.

Essays by six prominent British scholars and political figures.

LES ORIGINES DE LA GUERRE DE 1939. By André Maurois. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 63 p. Fr. 7.50.

A lucid and brief account by a well-known French historian and publicist.

FRANCE AT WAR. By W. Somerset Maugham. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 111 p. $1.00.

An English novelist visited France before her collapse and returned with this poignant book intended to augment Anglo-French good will.

IST ENGLAND STARK GENUG? Edited by John Brech. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 67 p.

A number of essays pointing out the weaknesses in Britain's military and economic position in time of war. Though naturally written from the German point of view, these pages are, on the whole, sane and balanced.

HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR. By Evan F. M. Durbin. London: Routledge, 1939, 119 p. 3/6.

A brief but penetrating statement of the alternatives.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF A DURABLE PEACE. By J. E. Meade. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 192 p. $2.00.

Interesting suggestions as to how economic relations can be reëstablished between countries of widely differing types of state control over domestic economies.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS AND PEACE. Edited by Emanuel Moresco. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 345 p. $2.00.

Essays prepared before the outbreak of the war.

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. By Alfred M. Bingham. New York: Duell, 1940, 336 p. $2.50.

A blueprint for a federation including all of Europe except the Soviet Union, by the editor of *Common Sense*.

A FEDERATION FOR WESTERN EUROPE. By W. Ivor Jennings. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 208 p. $2.50.

A British lawyer's scheme which presupposes a British victory and a willingness on the part of continental Europe to accept British legal and political institutions as the basis for a federation of relatively liberal states.

The United States

DEFENSE FOR AMERICA. Edited by William Allen White. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 205 p. $1.00.

This apposite and sane little book of fifteen essays by as many authors — educators,

publicists, religious leaders, etc. — should go far to restore common sense to a public opinion confused by the counsels of complacency and defeatism.

THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR. By Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers, 1940, 309 p. $2.75.

The head of the Communist Party in the United States explains its position towards the current World War.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN INTERPRETATION. By Harold J. Laski. New York: Harper, 1940, 278 p. $2.50.

An analysis of the President's historical and constitutional rôle by the well-known English Socialist and authority on political science. One of the five chapters concerns the President's part in the conduct of our foreign relations.

WAR PROPAGANDA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Harold Lavine and James Wechsler. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 363 p. $2.75.

An inquiry into "propaganda" forces operating in this country during the opening months of the present war, undertaken for the Institute of Propaganda Analysis.

ONE MAN'S FIGHT FOR A BETTER NAVY. By Holden A. Evans. New York: Dodd, 1940, 393 p. $3.00.

Mr. Evans, who served in the American Navy until he could tolerate its bureaucratic inefficiency no longer, vigorously recounts his efforts to reform our naval administration.

GOVERNMENT PRICE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WORLD WAR. By Herbert Stein. Williamstown (Mass.): Williams College, 1939, 138 p. $2.00.

An historico-statistical analysis of American policy by a student in Williams College.

AMERICA REBORN: A PLAN FOR DECENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRY. By Ralph L. Woods. New York: Longmans, 1939, 376 p. $3.00.

A plea for wholesale economic and social reform.

THE FUTURE IS OURS. By Jay Franklin. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 208 p. 50 cents.

The Tennessee Valley Authority as an example of what the American people must do if they are going to survive as a nation.

PRODUCTIVITY, WAGES, AND NATIONAL INCOME. By Spurgeon Bell. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 344 p. $3.00.

A statistical study of trends during the last twenty years in the United States.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE. By Laurence F. Schmeckebier. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939, 479 p. $3.00.

A revised edition of an invaluable guide through the maze of material published by the United States Government.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY. By James L. McCamy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, 275 p. $2.50.

An important study dealing with the practices of various Federal agencies.

THOMAS RILEY MARSHALL, HOOSIER STATESMAN. By Charles M. Thomas, Oxford (Ohio): Mississippi Valley Press, 1939, 296 p. $3.00.

A pedestrian biography, useful because Marshall was Vice-President under Wilson.

ALASKA: ITS HISTORY, RESOURCES, GEOGRAPHY, AND GOVERNMENT. By Mariette Shaw Pilgrim. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1939, 296 p. $3.00.

An introduction to our Arctic territory.

Western Europe

COURAGE DE LA FRANCE. By Paul Reynaud. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 210 p. Fr. 16.

Fourteen speeches delivered on various occasions between November 1938 and May 1939 when Reynaud was Finance Minister. They are devoted largely to discussions of economic and financial reforms — reforms which Reynaud wanted made within the framework of the liberal system.

HISTOIRE DE DIX ANS 1927–1937. By Jean-Pierre Maxence. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 379 p. Fr. 30.

A pseudo-Fascist novelist and political writer interprets ten years of French history through its literary manifestations.

LAISSERONS-NOUS DÉMEMBRER LA FRANCE? By Henri de Kerillis and Raymond Cartier. Paris: "Nouvelle Revue Critique," 1939, 252 p. Fr. 12.

M. de Kerillis, now an exile in America, was a Rightist deputy and editor of *L'Epoque*, while M. Cartier is a French journalist of similar persuasions. In this forthright book, published before the outbreak of the war, they mince no words over the folly of French policies, domestic and foreign, and the dangers which Hitlerism, Munichism and Fifth Columnism represented for the safety of France. History has now put her own seal of approval on many of their warnings and predictions.

FRANCIA, LA SORELLASTRA. By Silvio Maurano. Milan: Ceschina, 1939, 267 p. L. 10.

Two thousand years of French wrongs against Italy.

PLEINS POUVOIRS. By Jean Giraudoux. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 212 p. Fr. 18.

A singularly lucid and critical examination of certain French problems — such as population, urbanization and public works — by a prominent playwright and novelist, who in the early months of the war was in charge of France's central propaganda office. His plan for the country's moral regeneration through internal and imperial development presupposed France's surrendering her European mission, and thus represents a form of French isolationism.

LES EXPORTATIONS DE LA FRANCE ET LES NOUVEAUX PAYS INDUSTRIELS. By Claire Pohly. Geneva: Georg, 1939, 138 p. Swiss Fr. 4.

A statistical monograph.

L'AVENIR DÉMOGRAPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE. By Pierre-François Legasse. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1939, 279 p. Fr. 50.

A summary of the available data on the birth rate of France and allied problems.

STORIA DI CORSICA. By Mario Monterisi. Milan: Bocca, 1939, 166 p. L. 10.

This brief summary naturally emphasizes the *italianità* of Corsica.

L'UNITÉ ALLEMANDE, 1806–1938. By Pierre Benaerts. Paris: Colin, 1939, 224 p. Fr. 15.

A handy précis of German history since Napoleon.

THE COST OF THE WORLD WAR TO GERMANY AND TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. By Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940, 192 p. $2.50.

A supplementary volume in the "Economic and Social History of the World War," dealing exclusively with the period of actual hostilities.

L'ALLEMAGNE. Volumes I and II. By Jacques Bainville. Paris: Plon, 1939, Fr. 50.

Collected essays (1911–36) by the late royalist historian.

LES ALLEMAGNES: REFLEXIONS SUR LA GUERRE ET SUR LA PAIX (1918–1939). By Henri Berr. Paris: Michel, 1939, 256 p. Fr. 18.

Well-intentioned but somewhat muddle-headed clichés.

D'OÙ VIENT L'ALLEMAGNE? By Gonzague de Reynold. Paris: Plon, 1939, 238 p. Fr. 20.

An explanation of Hitler in terms of German geography, psychology and history.

GERMAN ECONOMY 1870–1940. By Gustav Stolper. New York: Reynal, 1940, 290 p. $3.00.

No one is better qualified to interpret the economic history of modern Germany than Dr. Stolper, founder and for many years editor of the *Deutsche Volkswirt* and member of the Reichstag under the Weimar Republic. He combines a meticulous scholarship and a journalist's feeling for readability with a keen political sense. Dr. Stolper's account shows clearly that the trend towards state control over economic life was already well advanced in Germany by 1914 and that the First World War and its aftermath so accelerated the process that it was nearly completed when Hitler took power.

THE REAL RULERS OF GERMANY. By Hans Behrend. London: Lawrence, 1939, 231 p. 3/6.

A Leftist attempt to prove that Hitler is a mere puppet of the big industrialists and bankers, interesting chiefly because of its naïveté. For instance, Fritz Thyssen, now a fugitive from Germany, is here listed among that country's "Real Rulers."

HITLER GERMANY AS SEEN BY A FOREIGNER. By Cesare Santoro. Berlin: Internationaler Verlag, 1939, 584 p.

Facts, figures and photographs exalting Nazi achievements.

THE GERMANS AND THE JEWS. By F. R. Bienenfeld. London: Secker and Warburg, 1939, 265 p. 7/6.

On the whole, a dispassionate and comprehensive explanation of the age-old incompatibility of the Jewish and German peoples.

SIX YEARS OF HITLER: THE JEWS UNDER THE NAZI RÉGIME. By G. Warburg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 317 p. 7/6.

A record of the facts.

GESTAPO. By Philip St. C. Walton-Kerr. London: Hale, 1939, 286 p. 10/6.

A rather amateurish, and in places unreliable, description of Germany's secret police.

NEMESIS? THE STORY OF OTTO STRASSER. By Douglas Reed. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 275 p. $2.75.

One of Britain's more irrepressible journalists writes about Otto Strasser: his career, his philosophy, and his rôle in Hitler's expected (by Mr. Reed) downfall.

THE SAAR PLEBISCITE. By Sarah Wambaugh. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 489 p. $5.00.

A definitive history by the outstanding authority on plebiscites, who was a member of the Saar Plebiscite Commission.

GUSTAV STRESEMANN: HIS DIARIES, LETTERS, AND PAPERS. Volume III. Edited and Translated by Eric Sutton. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 636 p. $6.50.

In this concluding volume of an important historical collection the story is carried from the famous Thoiry meeting with Briand in September 1926 to Stresemann's death.

GERMANY AND HER JEWS. By Sidney Osborne. London: Soncino, 1939, 358 p. 10/6.

The factual record of the Jewish contribution to German culture. Most of the book consists of brief biographies of outstanding German Jews, including Richard Wagner!

LE DOCTEUR SCHACHT. By Henri Bertrand. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 222 p.

A friendly and readable review of a notable career.

L'AUTRICHE SOUFFRANTE. By P. Chaillet. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939, 128 p. Fr. 12.

A concise and on the whole sound history of Austria from Dollfuss through the Anschluss. Though the book bears the *nihil obstat* of the Jesuits, it is critical of some of the policies of the Church.

SWISS-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By Dorothy Grant Jacquelin. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1939, 295 p. 80 cents.

In addition to the subject indicated in the title, this documented study contains a comprehensive description of Switzerland's economic development.

PRESENTO IL MIO TICINO. By Giuseppe Zoppi. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 216 p. L. 18.

A delightfully illustrated introduction to Switzerland's Italian canton.

PRE-FASCIST ITALY. By Margot Hentze. New York: Norton, 1939, 400 p. $4.25.

An interpretation of the history of Italy from 1870 to 1920 in terms of the failure of liberal institutions. There are some fifty pages of notes in the appendix.

STORIA DEL FASCISMO. By Francesco Ercole. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 2 v. L. 10.

A convenient manual by a former Minister of Education.

ECONOMIA POLITICA CORPORATIVA. By Francesco Vito. Milan: Giuffrè, 1939, 243 p. L. 25.

The theory, with particular application to Italy.

O CORPORATIVISMO FASCISTA. By António de Castro Fernandez. Lisbon: Imperio, 1938, 297 p. Esc. 15.

A friendly analysis of the Italian corporative state, more concerned with its legal structure than its actual operation.

REALTÀ STORICHE. By Roberto Farinacci. Cremona: "Cremona Nuova," 1939, 169 p. L. 5.

Seven speeches and essays dealing principally with international relations and the Jewish Question, by a former Secretary-General of the Fascist Party, a proponent of the Axis and leading anti-Semite.

RAZZISMO FASCISTA. By Giuseppe L. Omarini. Florence: Vallecchi, 1939, 166 p. L. 8.

An attempt to provide a *raison d'être* for Mussolini's "Aryan" policy.

SCRITTI E DISCORSI. DAL GIUGNO 1938 AL 18 NOVEMBRE 1939. By Benito Mussolini. Milan: Hoepli, 1939, 346 p. L. 15.

The latest volume in the "definitive edition" of il Duce's pronouncements.

LA POLITICA DELLA SANTA SEDE. By Mario Bendiscioli. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1939, 190 p. L. 10.

A competent survey of the Vatican's policies since the First World War.

ITALIA MISSIONARIA. By Padre G. B. Tragella. Rome: "Italica Gens," 1939, 370 p.

A detailed description of Italian missionary activities in Africa and Asia.

FREEDOM'S BATTLE. By J. Alvarez del Vayo. New York: Knopf, 1940, 381 p. $3.00.

This important book on the Spanish Civil War by the former Foreign Minister of the Republic is not only a valuable source of information on all aspects of that conflict but stands as a testament of faith in the Loyalist cause and an indictment of the suicidal shortsightedness of French and British policy.

LA GUERRA CIVILE IN SPAGNA. By General Francesco Belforte. Milan: Instituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1938–39, 4 v. L. 83.

A semi-official Italian history of the origins and causes of the Spanish Civil War. The information about Fascist intervention, to which two volumes are devoted, is of particular importance. There are numerous illustrations, maps and charts.

LA GUERRA DE ESPAÑA (1936–1939). By Carlos A. Gómez. Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1939, 2 v.

These comments on the military operations in Spain were originally published in *La Nacion* of Buenos Aires by an Argentine General Staff officer. There are a hundred sketch maps.

VENTI MESI DI GUERRA IN SPAGNA (LUGLIO 1936–FEBBRAIO 1938). By Emilio Faldella. Florence: Le Monnier, 1939, 514 p. L. 40.

A pedestrian account of the military operations.

HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By Robert Brasillach and Maurice Bardèche. Paris: Plon, 1939, 442 p. Fr. 30.

The authors of this meandering work are too partial to Franco to write history.

LES ESPAGNOLS ET LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By General Duval. Paris: Plon, 1939, 238 p. Fr. 18.

A French officer describes some of the later stages of the Civil War and seeks to persuade his countrymen of the justice of Franco's cause.

EL NUEVO ESTADO ESPAÑOL. By Juan Beneyto Pérez. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1939, 241 p. Ptas. 7.

National-Syndicalist doctrine and its relation to other philosophies.

LA SPAGNA DI FRANCO. By Concetto Pettinato. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 210 p. L. 13.

A Fascist journalist reports on the "New Spain."

DOCTRINE AND ACTION: INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW PORTUGAL, 1928–1939. By Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. London: Faber, 1939, 399 p. 10/6.

Selected addresses by the Prime Minister of Portugal.

PORTUGAL ANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL DE ESPAÑA: DOCUMENTOS Y NOTAS. By the Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional. Lisbon: Costa Carregal, 1939, 133 p.

An official statement on behalf of the Portuguese Government.

Eastern Europe

THE IMPERIAL SOVIETS. By Henry C. Wolfe. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 294 p. $2.50.

Recent Soviet foreign policy interpreted as the opening phase of a campaign to extend Russia's territorial conquests over large parts of Europe and Asia.

IZBRANNYE STATYI I RECHI, 1911–1937. By G. K. Ordzhonikidze. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 526 p. $1.25.

Speeches and articles by the late Commissar, a close collaborator of Stalin.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE. By Leonard E. Hubbard. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 315 p. $4.00.

Another good book on Soviet economic life by an authority in that field.

EKONOMIKA, ORGANIZATSIYA I TEKHNIKA VNESHNEI TORGOVLI LESOM. By S. A. Reynberg. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1939, 408 p. $1.50.

The economics, organization and technique of the international lumber trade.

BOLSHEVISTSKAYA PECHAT. By K. Omelchenko. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 104 p. 15 cents.

A popular account of the organization and development of the Soviet press.

HAMMER, SICKLE AND BATON. By Heinz Unger. London: Cresset, 1939, 275 p. 8/6.

A German orchestra conductor describes the Soviet Government's efforts to create a "revolutionary" music. An illuminating case study of the fate of the creative arts under a totalitarian dictatorship.

YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH SVERDLOV. VOSPOMINANIYA. By K. T. Sverdlova. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 133 p. 30 cents.

Recollections of an early Bolshevist leader, by his widow.

IZ DNEVNIKA. By F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 126 p. 30 cents.

Extracts from the diary of the founder of the Cheka.

LIETUVOS KARIUOMENE. Kaunas: Išleido Sąjunga Ginkluotomas Krašto Pajégomas Remti, 1938, 77 p.

An illustrated description of the organization and equipment of the Lithuanian Army.

KEEPERS OF THE BALTIC GATES. By John Gibbons. London: Hale, 1939, 253 p. 10/6.

Travels through the Baltic republics, now deceased.

THE MIRRORS OF VERSAILLES. By Elisabeth Kyle. London: Constable, 1939, 345 p. 10/.

A chatty pilgrimage through Hungary, Rumania, Bosnia, Bohemia and Latvia.

IS POLAND LOST? By Philip Paneth. London: Nicholson, 1939, 253 p. 6/.

Concerning the Poles' struggle for national independence, especially before and during the First World War.

CONSEGUENZE ECONOMICHE DELLE MUTAZIONI TERRITORIALI NELL'EUROPA CENTRALE. By Lello Gangemi. Naples: Jovene, 1939, 111 p. L. 18.

A professor of finance in the University of Naples traces the effects of the Central European boundary changes of 1938–39 upon the economies of the nations concerned.

JUGOSLAVIA D'OGGI. By Ugo Cuesta. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 188 p. L. 10.

Political, social, economic and cultural matters pleasantly discussed.

ALBANIA. Vol. I. Venice: Istituto di Studi Adriatici, 1939, 270 p. L. 15.

A survey of Albanian history, economics, culture, etc.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. MILITARY OPERATIONS, FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1917. Compiled by Captain Cyril Falls. New York: Macmillan, 1940, xxxix+586 p. $7.85.

This volume covers the first five months of 1917, including the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras. There is a separate box of maps and an appendix volume (158 pages) of documents.

BRITAIN. By E. H. Carr. New York: Longmans, 1939, 196 p. $2.00.

A review and trenchant criticism of British foreign policy from 1918 to July 1939, by the Wilson Professor of International Politics in the University College of Wales.

L'ANGLETERRE MAÎTRESSE DES DESTINÉES FRANÇAISES. By E. Morand. Paris: Éditions du Colombier, 1939, 303 p. Fr. 18.

History searched for evidence to prove that the enemy of France is England.

MY FIGHT TO REARM BRITAIN. By Viscount Rothermere. London: Eyre, 1939, 190 p. 5/.

A British press lord reviews one of his campaigns.

A PACIFIST IN TROUBLE. By William Ralph Inge. London: Putnam, 1939, 332 p. 7/6.

A number of essays, originally published during 1938 and 1939, in which the gloomy Dean opposed war with Germany.

THE SUN NEVER SETS. By Malcolm Muggeridge. New York: Random House, 1940, 393 p. $3.00.

Witty, disillusioned, fragmentary animadversions on the state — and decline — of England during the decade just closed.

GREAT BRITAIN: AN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION. By Albert Viton. New York: Day, 1940, 352 p. $3.00.

A penetrating, critical survey of the morphology, physiology and pathology of the British Empire, useful alike to general reader and student. Mr. Viton examines the political and economic relations of Britain not only to the Colonies, the Dominions, the Indian Empire and the British Mandates, but to the "Outer Empire" (*e.g.* Egypt, Tibet, the Portuguese Colonies) and the "Financial Empire" (*e.g.* Scandinavia).

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: ITS STRUCTURE, ITS UNITY, ITS STRENGTH. By Stephen Leacock, New York: Dodd, 1940, 263 p. $2.00.

The well-known Canadian economist and humorist looks at the Empire and finds it not only good but durable.

LES RAPPORTS COMMERCIAUX DE L'ANGLETERRE AVEC SES DOMINIONS. By Pierre Agopian. Paris: Librairie Sociale et Économique, *1939*, *166* p.

A study covering the last century.

CANADA: AMERICA'S PROBLEM. By John MacCormac. New York: Viking, 1940, 287 p. $2.75.

A thoroughly competent survey of Canada's political and economic problems and their relation to the United States, particularly during and after the present war. Mr. MacCormac was for many years correspondent of *The New York Times* in Canada.

CANADA, EUROPE, AND HITLER. By Watson Kirkconnell. New York: Oxford University Press, *1939*, *213* p. $1.50.

A rapid survey of Central and Eastern European problems, followed by a detailed examination of opinion regarding them among the various racial groups in Canada.

THE BANK OF CANADA. By Milton L. Stokes. Toronto: Macmillan, 1939, 382 p. $4.00.

A scholarly treatise on the development of central banking in Canada.

NEWFOUNDLAND. By R. H. Tait. New York: Newfoundland Information Bureau, 1939, 260 p. $2.50.

A handbook containing information of all sorts about Britain's oldest colony.

WAR-TIME ECONOMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUSTRALIA. By E. Ronald Walker. Melbourne: University Press, *1939*, *174* p. 5/.

How to organize the "real," as opposed to the "financial," resources of Australia.

THE SCANDINAVIANS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC. By J. Lyng. Melbourne: University Press, 1939, 207 p. 7/6.

A study in colonization and adaptation.

MAHATMA GANDHI: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS ON HIS LIFE AND WORK. Edited by S. Radharkrishnan. New York: Macmillan, *1939*, *382* p. $2.75.

Fifty-nine essays by men of widely varying religious, national and social backgrounds, written in honor of the Indian leader's seventieth birthday.

CHANGING INDIA. Edited by Raja Rao and Iqbal Singh. London: Allen and Unwin, *1939*, *271* p. 5/.

An anthology of some twenty representative Indian writers on social, political and cultural questions.

The Near East

ORIENTAL ASSEMBLY. By T. E. Lawrence. Edited by A. W. Lawrence. New York: Dutton, *1940*, *291* p. $3.00.

Miscellaneous writings, profusely illustrated. The editor, a brother of "T. E.," states that this book completes the publication of Lawrence's literary residue.

THE NEW SPIRIT IN ARAB LANDS. By H. I. Katibah. New York: The Author, *1940*, *320* p. $3.00.

Interesting and penetrating chapters on various aspects of the political, economic and cultural life of the Arab countries. There is a critical bibliography.

STORIA DEL NAZIONALISMO ARABO. By Francesco Cataluccio. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 333 p. L. 18.

A useful summary of recent history and current trends.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF PALESTINE. Edited by Sa'id B. Himadeh. Beirut: American Press, 1938, 602 p. 12/9.

An exhaustive survey, strictly factual and statistical.

Africa

AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. Edited by M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 296 p. $4.00.

An important comparative study of native institutions.

EGITTO MODERNO. By Angelo Sammarco and Others. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1939, 167 p. L. 10.

History, economic and political problems, and culture.

DESERTO: DA ASMARA A TRIPOLI IN AUTOMOBILE. By Franco Pattarino. Milan: "La Prora," 1938, 253 p. L. 12.

Journey through the back door of Egypt. Many illustrations.

VARIAZIONI TERRITORIALI NELL'A.O. DAL 1880 AL 1938. By Manlio Magini. Florence: Cya, 1939, 112 p. L. 10.

The diplomatic history behind boundary changes in and around Ethiopia.

L'ISTITUTO GEOGRAFICO MILITARE IN AFRICA ORIENTALE — 1885–1937. Florence: Istituto Geografico Militare, 1939, 245 p.

Profusely illustrated with photographs and folded-in maps.

LA CAMPAGNA 1935–36 IN AFRICA ORIENTALE. Vol. I. Rome: Tipografia Regionale for the Ministero della Guerra, 1939, 350 p. L. 20.

This volume covers the background and early preparations for the Ethiopian War. Documents fill about half the book.

PROSPETTIVE DI COLONIZZAZIONE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA. By Vincenzo Rivera. Rome: Libreria di Scienze, 1939, 126 p. L. 16.

An examination into the conditions governing white colonization in Ethiopia.

CAMMINI DEL SUD. By Fernando Gori. Milan: "La Prora," 1939, 318 p. L. 15.

Pen pictures of Fascist activities in Libya.

The Far East

QUESTIONS DU PACIFIQUE. Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale, 1939, 239 p.

Essays by seven experts of various nationality.

L'EUROPE EN ASIE. By Claude Farrère. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 102 p. Fr. 8.

A French novelist assails Chiang Kai-shek as a servant of the Comintern and urges the democracies to come to terms with Japan.

SHANGHAI AND TIENTSIN. By F. C. Jones. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 182 p. $2.00.

The history, legal status and economic life of the foreign concessions in China described in scholarly detail.

LE MOUVEMENT COMMUNISTE EN CHINE: DES ORIGINES À NOS JOURS. By Paul Simon. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 254 p. Fr. 30.

The author, a Belgian professor, is unable to give an objective account because of his great dislike for both the Bolsheviks and Chiang Kai-shek.

INNER ASIAN FRONTIERS OF CHINA. By Owen Lattimore. New York: American Geographical Society, 1940, 585 p. $4.00.

A work of fundamental importance summarizing the essence of many years of investigation concerning the history and human geography of China's hinterland.

L'UTILISATION DU SOL EN INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE. By Pierre Gourou. Paris: Centre d'Études de Politique Etrangère, 1940, 455 p. 50 Fr.

A detailed technical study with many charts and maps.

SIAM IN TRANSITION. By Kenneth Perry Landon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, 323 p. $2.50.

A summary of recent political, economic and cultural trends.

ORIENTACIONES DIPLOMATICAS. By José López del Castillo. Manila: Author, 1939, 354 p. $3.50.

Essays on the international position of the Philippines.

Latin America

THE ALL-AMERICAN FRONT. By Duncan Aikman. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 344 p. $3.00.

This is one of the sanest and most illuminating books written on Latin America in many a year. Getting below the surface, Mr. Aikman investigates the many economic, social and psychological differences which separate the United States from its southern neighbors and which distinguish those countries from each other. The "Hemisphere Defense" edition of this realistic book is especially to be recommended.

NUESTRO BELICE. By David Vela. Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1939, 195 p.

Historical evidence that British Honduras rightfully belongs to Guatemala.

ANTOLOGIA DEL CANAL (BODAS DE PLATA), 1914–1939. Edited by Octavio Méndez Pereira. Panama: The Star and Herald, 1939, 157 p.

Collected essays and documents concerning the Panama Canal.

O BRASIL NA ECONOMIA MUNDIAL. By José Jobim. Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Estudos Economicos, 1939, 264 p. Milreis 18.

A compendium of statistical information.

SETE ANOS DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL (ASPECTOS PRINCIPAIS) 1930–1937. By Jayme de Barros. Rio de Janeiro: Nacional, 1938, 119 p.

An officially sponsored review of recent Brazilian foreign policy.

ARGENTINE. By Carlos L. van Bellinghen. Brussels: Lesigne, 1939, 483 p.

A documented, statistical compendium on all aspects of Argentine life.

LA DEFENSA DEL VALOR HUMANO. By Alfredo L. Palacios. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1939, 537 p.

The progress of social legislation in Argentina as reflected in the parliamentary career of its greatest advocate.

PRINCIPIOS Y ORIENTACIONES. By Carlos M. Noel. Buenos Aires: Gleizer, 1939, 277 p.

Essays and lectures by an Argentine scholar and deputy. The second half of the book is devoted to a discussion of Argentina's foreign and military policies.

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF BOLIVIA. Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1940, 253 p.

A scholarly study by a professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh.

ECUADOR, THE UNKNOWN. By Victor Wolfgang von Hagen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 296 p. $3.50.

An exciting account of two and one-half years spent in various parts of the republic including the Galapagos Islands.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

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AGRICULTURE

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INTERNATIONAL Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, 1939–40. Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1940.

THE WORLD agricultural situation in 1938–39. Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1940.

WORLD trade in agricultural products. Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1940.

ALIENS

AN ACT to prohibit certain subversive activities; to amend certain provisions of law with respect to the admission and deportation of aliens; to require the fingerprinting and registration of aliens; and for other purposes. Approved, June 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 7 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 670, 76th Cong.; H. R. 5138; "Alien Registration Act, 1940.")

CHILDREN

CHILD welfare information centre. Summary of the legislative and administrative series of documents of the Child Welfare Information Centre published in 1939. Geneva, 1940. 77 p. 21¼ cm. (League of Nations, C.12.M.10.1940.IV.1.)

COLOMBIA

MENSAJES del Presidente López al Congreso Nacional, 1934–38. Bogota, Imprenta Nacional, 1939, 334 p.

LA POLITICA internacional; discursos mensajes, cablegramas y otros documentos del Presidente López sobre asuntos internacionales. Bogota, Imprenta Nacional, 1938, 295 p.

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REPORT of M. Carl Burckhardt, High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig. Geneva, 1940. 16 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.42.M.38.1940.VII.1.)

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JOINT resolution to authorize the postponement of payment of amounts payable to the United States by the Republic of Finland on its indebtedness under agreements between that Republic and the United States dated May 1, 1923, and May 23, 1932. Approved, June 15, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public resolution, No. 84, 76th Cong.; S. J. Res. 272.)

GUATEMALA — GREAT BRITAIN

CONTINUACION del libro blanco; Controversia entre Guatemala y la Gran Bretaña relativa a la convencion de 1859, sobre asuntos territoriales; Cuestion de Belice. Guatemala, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1939, 4 pts.

HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

JOINT RESOLUTION to authorize the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to assist the governments of American republics to increase their military and naval establishments, and for other purposes. Approved, June 15, 1940. Washington, 1940. (Public Resolution, No. 83, 76th Cong.; H. J. Res. 367.)

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INDIA and the war. Communiqué issued by the Governor-General and resolutions by the Indian National Congress, the All-India Moslem League and the Chamber of Princes. London, 1940. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6196.) 2d.

INTER-AMERICAN BANK

CONVENTION for the establishment of an Inter-American bank [Proposed Charter, By-Laws.] Washington, 1940. 43 p. 28cm. (Texts in Spanish and English.)

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AMERICAN delegations to international conferences, congresses and expositions and American representation on international institutions and commissions with relevant data. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1939. Washington, 1940. 192 p. (Department of State Publication, No. 1453, Conference Series No. 45.) 25c.

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ARRANGEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Japanese Government relating to local issues at Tientsin, June 19, 1940. London, 1940. 3 p. 24½ cm. (China No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6212.) 1d.

LABOR

THE I. L. O. Year-book, 1939-40. Tenth year of issue. Geneva, 1940. 345 p. 23 cm. (International Labour Office.)

METHODS of collaboration between the public authorities, workers' organisations and employers' organisations. Geneva, 1940. xii, 346 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

METHODS of family living studies, income, expenditure, consumption, by Robert Morse Woodbury. Geneva, 1940. viii, 144 p. 23 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series N (Statistics) No. 23.)

RECOMMENDATIONS and draft conventions adopted at Geneva, June 8 to 28, 1939. Message from the President of the United States transmitting recommendations and draft conventions adopted by the International Labour Organization of which the United States is a member at its twenty-fifth session held at Geneva, June 8 to 28, 1939. Washington, 1940. 53 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 841, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

LATIN AMERICA

THE FOREIGN trade of Latin America. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1940. 3 pts.

MEXICO — OIL

STANDARD oil company. Denials of justice; a memorandum on the decision of the Mexican Supreme Court of Dec. 2, 1939; the full text of the decision. N. Y., 1940. 167 p.

THE TRUE facts about the expropriation of the oil companies' properties in Mexico. Mexico City, Government of Mexico, 1940. 271 p. 22½ cm.

MONEY AND BANKING

ECONOMIC Intelligence Service. Money and banking 1939/40. Volume I. Monetary review. Geneva, 1940. 101 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1940.II.A.2.)

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The principal acts of Congress are listed, bills and reports being omitted.

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the Military and Naval Establishments, Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, and for other purposes. Approved, February 12, 1940. Washington, 1940. 14 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 415, 76th Cong.; H. R. 7805; "Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1940.")

AN ACT making appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, to provide supplemental appropriations for such fiscal year, and for other purposes. Approved April 6, 1940. Washington, 1940. 25 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 447, 76th Cong.; H. R. 8641; "First Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1940.")

AN ACT making appropriations for the Military Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved June 13, 1940. Washington, 1940. 33 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 611, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9209; "Military Appropriation Act, 1941.")

AN ACT to establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes. Approved, June 14, 1940. Washington, 1940. 3 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 629, 76th Cong.; H. R. 8026.)

AN ACT to authorize the construction or acquisition of naval aircraft, the construction of certain public works, and for other purposes. Approved, June 15, 1940. Washington, 1940. 2 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 635, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9848.)

AN ACT providing for the reorganization of Navy Department, and for other purposes. Approved June 20, 1940. Washington, 1940. 3 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 644, 76th Cong.; S. 4026.)

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the national defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved, June 26, 1940. Washington, 1940. 14 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 667, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10055; "First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941.")

AN ACT to expedite national defense, and for other purposes. Approved, June 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 9 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 671, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9822.)

AN ACT to amend the Act relating to preventing the publication of inventions in the national interest, and for other purposes. Approved, July 1, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 700, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10058.)

AN ACT to expedite the strengthening of the national defense. Approved, July 2, 1940. Washington, 1940. 3 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 703, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9850.)

AN ACT to establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes. Approved July 19, 1940. Washington, 1940. (Public, No. 757, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10100.)

AN ACT making appropriations for the Navy Department and the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved June 11, 1940. Washington, 1940. 37 p. 23 cm. (Public No. 588, 76th Cong.; H. R. 8438.)

NEUTRALITY

DECREES and regulations on neutrality transmitted to the Pan American Union by the member governments pursuant to resolution I of the Meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the American republics held at Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939. Supplement No. 2. Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 63 num. 1. 27 cm. (Law and Treaty Series No. 14.)

JOINT RESOLUTION to amend section 4 of Public Resolution Numbered 54, approved November 4, 1939, entitled "Joint resolution to preserve the neutrality and the peace of the United States and to secure the safety of its citizens and their interests." Approved, June 26, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public Resolution, No. 87, 76th Cong.; S. J. Res. 279.)

OPIUM

ADVISORY committee on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Revised list drawn up by the sub-committee of experts of drugs, preparations and proprietary medicines coming under the Hague (1912) and Geneva (1925), Opium Conventions and the Limitation Convention (Geneva, 1931). Geneva, 1939. 149 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.348.M.263.1939.XI.1940.XI.1.)

PANAMA CONFERENCE

REPORT of the Delegate of the United States of America to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held at Panamá September 23–October 3, 1939. Washington, 1940. 81 p. 23 cm. (Department of State Publication No. 1451, Conference Series, No. 44.) 15c.

RURAL LIFE, EUROPEAN

EUROPEAN Conference on Rural Life. National monographs drawn up by governments. BULGARIA. Geneva, 1940. 59 p., illus. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.233.M.159.1939.Conf.E.V.R. 29.)

——. ——. POLAND. Geneva, 1940. 44 p., illus. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.359.M.272.1939. Conf.E.V.R.30.)

SABOTAGE CLAIMS

MIXED claims commission. United States and Germany. Opinions and decisions in the sabotage claims handed down June 15, 1939, and October 30, 1939 and appendix. Washington, [1940] 324 p. 23 cm.

SECOND WORLD WAR

ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE

URUGUAY. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores. Antecedentes relativos al hundimiento del acorazado "Admiral Graf Spee" y la internacion del barco mercante "Tacoma." Montevideo, "El Siglo Ilustrado," 1940. 90 p.

THE BATTLE of the River Plate; an account of events before, during and after the action up to the self-destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee . . . London, 1940. 13 p. maps. 24½ cm.

Atrocities

LES ATROCITÉS Allemandes en Pologne. Témoignages et documents. Antonina Vallentin. Paris, Robert Denoël [1940.] 78 p. 20 cm.

Belligerent Regulations

AN ACT to confer certain powers upon the Governor in Council in the event of war, invasion or insurrection. Ottawa, Acland, [1939.] 3 p. (War Measures Act.)

PROCLAMATIONS and Orders in Council, passed under the authority of the War Measures Act . . . Volume 1. Ottawa, Patenaude, 1940. 237 p.

Finland

DOCUMENTS sur les relations finno-soviétiques. (Automne 1939.) Paris, Flammarion, 1940. 211 p. 19 cm. (Publication du ministère des affaires étrangères de Finlande.)

THE FINNISH blue book . . . and the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, published for the Ministry for foreign affairs of Finland. New York, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940. 120 p. 20½ cm. map.

Germany

100 DOKUMENTE des krieges, auswahl dem amtlichen deutschen weissbuch [Nr. 2]. Berlin, Deutscher verlag [1939?] 254 p. (Auswärtiges Amt.)

DOCUMENTS on the events preceding the outbreak of the war, compiled and published by the German Foreign Office. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. 549 p. 22 cm. [No. 2.]

POLNISCHE dokumente zur vorgeschichte des krieges. Erste folge. Berlin, Gedruckt im Deutschen Verlag, 1940. (Auswärtiges Amt. 1940 Nr. 3.) 40 p. 29 cm. American version:

THE GERMAN white paper. Full text of the Polish documents and the report on American Ambassador Bullitt's war attitude. Foreword by C. Hartley Grattan. New York, Howell, Soskin & Co., 1940. 72 p. 28 cm. $1.00.

DOKUMENTE zur kriegsausweitungspolitik der westmächte und generalstabsbesprechungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1940. (Auswärtiges Amt. 1940 Nr. 5.) Published June 29, 1940.

POLITISCHE geheimdokumente des französischer generalstabs über die britisch-französische pläne zur niederwerfung Deutschlands. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1940. (Auswärtiges Amt. 1940 Nr. 6.) Published July 3, 1940.

Italy — United Kingdom

CORRESPONDENCE with the Italian Government regarding the exercise by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of their belligerent rights at sea. Rome, March 3/19, 1940. London, 1940. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Italy No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6191.) 2d.

Norway

[NORWAY. Ministry for foreign affairs.] The German aggression of Norway. Authorised English translation of the White Paper issued by the Norwegian Government on April 14, 1940. London, 1940. 7 p. 1d.

—— ——. Traduction française autorisée du Livre blanc publiée par le Gouvernement norvégien le 14 avril, 1940. L'agression allemande en Norvége. (Londres), printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery office (1940). 8 p. 21 cm.

DOKUMENTE zur englisch-französischen Politik der Kriegsausweitung. Berlin, Reichsdruckerei (1940). (Auswärtiges Amt. 1940 Nr. 4.) Published April 27, 1940. American edition as:

BRITAIN'S designs on Norway. Full text of white book no. 4 published by the German Foreign office. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. xxxiii, 68, 62 p. 62 facsimile p. 26½ cm.

Poland

LES RELATIONS polono-allemandes et polono-soviétiques au cours de la période 1933-39; recueil de documents officiels. Paris, Flammarion, 1940. 252 p. 25½ cm. (At head of title: République de Pologne, Ministère des affaires étrangères.)

THAILAND — UNITED KINGDOM

TREATY of non-aggression between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the King of Thailand, Bangkok, June 12, 1940 . . . London, 1940. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Thailand No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6211.) 1d.

An identic treaty was signed with France.

TREATIES

REFERENCE manual of Latin American commercial treaties. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1940. 281 p. 24 cm.